THOMAS M CLINE V DEPT OF CORRECTIONS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
THOMAS M. CLINE, BRAD DEORNELLAS,
AND DAVID S. DELEZENNE,
UNPUBLISHED
April 24, 2003
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 234714
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 00-01377-CL
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, ANN GREEN, RAJABU
NAKENGE AND JIMMY STEGALL,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Murray, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right from the trial court’s granting of summary disposition to
defendants in this employment discrimination case. We affirm.
I. Material Facts and Proceedings
As a general overview, each of the plaintiffs are current or former Caucasian correction
officers who claim that their African-American supervisors discriminated and harassed them
because of their race. Only plaintiff Delezenne has been terminated from his employment;
plaintiffs Cline and Deornellas remain employed by the Department of Corrections
(Department). Additionally, as plaintiffs recognize in their brief on appeal, this is not a case
involving the use of racial slurs toward the plaintiffs in the workplace. Instead, the harassment
which they claim to have suffered from has a racial overtone (at least as plaintiffs claim), simply
because their supervisors are African-American and they are Caucasian.
A. Plaintiff Thomas Cline
Plaintiff Cline has been employed as a corrections officer with the Department since June
2, 1996. Between June 18 and July 30, 1999, Cline filed three separate complaints which he
claims were complaints of “race harassment.” Specifically, on June 13, 1999, Cline filed a union
grievance alleging that Sergeant Toya Williams, an African-American female, denied him
overtime on June 13, 1999 in violation of the collective bargaining agreement between the
Michigan Corrections Organization (MCO) and the Department. In that grievance Cline asserted
that he should have been offered overtime before “B-list” employees. In this union grievance
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there is no allegation that Cline was passed over for this overtime opportunity because of his
race.
Soon thereafter, on June 29, 1999, Cline filed an internal Department complaint. The
complaint was filed against Sgt. Williams and on the form Cline indicated that he felt that he had
suffered “race” and “gender” discrimination/harassment as he checked off those boxes on the
form. However, as to the substance of the complaint, Cline stated that he believed that he was
subjected to harassment “due to the fact that Sgt. T. Williams knew I was about to write a
grievance on her for passing over myself on the overtime available for the 10-6 shift on 6-14-99,
where she scheduled B-list personnel first.” Cline also indicated that on June 16, 1999, Sgt.
Williams asked him to step into the deputy’s conference room and, once he did, she said to him
“so you think you’re a big tough guy, right” and “you think you are a big puff daddy.” Cline
admitted, however, that Sgt. Williams never utilized racially derogatory names or comments to
him during any of these exchanges.
The Department investigated the overtime issue on July 13, 1999, and determined that
Officer Cline had been inadvertently passed over for overtime and that it had occurred because
there were several supervisors in charge of filling the particular schedule and an oversight simply
occurred. The Department indicated that “in the future, all efforts will be made to reverify that
A-list officers have been properly polled to establish that no mistakes were made.”
Around the same time, and in particular on July 16, 1999, Cline filed another internal
complaint against two of his supervisors, this time against defendant Sergeant Nakenge and a
Captain Warren, who was the shift commander. Sgt. Nakenge is an African-American. Cline
checked off on the form that he felt he was subject to “race” and “gender” discrimination.
Specifically, the complaint form indicates that Cline was complaining of two separate incidents
taking place on July 12, 1999. With respect to Sgt. Nakenge, Cline alleged that Sgt. Nakenge
approached him regarding a disagreement Cline had with corrections officer Holly, an AfricanAmerican female. The disagreement was over where inmates could be allowed to go to drink
water, with Holly’s opinion differing from that of Cline’s. According to Cline’s complaint, the
following exchange took place between he and Sgt. Nakenge:
He [Nakenge] then said “listen to this, this is the way it is going to work” when
you come into these units. From now on you are going to do what the regulars
say or do. I then said “well, they don’t do their jobs so I guess I don’t have to do
my job anymore, right.” Sgt. Nakenge then said “listen and don’t say another
word.” You have “no common sense” and the next time you are in this unit, you
will do what the regulars tell you “or else.” If you want to change the rules you
need to become a supervisor “you got that.” He then said that this came from
Captain Warren.
