CHRISTOPHER R GETTS V LINDA S GETTS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CHRISTOPHER R. GETTS,
UNPUBLISHED
May 20, 2003
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 238040
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-827914-DM
LINDA S. GETTS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Cavanagh and Hoekstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right from a judgment of divorce. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in refusing to award her any portion of the
lump sum or monthly payments under the Ford settlement agreement because the trial court’s
ruling was wrong as a matter of law, and none of the payments were for pain and suffering. We
disagree. A question of law is subject to de novo review on appeal. Christiansen v Gerrish Twp,
239 Mich App 380; 608 NW2d 83 (2000). Factual findings are subject to review for clear error.
Harper v Harper, 199 Mich App 409, 410; 502 NW2d 731 (1993). A finding is clearly
erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire record
is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made. Id. If the trial court’s
findings of fact are upheld, this Court must decide whether the dispositive ruling was fair and
equitable in light of those facts. The dispositional ruling is discretionary and should be affirmed
unless this Court is left with the firm conviction that the division was inequitable. Sands v
Sands, 442 Mich 30, 34; 497 NW2d 493 (1993).
A judgment of divorce must include a determination of the property rights of the parties.
Yeo v Yeo, 214 Mich App 598, 601; 543 NW2d 62 (1995). The goal in distributing marital
assets in a divorce proceeding is to reach an equitable distribution of property in light of all the
circumstances. McNamara v Horner, 249 Mich App 177, 188; 642 NW2d 385 (2002). The
court should consider the duration of the marriage, the contribution of each party to the marital
estate, each party’s station in life, each party’s earning ability, each party’s age, health and needs,
fault or past misconduct, and any other equitable circumstance. McDougal v McDougal, 451
Mich 80, 89; 545 NW2d 357 (1996). The parties’ manifestation of intent to lead separate lives,
such as the filing a complaint for divorce or maintaining separate homes, may be of crucial
significance when apportioning the marital estate. Byington v Byington, 224 Mich App 103, 112;
568 NW2d 141 (1997).
-1-
A personal injury award for one spouse’s pain and suffering is personal property, not
joint marital property. Bywater v Bywater, 128 Mich App 396, 398; 340 NW2d 102 (1983). The
trial court may award to a divorcing spouse any part of the real and personal estate of either party
if the estate and effects otherwise are insufficient to suitably support and maintain that party. Id.
The assets of both parties and jointly owned marital property, are available for distribution by the
trial court. Id. at 398-399.
It is proper for the trial court to consider the actual source or ownership of an asset.
Bywater, supra at 128 Mich App 399. This is one factor to be considered in reaching an
equitable division in divorce proceedings. Id. While the fact that a particular asset belongs
solely to one spouse may provide the trial court with a persuasive reason to award that property
to its owner, nevertheless, if the marital estate is otherwise insufficient to maintain the
nonowning party, the court may award all or part of the asset to that spouse. Id. at 400.
Defendant’s allegation that the trial court’s order of March 10, 2000, is wrong as a matter
of law has no merit. On March 10, 2000, the trial court found:
to the extent any portion of the $1,000,000.00 payment to be made to the
Claimants in the proposed Ford Motor Company Settlement is attributable to pain
and suffering for Christopher Getts, the amount so determined, if any, shall be
considered the Plaintiff’s separate property for purposes of this divorce action.
The Court denies Plaintiff’s request to determine what portion, if any, of such
1,000,000.00 payment is attributable to pain and suffering for Christopher Getts at
this time and the same shall be addressed at the trial of this case.
As stated in Bywater, a personal injury award for a spouse’s pain and suffering is not joint
marital property; it is personal property. Bywater, supra at 128 Mich App 398. Therefore, as a
matter of law, the trial court did not err in finding that any portion of the Ford settlement
agreement attributable to plaintiff’s pain and suffering be considered plaintiff’s separate
property.
Defendant argues that none of the payments under the Ford settlement agreement were
for pain and suffering. In its opinion, the trial court stated, “[t]he amount provided by Ford,
under paragraph 1(a) of the FORD settlement agreement filed under seal as Court Exhibit 1, is in
its entirety compensation for the pain and suffering of Plaintiff.” The trial court specifically
found that the settlement from Ford was not for wage compensation or for medical treatment.
