PEOPLE OF MI V CRAIG L MOONEY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 11, 2003
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 236424
Livingston Circuit Court
LC No. 01-012086-FC
CRAIG MOONEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Talbot and Borrello, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his convictions by a jury of two counts of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct (CSC I) using a knife,1 MCL 750.520b(1)(E), and one count of assault
with a dangerous weapon, MCL 750.82. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms of
thirteen to twenty years’ imprisonment for the CSC I convictions and one to four years’
imprisonment for the assault conviction. We affirm.
I. Facts
The trial occurred in March and April of 2001. Robert Abbo testified that the victim,
Claudia Mooney, entered his Mobil gas station during the early morning hours of December 15,
2000, with a bruised and bloody face. Abbo testified that Mooney was shaking, seemed “very
upset and scared,” and asked to call the police because her husband (defendant) had “beat her
up.”
Mooney testified that she married defendant in 1997 and that their relationship began
deteriorating when defendant lost his business in 2000. She stated that defendant was upset
about losing the business, that he began using alcohol and cocaine, and that he accused her of
having extramarital affairs. Mooney denied having been unfaithful during her marriage.
Mooney further testified as follows: On, December 14, 2000, she returned home from
work to find defendant upset and wanting drugs. She agreed to drive him to his drug supplier
1
The felony information charged defendant with one count of digital/vaginal penetration and one
count of foreign object/vaginal penetration.
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because he had been drinking alcohol and she did not want him to drive while drunk. After
returning home around 9:00 p.m., she told defendant that she had an appointment the following
morning to look at a new apartment for herself. Defendant then asked her to “get out,” but she
had nowhere to go because her family lives in Germany. She finally left and checked into a
nearby motel. Defendant called her at the motel around 4:30 a.m., screamed at her, and told her
that she needed to get their dogs and her possessions from the house because he was going to
“blow it up.”
Mooney testified that she returned to the house, put the dogs into her vehicle, and was
going back inside the house to get some things when defendant pulled her coat and told her that
she was not going to leave. She stated that he had a knife, that he began accusing her again of
infidelity, and that he wanted her to admit to having had affairs. She stated that she wrote down
some make-believe stories about affairs just to calm him down and that defendant then began
punching her. According to Mooney, defendant then directed her to remove her clothes, after
which he forced apart her legs and forced a dildo inside her vagina, asking her “if that’s how it
felt when I had sex with all those other men.” She admitted that she and defendant had used the
dildo for consensual sex in the past. She testified that he repeated the assault with the dildo at a
later point on the night in question and also forced his hand inside of her. She denied consenting
to the penetrations and stated that, because of the knife, she had no choice but to submit to them.
Mooney testified that defendant kicked, pushed, and punched her and that she believed he was
going to kill her. She finally departed and walked to Abbo’s gas station. After returning to the
house with the police, she found the house “destroyed” and discovered that a window of her
vehicle had been smashed. She later filed for divorce from defendant.
On cross-examination, the defense attorney pointed out that defendant had a scratch on
his shoulder in a picture apparently taken on December 15, 2002. He also pointed out that
Mooney had told the police that the assault occurred with a vibrator and not a non-vibrating
dildo. He also implied that (1) some of the blood produced that night was the result of Mooney’s
menstrual period and (2) the parties were fighting, as a result of their divorce proceedings, over
how to divide their shared assets.
Officer Amy Danforth of the Green Oak Township Police Department testified that she
met Mooney at Abbo’s gas station on December 15, 2000. Danforth testified that Mooney was
“quite beat up” and shaken and told Danforth she had been sexually assaulted. Danforth stated
that Mooney had a cut on his wrist2 but that his injury paled in comparison to Mooney’s injuries.
Dr. Mark Grant, an emergency room physician, testified that he examined Mooney on
December 15, 2000. According to Grant, Mooney stated that she had been sexually assaulted by
her husband with a dildo. Grant found several bruises and scratches on Mooney’s face, neck,
and arms, as well as a bruise on her thigh. He found no lacerations or other trauma on her vagina
or rectum, but he stated that this absence did not negate the possibility of a sexual assault.
2
Mooney testified that defendant caused this cut himself by punching a glass picture frame.