According to the complaint, Cline then left the housing unit and went to control central to speak
to Captain Warren, the shift commander. According to Cline, what transpired next is as follows:
I told him (Captain Warren) I got his message and asked him if he wanted me to
quit doing my job. He said “I want you to work with these officers and do as they
do in the units.” I then replied “these officers are all lazy and don’t do their jobs.”
Is that what you want me to do? He said “you need to go into these units and
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work and talk to these officers and if there are little rules they let slid [sic] then
you should do the same, you are only there for a couple of hours. I then said that
means breaking policy and not doing my job. I then told him when I am in these
units I run the unit, not inmates or Friendly officers. He then repeated about
letting rules slide when working with other officers in the units and doing as they
do.
Cline went on to indicate that Sgt. Nakenge and Cpt. Warren did not like the way he operated
and that they disliked him and considered him trouble. Cline concluded by asserting that “this
harassment is a direct retaliation against me for filing paperwork and grievances against the
supervisors.” Again, however, Cline admitted that neither Sgt. Nakenge nor Captain Warren
ever said anything to him in a racially derogatory manner, and further that he did not allege in
the substance of his complaint that he was subjected to race harassment or race discrimination.
In addition, Cline testified that in his view he had never filed a claim of race discrimination, race
harassment, or retaliation during his employment with the Department.
Cline also filed a complaint on July 30, 1999 wherein he alleged that on July 22, 1999, he
and Sgt. Nakenge were waiting for a gate to open when Nakenge turned to him and called him a
“bitch.” Again, Cline believes that he was called this by Sgt. Nakenge because of the paperwork
and grievances filed by Cline within the preceding weeks and that Nakenge’s “tone of voice was
belittling and condescending. I also felt threatened by these remarks and feared for my safety
while working with the supervisor.” As a result of Cline’s assertion that he did not feel safe
working with Sgt. Nakenge, Cline was moved to the dayshift on July 23, 1999 where he no
longer worked under Sgt. Nakenge. This transfer was temporary pending the results of the
investigation regarding the complaints and grievances Cline had against Sgt. Nakenge.
B. Plaintiff Brad Deornellas
Plaintiff Deornellas has been employed as a corrections officer with the Department since
1994. On November 4th, 1998, he filed an internal complaint against Sgt. Nakenge and Sgt.
Brown, both of whom are African-Americans. Plaintiff Deornellas checked off on the form that
he felt that he was subjected to race, gender and age discrimination and in his attachments to the
complaint, plaintiff Deornellas sets forth incidents that he had both with Sgt. Brown and Sgt.
Nakenge. As was the case with plaintiff Cline, Deornellas’ complaints against Sgt. Brown and
Sgt. Nakenge reveal a difference in opinion as to how things should operate and the perception
that he is being mistreated by the sergeants. There is, however, no evidence of any
discriminatory statements or differential treatment.
Indeed, both plaintiff Deornellas’
typewritten document dated November 6, 1998 regarding Sgt. Brown and his October 26, 1998
typewritten document regarding Sgt. Nakenge contained evidence that Deornellas did not
appreciate and had conflicts with these two sergeants, but contained no evidence indicating that
what transpired was a result of his race.
Plaintiff Deornellas also asserts that all of the yard officers are Caucasian while both
Sgts. Nakenge and Brown are African-American. Plaintiff Deornellas obtained written
statements from other Caucasian yard workers (all corrections officers) who indicated that Sgts.
Brown and Nakenge were disrespectful in their treatment towards the yard workers. However,
like the written statements from plaintiffs Cline and Deornellas, none of these written documents
contain any evidence that anything was done because of race. Rather, they show verbal
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exchanges between employees and their supervisors that resulted from animosity, personality
conflicts, disagreements over management issues, and the like.
