MITAN PROPERTIES VI V FRANDORSON PROPERTIES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MITAN PROPERTIES, VI, KENNETH MITAN,
and KEITH MITAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 3, 2003
Plaintiffs/CounterdefendantsAppellants,
v
No. 234125
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 94-077994-CZ
FRANDORSON PROPERTIES, FRANCIS
JEROME CORR, and THOMAS P. CORR,
Defendants/CounterplaintiffsAppellees.
Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and White and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs Mitan Properties, VI, Kenneth Mitan and Keith Mitan (collectively “MPC” or
plaintiff), appeal as of right the circuit court order awarding defendants Frandorson Properties,
Francis Corr and Thomas Corr (collectively “FP” or defendant) attorney fees and costs totaling
$316,827.06 on its counterclaims, pursuant to the slander of title statute, MCL 565.108. We
affirm.
I
In 1993, plaintiff Mitan Properties, VI, entered into an agreement to purchase three
shopping centers from defendant Frandorson Properties for approximately $22 million dollars.
After the deal went sour, Mitan Properties, VI, filed the instant suit in July 1994 against FP and
its partners, Francis and Thomas Corr, alleging breach of contract and constructive trust1 (Case
I). FP counterclaimed, alleging slander of title, tortious interference with advantageous business
expectancy, and seeking to quiet title. Judge Carolyn Stell was assigned Case I.
1
The complaint alleged that Mitan Properties, VI, had obtained an interest in the properties by
virtue of the purchase agreement, and sought that a constructive trust be imposed based on FP’s
alleged constructive fraud in breaching the agreement.
-1-
Soon after Mitan Properties, VI, filed Case I, FP filed a related suit in August 1994 (Case
II) against Mitan Properties, VI, Keith and Kenneth Mitan (MPC), and various others not parties
to Case I,2 alleging slander of title, tortious interference with a business or contractual
relationship, and conspiracy to commit slander of title or tortious interference with a business or
contractual relationship. Frandorson Properties v Mitan et al., Ingham Circuit Court No. 9478210-CH. Case II was also assigned to Judge Stell, and it is intertwined with Case I, having
arisen from the same transaction or occurrences.
In January 1995, the parties stipulated to
damages only in the amount of $25,000. In
disposition in FP’s favor and, separately, found
contempt. The Mitans appealed and this Court
named in the instant appeal.3
entry of a consent judgment in Case II as to
Case II, the circuit court granted summary
Keith and Kenneth Mitan guilty of criminal
affirmed both rulings as to the MPC parties
In the instant appeal from Case I, MPC challenges the validity of the final judgment
awarding FP attorney fees and costs totaling $316,827.06 under the slander of title statute, MCL
565.108.4 Judge Stell’s opinion and order was prepared after she left the bench in December
2000, and while she was under temporary appointment by the State Court Administrator Office
(SCAO) to complete several cases. MPC argues that Judge Stell was without authority to enter
judgment because she no longer was an elected judge, that MPC was improperly denied an
evidentiary hearing regarding the reasonableness of attorney fees defendants requested, that the
attorney fees awarded were erroneously calculated on several grounds, and that a default
judgment and summary disposition had been improperly entered.
2
The additional defendants were Teresa Mitan, mother of Keith and Kenneth Mitan, Mitan
Properties V, and Mitan Doublewood Ancillary Control Section, Inc.
3
Both appeals were resolved subsequent to MPC’s filing the instant appeal in December 2001.
See Frandorson Properties v Mitan, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals
(Docket No. 220675, issued 1/4/02) (affirming circuit court’s grant of summary disposition to FP
as to all Mitan defendants except Teresa Mitan); and In re Contempt of Keith Mitan and Kenneth
Mitan, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals (Docket Nos. 222230 & 222231,
issued 9/17/02) (affirming circuit court’s finding Mitans guilty of criminal contempt).
4
MCL 565.108 provides:
No person shall use the privilege of filing notices hereunder for the purpose of
slandering the title to land, and in any action brought for the purpose of quieting
title to land, if the court shall find that any person has filed a claim for that reason
only, he shall award the plaintiff all the costs of such action, including such
attorney fees as the court may allow to the plaintiff, and in addition, shall decree
that the defendant asserting such claim shall pay to plaintiff all damages that
plaintiff may have sustained as the result of such notice of claim having been so
filed for record.
-2-
Underlying Facts and Procedural History
The underlying facts are quoted from Frandorson Properties v Mitan (Frandorson I),
unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals (Docket No. 182423, issued 12/13/96),
although the parties’ designations are reversed.
Defendant Mitan Properties Company, VI (“Mitan VI”) is a partnership composed
of defendants Keith J. Mitan and Kenneth Mitan. On August 7, 1993, Mitan VI
entered into a purchase agreement with plaintiff, Frandorson Properties, whereby
Mitan VI agreed to purchase from plaintiff three shopping centers for
$21,976,832.10. Plaintiff alleges that Mitan VI subsequently defaulted on the
purchase agreement by failing to tender various deposits required by the
agreement and by failing to obtain a required financing commitment, thereby
rendering the agreement null and void under its terms.
On April 21, 1994, Mitan VI tendered to plaintiff a second offer to purchase the
three shopping centers, this time for a price of $16,500,000. Plaintiff did not
accept this offer. Instead, plaintiff entered into an agreement with Chemical Bank
of New York, whereby plaintiff agreed to convey its interest in the three shopping
centers to Chemical Bank in lieu of foreclosure. A closing date of July 20, 1994,
was set.