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Sergeant Richard Walter of the Green Oak Township Police Department testified that he
went to defendant’s house on the morning of December 15, 2000, and found it in disarray. He
stated that defendant appeared to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Walter stated that
he found cocaine in the residence.
Defendant testified as follows: His marriage to Mooney was deteriorating in December
2000 because she had had two extramarital affairs. When she returned home from work on
December 14, 2000, he stated that he needed a ride to his vehicle, which was in another city, and
that he needed to get some cocaine. He wanted to go to a motel that night, but Mooney wanted
him to return home. She drove him to get cocaine. While returning from the cocaine supplier,
he told her that he would be able to obtain most of the couple’s assets if they were to divorce.
They then stopped at his vehicle, and he was intending to get into it and go away for the weekend
when Mooney persuaded him to return to their house. When they did return to the house, they
began some consensual sexual activity involving the dildo, but he abruptly stopped the sexual
activity. He then asked Mooney to leave, which she did.
Defendant testified that Mooney’s brother telephoned from Germany between 4:00 and
5:00 a.m. Defendant became upset and called Mooney at the Best Western motel to tell her that
he was going to blow up the house with himself inside it and that she should come to retrieve the
dogs. He then began destroying the house, after which Mooney returned home. Defendant
testified that he took a knife and told her that she would see him kill himself if she did not leave
the house. He stated that Mooney tried to get the knife from him and that they then hugged each
other, after which he again told her that he was going to blow up the house. He testified that
Mooney subsequently tried to initiate sex with him but that he did not go through with it because
he was upset. He testified that Mooney threw a jar at him, cutting his wrist, and that he hit her,
pushed her, and held her down on the couch. He claimed that Mooney cut his back with the
knife, after which he hit her again, dragged her out of the house, and kicked her. He stated that
Mooney kept wanting to come back into the house to get her things, so he destroyed her purse
and its contents, as well as some of her clothes and underwear.
Defendant presented no witnesses other than himself, and the jurors convicted defendant
as charged.
II. Admission of Victim’s Prior Statement
On appeal, defendant first argues that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a
prior consistent statement given by Mooney because the defense had not claimed that Mooney’s
testimony included a recent fabrication. We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence for
an abuse of discretion. People v Taylor, 252 Mich App 519, 521; 652 NW2d 526 (2002).
Moreover, the erroneous admission of evidence generally does not require reversal unless, after
an examination of all the evidence in the case, it affirmatively appears “that it is more probable
than not that the error was outcome determinative.” People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495-496;
596 NW2d 607 (1999); see also MCL 769.26. The prosecutor in the instant case argues that
defense counsel did not properly preserve this issue for appellate review and that we therefore
should employ the plain error standard of review from People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597
NW2d 130 (1999). However, even assuming that defense counsel properly preserved the issue,
and even assuming that the trial court erred by admitting the statement, we conclude that reversal
is unwarranted. Indeed, the admission of the statement here is harmless under the standard from
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Lukity, supra at 495-496. Given that (1) Officer Danforth testified that Mooney told her that
defendant had subjected her to physical and sexual abuse involving nonconsensual sex with a
dildo; (2) Officer Danforth testified that she reported “digital penetration” to her coworkers after
meeting with Mooney; (3) Dr. Grant testified that Mooney told him about being physically
assaulted and sexually assaulted with a dildo; (4) defense counsel himself elicited on crossexamination, before the admission of the written statement at issue, that Mooney had stated to
the police that she had been assaulted several times; and (5) defendant does not challenge any of
this testimony on appeal, it clearly does not affirmatively appear that the admission into evidence
of Mooney’s prior written statement would likely have affected the outcome of the case. We
conclude that Mooney’s in-court testimony had already been sufficiently corroborated by the
testimony of Danforth and Grant and by Mooney’s testimony on cross-examination. Reversal is
therefore unwarranted. Id.
III. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Next, defendant argues that the prosecutor committed several instances of misconduct
requiring reversal. We disagree.
An appellate court reviews claims of prosecutorial misconduct on a case-by-case basis.