The union went forward on plaintiff Deornellas’ complaint and requested an
investigation, which was performed by Inspector Wanda Moore. After reviewing the
documentation submitted, Inspector Moore indicated to Warden Stegall (also an AfricanAmerican) that the allegations of unprofessional and harassing conduct towards the officers by
the sergeants were unsubstantiated. The January 21, 1999 memo from Warden Stegall to the
union indicated that there were several problem areas identified by the investigation, including
supervision techniques, crisis management, self-esteem/confidence building, and staffing
requirements. Additionally, Warden Stegall indicated that “this administration and the
management staff will continue to emphasize policy as it relates to race relations in the
workplace.”
In November 1998, plaintiff Deornellas was transferred from his yard position and put
into a guard tower position until approximately February 2000. The gun tower position, just like
the yard officer position, was not a “bid” position and corrections officers can be assigned to any
non-bid position at management’s discretion under the collective bargaining agreement. During
this assignment to the gun tower, Deornellas received the same pay and worked the same hours
as in the yard position. However, in April 2000, plaintiff Deornellas took a mental/depression
disability leave.
C. Plaintiff David Delezenne
Plaintiff Delezenne indicated that he had difficulties with Sgt. Nakenge commencing in
September 1995 when Sgt. Nakenge allegedly “threatened to kick my ass in the parking lot after
work,” bragging “that’s the way I handle my business as a sergeant.” Plaintiff Delezenne filed
an internal complaint against Sgt. Nakenge back in November 1995 and, as a result, plaintiff
Delezenne no longer worked for Sgt. Nakenge. However, on December 20, 1997, plaintiff
Delezenne was again assigned to work for Sgt. Nakenge. Nine days later, on December 29,
1997, plaintiff Delezenne filed an internal complaint form, checking off the boxes indicating that
he was being discriminated against and harassed on the basis of his race and color. In a
December 29, 1997 typewritten attachment to the complaint form, plaintiff Delezenne recounted
the events occurring two years earlier in 1995 and informed shift command of events that
occurred on December 20 and 21, 1997. In particular, plaintiff Delezenne indicated that on
December 20, 1997 he was having a conversation with several other officers regarding his
former desire to join the armed forces when Sgt. Nakenge jumped into the conversation and
allegedly stated, “there’s no way I would be accepted into any armed forces because I have no
self-esteem, I would never amount to shit, and I can barely do my job as C/O.” The next day,
according to plaintiff Delezenne, when he and Sgt. Nakenge had an argument about whose job it
was to take up a ticket that had been written by plaintiff, Sgt. Nakenge ultimately stated in a loud
voice, “I will not put up with this sarcastic shit from you” and “we’ll take care of this in the
sergeant’s office.” Once Sgt. Nakenge and plaintiff entered the office, Sgt. Nakenge slammed
the door into plaintiff’s left shoulder and said “what are you going to do about that bitch,” to
which plaintiff Delezenne retorted, “What is your problem? Are you trying to start a fight with
me in the sergeant’s office?” According to plaintiff, Sgt. Nakenge then grabbed the chair in the
office and threw it across the room, ran directly toward plaintiff, and said, “yes, let’s go bitch.”
No physical altercation took place. Importantly, after plaintiff Delezenne filed his December 29,
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1997 complaint, he admits that Sgt. Nakenge and he were separated and that he only sporadically
worked for him since that time.
Plaintiff Delezenne is the only one of the three plaintiffs to have been terminated from his
employment. On January 25, 2000, he was terminated for repeated work rule violations and time
and attendance problems that had been occurring throughout his employment. Although plaintiff
Delezenne asserted that he was discriminated against because of his race, he testified in his
deposition that he had no indication that Warden Stegall had denied any of his grievances
because of his race. Moreover, he never told Warden Stegall that he was being subjected to
racial harassment. Rather, he just told him he thought he was being harassed. In fact, plaintiff
Delezenne testified that he never indicated to Warden Stegall that he thought he was being
discriminated against because of his race and he never filed a complaint of harassment or
discrimination against the warden during his employment.