On July 15, 1994, five days before the scheduled closing with Chemical Bank,
Mitan VI filed a complaint in the Ingham Circuit Court, alleging an interest in the
subject shopping centers pursuant to the August 7, 1993, purchase agreement
(“Case I” [case No. 94-077994-CZ]). At the same time, Mitan VI recorded a lis
pendens in both Ingham County and Clinton County for the purpose of notifying
interested parties that an action was pending seeking “the transfer and conveyance
to [Mitan VI] of title to the propert[ies]” in question. The case was assigned to
Circuit Judge Carolyn Stell. On July 18, 1994, plaintiff filed its answer, together
with a counter-complaint against Mitan VI, and Keith and Kenneth Mitan,
alleging slander of title and tortious interference with a business or contractual
relationship. Plaintiff also filed a motion for bond with surety as security. An
expedited hearing was conducted on July 19, 1994, by Circuit Judge James
Giddings, acting in place of Judge Stell, who was unavailable. Following oral
arguments, Judge Giddings ordered Mitan VI to post a security bond with surety
in the amount of $38.4 million by 1:00 p.m. on July 21, 1994. Judge Giddings
also ordered that if the security bond was not posted by the date and time
required, Mitan VI’s complaint would be dismissed and Mitan would be enjoined
from refiling any action or related action for a period of forty-five days. Judge
Giddings gave the following reasons in support of his decision to issue the order:
(1) that submitted documentation “belies any assertion that [Mitan VI] can
rightfully claim that there is a lawful basis to proceed”; (2) Mitan VI’s failure to
demonstrate “that they have any lawful claim whatsoever arising out of the
[August 7, 1993, purchase agreement]”; (3) “inconsistencies demonstrated by the
conduct of [Mitan VI and its agents] in this matter”; and (4) that interference with
the pending sale of the properties would have “a significant compelling effect on
the financial future of [Plaintiff].”
-3-
Mitan VI did not post a security bond as ordered. Consequently, on July 21,
1994, Judge Giddings issued an order dismissing Mitan VI’s complaint and
canceling all the lis pendens recorded by Mitan VI or its agents with respect to the
properties in question. Additionally, the court enjoined Mitan VI from refiling its
action or a related action for forty-five days. In the meantime, Mitan VI filed an
appeal with this Court from the July 19 order requiring it to post a security bond.
At the same time, it recorded a second set of lis pendens, this time using the
caption of this Court on the lis pendens.
On the following day, July 22, 1994, plaintiff [Frandorson] filed a motion for
bond, injunctive relief and contempt in the trial court and again obtained an
expedited hearing. Judge Giddings thereupon issued a second order canceling the
second set of lis pendens and enjoining Mitan VI from recording, “anywhere in
the world,” any further lis pendens pertaining to the subject properties. The order
also enjoined Mitan VI and its agents “from initiating any new actions pertaining
to the subject matter of the case in any court of general jurisdiction for forty-five
days from July 21, 1994.” Additionally, the order provided that a contempt
hearing would be held at a future date and the matter of sanctions for the filing of
the second set of lis pendens would be addressed at the contempt hearing.
Two days later, on July 24, 1994, Mitan VI assigned its alleged interest in the
shopping centers to Mitan Properties Company V (“Mitan V”), which is a
Michigan limited partnership composed of Keith and Kenneth Mitan as the
limited partners and Mitan Doublewood Ancillary Control Section, Inc. (“Mitan,
Inc.”) as the general partner. On the following day, Monday, July 25, 1994,
Mitan V recorded in both Ingham County and Clinton County copies of: (1) the
August 7, 1993, purchase agreement between plaintiff and Mitan VI; (2) the
above-described assignment from Mitan VI to Mitan V; and (3) an affidavit from
Teresa Mitan, an officer of Mitan Inc., attesting to Mitan V’s alleged interest in
the shopping centers pursuant to the foregoing assignment. These documents,
although not containing the label “lis pendens,” nonetheless had the same effect
of clouding plaintiff’s title to the properties in question, thereby impeding plaintiff
from consummating its pending transaction with Chemical Bank.
Plaintiff [Frandorson] responded to this latest course of events by filing a motion
for bond, injunctive relief, contempt and cancellation of the third set of titleclouding documents. Judge Stell, who was now available, scheduled a hearing for
August 1, 1994, at 4:00 p.m. on plaintiff’s [Frandorson’s] motion.
On August 1, 1994, before the scheduled hearing in Case I, plaintiff [Frandorson]
commenced the present action in the Ingham Circuit Court against Mitan VI,
Mitan V, Mitan, Inc., Keith J. Mitan, Kenneth Mitan and Teresa Mitan, alleging
slander of title, tortious interference with a business or contractual relationship,
and conspiracy to commit slander of title or tortious interference with a business
or contractual relationship (“Case II” [Case No. 94-78210-CH]). The second
action was commenced because, following the assignment of interest from Mitan
VI to Mitan V, there were now several new participants involved in the matter
who were not parties to the action in Case I. The complaint in Case II alleged that
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the action arose out of the same transaction as that involved in Case I and,
consequently, Case II was assigned to Judge Stell. Plaintiff’s [Frandorson’s]
complaint requested an award of compensatory and exemplary damages, an award
of costs and attorney fees under MCL 565.108. . . , an order canceling the latest
set of title-clouding documents, and an order adjudging that the Mitan defendants
had no right, title or interest in the properties in question.
Just hours before the scheduled hearing in Case I, Mitan VI caused Case I to be
removed to federal court. The parties subsequently appeared for the scheduled
hearing, but Judge Stell ruled that she no longer had jurisdiction over that case in
light of its removal to federal court. However, Judge Stell agreed to entertain a
motion for bond or other relief in Case II. Defendant Keith Mitan, an attorney,
represented the defendants. Plaintiff’s counsel apprised Judge Stell of the
previously described history in the matter and informed her that plaintiff was
unable to consummate its pending real estate transaction with Chemical Bank
because [of] the various title-clouding documents that had been recorded by
defendants. Following oral arguments, Judge Stell announced the following
decision from the bench:
“The argument that an affidavit of interest, or these latest filings
[by Mitan] are not the equivalent of a lis pendens is completely
without merit[.]
***
The Court grants bond in the amount of $38.4 million which is to
be filed with the Clerk of this Court no later than 12:00 noon,
Wednesday, August 3, 1994.
Since this amount has been under discussion since a week ago
Tuesday, I think that there has been ample notice.
***
The sanction, if the bond is not filed, is that no pleadings may be
filed by Defendant Mitan until the bond is filed.
***
The Court dismisses any affidavit of interest, any lis pendens or
any other document[s] that are currently clouding title to these
subject properties.
The Court enjoins any person or legal entity from filing any
document that clouds title to the subject properties.”
-5-
Plaintiff’s attorney was directed to prepare an order consistent with Judge Stell’s
ruling. Judge Stell ordered the parties to appear at 2:00 p.m. the following day,
i.e., August 2, 1994, for entry of the order.
