PEOPLE OF MI V PAUL FRANCES JONES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 26, 2003
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 238127
Calhoun Circuit Court
LC No. 01-002172-FH
PAUL FRANCES JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Meter and Schuette, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his convictions of unlawfully driving away an automobile
(UDAA), MCL 750.413, and third-degree retail fraud, MCL 750.356d(4), entered after a jury
trial. We affirm. This appeal is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Defendant was observed driving a car that belonged to complainant. Complainant had
not given anyone permission to drive her car. Two of complainant’s co-workers observed the car
on the street, followed it to a parking lot, and called the police. The witnesses pointed out
defendant to the police as defendant left a dollar store. The police confronted defendant, who
denied that he owned a car in the parking lot. Defendant was arrested, and was found to have
merchandise from the dollar store concealed on his person. Defendant testified and conceded
that he was guilty of stealing merchandise from the dollar store; however, he denied that he stole
complainant’s car. He admitted that he drove the car to the dollar store and that he did not have
complainant’s permission to do so. Defendant stated that he did not know complainant and
maintained that he got the car from a woman he knew as “Spring.”
During closing argument defense counsel argued that no evidence showed that defendant
intended to steal the car. Counsel contended that the evidence showed nothing more than that
defendant used the car without authority.
The trial court instructed the jury on the principal offense of UDAA and on the lesserincluded offense of use of an automobile without authority and without intent to steal, MCL
750.414. The jury found defendant guilty of UDAA and third-degree retail fraud. The trial court
sentenced defendant as a fourth habitual offender to concurrent terms of three to seven years for
UDAA, with credit for 156 days, and ninety-three days for retail fraud, with credit for ninetythree days.
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Defendant moved in the trial court for a new trial, and sought an evidentiary hearing
pursuant to People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). He contended that trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to grasp the elements of UDAA and by failing
to call alibi witnesses. The trial court denied defendant’s motion, finding that the arguments
presented by defendant did not justify holding a Ginther hearing.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms. Counsel must have made errors so serious that he was not performing as the “counsel”
guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20;
People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 599; 623 NW2d 884 (2001). Counsel’s deficient performance
must have resulted in prejudice. To demonstrate the existence of prejudice, a defendant must
show a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceedings would
have been different. Id., 600. Counsel is presumed to have afforded effective assistance, and the
defendant bears the burden of proving otherwise. People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76; 601
NW2d 887 (1999).
The elements of UDAA are: (1) possession of a vehicle; (2) driving the vehicle away; (3)
the act of driving the vehicle away is done willfully; and (4) the possession and driving away
must be done without authority or permission. The offense of UDAA does not require an intent
to steal, i.e., to permanently deprive the owner of his property. People v Hendricks, 200 Mich
App 68, 71; 503 NW2d 689 (1993).
The elements of using an automobile without authority and without intent to steal are
that: (1) the defendant obtained lawful possession of the vehicle; (2) the defendant used the
vehicle beyond the authority granted to him; (3) the defendant intended to use the vehicle beyond
the authority granted to him; and (4) the defendant knew that he did not have the authority to use
the vehicle in the manner that he did. MCL 750.414; People v Hayward, 127 Mich App 50, 6061; 338 NW2d 549 (1983).
To be guilty of UDAA, the defendant must have taken initial possession of the vehicle in
an unlawful manner. Use of a vehicle without authority and without intent to steal applies if the
defendant got initial possession of the vehicle in a lawful manner but then used it in a manner he
knew was unauthorized. CJI2d 24.4.
Defendant argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance at trial by
misapprehending the elements of UDAA and contending that the offense included an intent to
steal and by failing to call various alibi witnesses. We disagree. A review of counsel’s closing
argument reveals that counsel was asserting that because the evidence did not establish that
defendant took possession of the vehicle in an unlawful manner, a conviction of using an
automobile without authority was appropriate. Counsel’s use of the term “intent to steal”
constituted trial strategy. We do not substitute our judgment for that of counsel on matters of
trial strategy. People v Rice (On Remand), 235 Mich App 429, 445; 597 NW2d 843 (1999).
However, notwithstanding counsel’s argument, complainant’s testimony that no one had
permission to use her car supported a finding that defendant did not gain possession of the car in
a lawful manner because “Spring” could not have had lawful possession of the car. The fact that
a strategy may not have succeeded does not mandate a conclusion that the strategy constituted
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ineffective assistance of counsel. People v Stewart (On Remand), 219 Mich App 38, 42; 555
NW2d 715 (1996). Defendant has not demonstrated that counsel’s use of the term “intent to
steal” resulted in prejudice. Carbin, supra.
Furthermore, defendant has not substantiated his claim that counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to call alibi witnesses because he has not indicated what any alibi witness
might have testified to at trial. Under the circumstances, defendant has not overcome the
presumption that counsel rendered effective assistance at trial. Rockey, supra.
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred in calculating the number of days of
sentence credit to which he was entitled. He does not specify the basis for his contention that the
trial court’s calculation was erroneous; therefore, we deem this issue abandoned. People v
Leonard, 224 Mich App 569, 588; 569 NW2d 663 (1997).
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Bill Schuette
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