D. The Circuit Court’s Opinion
On April 26, 2001 the circuit court issued an opinion and order granting defendant’s
motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). The trial court concluded in its
written opinion that none of the plaintiffs had created a genuine issue of material fact on any of
their claims, and therefore, granted the motion and dismissed the case with prejudice.
II. Analysis
A. Hostile Environment
Plaintiffs first argue that the trial court inappropriately dismissed their hostile work
environment claims. We review this issue de novo, as each of the claims on appeal were
dismissed through the grant of a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10).
Spiek v Dep't of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). In Kelly-Stehney &
Assoc, Inc v MacDonald’s Industrial Products Inc, 254 Mich App 608, 611-612; 658 NW2d 494
(2003), we set forth the standard of review for our Court to apply when considering the propriety
of the grant or denial of a motion for summary disposition decided under MCR 2.116(C)(10):
A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual
sufficiency of the complaint. Veenstra v Washtenaw Country Club, 466 Mich
155, 163; 645 NW2d 643 (2002). A motion for summary disposition should be
granted when, except in regard to the amount of damages, there is no genuine
issue in regard to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment or
partial judgment as a matter of law. MCR 2.116 (C)(10), (G)(4); Veenstra, supra
at 164. In deciding a motion brought under this subsection, the trial court must
consider affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other evidence
submitted by the parties, MCR 2.116(G)(5), in a light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Veenstra, supra at 164. The moving party has the initial
burden of supporting its position with documentary evidence, but once the
moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to
establish that a genuine issue of disputed fact exists. Quinto v Cross & Peters Co,
451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996). “Where the burden of proof at trial
on a dispositive issue rests on a nonmoving party, the nonmoving party may not
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rely on mere allegations or denials in pleadings, but must go beyond the pleadings
to set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material facts exists.”
Id. The moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law when the
proffered evidence fails to establish a genuine issue regarding any material fact.
Veenstra, supra at 164. [Id. at 149]
In order to establish a prima facie case of a racially hostile work environment, plaintiffs
must establish (1) that they belonged to a protected group; (2) that they were subjected to
communication or conduct on the basis of race; (3) they were subjected to unwelcome racial
conduct or communication; (4) the unwelcome racial conduct or communication was intended to,
or in fact did, substantially interfere with the employee’s employment or created an intimidating,
hostile or offensive work environment, and (5) respondeat superior. Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich
368, 382-383; 501 NW2d 155 (1993) (footnotes omitted). Additionally, as to respondent
superior, an employer is not liable for a hostile work environment if it adequately investigated
and took prompt remedial action once it had actual notice of the alleged hostile work
environment. Sheridan v Forest Public Schools, 247 Mich App 611, 622; 637 NW2d 536
(2001).
The trial court dismissed each of the plaintiffs’ hostile work environment claims on the
basis that none of the statements or conduct at issue were on the basis of race and that the
conduct otherwise did not create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment. The
trial court was correct in this regard.
Although the evidence revealed that each of the three plaintiffs complained of statements
and conduct on the part of their supervisors, there is no evidence (a fact plaintiffs admit) that any
derogatory or racially motivated statements were ever made. Stated another way, there’s not a
hint of evidence in the record to show that any supervisor employed by the Department utilized a
racially derogatory term toward these plaintiffs or anyone else. Thus, in an attempt to inject race
into their case, plaintiffs argue that because they are Caucasian, and because they were subjected
to inappropriate treatment at the hands of African-American supervisors, they have established a
jury question on their hostile work environment claim. However, a supervisor’s different skin
pigmentation alone is not sufficient to establish that inappropriate but neutral statements were
made on the basis of race. Iadimarco v Runyon, 190 F3d 151, 156 (CA 3, 1999) (“We agree that
the race of the selecting officials is not a sufficient circumstance to establish a prima facie case
of discrimination by itself.”).
