PEOPLE OF MI V NICOLE L MOORE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 29, 2003
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 237793
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 00-013489
NICOLE L. MOORE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Jansen and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right from her convictions by a jury of possession with intent to
deliver fifty or more but less than 225 grams of heroin, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii), and possession
with intent to deliver less than fifty grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv). The trial court
sentenced her to ten to twenty years’ imprisonment for the heroin conviction and to a concurrent
term of one to twenty years’ imprisonment for the cocaine conviction. We affirm.
In her first issue on appeal, defendant argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct
requiring reversal. “We review claims of prosecutorial misconduct case by case, examining the
remarks in context, to determine whether the defendant received a fair and impartial trial.”
People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 586; 629 NW2d 411 (2001). Defendant identifies five
specific areas of concern.
She first contends that the prosecutor improperly relied on evidence of other bad acts in
violation of MRE 404 by eliciting from a witness that one of the vehicles confiscated from the
home in which the drugs were found had an altered vehicle identification number. She argues
that the prosecutor improperly failed to provide advance notice of her intention to use this “other
acts” evidence as required by MRE 404(b) and improperly insinuated that the vehicle was stolen.
We cannot conclude that reversal is warranted. Indeed, even assuming, arguendo, that
the prosecutor should not have elicited the information in question, defendant was not denied a
fair trial as a result of the error. The discussion of the altered number was brief, and,
significantly, the court ordered the offending answers struck from the record. No one testified
that defendant actually possessed a stolen vehicle but merely that “something ha[d] been altered
on [the] vehicle.” Under the circumstances, the defendant was not denied her right to a fair and
impartial trial. See Watson, supra at 586.
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Second, defendant contends that the prosecutor erred during closing arguments by stating
that defendant was faking her limp to elicit sympathy from the jury. Because there was no
objection to this remark, we review this issue using a plain error analysis. People v Carines, 460
Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). To obtain relief, defendant must demonstrate the
existence of a clear or obvious error that affected the outcome of the case. Id. We find no such
error. During trial, the prosecutor had questioned defendant about her limp, asking whether she
had also limped the previous day. Defendant testified that she had indeed been limping the
previous day. The jury was in a position to determine whether defendant had been limping
previously or whether defendant may have been attempting to elicit sympathy. At any rate, we
cannot conclude that the statement by the prosecutor affected the outcome of the case, given the
evidence of defendant’s guilt introduced during trial. Accordingly, reversal is unwarranted.1 Id.
Third, defendant contends that the prosecutor erred during closing arguments by stating
without evidentiary support that defendant matched the identification of the unnamed person
mentioned in the search warrant. We find no error, however, because the officer in charge
testified that defendant did indeed match the description in the search warrant. Accordingly, the
prosecutor’s argument was supported by the evidence introduced at trial.
Fourth, defendant contends that the prosecutor erred during closing arguments by
mischaracterizing the testimony of a witness. We agree that the prosecutor erred in this instance.
Indeed, contrary to the prosecutor’s assertion, the witness in question did not testify that she had
talked with defendant’s mother about her proposed testimony. However, although the prosecutor
made a misstatement, we cannot say that the brief mischaracterization of the witness’ testimony
deprived defendant of a fair and impartial trial. See Watson, supra at 586. Moreover, the trial
court’s instruction that the attorneys’ arguments were not evidence was sufficient to cure any
prejudice. See People v Long, 246 Mich App 582; 588; 633 NW2d 843 (2001).
Fifth, defendant contends that the prosecutor erred by giving “unsworn testimony” that
defendant had been involved in prior drug sales.
During closing arguments, defense counsel argued:
See, you gotta watch this kinda’ situation, ‘cause it’s like bein’ in the wrong place
at the wrong time. Essentially, it’s that. Because, see, this isn’t a long
investigation, where we’ve been watchin’ Nicole Moore, and –
MS. KETTLER [prosecutor]: (interposing) Objection. That is not in evidence.
That may or may not be true.
1
Moreover, we note that defendant made several attempts to portray herself as a downtrodden
victim during trial by making references to her own medical condition, her mother’s ill health,
and her father’s recent death. She also claimed that the prosecutor was trying to “kill” her. The
prosecutor did not commit plain error when she attempted to neutralize defendant’s injection of
inappropriate and irrelevant considerations into the trial. See People v Delisle, 202 Mich App
658, 671; 509 NW2d 885 (1994) (prosecutor can respond to pleas for sympathy).
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MR. EVANS [defense counsel]: Your Honor, this is closin’ argument.
MS. KETTLER: That is not in evidence.
MR. EVANS: Well, they haven’t talked about buyin’ no drugs. They said
they’ve never bought drugs from her.
THE COURT: Overruled. Proceed.
The prosecutor responded as follows during rebuttal argument:
Now, he wants to talk about, well, they didn’t tell you about ever buying any
drugs from the defendant. He’s saying that because he knows that I can’t
introduce that here; whether that happened, or not. So, it’s okay for him to talk
about things that aren’t in evidence, but –
MR. EVANS: (Interposing) Your Honor, then I object. Why is she goin’ into
then?
