JOHN R SEIB V VOLKSWAGENWERK AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JOHN R. SIEB, Personal Representative of the
Estate of MARIA EUGENIA SIEB, Deceased,
UNPUBLISHED
April 17, 2003
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 231049
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 00-023318-CZ
VOLKSWAGENWERK
AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT,
Defendants,
and
GERHARD REICHEL
HAENCHEN,
AND
DIETMAR
K.
Appellants.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Jansen and Talbot, JJ.
TALBOT, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur in all respects save the remand for assessing of costs for a partial violation of
MCR 2.114(E).
The filing of a signed pleading1 that is not well-grounded in fact and law subjects the filer
to sanctions under MCR 2.114(E). Yee v Shiawassee County Bd of Comm’rs, 251 Mich App
379, 407-408; 651 NW2d 756 (2002). MCR 2.114(D) provides that the signature of an attorney
or party constitutes a certification that (1) the attorney or party has read the pleading; (2) to the
best of the attorney’s or party’s knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable
inquiry, the pleading is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good-faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; and (3) the pleading is not
interposed for any improper purpose. In re Forfeiture of Cash & Gambling Paraphernalia, 203
Mich App 69, 71; 512 NW2d 49 (1993). “Not every error in legal analysis constitutes a
1
“[T]he rules on the . . . signing. . . of pleadings apply to all motions, affidavits, and other papers
provided for by the court rules. MCR 2.113(A).” Bechtold v Morris, 443 Mich 105, 108-109;
503 NW2d 654 (1993).
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frivolous position.” Kitchen v Kitchen, 465 Mich 654, 663; 641 NW2d 245 (2002). The
imposition of a sanction under MCR 2.114 is mandatory upon the finding that a pleading was
signed in violation of the court rule or a frivolous action or defense had been pleaded.
Schadewald v Brule, 225 Mich App 26, 41; 570 NW2d 788 (1997).
Appellants’ motion to quash the subpoenas duces tecum did not warrant sanctions. The
circuit court found that appellants’ motion was frivolous because MCR 2.305(E) clearly
permitted Josephs to petition the court for the subpoenas duces tecum irrespective of his status to
practice law in Michigan. However, the court did not address the other arguments advanced by
appellants in their motion. The court deferred to the Florida court regarding whether appellants
had knowledge relevant to the case, but did not rely on any ruling or finding by the Florida court.
The court did not address appellants’ arguments that they had no authority to produce the
requested documents and that plaintiff’s request for the production of documents was oppressive.
Even if the court correctly determined that appellants’ challenge to Josephs’ filing of the petition
was frivolous, appellants’ other asserted grounds for quashing the subpoenas duces tecum, which
were supported by affidavits and which the court did not address, were not frivolous.
The majority acknowledges this fact when it remands to the trial court to assess costs for
raising one frivolous argument out of four. The court rule simply does not allow for such a
piecemeal approach in evaluating the validity of appellants’ motion. Such an approach would
swamp our trial courts if they were required to finely slice every pleading and motion filed as to
the merits of each argument advanced. Viewed in its entirety, appellants’ motion was
sufficiently grounded in law and fact to avoid sanctions.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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