In the absence of such evidence, plaintiffs failed to establish that they were subjected to
“unwelcome racial conduct or communication” as required by Radtke. Radtke, supra, 442 Mich
at 382-383. The evidence produced by plaintiffs established only that there were personality
conflicts between plaintiffs, other corrections officers, and their supervisors. However, although
there may be evidence of belligerence on the part of the supervisors, there is no evidence of
racial harassment. Morris v Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201 F3d 784, 791 (CA 6, 2000).
Anti-discrimination laws are not to be utilized as “a ‘general civility code’ designed to purge the
workplace of all boorish or even all harassing conduct.” Berry v Delta Airlines Inc, 260 F3d
803, 808 (CA 7, 2001), quoting Spearman v Ford Motor Co, 231 F3d 1080, 1084 (CA 7, 2000),
citing Oncale v Sundowner Offshore Services Inc, 523 US 75, 81; 118 S Ct 998; 140 L Ed 2d
201 (1998).
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Additionally, even if there was evidence in the record to establish that the statements and
actions of the supervisory personnel were done on the basis of race, none of the plaintiffs could
establish the fourth prong of Radtke, i.e., that the unwelcome racial conduct or communication
was intended to, or in fact did, substantially interfere with the employee’s employment thereby
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment. Some factors to utilize in
determining whether conduct substantially interfered with the employee’s employment are (1)
the frequency of the conduct, (2) its severity, (3) whether it was physically threatening or a mere
offensive utterance, and (4) whether it interfered with the employee’s work performance. Harris
v Forklift Systems Inc, 510 US 17, 23; 114 S Ct 367; 126 L Ed 2d 295 (1993). Being called a
“bitch,” being told to “prove it,” or being told that one would “never amount to shit” does not
create an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment. Moreover, the alleged conduct
took place over a short period of time, and comprised mostly offensive utterances. Id. As such,
the trial court properly granted summary disposition to defendant on each of the plaintiffs’
hostile work environment claims.
B. Race Discrimination
Plaintiffs next argue that their claims of race discrimination were improperly dismissed.
As this issue was also resolved by defendants’ motion for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(10), our review is de novo. Spiek, supra.
In order to establish a case of race discrimination without the use of direct evidence,
plaintiff must utilize the prima facie shifting burden approach set forth in Town v Michigan Bell
Telephone Co, 455 Mich 688, 695; 568 NW2d 64 (1997). In doing so, plaintiff must establish
(1) that he was a member of a protected class, (2) that he was subjected to an adverse
employment action, (3) that he was qualified for the position, and (4) others, similarly situated
and outside the protected class, were unaffected by the employer’s adverse employment
decisions. Id. If plaintiffs establish a prima facie case, the employer must articulate a
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Id. Once the employer does so,
“the presumption of discrimination created by plaintiff’s prima facie case dropped away, and the
burden of production returned to plaintiff to show the existence of evidence ‘sufficient to permit
a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that discrimination was a motivating factor for the adverse
action taken by the employer toward the plaintiff.’” Hazle v Ford Motor Co, 464 Mich 456, 473;
628 NW2d 515 (2001), quoting Lyle v Malady, 458 Mich 153, 176; 579 NW2d 906 (1998).
Plaintiffs initially argue that they were subjected to an adverse employment action
because of the verbal abuse, threats, and harassment they experienced and because of
management’s refusal to investigate the complaints. In support of this argument, plaintiffs cite
Meyer v City of Center Line, 242 Mich App 560; 619 NW2d 182 (2000). In Meyer this Court
held in a civil rights retaliation case that
a supervisor’s decision not to take action to stop harassment by co-workers in
retaliation for an employee’s opposition to a violation of the Civil Rights Act can
constitute an adverse employment action. When the harassment is sufficiently
severe, a supervisors failure to take action to respond can constitute a materially
adverse change in the conditions of employment. Id. at 571.