As it turned out, Judge Stell was unable to issue an order as contemplated on
August 2, 1994, because, shortly before the scheduled hearing, defendants
[Mitans] caused Case II to be removed to federal court. On August 4, 1994,
however, on plaintiff’s [Frandorson’s] motion, the federal court remanded Cases I
and II to state court. In doing so, the federal court imposed sanctions against the
Mitan litigants on the basis that removal “was instituted for the wholly improper
purpose of delaying and impeding both the state court in conducting its business
as well as Frandorson in conveying the title of the real property to Chemical
Bank.”
On the following day, August 5, 1994, Judge Stell, having regained jurisdiction
over Case II, entered an order providing: (1) that the Mitan defendants were
required to post a $38.4 million bond with surety as security for damages and
costs, including attorney fees, for which they might be found liable for recording
the various title-clouding documents; (2) that defendants were not permitted to
file any pleadings “until said bond is filed or until further Order of th[e] Court”;
(3) that if defendants failed to post the required surety bond, plaintiff could file a
motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(9); (4) that
defendants and their agents were enjoined from filing or recording any further
documents which cloud or may tend to cloud the title to the properties in question;
(5) that all title-clouding documents previously filed were to be canceled and
dissolved upon the recording of a certified copy of the court’s order; and (6) that a
contempt hearing would be scheduled for a future date.
On August 8, 1994, the law firm of Hardig & Parsons entered an appearance in
Case II on behalf of each of the Mitan defendants. The following day, August 9,
1994, the Mitan defendants, through their newly retained counsel, once again
removed Cases I and II to federal court. The federal court, once again, remanded
the cases to the Ingham Circuit Court.
On August 26, 1994, without having posted any security bond as ordered, the
Mitan defendants filed an answer to plaintiff’s [Frandorson’s] complaint. The
answer was signed by defendant Keith Mitan, as attorney for all defendants. The
answer was filed against the recommendation of Hardig & Parsons, which
subsequently withdrew as legal counsel for the Mitan defendants.
On October 7, 1994, plaintiff moved to strike defendants’ answer and sought
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(9). The motion alleged that
defendants’ answer violated the court’s August 5, 1994, order, because defendants
had not posted a security bond as required by the order. The motion further
alleged that, due to defendants’ noncompliance with the August 5, 1994, order,
defendants could not defend plaintiff’s action, thereby entitling plaintiff to
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(9). Defendants [Mitans], through
newly retained counsel, responded to the motion by attacking Judge Stell’s
-6-
August 5, 1994, order, arguing that it was unconstitutional and invalid.
Defendants also informed Judge Stell that plaintiff had now consummated its real
estate transaction with Chemical Bank and, therefore, a bond was no longer
necessary.
In a decision from the bench, Judge Stell granted plaintiff’s motion, stating:
“Well, I believe that most of the arguments that have been made
were made at the time of the original motion, and I reject those
arguments at this time.
It’s certainly possible that I am wrong, and that one cannot impose
a bond as a requirement for a Defendant to file pleadings; but I did
address that issue previously. And I still think my ruling was
correct.
It does not at all surprise me that Defendant [Mitan] does not
agree, and I recognize that Mr. Knowlton is not responsible for the
things that occurred in this case before he took over.
However, I do not believe that a party can, by consistently
changing lawyers, evade the responsibility of its decisions.
At the time that I signed that order, Defendants had at least two
options. One was a Motion to Reconsider, and the second—which
has to be filed within 14 days—the second was to go to the Court
of Appeals and say, [‘]we need immediate relief. This is an absurd
ruling, and we ask for immediate consideration.[’]
To wait and do nothing, and then say, [‘]oh, by the way, we think
this isn’t fair, just the way we thought it wasn’t fair or
constitutional initially,[’] seems to me to be very inappropriate way
to be proceeding. And I believe your clients have placed you in an
awkward position, Mr. Knowlton.
The Court denied the motion—or grants the Motion to Strike
Answers and Summary Disposition, pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(9).”
An order incorporating Judge Stell’s decision was entered on November 28, 1994.
Thereafter, on January 10, 1995, the parties stipulated to entry of a consent
judgment as to damages only in the amount of $25,000. [Frandorson I, supra,
slip op at 1-6 (footnotes omitted).]
This Court affirmed the circuit court’s decision requiring a security bond for continuance of the
title-clouding documents, but reversed on due process grounds the court’s striking of the Mitans’
answer and grant of summary disposition in Frandorson’s favor, and remanded for further
proceedings. Frandorson I, supra, slip op at 8-9. On remand, the circuit court granted summary
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disposition on all counts under MCR 2.116(C)(10), and on the alternative ground of res judicata,
MCR 2.116(C)(7).5 The circuit court also found the Mitans guilty of criminal contempt.6
The Mitans appealed from that portion of the circuit court’s order granting Frandorson
summary disposition. In Frandorson II, this Court affirmed the grant of summary disposition on
all claims except for the conspiracy claim against Teresa Mitan, mother of the Mitans. The
Supreme Court denied the Mitans’ application for leave to appeal Frandorson II. 467 Mich 864
(2002). This Court also affirmed the circuit court’s finding Keith and Kenneth Mitan in criminal
contempt. In re Contempt of Keith Mitan and Kenneth Mitan, supra. The Supreme Court denied
the Mitans’ application for leave to appeal by order dated May 30, 2003. ___ Mich ___ (2003).
II
In January 2001, after Judge Stell had left office, the SCAO assigned her to complete
work on four cases, including the instant case. She did so, and entered her opinion and order in
this case on February 18, 2001. Judge Giddings signed and entered the final judgment. Plaintiff
argues that the SCAO’s assignment of Judge Stell to sit in the county where she had been
rejected in the November 2000 election7 nullified the vote of the people, and countermanded the
constitutional requirement that judges be elected, Const 1963, art 6, § 12. We disagree.
This issue presents a question of law this Court reviews de novo. Walters v Snyder, 239
Mich App 453, 456; 608 NW2d 97 (2000). Const 1963, art VI, § 23, provides in pertinent part:
The supreme court may authorize persons who have been elected and served as
judges to perform judicial duties for limited periods or specific assignments.
Section 226 of the Revised Judicature Act, MCL 600.226, provides in pertinent part:
(1) The supreme court may authorize any retired judge from any court to perform
judicial duties in any court in the state. The authorization may be for a period or
periods as the supreme court shall designate with the consent of the retired judge.
[Emphasis added.]
5
See Frandorson Properties v Mitan et al, supra, slip op at 6.
