PEOPLE OF MI V RICHARD VINCENT HALL
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
August 26, 2003
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 239708
St. Clair Circuit Court
LC No. 01-002528-FH
RICHARD VINCENT HALL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Cavanagh and Saad, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury conviction for possession of marijuana, MCL
333.7403(2)(d). We affirm. This appeal is being decided without oral argument pursuant to
MCR 7.214(E).
On appeal, defendant asserts that his co-defendant’s statement was admitted in violation
of his right to confrontation. A statement against penal interest, admissible as substantive
evidence under MRE 804(b)(3), does not violate the Confrontation Clause if the prosecutor
establishes that the declarant is unavailable as a witness and the statement bears adequate indicia
of reliability or falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. People v Poole, 444 Mich 151,
163; 506 NW2d 505 (1993).
Although defendant argues that Lilley v Virginia, 527 US 116; 119 S Ct 1887; 144 L Ed
2d 117 (1999), requires reversal, this Court has held that Poole remains binding precedent
because Lilly was a plurality opinion and a majority of the US Supreme Court did not hold that
the Confrontation Clause imposes a blanket ban on the use of accomplice statements. People v
Beasley, 239 Mich App 548, 558-559; 609 NW2d 581 (2000).
Applying the Poole factors, the trial court did not err in admitting the statements. The
statement was voluntarily given and contemporaneous with the event. Although the statement
was made to a law enforcement official, it was uttered spontaneously without prompting from
the officer. Co-defendant did not minimize her role, or shift the blame onto defendant. There is
no indication that the statement was made for revenge, or that co-defendant had a motive to lie.
The record does not show that the sentencing court was unaware of its discretion to not
impose the maximum sentence. There is no legal requirement that a trial court state on the
record that it understands it has discretion and is utilizing that discretion. People v Beneson, 192
-1-
Mich App 469, 471; 481 NW2d 799 (1992). Absent clear evidence that the sentencing court
incorrectly believed that it lacked discretion, the presumption that a trial court knows the law
must prevail. People v Knapp, 244 Mich App 361, 389; 624 NW2d 227 (2001).
Affirmed.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Henry William Saad
-2-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