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However, plaintiffs’ claims were properly dismissed because the evidence established that each
of the written complaints filed by the plaintiffs were investigated by the Department. Because
plaintiff Delezenne’s complaint was investigated by the Department, what he is really arguing is
that he was unsatisfied with the results of the investigation and, with respect to plaintiffs Cline
and Deornellas, they continued to experience the allegedly hostile conduct. But being
dissatisfied with the adequacy of the employer’s investigation does not constitute an adverse
employment action. Moreover, even if it did, for the reasons previously stated, the conduct and
communication that took place within the Department was not sufficiently severe to constitute an
adverse employment action. Meyer, therefore, offers no support for plaintiffs’ position.
Plaintiff Cline also argues that he was transferred from his regular shift to a different
shift, which resulted in his loss of both shift premiums and significant overtime opportunities.
However, this conclusionary assertion is unsupported by the evidence. Although plaintiff Cline
attached to his appeal brief a two-page handwritten document purporting to show that he missed
overtime opportunities on certain days because of his shift change, there is nothing to suggest
that this was done on the basis of his race. There is also no evidence that whoever received the
overtime was not Caucasian. Additionally, Cline admitted that he was told he was transferred
for his own protection, and that his union advised against filing a grievance because the
Department was within its rights to transfer him to a different shift.
Finally, as to plaintiff Cline’s assertion that his answers to interrogatory numbers thirty
and thirty-one establish dissimilar treatment, in those answers he has only set forth the names of
African-American male and female correctional officers who he claims were treated differently
than him. However, neither answers to interrogatories thirty or thirty-one provide any factual
basis establishing dissimilar treatment because of race, nor does his answer to interrogatory
thirty-two. Indeed, in his answer to interrogatory thirty-two plaintiff Cline simply claims that
certain African-American officers were not subjected to the same name calling, threats and
ridicule and were given preferential job assignments and promotions. However, these are not the
specific facts that would warrant the finding of a genuine issue of material fact when responding
to a properly supported motion for summary disposition. See MCR 2.116(G)(4). See also
Jackson v Maryland, 171 F Supp 2d 532, 541 (D Md, 2001) (failure to offer specific instances of
when and how other similarly situated employees were treated precludes discrimination claims).
As such, the trial court properly dismissed plaintiff Cline’s discrimination claims.
Plaintiff Deornellas asserts that he was transferred from his regular assignment in the
yard to the gun tower for a period exceeding six months. However, it is undisputed that
Deornellas received the same rate of pay and worked the same hours as he did in his prior
position, and that the Department in fact could within its discretion move correctional officers
between non-bid positions such as the yard and gun tower positions. Just as importantly, there
was no evidence submitted by plaintiffs to establish that the transfer was done for any
discriminatory purpose or that he was treated differently than a similar situated employee when
he was temporarily transferred.
Plaintiff Deornellas also argues in a conclusionary fashion that he was subjected to
harassment that was so severe and pervasive that he was forced to take a medical leave.
However, Deornellas has offered no law nor any substantial argument that he was subjected to a
constructive discharge which, if established, could constitute an adverse employment action.
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Finally, it is undisputed that plaintiff Delezenne was subjected to an adverse employment
action because he was terminated from his employment in January 2000. However, the
Department set forth admissible evidence establishing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
his termination – poor time and attendance plus other disciplinary problems. Town, supra.
Although plaintiff argues that Sgt. Brown had the same poor time and attendance issues, plaintiff
Delezenne cannot properly compare himself to Sgt. Brown, who is a supervisor and therefore not
similarly situated to plaintiff. See Ercegovich v Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co, 154 F3d 344,
352 (CA 6, 2000); Mitchell v Toledo Hospital, 964 F2d 577, 583 (CA 6, 1992); Patterson v
Avery Dennison Corp, 281 F3d 676, 680 (CA 7, 2002).1 As such, plaintiffs’ claims of race
discrimination were properly dismissed.
C. Retaliation
Plaintiffs also argue that the trial court should not have summarily dismissed their
retaliation claims. We review this issue de novo. Spiek, supra.
In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the Civil Rights Act, plaintiffs
must establish (1) that they were engaged in a protected activity; (2) that defendant knew of the
plaintiffs’ protected activity; (3) that defendant took an adverse employment action against
plaintiff; and (4) that plaintiffs’ engaging in a protected activity was a significant factor in the
adverse employment action. DeFlaviis v Lord & Taylor Inc, 223 Mich App 432, 436; 566
NW2d 661 (1997).
