SHARLENE TOLLIVER V WILLIAM VANDENBELT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
SHARLENE TOLLIVER,
UNPUBLISHED
June 19, 2003
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
WILLIAM VANDENBELT, M.D., BAY CITY
O.G., P.C., and BAY MEDICAL CENTER,
No. 237116
Bay Circuit Court
LC No. 01-003094-NH
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Saad and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals from and we affirm the trial court’s order granting summary disposition
to defendants in this medical malpractice action.
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred as a matter of law in its interpretation of the
interaction between the tolling provision of MCL 600.5856(d) and the notice of intent to sue
provision of MCL 600.2912b. MCL 600.2912b establishes a non-suit period lasting up to 182
days that is commenced by the filing of a written notice of intent to file a lawsuit. MCL
600.5856(d)1 provides that if the notice is filed less than 182 days before the expiration of the
two-year period of limitation, MCL 600.5805(5), the statute of limitations is tolled for a period
equal to the number of days remaining in the notice period.
Our Supreme Court, in Omelenchuk v City of Warren, 461 Mich 567; 609 NW2d 177
(2000), has explained that the first clause of § 5856(d)
sets forth the circumstances in which [§ 5856(d)] is applicable. Thus, if the
interval when a potential plaintiff is not allowed to sue ends before the limitation
period ends (i.e., if notice is given more than one hundred eighty-two days before
1
MCL 600.5856(d) specifically provides that the statutes of limitations or repose are tolled:
If, during the applicable notice period under section 2912b, a claim would
be barred by the statute of limitations or repose, for not longer than a number of
days equal to the number of days in the applicable notice period after the date
notice is given in compliance with section 2912b.
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the end of the limitation period), then [§ 5856(d)] is of no consequence. In that
circumstance, the limitation period is unaffected by the fact that, during that
period, there occurs an interval when a potential plaintiff cannot file suit.
If, however, the interval when a potential plaintiff is not allowed to file
suit would end after the expiration of the limitation period (i.e., if notice is given
one hundred eighty-two days or less before the end of the limitation period), then
[§ 5856(d)] applies. In that instance, the limitation period is tolled. [Emphasis
supplied.]
The statement in Omelenchuk is consistent with the plain language of § 5856(d), which
provides tolling protection if the statute of limitations expires during the notice period. Plaintiff
contends that the emphasized portion of Omelenchuk is merely dicta and, therefore, this Court is
free to ignore it and interpret the statute anew. We disagree. Parts of judicial decisions may be
authoritative though not decisive:
“When a court of last resort intentionally takes up, discusses and decides a
question germane to, though not necessarily decisive of, the controversy, such
decision is not a dictum but is a judicial act of the court which it will thereafter
recognize as a binding decision.” In re Cox Estate, 383 Mich 108, 117; 174
NW2d 558 (1970), quoting Chase v American Cartage Co, Inc, 176 Wis 235,
238; 186 NW2d 598 (1922) (emphasis in original).
The Supreme Court in Omelenchuk undertook to interpret the meaning of § 5856(d) and its
relationship to § 2912b – the precise issue we must decide. In order to interpret the statutory
meaning, it was necessary to consider and interpret the entire statute – though portions of the
statute might not be directly implicated by the facts presented in Omelenchuk. Therefore, the
Court determined, first, that in certain situations, applicable here, the notice period would not
affect the statute of limitations, but that in other situations it would toll the statute. The Court
then went on to determine – in those circumstances where the notice period would affect the
statute of limitations – exactly what affect the notice period would have. The issue regarding the
meaning of the first clause of § 5856(d) was therefore germane to the controversy and the
Court’s resultant conclusion regarding the nonapplicability of the tolling provision, is not dicta.
Here, plaintiff’s cause of action arose on December 17, 1998. Absent an applicable
tolling provision, the two-year limitation period would have expired on December 17, 2000.
Plaintiff filed her notice of intent on April 25, 2000, which triggered the 182-day “no filing”
notice period. MCL 600.2912b(1). The 182-day period (during which time plaintiff could not
file suit) expired on October 24, 2000. As of October 24, 2000, the statute of limitations had
fifty-four days to run. Therefore, during the notice period, a claim would not have been barred
by the statute of limitations. MCL 600.5856(d). Accordingly, pursuant to Omelenchuk,
§ 5856(d) was inapplicable, the limitation period was not tolled or “extended,” and plaintiff was
required to file her lawsuit before the expiration of the standard, two-year statute of limitation,
December 17, 2000, in order to avoid the two-year time bar. Plaintiff failed to file her lawsuit
until January 29, 2001 – after the limitation period had expired. Thus, the trial court correctly
ruled that plaintiff’s complaint was barred by the statute of limitations.
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Plaintiff raises the unpreserved claim that §5856(d) is unconstitutional because its
application in this case restricts her right of access to the courts. However, it would be
inappropriate for us to consider this issue because the tolling provision is simply inapplicable
where plaintiff’s notice period ended before the statute of limitations period expired. See Auto
Club Ins Ass’n v City of Farmington Hills, 220 Mich App 92, 100-101; 559 NW2d 314 (1996).
Plaintiff also contends that the tolling provision of § 5856(d) treats similarly situated
medical malpractice plaintiffs differently depending solely on when they file their mandatory
notice of intent to file a lawsuit and therefore violates plaintiff’s right to equal protection, Const
1963, art 1, § 2. Pursuant to Omelenchuk, supra, at 574, the tolling period challenged by
plaintiff is inapplicable to her because the 182-day notice/non-suit period of § 2912b(1) ended
well before the two-year limitations period expired. Because plaintiff was not precluded from
filing her complaint by the interaction of § 2912b and § 5856(d), it is unnecessary to consider her
equal protection claim. Traylor v Auditor General, 360 Mich 146, 154; 103 NW2d 769 (1960)
(“[F]ew principles of judicial interpretation are more firmly grounded than this: a court does not
grapple with a constitutional issue except as a last resort”).2
Affirmed.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
2
Were we to consider plaintiff’s equal protection challenge, we would agree with our decision in
Neal in which we rejected a similar challenge directed at § 2912b. “Under rational-basis review,
courts will uphold legislation [if the] legislation is rationally related to a legitimate government
purpose.” Crego, supra at 259, citing Dandridge v Williams, 397 US 471, 485; 90 S Ct 1153; 25
L Ed 2d 491 (1970). This Court has identified a legitimate purpose for the notice period
(§2912(b)), and has observed that the notice period interacts with the tolling statute (§5856(d) to
achieve a legitimate purpose -- the protection of all potential medical malpractice claimants from
the possible adverse impact of the statute of limitations during the “non-suit” notice period.
Therefore, we conclude that, were we to address plaintiff’s equal protection argument, the
rational basis inquiry is satisfied and § 5856(d) does not violate equal protection.
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