The trial court relied on the fact that plaintiff’s attorney was present during the negotiations with
Ford and testified that provision 1(a) of the Ford settlement agreement was intended to
compensate the victims of the Ford River Rouge explosion for their immense pain and suffering.
The amount in section 1(a) was drafted using the average of the product liability caps of other
states regarding non-economic pain and suffering damages.
The trial court cited Bywater, supra at 128 Mich App 340, and found that any settlement
offered to plaintiff by Ford in section 1(a), which is for pain and suffering, is not marital
property. The trial judge stated the amount in provision 1(a) cannot represent an offer to
compensate defendant for a loss of consortium because defendant admitted that she had lost no
amount of consortium.
-2-
The trial court also found that the assets of the estate were sufficient to support defendant
in the lifestyle to which she was accustomed before the settlement from Ford, and therefore, the
money from the Ford settlement agreement need not be invaded. The trial court also cited
Byington, supra at 224 Mich App 103, and stated that because the Ford asset was acquired six
months after the complaint for divorce was filed, this was a perfect example of a public
manifestation to lead separate lives. Furthermore, the trial court found that defendant made no
contribution to the Ford asset.
After review of the record, we conclude that the trial court’s findings are not clearly
erroneous and are supported by the record. Plaintiff’s attorney for his claims against Ford as a
result of the Ford River Rouge explosion testified that the Ford settlement agreement was for
intangible elements of pain and suffering, mental anguish, humiliation, mortification,
disfigurement, disability, and emotional distress. Plaintiff’s attorney also testified that in the
Ford negotiations, they discussed the potential value of intangible claims and non-economic
damages. One million dollars represented a reasonable figure for pain and suffering. The
$1,000,000 was exclusively for non-economic damages. Defendant also admitted that she did
not suffer a loss of companionship as a result of the accident. Therefore, the evidence
demonstrated that the purpose of the Ford settlement agreement was to compensate plaintiff for
his pain and suffering.
Furthermore, the assets of the estate before the Ford settlement were sufficient to support
defendant in the style to which she was accustomed. Defendant testified that if she were able to
leave the marriage with enough money to provide her the lifestyle to which she has been
accustomed, that would be sufficient. Plaintiff’s salary provided defendant a life that was
sufficiently comfortable and met all her needs. Before the accident, defendant acknowledged
that the marital estate was sufficient to provide her with the standard of living that she had during
the marriage. Defendant testified that she never lived a life of luxury, did not go to the spa, was
not a member of a private club, and did not eat at expensive restaurants. Therefore, the trial
court did not err in concluding that the assets of the estate were sufficient to support defendant in
the living style that she was accustomed.
Moreover, the evidence clearly showed defendant did not contribute to the Ford
settlement award, and that before the accident, plaintiff and defendant were publicly living
separate lives. Defendant only visited plaintiff in the hospital on the night of his accident. Other
than opening jars, defendant did not help plaintiff while he was recovering from his accident.
Defendant never offered to help plaintiff after he left of the hospital and never offered to take
him to physical therapy. Defendant did not have any out-of-pocket expenses for treating plaintiff
while he was in the hospital. At the time of the accident, the divorce had been filed for five
months, and plaintiff and defendant were living separate lives. Plaintiff and defendant had
ceased going out in public together as a married couple and had stopped presenting themselves
as married people. The last time plaintiff and defendant had sexual relations was nine months
before the accident. Therefore, we find that the trial court’s findings of fact with regard to
section 1(a) of the Ford settlement agreement are not erroneous.
Next, defendant argues that the monthly payments under section 1(c) of the Ford
settlement agreement are marital assets. Section 1(c) of the Ford agreement states: (c) a lump
sum will be paid in the amount of $14,521.01 representing the monthly benefits for February
through August 1999. Thereafter claimant or duly designated payee shall be paid 218 monthly
-3-
payments commencing on or about September 1, 1999. The trial court found: “Any payments to
Plaintiff under paragraph 1(c) of Court Exhibit 1, is compensation for lost wages. This is an
after acquired asset of the marriage.”
