JOHN M STEIGER V THOMAS W SASS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
UNPUBLISHED
March 13, 2003
JOHN M. STEIGER, CAROL A. STEIGER,
RONALD MARTELLO, CLAUDIA
MARTELLO, and UMIT BILGE
Plaintiff-Appellants,
v
THOMAS W. SASS, WILLIAM
WAGANFEALD, JERRY M. NEHR TRUST,
SHARON A. NEHR TRUST, DENNIS E.
DOUBECK, SANDRA DOUBECK, TAYLOR
FAMILY TRUST, JOHN H. TAYLOR
TRUSTEE, JOSEPH NOWAK, BEVERLY
NOWAK, JIM and VICTORIA DAVIDSON,
MARJORIE KAY BURDO, JUDITH K.
METYKO, JOHN A. METYKO, COLIN P.
FREEL, ESTHER FREEL, DALE POTTER, and
WANDA POTTER,
No. 238252
Presque Isle Circuit Court
LC No. 00-002406-CH
Defendant-Appellees.
Before: Donofrio, P.J., and Saad and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right from an order granting summary disposition in favor of
defendants. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case to the trial court for a
determination of the scope of the use of the easement to which the parks are subject.
This case arose when plaintiffs brought this action in an attempt to quiet title to two
parcels of land known as Parks “A” and “B” (“the property”). The land at issue is located in the
Ottawa Hills Subdivision in Presque Isle County. Plaintiffs are lot owners in the plat and claim
title to the property pursuant to a tax deed from the Department of Treasury dated March 2,
1979. Plaintiffs are the successor purchasers to the purchasers at the tax sale. Defendants are
also lot owners in the subdivision.
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A chronological timeline is useful in determining the property rights of the parties in this
case. In June 1970 a plat was prepared for the property and filed with the county register of
deeds. The Freel family1 owned the plat, consisting of almost nineteen acres, and divided it into
thirty-four lots and two private parks labeled “A” and “B.” The “Proprietor’s Certificate” dated
June 12, 1970 states as follows:
We as proprietors certify that we caused the land embraced in this plat to be
surveyed, divided, mapped and dedicated to the use of the public. Parks “A” and
“B” are dedicated to the use of the lot owners. That the public utility easements
are private easements and that all other easements are for the uses shown on the
plat. Lots embracing any waters of Lake Nettie are subject to the correlative
rights of other riparian owners and to the public trust in these waters. Waterfront
lots extend to the waters edge.
Thereafter, the property owners began selling off the lots in the plat. Apparently, the tax
assessor, post-dedication of Parks A and B to the lot owners, placed the parks upon the tax roll
contrary to the established practice of spreading the assessed value of the dedicated parks pro
rata among the lot owners, and held the plat proprietor responsible. Presumably they failed to
pay the taxes causing foreclosure and the resultant tax sale.
The tax sale occurred in May 1977. At the sale, Mitchell Kamlay and Stephen Ura
purchased the property. Seemingly, on August 31, 1977 the Freels quit claimed their interest in
Park A to Mitchell and Mary Ann Kamlay, and Stephen and Estelle Ura. On the same day, the
Freels quit claimed their interest in Park B to Robert and Anna Heise. The next relevant event
was when the Michigan Department of Treasury issued a tax deed for both Parks A and B to
Mitchell Kamlay and Stephen Ura on March 2, 1979. Thereafter there appears to be
accommodating transfers between these parties that do not affect the outcome of this case. The
tax deed was not recorded until May 20, 1991, and a return of service of notice of the sale has
never been filed with the county treasurer.
Plaintiffs now claim that the rights of the lot owners have been extinguished by the tax
deed dated March 2, 1979. Defendants counter arguing that plaintiffs cannot prove that the tax
title was perfected as required by MCL 211.140(1) and therefore plaintiffs’ claims are without
merit. The trial court agreed with defendants finding that, “[t]hey then had five years to file a
return of service of notice of the sale with the county treasurer. It has never been filed. Under
MCL 211.73a as proper notice was not given, they are barred from asserting title or claiming a
lien on the land by reason of a tax purchase.”
We review a trial court’s grant or denial of a motion for summary disposition de novo.
Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). Although the trial
court’s order does not specify which subsection of MCR 2.116(C) that the trial court relied upon,
it appears to us that the trial court relied on MCR 2.116(C)(10) because it considered factual
evidence not in the pleadings. See Gibbons v Caraway, 455 Mich 314, 320, n 7; 565 NW2d 663
1
Virgil and Judy Freel, John and Gertrude Freel, and Ronald and Bertha Freel.
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(1997). Furthermore, “[a]ctions to quiet title are equitable in nature and are reviewed de novo by
this Court.” Dobie v Morrison, 227 Mich App 536, 538; 575 NW2d 817 (1998).
On appeal, plaintiffs first claim that defendants were not entitled to notice of the tax sale
because they were not owners of the parks, or the last grantee or grantees in the chain of title of
the property as described by MCL 211.140. We disagree.
MCL 211.140(1) clearly provides that:
A writ of assistance or other process for the possession of property the title to
which was obtained by or through a tax sale, except if title is obtained under
section 131, shall not be issued until 6 months after the sheriff of the county
where the property is located files a return of service with the county treasurer of
that county showing service of the notice prescribed in subsection (2). The return
shall indicate that the sheriff made personal or substituted service of the notice on
the following persons who were, as of the date the notice was delivered to the
sheriff for service:
(a) The last grantee or grantees in the regular chain of title of the property, or of
an interest in the property, according to the records of the county register of
deeds. [Emphasis added.]
It is undisputed that a return of service of notice of the tax sale has never been filed with the
county treasurer and thus has not been perfected in accordance with MCL 211.140(1). Contrary
to the assertions of plaintiff, application of MCL 211.140(1) provides that anyone having an
interest in the party must be noticed. Therefore all persons entitled to notice were not noticed
and the tax title upon which plaintiffs rely was not properly perfected and accordingly plaintiffs
cannot claim any rights under the 1979 tax deed to defeat defendants’ rights. MCL 211.73a.
Plaintiffs next argue that due to the tax sale, the state obtained absolute title extinguishing
all easements and encumbrances. In support of their argument, plaintiffs cite MCL 211.67.
However, our review of the statute reveals that MCL 211.67 is not applicable to the instant case.
MCL 211.67 does not apply to the rights of a private purchaser following a tax sale. Instead,
MCL 211.67 only applies when the state is bid in at a tax sale and obtains absolute title after
proper perfection of the title. Therefore this argument also fails.
Lastly plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred when it sua sponte ruled that the lot
owners within the plat hold title to Parks A and B under the original plat dedication.
Specifically, plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred when it stated:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that for the reasons stated in this Court’s written
Opinion that:
1. The owners of lots within the recorded plat of Ottawa Hills Subdivision (said
plat being recorded at Liber 3 of Plats, Pages 64-65 Presque Isle Records) hold
title to Parks A and B under the original plat dedication.
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Defendants respond that it makes little practical difference if the thirty-four lot owners’
individual interests are that of an easement or title because in both cases they would still be able
to use the parks.
We recognize that the “intent of the plattors should be determined with reference to the
language used in connection with the facts and circumstances existing at the time of the grant.”
Dobie, supra, 227 Mich App 540. The language here from the Proprietor’s Certificate states,
“Parks ‘A’ and ‘B’ are dedicated to the use of the lot owners.” (Emphasis added.) Undoubtedly,
the language does not purport to transfer ownership of the parks to the lot owners, but rather a
use. Plaintiffs have title to Parks A and B subject to the easement encumbrance placed upon the
land by the Freels in the original “Proprietor’s Certificate” dated June 12, 1970, because the right
of use was never extinguished by the tax sale. Therefore, plaintiffs’ rights stem from the quit
claim deeds that were, of course, subject to the right of use dedicated to the lot owners. After
thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable law, we find the language used in the
Proprietor’s Certificate is more consistent with the grant of an easement than a grant of fee
ownership rights. See Id. Accordingly, we find that the trial court erred when it ruled that the lot
owners within the plat hold title to Parks A and B under the original plat dedication, and remand
the case to the trial court for a determination on the scope of the use of the easement and other
equitable relief.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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