6
See In re Contempt of Keith Mitan and Kenneth Mitan, supra, slip op at 7.
7
Judge Stell attempted to withdraw from the 2000 election, and brought suit in circuit court
when the Secretary of State prevented her from doing so. The circuit court ruled in Judge Stell’s
favor, and this Court denied the Secretary of State’s motion for peremptory reversal. However,
the Supreme Court peremptorily reversed the circuit court’s ruling, holding that under an
intervening change in the law Judge Stell’s withdrawal from the 2000 election was untimely.
Judge Stell’s name therefore remained on the ballot.
-8-
The State Court Administrative Office (SCAO) is an administrative arm of the Supreme
Court and acts under the supervision and direction of the Supreme Court. See MCR 8.103.8 The
SCAO’s “Judicial Assignment Guidelines,” dated January 1998, state in the Introduction:
These guidelines are for the use of judges, court personnel and the SCAO staff
involved in the assignment process. They are subject to change or exception at
the direction of the State Court Administrator. . . .
SCAO Guideline N, on which plaintiff MPC relies, states:
N. Former Judges
1. “Former Judge” means any judge, no longer holding office, who was
elected and served as a judge. This includes, but is not limited to, judges
receiving retirement benefits.
2. Former judges may be assigned judicial duties in any court in the State.
3. A former judge who has been defeated will not be assigned to any
court in the jurisdiction in which s/he was defeated. Jurisdiction means
the county or counties of a judicial circuit or probate court, and means the
judicial district, including all election divisions thereof, of a district court.
[Emphasis added.]
Under the Michigan Constitution, art VI, § 23, and under MCL 600.226, the Supreme
Court has authority to assign former judges to temporary judicial assignments. MCL 600.226
specifies that the Supreme Court “may authorize any retired judge from any court to perform
judicial duties in any court in the state.” (Emphasis added.)
Plaintiff MPC’s reliance on Brockman v Brockman, 113 Mich App 233; 317 NW2d 327
(1982), as supporting its position is misplaced. In Brockman, the parties stipulated that the
circuit court judge appoint a retired judge to preside over their trial, and make factual findings
8
MCR 8.103 provides in part:
The state court administrator, under the Supreme Court’s supervision and
direction, shall:
(1) supervise and examine the administrative methods and systems employed in
the offices of the courts . . . and make recommendations to the Supreme Court for
the improvement of the administration of the courts;
***
(4) recommend to the Supreme Court the assignment of judges where courts are
in need of assistance and carry out the direction of the Supreme Court as to the
assignment of judges . . . .
-9-
and conclusions of law, and a trial was so held (emphasis added). The plaintiff appealed,
challenging for the first time the circuit court’s authority to make such an appointment. This
Court considered the issue although it had not been raised below, and concluded that the circuit
court was without such authority. In the process, the Brockman Court noted that it is the
Supreme Court that has the authority to assign former judges to perform temporary judicial
assignments:
The Supreme Court is empowered by the Michigan Constitution to authorize
persons who have been elected and have served as judges to perform judicial
duties for limited periods or specific assignments. Const 1963, art 6, § 23. The
Legislature has enacted certain statutes to allow the Court to implement that
authority. MCL 600.226 . . . . There are no constitutional or statutory provisions
giving a circuit court judge the power to appoint a retired judge or any other
person to sit as a court in a civil action. In fact, the constitution denies such
authority. Const 1963, art 6, § 27.[9] Thus, Judge Hausner was without any
constitutional or statutory authority to appoint former Judge Sullivan to sit as the
court and try this matter. [Brockman, supra at 327.]
Plaintiff MPC’s reliance on Const 1963, art VI, §§ 11 and 12,10 is also misplaced. Those
provisions establish that the method of selecting judges is by election and not by appointment.
9
Art VI, § 27 provides:
The supreme court, the court of appeals, the circuit court, or any justices or judges
thereof, shall not exercise any power of appointment to public office except as
provided in this constitution.
10
Those provisions state:
Sec. 11. The state shall be divided into judicial circuits along county lines in each
of which there shall be elected one or more circuit judges as provided by law.
Sessions of the circuit court shall be held at least four times in each year in every
county organized for judicial purposes. Each circuit judge shall hold court in the
county or counties within the circuit in which he is elected, and in other circuits as
may be provided by rules of the supreme court. The number of judges may be
changed and circuits may be created, altered and discontinued by law and the
number of judges shall be changed and circuits shall be created, altered and
discontinued on recommendation of the supreme court to reflect changes in
judicial activity. No change in the number of judges or alteration or
discontinuance of a circuit shall have the effect of removing a judge from office
during his term. [Const 1963, art VI(11).]
Sec. 12. Circuit judges shall be nominated and elected at non-partisan elections in
the circuit in which they reside, and shall hold office for a term of six years and
until their successors are elected and qualified. In circuits having more than one
circuit judge their terms of office shall be arranged by law to provide that not all
terms will expire at the same time. [Art VI(12).]
-10-
Article VI, § 23, however, specifically grants the Supreme Court authority, without limitation, to
assign former judges judicial duties for limited periods.
As stated in the introduction to the SCAO’s guidelines, the guidelines are “subject to
change or exception at the direction of the State Court Administrator.” Plaintiff MPC has
presented no authority to support that a discretionary SCAO guideline can trump the
constitutional and statutory authority of the Supreme Court to appoint former judges to
temporary assignments in any court in the state. Nor has plaintiff presented any authority to
support that this Court may hear challenges to SCAO temporary appointments, which,
presumably, are challenges to the Supreme Court’s authority. Additionally, we agree with
defendant FP that given Judge Stell’s familiarity with the case, having presided over it from July
1994 until she left the bench more than six years later, she was best equipped to complete the
case, particularly under the circumstance that she had taken the damages ruling at issue here
under advisement before leaving the bench. Plaintiff’s claim fails.
III
MPC contends that the circuit court’s refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing regarding the
reasonableness of the attorney fees constitutes error requiring reversal. We disagree.