Assuming that plaintiffs were engaged in a protected activity, plaintiffs’ claims were
properly dismissed because as to plaintiffs Cline and Deornellas, they were not subjected to an
adverse employment action and as to plaintiff Delezenne, he could not establish that his filing of
the complaint was a significant factor in the adverse employment action. Barrett v Kirtland
Community College, 245 Mich App 306, 315; 628 NW2d 63 (2001). For the reasons previously
stated, defendant terminated Delezenne’s employment because of his well documented
attendance and other disciplinary problems, and there was no evidence linking his complaints to
his termination. Additionally, plaintiff Delezenne’s termination took place more than a year
after he filed his internal complaint, which detracts from any causal relationship between the two
events. Moreover, for the reasons previously stated, neither plaintiffs Cline nor Deornellas were
subjected to adverse employment actions. As such, the trial court properly granted summary
disposition to defendants on plaintiffs’ retaliation claims.2
D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
1
Even if plaintiffs’ discrimination claims were not properly dismissed on the merits, it is clear
that the individual defendants would not be liable under the civil rights claims. Jager v
Nationwide Truck Brokers, Inc, 252 Mich App 464, 478-482; 652 NW2d 503 (2002).
2
We also point out that plaintiff Cline stated in his June 29, 1999 initial complaint that he felt
Sgt. Williams was harassing him because he filed an overtime grievance against her, while in his
July 16, 1999 complaint he likewise asserted the harassment was due to the union grievance, as
opposed to any opposition to unlawful discrimination.
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Plaintiffs also ask us to reverse the trial court’s grant of summary disposition to
defendants on plaintiffs’ claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. We review this
issue de novo. Spiek, supra. In Mino v Clio School District, 255 Mich App 60; ___ NW2d ___
(2003), we recently set forth the proofs plaintiffs must bring forward to establish a claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress:
In order to establish a valid claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a
plaintiff must show: “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intent or
recklessness, (3) causation, and (4) severe emotional distress.” Graham v Ford,
237 Mich App 670, 674; 604 NW2d 713 (1999). The Graham Court further
stated:
Liability. . . has been found only where the conduct complained of
has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to
go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. . . It is not
enough that the defendant has acted with an intent that is tortuous or
even criminal, . . . or even that his conduct has been characterized by
“malice,” or a degree of aggravation that would entitle the plaintiff to
punitive damages for another tort. . . The test is whether . . . an
average member of the community would . . . claim, “Outrageous!”
[Id. at 674-675 (citations and quotations omitted).] [Mino, supra at
79-80.]
Additionally, “liability clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances,
petty oppressions or other trivialities.” Id. See also Margita v Diamond Mortgage Corp, 159
Mich App 181, 188; 406 NW2d 268 (1987). Whether the facts arise to extreme and outrageous
conduct is a question of law for the court to decide. See Doe v Mills, 212 Mich App 73, 92; 536
NW2d 824 (1995).3
In the present case it is abundantly clear that nothing that occurred within the workplace
with respect to these plaintiffs was sufficiently outrageous to fall within the rare case comprising
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Although it may have been unpleasant to be on the
receiving end of the conduct alleged to have taken place by the supervisors, the conduct alleged
by no means constitutes conduct which is so outrageous in character that it would go beyond all
bounds of decency in a civilized society. Mino, supra. Indeed, they are mostly comprised of
threats and indignities which do not fall within the parameters of this tort. Id. Accordingly, the
trial court properly granted summary disposition to defendants on plaintiffs’ intentional infliction
of emotional distress claims.
3
It should be noted that our Supreme Court has yet to recognize or adopt this tort. See, e.g.,
Smith v Calvalry Christian Church, 462 Mich 679, 690; 614 NW2d 590 (2000) (Weaver, C.J.,
concurring).
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Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
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