People v McElhaney, 215 Mich App 269, 283; 545 NW2d 18 (1996). The court examines the
prosecutor's actions in context to decide if they deprived the defendant of a fair and impartial
trial. See id. Otherwise improper remarks may not require reversal if the remarks were made in
response to defense counsel's arguments. People v Kennebrew, 220 Mich App 601, 608; 560
NW2d 354 (1996). Moreover, if a defendant did not object to alleged prosecutorial misconduct
below, this Court reviews for plain error. People v Schutte, 240 Mich App 713, 720; 613 NW2d
370 (2000). To obtain relief under the plain error doctrine, a defendant must demonstrate the
existence of a clear or obvious error that likely affected the outcome of the case. Id.; People v
Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). Even if a defendant satisfies this initial
burden, reversal is appropriate only if the plain error resulted in the conviction of an actually
innocent person or seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings. Carines, supra at 763; Schutte, supra at 720. Moreover, “[n]o error requiring
reversal will be found if the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor’s comments could have been
cured by a timely instruction.” Schutte, supra at 721.
A. Elicitation of Evidence
Defendant argues that the prosecutor committed error requiring reversal by eliciting
inadmissible evidence in three separate instances. He first contends that the prosecutor “invited
error by offering specious reasons for admission of the complainant’s written statement.” This
argument is unpreserved because defendant did not object to the admission of this statement
below on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct. Accordingly, we review for plain error.
Schutte, supra at 720. We find no basis for reversal because, as noted above, the admission of
the statement did not likely affect the outcome of the case. Carines, supra at 763; Lukity, supra
at 495-496. Moreover, we conclude that the prosecutor acted in good faith by offering the
statement into evidence, and prosecutorial misconduct cannot be premised on a prosecutor’s
good-faith effort to admit evidence if the attempt did not prejudice the defendant. People v
Noble, 238 Mich App 647, 660-661; 608 NW2d 123 (1999). As noted above, the statement at
issue did not in fact prejudice defendant.
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Second, defendant contends that the prosecutor erred by asking a police officer, on
redirect examination, to reiterate that he had been in the Mooney’s house before and to explain
why he had been there previously. Although defendant did object to this line of questioning, we
cannot agree that the questioning requires reversal, for several reasons. First, the officer initially
indicated that he had been in the house on a prior occasion while being questioned by defense
counsel, and counsel did not object at that time to the officer’s statement. Second, the officer,
during redirect, never indicated why he had been at the house previously because his answer was
cut off by defense counsel’s objection. Third, the trial court gave a clear curative instruction,
stating that “[t]he fact that the Sergeant may have been at the home previously is immaterial to
this lawsuit and don’t speculate on why.” Finally, the court instructed the jurors that “[t]he
questions that the lawyers ask the witnesses are not themselves evidence.” Under all these
circumstances, we cannot conclude that the prosecutor’s questioning denied the defendant a fair
and impartial trial. McElhaney, supra at 283. Reversal is unwarranted.
Defendant thirdly contends that the prosecutor erred by eliciting that defendant was
incarcerated as a result of the criminal allegations against him. Defendant did not object to the
prosecutor’s questioning in this regard, and plain error review is therefore appropriate. Schutte,
supra at 720. We find no plain error because defendant himself first elicited that he had been
incarcerated pending investigation of the instant crimes. The prosecutor did nothing more than
reiterate something to which defendant had already testified. The prosecutor’s elicitation did not
affect the outcome of the case, see Carines, supra at 763, and reversal is again unwarranted.
B. Misstatements of Fact
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor misstated facts five different times in her crossexamination of defendant. He first contends that the prosecutor improperly stated that Mooney’s
menstrual period had ended on the night of the assaults. We find no error requiring reversal with
respect to this statement because Mooney testified on cross-examination that she had “pretty
much come to the end of [her] . . . menstruation period” and did not need to use a tampon. The
prosecutor’s statement conformed to Mooney’s testimony. At any rate, we cannot conclude that
the statement by the prosecutor with respect to this issue denied defendant a fair trial, given that
defendant replied to the prosecutor that Mooney had not in fact finished her menstrual period on
the night in question and given Dr. Grant’s testimony that Mooney was experiencing the last
stages of her menstrual period when he examined her.