A
This Court reviews a trial court’s award of attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. In re
Attorney Fees & Costs, 233 Mich App 694, 704; 593 NW2d 589 (1999). In Head v Phillips
Camper Sales, 234 Mich App 94, 113; 593 NW2d 595 (1999), the court awarded the plaintiff
attorney fees under the Michigan Consumer Protection Act without holding an evidentiary
hearing, and this Court affirmed:
We likewise reject plaintiff’s initial contention that the trial court erred in failing
to hold an evidentiary hearing regarding the reasonableness of her [attorney] fee
request. The trial court should normally hold an evidentiary hearing when the
opposing party challenges the reasonableness of a fee request. B & B Investment
Group v Gitler, 229 Mich App 1, 15-17; 581 NW2d 17 (1998); Petterman v
Haverhill Farms, Inc, 125 Mich App 30, 33; 335 NW2d 710 (1983). Here,
however, the trial court did not err in awarding fees without having held an
evidentiary hearing because the parties created a sufficient record to review the
issue, and the court fully explained the reasons for its decision. See Giannetti
Bros Constr Co v Pontiac, 175 Mich App 442, 450; 438 NW2d 313 (1989).
In Giannetti Bros Constr Co v Pontiac, 175 Mich App 442, 450; 438 NW2d 313 (1989), the
defendant challenged the trial court’s award of expert witness fees as being too low, arguing that
it had “no clue as to the basis on which the claimed expert witness fees were allowed or denied
and that it was error for the trial court to refuse an evidentiary hearing on the issue.” 175 Mich
App at 449. This Court disagreed, noting:
While it is true that the trial court did not expressly state which expert witness
fees had been disallowed, we think it of some significance that the figure awarded
-11-
($10,844.27) was, apparently, precisely the figure proposed by plaintiff Giannetti
in its brief to the trial court.
Pontiac bore the burden of proving its fees and costs. Giannetti challenged
portions of the costs submitted. After considering the briefs of both parties, the
trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, sided with Giannetti and disallowed
the bulk of Pontiac’s claimed expert witness fees. In view of the parties’ briefing
of the issue, the voluminous record before the trial court, and the trial court’s
familiarity with the circumstances of the case, we find no abuse of discretion in
the trial court’s limited award of expert witness fees nor in its having made the
award without having held an evidentiary hearing on the matter. The issue of
costs in this matter had been before the trial court off and on for nearly three
years. The cost issues were extensively briefed by both parties. We do not view
as unreasonable the trial court’s unwillingness to needlessly drag this case out any
longer. [Giannetti, supra at 449-450. Emphasis added.]
The Giannetti Court further noted:
We distinguish Petterman [v Haverhill Farms, Inc, 125 Mich App 30, 33; 335
NW2d 710 (1983)], wherein we remanded for an evidentiary hearing as to the
reasonableness of the attorney fee sought since, in that case, the trial court had
failed to give due consideration to the opposing party’s challenge to the
reasonableness of the figure. [175 Mich App at 450.]
On appeal, plaintiff MPC relies on Wilson v General Motors Corp, 183 Mich App 21;
454 NW2d 405 (1990), to support its position that the failure to hold an evidentiary hearing
constitutes reversible error. The Wilson Court relied on Petterman, supra, when it stated that
where the opposing party challenges the reasonableness of the fee requested, although a full
blown trial is not necessary, an evidentiary hearing is. Id. at 42-43. Petterman, however, does
not stand for the proposition that evidentiary hearings must always be granted. Rather, it states:
In the present case, the trial court considered none of [the Wood v DAIIE11
factors] on the record. It made no findings of fact. Instead, it found the bill of
costs to be “prima facie accurate.” . . . .
The itemized bill in itself was not sufficient to establish the reasonableness of the
fee, nor was the trial judge required to accept it on its face. . . . When plaintiff
challenged the reasonableness of the fee requested, the trial court should have
inquired into the services actually rendered by the attorney before approving the
bill of costs. . . . Since plaintiff claimed that defendants’ attorney fees were
excessive in general and the trial court failed to actually consider the issue of
reasonableness but instead found the bill acceptable on its face, the trial court
abused its discretion. This case is therefore remanded to the trial court for an
11
413 Mich 573; 321 NW2d 653 (1982).
-12-
evidentiary hearing on the reasonableness of the fee requested by defendants’
attorney. . . . [Petterman, supra at 30-31.]
B
In the instant case, a description of the proceedings and documentary record pertinent to
attorney fees is set forth in the circuit court’s opinion, to which plaintiff does not object:
On May 8, 1996, a[n] . . . Order was entered, which granted Frandorson’s
Petition for an Award of Attorney Fees, Costs and Damages pursuant to MCL
565.108 in an amount to be determined by the Court.
Frandorson submitted on or about May 29, 1996 a Supplemental Filing Regarding
Petition for an Award of Damages, Costs and Attorney Fees Pursuant to MCL
565.108 . . . which included Exhibit A, an updated statement of attorney fees and
costs, adding those incurred by Frandorson between February and April 1996.
This was followed on or about June 25, 1996 by Frandorson’s Motion for
Summary Disposition as to the Amount of Its Award of Attorney Fees and Costs
Pursuant to MCL 565.108. . . ., in which Frandorson claimed that despite repeated
letters to Mitan’s counsel requesting notice of the specific objections to the
proposed attorney fees, none had been provided. Finally on or about July 11,
1996 Mitan filed Objections to Frandorson’s Bills for Attorney Fees and Costs
Submitted Pursuant to MCR [sic MCL] 565.108. . . and [t]his Court’s May 8,
1996 Order (1996 Objections).
Mitan appealed the decision in Case II, and on December 13, 1996, the Court of
Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded the matter to this Court
for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals decision in Case II effectively
undermined the Order Granting Summary Disposition in Case I because that order
was based on res judicata. As a result, no further action was taken to determine
the appropriate amount of attorney fees.
On May 28, 1999, this Court issued another Opinion and Order in Case II, again
granting summary disposition to Frandorson. Frandorson brought a new motion
for summary disposition in Case I, and the Court adopted her opinion in Case II
and again entered an Order Granting Summary Disposition in Case I on July 10,
1999.
On or about February 10, 2000 Frandorson filed the instant Motion. Mitan filed a
generalized response on or about February 29, 2000 and later, on or about April 7,
2000 filed Counter-Defendants’ Identification of Objections to the
Reasonableness of Claimed Hours Billed by Frandorson’s Counsel and Request
for Evidentiary Hearing (Identification of Objections). The Identification of
Objections incorporated by reference the 1996 Objections. A hearing was held on
April 26, 2000 on Mitan’s Request for Evidentiary Hearing. The Court denied the
request, ordered both counsel to provide unredacted billings to each other by May
17, 2000, Mitan to file its objections and the reasons for them by June 14, 2000
and Frandorson to file its response to Mitan’s objections by June 28, 2000. A
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later stipulation and order of May 16, 2000 extend the deadline for exchanging the
unredacted billings to May 22, 2000.