In its opinion, the trial court cited Byington, supra at 224 Mich App 103, and concluded:
that under appropriate circumstances an asset, (such as the asset at issue in the
case at bar), might be awarded wholly to one party. The Court determines that
such an award would be based on the other party’s lack of contribution to the
acquisition of an asset, acquired by the other party alone, after the filing of the
Complaint for Divorce. Further, the lack of contribution to the acquisition of the
asset could be weighed to require award of such an asset to the party who
acquired it. The Court of Appeals, instructs the a [sic] trial court to consider the
manifestation of the parties to maintain separate lives when apportioning such an
asset under the factors of Sparks v Sparks, 440 Mich 141, 159-160; 485 NW2d
893 (1992).
The trial court did not err in awarding the monthly payments under section 1(c) of the
Ford settlement agreement to plaintiff. Defendant did not contribute to the Ford asset which was
obtained after the parties manifested an intention to maintain separate lives. Defendant did not
have any out-of-pocket expenses for treating plaintiff while he was in the hospital. By the time
of the accident, the divorce had been filed for five months, and plaintiff and defendant were
living separate lives. Plaintiff and defendant had ceased going out in public together or
representing themselves as a married couple. Therefore, pursuant to Byington, the trial court did
not err in awarding the monthly payments under section 1(c) of the Ford settlement agreement to
plaintiff.
Defendant argues that the trial court’s division of the assets was not fair and equitable in
light of all the circumstances. In dividing the marital estate, the court should consider the
duration of the marriage, the contribution of each party to the marital estate, each party’s station
in life, each party’s earning ability, each party’s age, health and needs, fault or past misconduct,
and any other equitable circumstance. McDougal, supra at 451 Mich 89.
The trial court analyzed the factors in dividing the marital estate and found that although
the marriage was lengthy, defendant never made any palpable contribution to the marital estate
and made no contribution to the Ford asset in dispute. The trial court found that the age of the
parties was not a factor of any weight, but that the health of the parties weighed in favor of the
distribution advocated by plaintiff because plaintiff is disabled and defendant can obtain
employment. The trial court found that defendant is entitled to no portion of the property
acquired after the parties’ manifestation of intent to lead separate lives.
The trial court awarded the marital home to plaintiff, with half the equity to defendant,
ordered that each party be liable for his own credit card debt, and divided evenly all stock,
brokerage accounts, pension and retirement funds. The trial court awarded plaintiff all the
proceeds from the Ford River Rouge explosion settlement, all UAW crisis money, and River
Rouge Trust Fund money. Defendant was awarded the Ford Probe, and plaintiff was awarded
the Dodge Van. Defendant was awarded her two karat diamond ring and the interest income
-4-
produced from the Ford settlement agreement held in trust. The trial court ordered the balance of
the property to be equitably divided.
We conclude that the trial court’s ruling was fair and equitable in light of all the facts.
The trial court did not err in analyzing the factors. Aside from the Ford settlement agreement
proceeds, the assets were divided evenly. As stated above, section 1(a) of the Ford settlement
agreement was awarded to plaintiff for his pain and suffering, which under Bywater, supra at
128 Mich App 398, is separate property. Additionally, the court correctly awarded the remainder
of the Ford settlement agreement proceeds to plaintiff because pursuant to Byington, supra at
224 Mich App 103, defendant did not contribute to the asset, and the parties already maintained
separate lives by the time the accident occurred. The trial court did not err in refusing to invade
the Ford proceeds under Bywater because the court correctly found that the assets of the estate
were sufficient to support defendant in the lifestyle to which she was accustomed. Therefore, we
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its division of the parties’ assets.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in refusing to award defendant any portion
of the UAW Crisis Fund and Ford River Rouge Fund payments. We disagree. Factual findings
are subject to review for clear error. Christiansen, supra at 239 Mich App 380. The parties’
manifestation of intent to lead separate lives, by filing a complaint for divorce or maintaining
separate homes may be of crucial significance when apportioning the marital estate. Byington,
surpa at 224 Mich App 112. The factor of what each party contributed to the marital estate is
significant with regard to property acquired after public manifestation to lead separate lives. Id.
at 115. An appropriate weighing of the factors may in some cases result in a determination that
the nonacquiring party is entitled to no portion of property acquired after a manifestation of
intent to lead separate lives because of the difference in the parties’ contributions to the
acquisition of such property. Id. at 116. Because defendant did not contribute to the Ford asset
which was obtained after the parties manifested an intention to maintain separate lives, pursuant
to Byington, we find that the trial court did not err in awarding the UAW Crisis Fund and Ford
River Rouge Fund payments to plaintiff.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in refusing to award her spousal support.