Second, defendant contends that the prosecutor improperly challenged defendant’s
testimony on cross-examination that he knew about two affairs Mooney had had – one he learned
of after the first year the couple was married and one he learned of two weeks before the instant
assaults. When defendant gave this testimony, the prosecutor stated, “[t]hat wasn’t your
testimony before . . . .” We discern no basis for reversal with respect to the prosecutor’s
statement. First, defendant objected to the prosecutor’s statement, after which she withdrew it.
Second, the prosecutor’s statement was, in actuality, accurate. Defendant stated on crossexamination, “I said the first [affair] I knew about after the first year we were married. The
second one I just found out about two weeks prior.” However, defendant had not in fact testified
on direct examination that he knew about the first affair “after the first year we were married.”
Instead, he simply testified that “[m]y wife had an affair that I had known about,” without
specifying when he learned of it. No prosecutorial misconduct is apparent.
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Third, defendant contends that the prosecutor improperly indicated that he had given two
explanations for the cut on his wrist. The prosecutor implied that defendant had stated (1) that
the cut resulted from Mooney’s throwing a glass at him and (2) that the cut occurred when
Mooney pulled the knife away from defendant’s throat while he was threatening to commit
suicide. We agree that the prosecutor erred with respect to this issue, because defendant had not
in fact testified that the cut on his wrist resulted from a struggle with the knife. However, we
cannot agree that the error requires reversal, because defense counsel objected to the prosecutor’s
statement, and the court sustained the objection. Defendant then reiterated that the cut resulted
from the glass thrown by Mooney. Under the circumstances, the brief misstatement of fact did
not affect the outcome of the case or deprive defendant of a fair trial. See McElhaney, supra at
283.
Fourth, defendant contends that the prosecutor erred by implying that defendant had
given two different time frames in stating when the cut on his back occurred. On direct
examination, defendant testified that after he pushed Mooney back onto the couch and held her
down, he went toward the kitchen for a towel, at which point Mooney swiped him with the knife
and cut his back. On cross-examination, the prosecutor implied that defendant had at one point
changed his sequence of events and testified that Mooney inflicted the cut on his back at a later
time, after he had attempted to drag Mooney out of the house. We agree once again that the
prosecutor erred with respect to this issue. Defendant did not in fact testify that Mooney cut him
with the knife after he attempted to drag her out of the house. Again, however, we cannot agree
that the error requires reversal. Indeed, defendant did not object to the prosecutor’s
misstatement, and we cannot agree that the brief misstatement affected the outcome of the case
under the standard from Carines, supra at 763. Moreover, defendant immediately corrected the
prosecutor and reiterated the sequence of events he had recited on direct examination. Under the
circumstances, defendant was not denied a fair and impartial trial. See McElhaney, supra at 283.
Fifth, defendant contends that the prosecutor misstated the facts in evidence by indicating
that, in x-raying defendant’s wrist, the doctors treating him were looking for fractures and not for
glass. Defendant contends that the prosecutor had no basis from which to conclude that the
doctors were not looking for glass. However, the prosecutor referred to the medical report,
which apparently mentioned an absence of fractures and did not mention that an exploration for
glass fragments had taken place. Accordingly, the prosecutor’s statement was a reasonable
inference from the information available to her. At any rate, defendant did not object to the
prosecutor’s statement, and we cannot conclude that this brief statement on a peripheral issue
affected the outcome of the case.3 Carines, supra at 763.
C. Sarcasm
3
Mooney testified that the cut on defendant’s wrist occurred when he smashed a glass picture
frame. Therefore, the possible presence of glass in defendant’s wrist was immaterial to the
outcome of the case – both sides agreed that the cut resulted from some type of glass (either a
picture frame or a drinking glass).
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Next, defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly used sarcasm in cross-examining
defendant. Defendant, however, failed to object to the instances of sarcasm he identifies on
appeal.4 Accordingly, we review for plain error. Schutte, supra at 720. We discern no clear or
obvious error, see Carines, supra at 763, because the prosecutor was engaging in proper crossexamination and merely emphasizing that defendant seemed to have a ready answer for anything
asked of him. Moreover, defendant has cited no authority indicating that a prosecutor may not
use sarcasm in cross-examining a witness. See People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 587; 629
NW2d 411 (2001) (an appellant may not leave it up to this Court to search for authority to
sustain his position). Also, a prosecutor is not required to make her points using the blandest
possible terms. See, generally, Schutte, supra at 722. Reversal is unwarranted.