On June 14, 2000 Mitan filed its Further Objections to the Reasonableness of
Claimed Hours Billed by Frandorson’s Counsel (Further Objections), which
incorporated by reference the 1996 Objections and the Identification of
Objections. Frandorson filed a responsive pleading (Response) to the Further
Objections on June 28, 2000.
In its Motion, Frandorson claimed $322,218.79 in attorney fees and costs through
April 1996 and an additional $71,232.07 between May 1996 and December 1999
for a total of $393,450.86. Frandorson unilaterally agreed to reduce that amount
by $28,456.32 (the total of sanctions imposed against Mitan by various other
courts involved in this matter) and by $1,095.81 (the amount by which
Frandorson’s requested sanctions against Mitan were reduced in Federal court
proceedings). After those deductions, the amount actually requested was
$363,898.73.
In Frandorson’s Response, it modified its earlier request to add the attorney fees
and costs incurred between January 1, 2000 and April 30, 2000 ($32,081.32) and
its estimated attorney fees and costs for May and June 2000 ($5,000) and to
deduct $25,003.56 (the amount of damages in Case I) and $7,600 (twice the
amount of fees inadvertently billed to this matter). Frandorson now seeks
$394,051.97 in attorney fees and costs.
In its Further Objections, Mitan asked the Court to:
(1) Deny Frandorson’s Motion because Frandorson has failed to show that
the requested fees were reasonably necessary, that they arouse [sic] out of
Case I and that they were reasonably incurred.
***
(3) Permit Mitan to have an evidentiary hearing.
(4) Sharply reduce the amount of attorney fees because it was out of
proportion to the damages allegedly claimed, if the Court proceeded with
its consideration of the Motion without an evidentiary hearing.
***
In support of its request for an evidentiary hearing on this issue (a request which
the Court has already denied), Mitan cites Howard v Canteen Corp, 192 Mich
App 427, 437; 481 NW2d 718 (1992). Howard involved a challenge by the
defendant to the appropriateness of the attorney fees awarded to the prevailing
plaintiff in a gender discrimination suit. . . .
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The Court of Appeals remanded Howard to the trial court for an evidentiary
hearing regarding the reasonableness of fees, finding there was insufficient
opportunity for defendant to challenge the specific hours or rates and that the trial
court’s findings were insufficient to satisfy the . . . requirement that the trial court
make findings of fact. The trial court was directed to give consideration to the
nonexclusive list of factors and guidelines in Wood v DAIIE, 413 Mich 573, 588;
321 NW2d 653 (1982), make a finding regarding the actual time spent on the case
and determine a reasonable attorney fee. The Court of Appeals indicated that the
trial court was not required to detail its findings regarding each factor.
The factual basis for the Howard decision is not present in this case. The
plaintiff’s attorney in Howard told the court that no contemporaneous billing
records were kept because the firm did not usually bill on an hourly basis since it
was a “plaintiffs’ firm.” The Court of Appeals noted:
While such records are not required to be kept, in demanding a
large sum of attorney fees the lack of contemporaneous time
records leaves room for doubt regarding the reasonableness of the
hours expended. Where the opposing party challenges the
reasonableness of the requested fee, the trial court should hold an
evidentiary hearing regarding the issue. If any of the underlying
facts, such as the number of hours spent in preparation, are in
dispute, the trial court should make findings of fact regarding the
disputed issues. Howard, p 438.
Here, not only were contemporaneous records kept, they were voluminous and
they were provided to Mitan’s counsel, who have had ample opportunity to
examine them, as shown by the more than 1,000 objections filed. In addition, the
billings for the bulk of the claimed fees have been in Mitan’s counsel’s possession
since May 1996—some three years and seven months before this Motion was
filed.
Mitan also relies on B & B Investment Group v Gitler, 229 Mich App 1; 581
NW2d 17 (1998), in which defendants contested, inter alia, attorney fees awarded
in a statutory slander of title action and attorney fees awarded in three contempt
proceedings. The Court of Appeals upheld the amount of the attorney fees
awarded in the slander of title action, but remanded for an evidentiary hearing
with respect to the reasonableness of attorney fees awarded during the contempt
proceedings.
The facts in B & B Investment are strikingly dissimilar to the facts in this case.
The district court in B & B Investment, in the first contempt hearing, adopted
plaintiff’s counsel’s oral representations as to the number of hours expended and
the hourly rates for himself and an associate over defense counsel’s objections. In
the second contempt hearing, the court granted the requested attorney fees with no
inquiry on the record into the reasonableness of the fee request, notwithstanding
defense counsel’s challenge. The court continued this pattern in the third
-15-
contempt hearing by ordering the payment of additional attorney fees without any
basis for that award being placed on the record.
With that factual basis, it is hardly surprising that the Court of Appeals noted
“Under these circumstances, we remand for an evidentiary hearing to determine
reasonable attorney fees.” 229 Mich App 17. Contrast those circumstances to the
facts in this case. Mitan has availed itself of three separate opportunities to
identify specific objections to the fees requested by Frandorson. It has also had
access to the unredacted billings.
The facts in this case are not analogous to the facts in Howard or B & B.
[Emphasis added.]
Given the voluminous documentary record reviewed by the court, and the fact that the
court made extensive factual findings, we conclude that the circuit court did not commit error
requiring reversal by not holding an evidentiary hearing. Head, supra, and Giannetti, supra.
IV
Plaintiff MPC next argues that, as to the attorney fees and costs for the period of January
1, 2000 to April 30, 2000, the circuit court’s refusal to grant an evidentiary hearing deprived
plaintiff of due process, since as to that time period the court decided to predict plaintiff’s
objections to the fees sought instead of allowing it to respond.
Analysis of what process is due in a particular proceeding depends on the nature
of the proceeding and the interest affected by it. Generally, due process in civil
cases requires notice of the nature of the proceeding, an opportunity to be heard in
a meaningful time and manner, and an impartial decision maker. The opportunity
to be heard does not require a full trial-like proceeding, but does require a hearing
to the extent that a party has a chance to know and respond to the evidence. [Klco
v Dynamic Training Corp, 192 Mich App 39, 42-43; 480 NW2d 596 (1991).