MS. KETTLER: Well, you brought it up, counsel.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MS. KETTLER: The fact is, you don’t know whether that’s happened, or not.
That type of evidence was not admitted here. You don’t know, or not. I’m just
saying don’t let him break the rules and say, “Oh, that never happened,” because
that’s not what the evidence is. He is asking you to assume that. That’s not what
the evidence is.
The prosecutor made a similar argument with regard to whether the police had searched the
address where defendant claimed she lived. This came in response to defendant’s argument that
the police must not have considered defendant to be a drug dealer because they did not search
her home.
We find no error because the prosecutor’s comments were a proper response to matters
raised by the defense. See, generally, People v McElhaney, 215 Mich App 269, 284; 545 NW2d
18 (1996). Indeed, “[a] prosecutor's comments must be considered in light of the defense
arguments.” People v Messenger, 221 Mich App 171, 181; 561 NW2d 463 (1997). Otherwise
improper remarks may not require reversal if the remarks were made in response to defense
counsel's arguments. People v Kennebrew, 220 Mich App 601, 608; 560 NW2d 354 (1996).
Reversal is unwarranted.2
2
We reject defendant’s argument on appeal that the prosecutor’s improper conduct in the
aggregate denied defendant a fair trial. Indeed, any errors were slight and did not affect
defendant’s right to a fair trial.
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In her second issue on appeal, defendant argues that the jury was exposed to extraneous
information when two men in the courtroom engaged in certain unspecified disruptions during
the trial. She argues that the court owed a duty to investigate whether the jury was influenced by
the interruption. Because defendant did not object at trial, we review this issue using the plain
error analysis from Carines, supra at 763-764. Defendant has not met her burden for relief.
Indeed, when the prosecutor objected to the interruption and sought further inquiry into whether
the jurors had been influenced, defense counsel assured the court that one of the men was a
former client and that their presence had nothing to do with this case. Counsel specifically
dissuaded the court from inquiring further into the interruption. Moreover, the trial court
instructed the jury that two men had been removed for interrupting the proceedings and that they
had no connection with the trial. Under these circumstances, no plain error requiring reversal is
apparent.
Defendant additionally argues that her attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel
by failing to request further inquiry into the matter. To establish ineffective assistance of
counsel, a defendant must show that her counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and that, but for counsel’s error or errors,
it is reasonably probable that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. People
v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 302-303; 613 NW2d 694 (2000). Effective assistance of counsel is
presumed, and the defendant bears a heavy burden of proving otherwise. Id. at 302. Here,
because defendant failed to make a testimonial record in the trial court in connection with a
motion for a new trial or an evidentiary hearing, this Court’s review of this issue is limited to
mistakes apparent on the record. People v Sabin (On Second Remand), 242 Mich App 656, 658659; 620 NW2d 19 (2000).
We discern no basis for reversal. Whatever happened at trial, the prosecutor felt there
was some form of prejudice to the prosecutor’s case. Defense counsel apparently was not
concerned with the effect of the interruption on defendant’s case. Indeed, from the record, it
appears that the interruption had no connection with defendant or this trial. Under the
circumstances, defendant has not shown that his counsel acted unreasonably by failing to request
a further inquiry into the matter or that counsel’s actions in connection with the incident affected
the outcome of the case. Toma, supra at 302-303.
Finally, defendant argues that the court erred by denying her request that the jury be
instructed on the defense of “mere presence” under CJI2d 8.5, which provides:
Even if the defendant knew that the alleged crime was planned or was
being committed, the mere fact that [he/she] was present when it was committed
is not enough to prove that [he/she] assisted in committing it.
The court ruled that CJI2d 8.5 applied only to prosecutions under an aiding and abetting theory
and that the concept of “mere presence” was adequately covered by the possession instruction.
The court instructed the jury, consistent with CJI2d 12.7, as follows:
Possession does not necessarily mean ownership, possession means either
that the person has actual physical control of the substance, as I do the pen that I
am now holding [indicating], or that the person has the right to control the
substance even though it is in a different room or place. Possession may be sole,
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where one person alone possesses the substance, or possession may be joint,
where two or more people each share possession. It is not enough that the
defendant merely knew about the substance, the defendant possessed the
substance only if she had control of it, or the right to control it, either alone or
together with someone else. [Emphasis added.]
We review this claim of instructional error de novo. People v Bartlett, 231 Mich App
139, 143; 585 NW2d 341 (1998). A trial court’s instructions must include all the elements of the
charged offenses and “must not omit material issues, defenses, and theories if the evidence
supports them.” Id. “Even if somewhat imperfect, instructions do not create error if they fairly
present to the jury the issues tried and sufficiently protect the defendant's rights.” Id. at 143-144.
We find no error. First, the placement of CJI2d 8.5 in the jury instructions within the aiding and
abetting chapter and its specific language indicate that the instruction applies to defendants
accused of assisting another person – that is, aiding and abetting, which was not at issue here.3
Second, the instruction given by the court, which included definitions of constructive possession
and intent, sufficiently instructed the jury on the applicable law, incorporating the central thrust
of the “mere presence” instruction. Under these circumstances, reversal is unwarranted.
Affirmed.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
3
The state’s theory was that defendant was the principal in the charged offenses.
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