D. Closing and Rebuttal Arguments.
Next, defendant argues that the prosecutor erred in numerous respects during her closing
and rebuttal arguments. Defendant failed to object to any of these alleged instances of
misconduct, so we will review for plain error. Schutte, supra at 720. We find no clear or
obvious errors that affected the outcome of the case. Carines, supra at 763. Defendant contends
that the prosecutor improperly used Mooney’s prior statement to reinforce her credibility. We
disagree. Indeed, the trial court admitted the statement after the prosecutor made a good-faith
effort to have it admitted. The prosecutor did not clearly err by mentioning a document that had
been admitted into evidence by the trial court.5 Defendant also contends that the prosecutor (1)
used the authority of her office to improperly refer to defendant as a liar and to improperly vouch
for Mooney’s credibility and (2) improperly urged the jurors to convict defendant based on a
sense of civic duty. We conclude that defendant has waived these arguments on appeal because,
contrary to the requirements of MCR 7.212(C)(7), he has failed to specify the transcript pages on
which the alleged errors occurred. Accordingly, we cannot determine the comments he finds
objectionable and under which legal precepts he premises his specific objections. This Court
does not entertain issues that have been inadequately briefed. See, generally, Watson, supra at
587. At any rate, our review of the record demonstrates that prosecutor properly argued that, in
light of the evidence introduced at trial, Mooney’s version of the events was more credible than
defendant’s. The prosecutor was allowed to make such an argument, and she was not required to
use the blandest possible terms. Schutte, supra at 722. Moreover, to the extent any errors did
occur, they could have been cured with a proper curative instruction. Id. at 721.
4
In challenging the prosecutor’s use of sarcasm, defendant makes a vague reference to additional
instances of prosecutorial misconduct but does not cite transcript pages in support. We do not
consider these additional instances of alleged misconduct because of the inadequate briefing, see
Watson, supra at 587, and the violation of MCR 7.212(C)(7) (requiring that specific transcript
pages, if pertinent, be cited on appeal).
5
Moreover, the portion of the prosecutor’s argument cited by defendant in his briefing of this
issue does not, contrary to his contention, emphasize that Mooney was consistent in her
statements; instead, it reminds the jury that Mooney accused defendant of the charged crimes
immediately after they occurred. Officer Danforth also testified about an immediate accusation.
-7-
Defendant also contends that the prosecutor wrongly stated that defendant cut up
“hundreds” of Mooney’s underpants in a fit of anger and that he “cut” a pair off her body, when
in actuality defendant testified that he cut up only a “sizeable pile” of underpants, and Mooney
testified that he ripped (as opposed to cut) a pair off her body. We discern no clear or obvious
error with respect to these statements, since they largely conformed to the evidence introduced at
trial. To the extent the prosecutor used improper terminology, we cannot conclude that the brief,
substituted terms affected the outcome of the case, Carines, supra at 763, and any error could
have been cured with a proper curative instruction. Schutte, supra at 721.
Defendant also contends that the prosecutor improperly stated that defendant had
consumed a “ton” of cocaine on the evening in question, when defendant testified only that he
had consumed “three lines,” or a “[q]uarter gram,” of cocaine. Once again, any error in this
regard could have been cured with a proper curative instruction. Id. Moreover, the context
makes clear that the prosecutor was not referring to an actual ton, i.e., two thousand pounds, of
cocaine. She was conveying the fact that defendant had consumed a large quantity of cocaine,
and to a non-drug-user, three lines of cocaine may very well be considered a large quantity. No
clear or obvious error is apparent, and the prosecutor’s remarks did not affect the outcome of the
case. Carines, supra at 763.
Finally, defendant contends that the prosecutor erred by stating that it would be far worse
for defendant to go free after assaulting Mooney than it would be for him to be falsely accused.