Citations omitted.]
The circuit court’s opinion stated in pertinent part:
The Court notes, however, that the additional request for fees and costs for the
period of January 1, 2000 – April 30, 2000 (Exhibit 6 to Frandorson’s Response)
was made too late for Mitan to respond. She has still considered the request,
believing that after reviewing Mitan’s three previous sets of objections in
excruciating detail, she is able to accurately predict the objections and bases for
them that Mitan would make.
Neither party explains how much or how many hours defendant FP requested for the
January through April 2000 period, or how much the circuit court awarded. Our review of the
-16-
record disclosed that the circuit court awarded $21,902.00 of the claimed $28,604.00 in attorney
fees, representing 121 of the claimed 176.4 hours.12
Plaintiff at no time below, or on appeal, identified objections it would have made to the
fees defendants sought, nor does plaintiff argue on appeal that any such objections would have
differed from those the circuit court predicted. The circuit court disallowed approximately
$7,000 of the amount defendants requested in attorney fees and plaintiff does not argue that any
objection it would have voiced could have, if adopted, resulted in greater diminishment in the
award of attorney fees.
We conclude that under the circumstances that defendants provided extensive detailed
records breaking out the legal services performed during the four months at issue by date,
initials, description of service performed and fee sought; that the court disallowed a significant
portion of the fees requested; and that plaintiff has not articulated objections to the fees, plaintiff
has not shown a deprivation of due process.
V
Plaintiff next argues that the circuit court improperly shifted the burden of proof
regarding the reasonableness of attorney fees. Plaintiff argues that without expert testimony, the
circuit court should have resolved the issue in plaintiff’s favor because plaintiff did not have the
burden of proof.
The circuit court’s opinion stated several times that the burden was on defendant FP to
prove the fees requested were reasonable. The court properly placed the burden of proof on
defendant FP to establish the reasonableness of the fees requested. The court’s reference in
passing to the fact that expert testimony would have been helpful does not support that it shifted
the burden of proof to plaintiff, rather, the statement was responding to defendant’s contention
that expert testimony is often presented. The court in fact stated that there is no requirement that
such testimony be presented, and there is no indication that this played any role in the burden of
proof the court applied. Plaintiff’s claim is unsupported by the record and fails.
VI
Plaintiff MPC also asserts that the circuit court abused its discretion in allowing fees
related to proceedings in other courts, i.e., for removals to federal court and the appeals to the
Court of Appeals. The circuit court’s opinion states in this regard:
12
Attachment A of the circuit court’s opinion and order sets forth by date and initials the
services for which it disallowed fees, and indicates that it disallowed 55.4 hours of the claimed
176.4, i.e., all services performed by a law clerk (initials BPM) totaling 53.6 hours ($6,432.00),
and 1.8 hours ($270.00) for services performed by AOR that the court deemed were not
necessary to prosecute this action. These figures assume the court found the hourly fees sought
for the allowed services were reasonable, which is a fair assumption given that plaintiff never
contested the reasonableness of the hourly fees defendant sought, and the court so noted in its
opinion, at page 8.
-17-
Federal Removal Cases, Federal and State Appeals, Contempt Proceedings
Mitan has objected to all charges for services provided in the federal
removal cases, Mitan’s appeal to the Sixth Circuit of sanctions awarded in the
removal cases, Mitan’s two claims of appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals
and the contempt proceedings in this Court. It has acknowledged that “this Court
has already rejected the Mitans’ objections to fees and expenses incurred in the
related federal removal cases, appeals, and contempt proceedings”. (1996
Objections, p 5.) Given that there would be no federal removal cases or appeals
from them but for Mitan’s actions, it is ludicrous to suggest that fees for those
proceedings do not arise out of this litigation. The same is true for Mitan’s
appeals to the Michigan Court of Appeals.
The contempt proceedings are part of this case and Case II. Mitan’s only new
argument is that fees and costs should not be awarded because the findings of
contempt are now on appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals. This argument is
without merit.
The Court will not revisit earlier rulings that attorneys fees and costs which were
incurred in these matters would be awarded. Objections on these grounds are
again overruled.
After plaintiff filed the instant appeal, a panel of this Court affirmed the circuit court’s findings
of contempt against the Mitan brothers in In re Contempt of Keith Mitan and Kenneth Mitan,
supra.
Defendant FP argues that, in any event, the award was proper under MCL 565.108
because the statute places no limit on the award of attorney fees other than that a plaintiff must
prevail on the slander of title claim, which FP did in this case. MCL 565.108 provides in
pertinent part that the court “shall award the plaintiff all the costs of such action [to quiet title],
including such attorney fees as the court may allow the plaintiff.” There are very few cases
involving damage awards under MCL 565.108. Some guidance is provided in B & B Investment
v Gitler, 229 Mich App 1; 581 NW2d 17 (1998), where this Court stated that an award of
attorney fees under MCL 565.108 is not limited to fees incurred up to the time the cloud on title
is removed. Id. at 11.
Given the complex and protracted litigation at issue here, the number of suits and appeals
involved, the broad wording of the statute, and the absence of authority supporting plaintiff’s
position, we conclude the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in awarding defendant
attorney fees pertinent to the federal removals and appeals to this Court. The facts underlying
these proceedings are well documented in prior decisions of this Court. Those decisions place
responsibility for these additional proceedings squarely on MPC. We find no error.
VII
Plaintiff also contends that the circuit court improperly allowed attorney fees that were
incurred long after the claims of interest were discharged, contrary to B & B Investment, supra.
As discussed in the previous issue, B & B Investment, supra at 11, states that attorney fees under
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MCL 565.108 are not limited to fees incurred up to when the cloud on title is removed. Given
the broad wording of the statute, the complicated and protracted litigation here, the number of
suits and appeals involved, and the absence of authority supporting plaintiff’s position, we affirm
the circuit court’s determination.
VIII
Plaintiff asserts that the circuit court improperly calculated attorney fees because it
disallowed only 25% of the fees incurred in the RICO lawsuit. Plaintiff notes that it specifically
objected to $51,046 of such fees, but that the circuit court disallowed only $7,600, which was a
figure defendant advanced, not plaintiff. Plaintiff also contends that the circuit court improperly
allowed attorney fees defendant incurred in contempt proceedings, in contravention of MCL
565.108, which permits an award of “all the costs of such action.” MPC maintains that fees
incurred in regard to contempt proceedings do not constitute costs in an action to quiet title.