We disagree. The trial court’s factual findings are to be reviewed for clear error. Moore v
Moore, 242 Mich App 652, 654; 619 NW2d 723 (2000). The main objective of alimony is to
balance the incomes and needs of the parties in a way which will not impoverish either party, and
an award of alimony must be based on what is just and reasonable under the circumstances of the
case. Moore, supra at 242 Mich App 654. The factors to be considered in granting alimony are:
(1) the past relations and conduct of the parties; (2) the length of the marriage; (3) the abilities of
the parties to work; (4) the source and amount of property awarded to the parties; (5) the parties’
ages; (6) the abilities of the parties to pay alimony; (7) the present situation of the parties; (8) the
needs of the parties; (9) the parties’ health; (10) the prior standard of living of the parties and
whether either is responsible for the support of others; (11) contributions of the parties to the
joint estate; (12) a party’s fault in causing the divorce; (13) the effect of cohabitation on a party’s
financial status; and (14) general principles of equity. Ianitelli v Ianitelli, 199 Mich App 641,
644; 502 NW2d 691 (1993).
In its opinion, the trial court found that plaintiff is disabled and that defendant did not
suffer from any disability that would prevent her from obtaining full time employment.
Defendant received her certification from Michigan Para Professionals in medical assisting and
-5-
has twelve years of practical experience. Defendant stated that jobs in her area pay at least $9.50
an hour. In addition, the trial court found that defendant will have a lump sum payment from the
interest on the Ford settlement agreement funds to use to continue her new life. The trial court
concluded that plaintiff is not entitled to alimony.
The trial court’s findings were not clearly erroneous, and the ruling was fair and
equitable. Although defendant had not worked since early 1990, there is no physical reason why
she cannot seek employment. Defendant was trained as a medical assistant and obtained a
diploma from Michigan Para Professionals. Medical assistant jobs are currently available for $9
to $9.50 an hour.
Additionally, defendant did not contribute monetarily to the marital estate. Defendant did
not work for a majority of the marriage and did not contribute to any of the household expenses
during the marriage. Defendant intended to return to work. During the marriage, defendant
agreed with plaintiff that she would stay home until their child was in high school, and then she
would return to work.
Furthermore, defendant will be able to maintain a similar lifestyle to the one she had with
plaintiff with a combination of the property that she received from the division of the marital
estate and the money she can earn from employment. Defendant lived a life that was sufficiently
comfortable where all of her needs were met based on plaintiff’s salary. Before the accident,
defendant did not fear that the marital estate was not sufficient to provide her with the standard
of living that she had during the marriage. We conclude the trial court did not err in refusing to
award alimony to defendant.
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to award expert and
attorney fees. We disagree. The decision whether to award attorney fees in a divorce action is
within the trial court’s discretion and will be reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion.
Millilgan v Milligan, 197 Mich App 665, 670; 496 NW2d 394 (1992). The trial judge awarded
defendant the $15,000 in interest from the Ford settlement funds and stated, “this will give her
monies to continue her new life and pay her attorney fees.”
Defendant’s claim is without merit because the trial court, in fact, awarded defendant half
of the marital estate and $65,000 to pay, in part, her attorney fees.
Plaintiff argues that defendant’s appeal was vexatious as provided by MCR 7.216(C).
MCR 7.216(C)(1)(a) provides that this Court may assess damages when it determines that an
appeal was vexatious because it “was taken for purposes of hindrance or delay or without any
reasonable basis for belief that there was a meritorious issue to be determined on appeal.” We
find that defendant’s issues on appeal were not vexatious pursuant to MCR 7.216(C).
We affirm.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
-6-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.