Once again, any prejudice resulting from this statement could have been cured by a proper
curative instruction. Schutte, supra at 721. Moreover, although we do not dispute that the
challenged statement, viewed in isolation, would be deemed improper, otherwise objectionable
comments do not require reversal if they are made in response to defense arguments. People v
Kennebrew, 220 Mich App 601, 608; 560 NW2d 354 (1996). Here, defense counsel stated that it
would be worse to be falsely accused of sexual assault than to be the victim of a sexual assault.
The prosecutor then agreed that “falsely accusing someone would be a very serious situation,”
pointed out that no evidence of a false accusation existed in the instant case, and stated that
defendant’s going free after committing the assault would be a travesty. The comments did not
urge the jurors to convict an innocent person but merely (1) responded to defense counsel’s
argument and (2) emphasized that defendant was indeed guilty of the assaults. No clear or
obvious error is apparent, and the comments did not likely affect the outcome of the case,
especially because the trial court properly instructed the jury with respect to the burden of proof.
Carines, supra at 763. Reversal is unwarranted.
IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Next, defendant argues that his trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that his counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms, and that, but for counsel’s error or errors, it is reasonably probable that the outcome of
the proceedings would have been different. People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 302-303; 613 NW2d
694 (2000). Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant bears a heavy burden
of proving otherwise. Id. at 302.
A. Fee Structure
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Defendant first contends that the fee structure under which defense counsel worked
automatically caused ineffective assistance in this case.6 We disagree that this issue merits
reversal. First, the case law defendant cites does not demonstrate that such a fee structure is
automatically deficient in a non-capital case. As noted, an appellant must not leave it up to this
Court to search for authority to sustain or reject a position. Watson, supra at 587. Second,
Gatesman testified that he receives around six hundred dollars for every assigned case, regardless
of whether the case ends in a plea agreement and involves little work. It is eminently reasonable
to assume that the cases demanding little work “balance out” the cases demanding more.
Finally, our review of the transcripts demonstrates that Gatesman vigorously cross-examined the
prosecution witnesses and argued defendant’s case; no instance of actual ineffective assistance of
counsel is apparent to us.
B. Counsel’s Preparation for Trial
Defendant also contends that Gatesman inadequately prepared for trial. We once again
disagree that this issue merits reversal. Indeed, we cannot conclude that the actions defendant
argues should have been taken by Gatesman would have affected the outcome of the trial. Toma,
supra at 302-303. Indeed, testing to see whether the knife had defendant’s blood on it would
have yielded little useful information, given that defendant admittedly had a cut on his wrist that
could have caused his blood to get on the knife. Nor would testing the knife for Mooney’s
fingerprints have been useful, given that Mooney shared the house and obviously had access to
the kitchen implements. Moreover, the evidence of sexually-explicit magazines at the home of
defendant and Mooney would not, contrary to defendant’s argument on appeal, have
demonstrated that Mooney voluntarily bought a sexually-explicit magazine and alcohol on the
night of the assaults. Defendant also mentions emails in which Mooney discusses having sex
with another woman. Defendant states, “[t]he emails explain why the dildo in evidence was two
ended, and could have been viewed by the jury as corroborative of Defendant’s claim that it
would not have been unusual for the complainant to use it herself that night . . . .” However,
Mooney admitted that she sometimes voluntarily used the dildo; using the emails in the way
defendant suggests (even assuming that they would have been admissible at trial) would not have
contributed to defendant’s defense. Defendant additionally argues that counsel should have
introduced evidence that Mooney had made numerous automatic teller machine (ATM)
withdrawals from her bank account en route to a drug supplier; he contends that this evidence
would have corroborated his testimony that Mooney used drugs. We disagree that counsel erred
with respect to the introduction of this evidence. Indeed, we fail to see how this evidence would
have affected the outcome of the trial. People commonly make ATM withdrawals for reasons
other than to purchase illegal drugs.
C. Failure to Call Witnesses
6
At the evidentiary hearing below dealing with defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel
claims, defense counsel, Mark Gatesman, testified that the court pays him around six hundred
dollars for each case he is assigned, regardless of the actual amount of time he spends on the
case.