Because plaintiff’s challenge regarding the RICO suit contains no discussion or citation
to authority, it is waived. Silver Creek Twp v Corso, 246 Mich App 94, 99; 631 NW2d 346
(2001). We will not disturb the circuit court’s analysis and determination.
Plaintiff’s conduct in this case necessitated the institution of contempt proceedings.
MCL 565.108 authorizes the court to award “all the costs of such action, including attorney
fees.” Further, MCL 600.1721, governing payment of damages in contempt proceedings,
provides that if the alleged misconduct has caused an actual loss or injury, the court shall order
the contemnor to pay a sufficient sum to indemnify the injured person. This statute does not
differentiate between civil and criminal contempt. We conclude that the circuit court’s award of
attorney fees was proper.
IX
Plaintiff also argues that in determining a reasonable attorney fee, the circuit court abused
its discretion by failing to consider the third factor (amount in question and results achieved), and
by substituting the first factor (professional standing and experience of the attorney) in its place.
We disagree.
The circuit court’s opinion stated in pertinent part:
The party seeking attorney fees and costs has the burden of proving that they are
reasonable, i.e. [sic] reasonably necessary and reasonably incurred. In re O’Neill
Estate, 168 Mich App 540 (1988). The trial judge has the duty to make findings
of fact on disputed issues. In doing so the judge must consider the factors set
forth in Crawley v Schick, 48 Mich App 728, 737; 211 NW2d 217 (1973), later
adopted in Wood v DAIIE, 413 Mich 573, 588; 321 NW2d 653 (1982), but is not
required to detail its findings as to each specific factor.
***
[discussion of facts in In re O’Neill and Wood, supra]
-19-
In Wood v DAIIE, the Michigan Supreme Court held that a determination under
the law that a party is entitled to attorney fees does not decide the amount of the
award.
. . . As to this question, we agree with the defendant that the
controlling criterion is that the attorney fees be ‘reasonable’. We
adopt the guidelines for determining ‘reasonableness’ set forth in
Crawley [supra at 737].
The Crawley panel noted that there is no precise formula for
computing the reasonableness of an attorney’s fee, but said that
factors to be considered are:
‘(1) the professional standing and experience of the attorney; (2)
the skill, time and labor involved; (3) the amount in question and
the results achieved; (4) the difficulty of the case; (5) the expenses
incurred; and (6) the nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client.’ (Citations omitted.)
There has been no suggestion that the law firm and the attorneys involved do not
enjoy a high degree of professional standing within the legal community. The
experience of the two attorneys who led the case, Robert W. Stocker, II and Mark
R. Fox, is sufficient for the Court to believe that they exercised good judgment in
the choices they made in determining the strategy of this case.
The skill, time and labor involved in this case was enormous—for both sides.
That was occasioned primarily by strategic decisions made by Mitan and also by
its remarkable recalcitrance in complying with reasonable discovery demands.
Mitan’s wholly unjustified actions in removing Case I, and later Case II, to
federal court on the flimsiest of rationales and its subsequent appeal of the
sanctions imposed as a result of those unwarranted removals to the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals [sic Eastern District of Michigan] significantly increased the
time and labor required to prosecute this case. Even the timing of those removals
increased the fees charged to Frandorson by its attorneys. Mitan’s practice of
removing the case just hours before a scheduled hearing meant the attorneys
appeared even though this Court had automatically been divested of its
jurisdiction by the removal. Mitan took what should have been a reasonably
straightforward case and transformed it into a monstrosity. It should not now
complain that the attorney fees and costs are too high.
The difficulty of the case was also increased by Mitan’s tactics. For example,
there would have been no need to research federal law on removals but for
Mitan’s decision to remove the cases to the federal district court.
The only one of the Wood factors that Mitan addressed to any degree was that of
the amount in question and the results achieved. Mitan argued that the fees and
costs requested was far in excess of the results achieved. This argument could
well be persuasive if this were a personal injury lawsuit. Certainly a request for
-20-
$394,051.97 in attorney fees and costs where the plaintiff in an automobile
accident received an award of $25,003.56 would raise anyone’s eyebrows. But
what was at stake in this case was Frandorson’s ability to clear title to its
properties in order to proceed with a closing with Chemical Bank and its need to
remove the threat that the personal indemnifications and its partners were required
to make would be required. Frandorson did prevail on all three counts of its
counterclaim. Although for reasons stated below, the Court will not award the
entire $394,051.97, a significant amount of fees and costs is consistent with the
result achieved.
The circuit court’s opinion addressed the third factor and did not inordinately weigh the
first factor. Plaintiff’s argument is unsupported by the record and fails.
X
Plaintiff’s argument that the default judgment against Kenneth Mitan was wrongly
entered is moot, because the court granted FP summary disposition in July 1999 on the merits.
XI
Plaintiff asserts that summary disposition was improperly entered because the judgment
in Case II is on appeal, and if that appeal is successful, then summary disposition in the instant
case will be improper because res judicata will be inapplicable.
Res judicata requires that the parties to the second action be substantially identical to the
parties in the first action. In re Humphrey Estate, 141 Mich App 412, 434; 367 NW2d 873
(1985). The parties must have been adversaries, i.e., arrayed on opposite sides and have a
controversy between them. York v Wayne Co Sheriff, 157 Mich App 417, 426-427; 403 NW2d
152 (1987). Plaintiff does not argue that Teresa Mitan was not its privy.
Plaintiff’s argument that this Court’s partial reversal in Case II (which was as to Teresa
Mitan only), renders the judgment in that case interlocutory and thus res judicata is inapplicable,
is meritless. Plaintiff provides no authority to support that res judicata does not apply here. As
discussed above, this Court has resolved the appeals from Case II against MPC, including
affirming the grant of summary disposition in FP’s favor except as to the conspiracy claim
against Teresa Mitan. The Supreme Court denied MPC’s application for leave to appeal the
grant of summary disposition to FP. 467 Mich 864 (2002). The judgment in Case II is final as to
the rights and liabilities of the parties at issue here and res judicata applies.
We affirm in all respects.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
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