PEOPLE OF MI V MARKUS WOODHAVEN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 29, 2003
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 239325
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 01-006551
MARKUS WOODHAVEN, a/k/a RICHARD
DE’MARIUS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Griffin and Gage, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his convictions, following a bench trial, of carjacking, MCL
750.529a, armed robbery, MCL 750.529, and felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b. The trial court
sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of eight to twenty-five years’ imprisonment for the
carjacking and armed robbery convictions and a consecutive two-year term for the felonyfirearm conviction. We affirm.
The victim testified that his van was taken from him at gunpoint. Defendant was found
with the van a week later. Defendant testified that he knew the van was stolen, but that he was
not the one who stole it. The victim was unable to identify defendant in a lineup and the
description he provided the police varied somewhat from defendant’s actual appearance.
Defendant gave two statements to the police. In the first statement, he did not confess, but
rather, implicated someone else. However, in the second statement, he did confess and also
made a written apology to the victim. Defendant moved to suppress the second statement on the
ground that it was involuntary because he was coerced into making the confession. The motion
was denied.
Defendant now contends that the circuit court erred by determining that defendant
voluntarily confessed. We disagree.
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision not to suppress evidence. People v
Taylor, 253 Mich App 399, 403; 655 NW2d 291 (2002). However, this Court reviews the trial
court’s underlying factual findings for clear error. Id. This Court may find clear error if it has “a
definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake.” People v Manning, 243 Mich
App 615, 620; 624 NW2d 746 (2000).
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If the State uses a defendant’s confession as evidence to prove the defendant’s guilt of
committing a crime, then the United States Constitution requires that the defendant must have
voluntarily provided that confession.1 People v Wells, 238 Mich App 383, 386; 605 NW2d 374
(1999); see also Dickerson v United States, 530 US 428, 433; 120 S Ct 2326; 147 L Ed 2d 405
(2000). The test of voluntariness is whether, “considering the totality of all the surrounding
circumstances, the confession is ‘the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by
its maker,’ or whether the accused’s ‘will has been overborne and his capacity for selfdetermination critically impaired.’” Wells, supra at 386, quoting People v Cipriano, 431 Mich
315, 333-334; 429 NW2d 781 (1988), quoting Culombe v Connecticut, 367 US 568, 602; 81 S Ct
1860; 6 L Ed 2d 1037 (1961). Therefore, the ultimate test for determining whether a statement
was voluntarily made depends on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statement.
Wells, supra at 387; see also Dickerson, supra.
The factors to be considered in determining voluntariness have been set forth in Cipriano,
supra at 334.2 However, defendant does not contend that the trial court erred in its assessment of
any of those factors. Instead, defendant contends that, at the hearing, the trial court
impermissibly deprived defense counsel of an opportunity to question Sergeant Benjamin
Wagner, the officer who took the second statement, about the purported lack of evidence existing
prior to the confession. Defendant argues that his intended line of questioning would have
affected the credibility of Sgt. Wagner. According to defendant, Sgt. Wagner’s credibility was
crucial to the trial court’s determination that Sgt. Wagner did not, as defendant claimed, tell
defendant that he would “be slammed” and “get life” if defendant did not confess.
At the outset, we note that defendant fails to acknowledge that the trial court did allow
some inquiry into Sgt. Wagner’s knowledge of the case at the time he took defendant’s second
statement. At the hearing, defense counsel inquired whether, at the time of the second statement,
Sgt. Wagner had been aware that defendant had given the first statement in which he implicated
another person. Sgt. Wagner responded affirmatively. Defense counsel also inquired whether
Sgt. Wagner had been aware that defendant did not match the description given by the victim, to
which Sgt. Wagner responded in the negative. It was after this inquiry that defense counsel
sought to inquire whether the victim had picked defendant out of a line-up and the prosecution
objected.
1
The Michigan Constitution also mandates that the defendant must have voluntarily confessed in
order for the State to use that confession as evidence of guilt. People v Wright, 441 Mich 140,
147; 490 NW2d 351 (1992), citing People v Louzon, 338 Mich 146, 153-154; 61 NW2d 52
(1953).
2
These factors include: the age of the accused; his lack of education or his intelligence level; the
extent of his previous experience with the police; the repeated and prolonged nature of the
questioning; the length of the detention of the accused before he gave the statement; the lack of
any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights; whether there was unnecessary delay in
bringing the accused before a magistrate before he gave the confession; whether the accused was
injured, intoxicated or drugged, or in ill health when he gave the statement; whether the accused
was deprived of food, sleep, or medical attention; whether he was physically abused; and
whether he was threatened with abuse. People v Cipriano, 431 Mich 315, 334; 429 NW2d 781
(1988).
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Defendant contends that his proposed line of questioning was relevant to Sgt. Wagner’s
credibility. We disagree. Evidence is relevant if it tends to make the existence of a material fact
more or less probable. MRE 401. Here, assuming that Sgt. Wagner would have testified that he
knew of the paucity of evidence against defendant, that testimony would not tend to detract from
the believability of his testimony concerning the purportedly coercive statements. An opposite
conclusion requires an inference that police interrogators have a reason to coerce confessions
when faced with a lack of inculpatory evidence. Without evidence specifically tailored to Sgt.
Wagner, we will not assume the existence of the inference, and find that defendant’s proposed
line of questioning was not relevant to Sgt. Wagner’s credibility. Nevertheless, at the time of the
prosecution’s objection, defense counsel had already elicited testimony that Sgt. Wagner knew
about defendant’s first statement and that he did not know that defendant did not match the
description of the assailant given by the victim. Therefore, relevant or not, the trial court was
aware of this information.
Regarding the court’s ultimate decision that defendant’s confession was voluntary,
deference must be given to the trial court’s opportunity to evaluate the evidence and the
witness’s credibility. See People v Givans, 227 Mich App 113, 123-124; 575 NW2d 84 (1997).
We are not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made regarding any of the
trial court’s factual determinations. Therefore, defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to suppress is without merit.
Defendant also argues that, without the confession, the prosecution did not offer
sufficient evidence to convict defendant. However, because we have concluded that defendant’s
confession was properly admitted, we need not address this issue.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
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