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Defendant next contends that Gatesman unreasonably failed to call defendant’s parents as
witnesses. He argues that his mother would have testified that (1) Mooney admitted to her that
she had had an extramarital affair (thus contradicting Mooney’s testimony at trial), (2) Mooney
normally drank vodka, while defendant drank whiskey (thus implying that the vodka from the
partially-empty bottle of vodka discovered at the scene of the assaults had been consumed by
Mooney and not defendant), and (3) defendant had a four-inch slash on his back, as well as a
puncture wound on his arm, the day after his arrest (thus corroborating defendant’s testimony
that Mooney harmed him on the night in question). Defendant argues that his father would have
testified that (1) Mooney normally drank vodka, and she told him she had been drinking alcohol
on the night in question (thus contradicting Mooney’s testimony that she did not drink that night)
and (2) he saw a broken glass in the house after the assaults (thus corroborating defendant’s
testimony that the cut on his wrist occurred when Mooney threw a glass at him).
Counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that he did not call defendant’s parents at trial
because he believed that their testimony would not be relevant and because “the jury would not
have believed what they said based on their relationship with [defendant]. They would have
come across as self-serving.” He also stated that he did not want to introduce evidence of the
broken glass because it could have implied that Mooney threw the glass defensively. We note
that “[d]ecisions regarding what evidence to present and whether to call or question witnesses are
presumed to be matters of trial strategy. People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76; 601 NW2d 887
(1999). “This Court will not substitute its judgment for that of counsel regarding matters of trial
strategy, nor will it assess counsel’s competence with the benefit of hindsight.” Id. at 76-77.
That a particular strategy failed does not render its use ineffective assistance of counsel. People
v Kevorkian, 248 Mich App 373, 414-415; 639 NW2d 291 (2001). Counsel made reasonable
choices, and we will not assess his competence with the benefit of hindsight. Moreover,
“[i]neffective assistance of counsel can take the form of failure to call witnesses only if the
failure deprives the defendant of a substantial defense.” People v Hyland, 212 Mich App 701,
710; 538 NW2d 465 (1995), vacated in part on other grds 453 Mich 902 (1996). “A defense is
substantial if it might have made a difference in the outcome of the trial.” Id. We do not believe
that the failure to call defendant’s parents as witnesses deprived defendant of a substantial
defense.
D. Failure to Object
Defendant contends that Gatesman unreasonably failed to object to instances of
prosecutorial misconduct. However, as noted in part III of this opinion, the various instances of
alleged prosecutorial misconduct either (1) did not, in actuality, constitute misconduct or (2) did
not affect the outcome of the trial. Accordingly, defendant did not receive ineffective assistance
of counsel under the standard from Toma, supra at 302-303.
Defendant also contends that Gatesman should have objected to Dr. Grant’s reading of
Mooney’s medical records and commenting on various photographs. We disagree that this
contention merits reversal. First, defendant cites no case law indicating that Dr. Grant acted
improperly. An appellant may not leave it up to this Court to search for authority to sustain his
position. Watson, supra at 587. Second, the medical records were admitted into evidence, and
therefore Dr. Grant’s testimony was largely cumulative; the failure to object did not affect the
outcome of the trial. Toma, supra at 303.
-10-
E. Concession of Guilt
Finally defendant contends that Gatesman erred by stating the following in closing
arguments:
One of the charges is an Assault with a Dangerous Weapon. And maybe it
is reasonable for you to believe, at some point, when the knife’s being used in the
manner that [defendant] described for you, that at some point, she believed that
knife was trying to be used on her and that she was in fear. That might be
reasonable based on all the evidence that you’ve heard in this case. But when you
look at the jury form and it gives you the choice regarding the two sexual,
Criminal Sexual Conduct cases that’s where your difficult decision really comes
up.
Defendant contends that this argument amounted to a concession of guilt on the charge of assault
with a dangerous weapon and that he did not consent to such a concession. While a defense
attorney can legitimately employ the accepted trial strategy of admitting guilt to a lesser offense,
see People v Emerson (After Remand), 203 Mich App 345, 349; 512 NW2d 3 (1994), a
concession of guilt cannot be made without the defendant’s consent. Wiley v Sowders, 647 F 2d
642, 649 (CA 6, 1981). Here, however, contrary to defendant’s contention on appeal, counsel
did not concede guilt. Counsel used the term “might” and failed to discuss an essential element
of assault with a dangerous weapon – that defendant intended to injury Mooney or to place her in
fear of an immediate battery. See People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 505; 597 NW2d 864
(1999) (discussing elements of assault). Defendant’s argument is without merit.
