BRUCE FRITZ V JOHN MONNICH
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
UNPUBLISHED
May 20, 2003
BRUCE FRITZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
JOHN MONNICH, and HOLAHAN, MALLOY,
MAYBAUGH & MONNICH, P.C., d/b/a
HOLAHAN, MALLOY, MAYBAUGH,
MONNICH & DELIE,
No. 235262
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 97-541140-NM
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Murphy and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the judgment granting defendants’ motion for summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8), and (10). This action involves claims of legal
malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and alleged violations of state and federal employee
polygraph protection acts, MCL 37.201 et seq. and 29 USC 2001 et seq. The case arises out of
defendants’ representation and defense of plaintiff and Pontiac Osteopathic Hospital (POH) in a
sexual harassment lawsuit. The sexual harassment suit was settled, allegedly without plaintiff’s
consent, although POH’s agreement to settle is not in dispute. Here, plaintiff challenges
summary dismissal of his causes of action, and argues that he was entitled to partial summary
disposition. We affirm.
We first address dismissal of the legal malpractice claim. On appeal, numerous
arguments are presented regarding the interplay between the Michigan Rules of Professional
Conduct (MRPC) and a legal malpractice action, the appropriate standard of care and what
constitutes a breach of that standard, and the evidentiary burdens and use of expert testimony.
We find it unnecessary to address plaintiff’s arguments in-depth because he has failed, as a
matter of law, to show the requisite injury even assuming that defendants’ representation was
negligent.
To establish legal malpractice, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the existence of an attorneyclient relationship; (2) negligence in the legal representation of the plaintiff; (3) that the
negligence was a proximate cause of an injury; and (4) the fact and extent of the injury alleged.
Simko v Blake, 448 Mich 648, 655; 532 NW2d 842 (1995); Persinger v Holst, 248 Mich App
499, 502; 639 NW2d 594 (2001). A plaintiff in a legal malpractice suit must show that but for
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the attorney’s alleged malpractice, he or she would have been successful in the underlying
action. Radtke v Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone, 453 Mich 413, 424; 551 NW2d 698 (1996);
Coleman v Gurwin, 443 Mich 59, 63-64; 503 NW2d 435 (1993)(giving rise to the suit within a
suit requirement in order to avoid speculative damages); Colbert v Conybeare Law Office, 239
Mich App 608, 619-620; 609 NW2d 208 (2000).
The Colbert panel, analyzing the “injury” element of a legal malpractice action, ruled:
A claim of malpractice further requires a showing of actual injury caused
by the malpractice, not just the potential for injury. Keliin v Petrucelli, 198 Mich
App 426, 430; 499 NW2d 360 (1993). Although plaintiff claims that it was
foreseeable that he would suffer damages as the result of his delay in filing a
worker’s compensation claim, plaintiff relies solely on speculation and the
potential for injury to support his claim. Plaintiff has offered no evidence
showing actual injury, i.e., the “fact and extent” of the damages he alleges.
McCluskey v Womack, 188 Mich App 465, 473; 470 NW2d 443 (1991). [Colbert,
supra at 620.]
Here, the underlying sexual harassment suit was settled, with POH alone being
responsible for making the full settlement payment, not plaintiff. Plaintiff also was not
financially responsible for any litigation costs. If the case had proceeded to trial, plaintiff faced
the possibility of being personally liable on a judgment. Therefore, there was no financial injury
arising out of the settlement, yet there was the prospect of financial injury had there been no
settlement.1 Moreover, the settlement agreement specifically provided that plaintiff and POH
denied liability and any wrongdoing, and that the settlement did not reflect an admission of
liability. Had defendants not settled the sexual harassment suit, plaintiff’s chance of success in
the action is a matter that is highly speculative.2 Regardless, it is apparent that the alleged victim
in the sexual harassment suit would not have proceeded against plaintiff alone after settling with
POH and receiving compensation. Plaintiff has no actual compensable injury. We also note
with significance that the trial court ruled that plaintiff’s injury claim was speculative; however,
a review of the issues presented in plaintiff’s appellate brief reveals a lack of any challenge to
that finding. Reversal is not warranted.
With respect to plaintiff’s claim of breach of fiduciary duty, claims against attorneys
brought on the basis of inadequate representation sound in tort and are grounded in the law of
legal malpractice only. See Aldred v O’Hara-Bruce, 184 Mich App 488, 490-491; 458 NW2d
671 (1990). Plaintiff alleged that defendants violated their fiduciary duties by failing to exercise
reasonable care in representing plaintiff. The gravamen of plaintiff’s allegations concerning the
alleged breach of fiduciary duties sounded in legal malpractice; therefore, the fiduciary duty
1
Recovery in a legal malpractice action is usually the value of the claim in the proceeding in
which the negligent act occurred if the client was a plaintiff, or if the client was a defendant, the
amount of the judgment imposed upon him. Coleman, supra at 63-64.
2
The ability to assess the “likelihood of success” issue by a trier of fact would be virtually
impossible in light of the fact that the alleged victim is now deceased.
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claim cannot constitute a separate cause of action and was subsumed by the malpractice claim.
Moreover, assuming that some of the specific fiduciary duty allegations are distinguishable,
plaintiff’s action is defeated as a matter of law because of the highly speculative nature of the
alleged damages.
Finally, with respect to the polygraph claims, the trial court correctly determined that
collateral estoppel barred plaintiff from relitigating the issues necessary for him to succeed. The
issue of collateral estoppel arose based on previous litigation by plaintiff against POH.
Collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue in a subsequent, different cause of action
between the same parties or their privies when the issue was actually and necessarily determined
in a prior proceeding that culminated in a valid final judgment. Ditmore v Michalik, 244 Mich
App 569, 577; 625 NW2d 462 (2001). The issue must be identical, not merely similar, Wilcox v
Sealey, 132 Mich App 38, 47; 346 NW2d 889 (1984), and the prior proceeding must have
provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, Detroit v Qualls, 434 Mich 340, 357;
454 NW2d 374 (1990).
Plaintiff argues that the polygraph claims against defendants are distinct from those
asserted in the previous litigation against POH. With respect to the polygraph examination
conducted on March 22, 1995, there was a jury determination in the previous suit that plaintiff
was no longer an employee at the time the test was administered; therefore, no liability arose
under state and federal law. Thus, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, any polygraph
claims in the case sub judice arising out of the March 22, 1995, polygraph test are barred.
Clearly, if plaintiff was no longer an employee at the time, plaintiff’s agency theory of liability
could not be pursued against defendants.
Additionally, in regard to plaintiff’s refusal to take a requested polygraph test prior to
March 22, 1995, the trial judge in the earlier litigation granted summary disposition against
plaintiff on the polygraph claims, ruling that plaintiff failed to allege or present any proof of
damages. Therefore, any polygraph claims here arising out of pre-March 22, 1995, polygraph
requests were properly dismissed on the basis of collateral estoppel. To the extent that there may
have been additional instances in which defendants, on POH’s behalf, requested plaintiff to take
a polygraph examination, dismissal was still proper because plaintiff’s complaint alleged injuries
and damages arising solely out of the March 22, 1995, examination. The polygraph claims were
properly dismissed.
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Karen Fort Hood
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