V. Replaying of Testimony
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred by replaying Mooney’s videotaped
testimony for the jury in response to their request. Defendant contends that the trial court should
instead have had the reporter read back the requested testimony. We review this issue for an
abuse of discretion. See, generally, People v Howe, 392 Mich 670, 675-676; 221 NW2d 350
(1974); MCR 6.414(H). Defendant cites several out-of-state and federal cases in arguing that a
playback of videotaped testimony is inappropriate. However, he cites no binding case law – i.e.,
Michigan case law – that requires us to flatly reject the playback of videotaped testimony in the
instant case. The matter was assigned to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the court
exercised this discretion by (1) first directing the jurors to use their collective memory in
recalling Mooney’s testimony and (2) ensuring that the jury also heard defense counsel’s crossexamination of Mooney. As noted in Howe, a court “cannot simply refuse to grant the jury’s
request for fear of placing too much emphasis on the testimony of one or two witnesses.” We
simply cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the playback of the
testimony.
VI. Newly-Discovered Evidence
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court should have granted him a new trial based on
newly-discovered evidence. To obtain relief with respect to this issue, defendant must
demonstrate that:
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(1) the evidence itself, not merely its materiality, was newly discovered; (2) the
newly discovered evidence was not cumulative; (3) including the new evidence
upon retrial would probably cause a different result; and (4) the party could not,
using reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced the evidence at trial.
[People v Bradshaw, 165 Mich App 562, 567; 419 NW2d 33 (1988).]
Defendant cites the affidavit of Michael York, in which York states that (1) he had an
extramarital affair with Mooney beginning in October 2000; (2) Mooney told him that she had
had another extramarital affair before October 2000; and (3)Mooney told him that, on the night
in question, “she and [defendant] engaged in consensual sex before they fought, and . . . after that
consensual sex they argued, and he hit her and pulled a knife on her.” The trial court rejected
defendant’s argument concerning York’s potential testimony as untimely7 and also stated that
York’s affidavit dealt with “collateral testimony.”
On appeal, defendant argues that York’s testimony would be admissible for impeachment
under MRE 613(b) as prior inconsistent statements. MRE 613(b) states, in part:
Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not
admissible unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the
same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate the witness
thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require.
However, as noted in People v Sutherland, 149 Mich App 161, 165; NW2d (1985), “[e]xtrinsic
evidence may not be used to impeach a witness on a collateral matter.” The issue of whether
Mooney had had extramarital affairs was clearly a collateral matter in this case, and therefore
York’s testimony about the affairs would not have been admissible at trial under Sutherland.
Defendant counters by stating that because the prosecutor introduced Mooney’s unequivocal
testimony that she had had no extramarital affairs, defendant would be able to admit York’s
testimony about the affairs under the “sweeping denial” doctrine. See United States v
Markarian, 967 F2d 1098, 1102-1103 (CA 6, 1992). However, even assuming that this
“sweeping denial” doctrine is applicable under Michigan, as opposed to federal, law,8 relief is
nonetheless unwarranted. As clearly stated in People v Stricklin, 162 Mich App 623, 632; NW2d
(1987), “newly discovered evidence is not grounds for a new trial where it would be used merely
for impeachment purposes.” See also Bradshaw, supra at 567. This rule from Stricklin and
Bradshaw applies equally to York’s statement about the sequence of events on the night in
question. Indeed, defendant indicates in his appellate brief that the statement would be
admissible for impeachment purposes and not as substantive evidence. See also People v Kohler,
113 Mich App 594, 599, 318 NW2d 481 (1981). Accordingly, a new trial is unwarranted.
Stricklin, supra at 632; Bradshaw, supra at 567.
7
Defendant made the newly-discovered evidence argument after having already filed his original
motion for a new trial.
8
Defendant cites no Michigan law in support of the doctrine.
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Affirmed.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
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