PEOPLE OF MI V ROBERT WILLIAM DAGGETT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 4, 2003
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 228915
Montcalm Circuit Court
LC No. 99-000224-FC
ROBERT WILLIAM DAGGETT,
Defendant-Appellant.
ON REMAND
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Bandstra and Hoekstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This case is before us by order of the Supreme Court that, in lieu of granting leave to
appeal, vacated our previous opinion1 and remanded the case to us for reconsideration in light of
People v Hardiman, 466 Mich 417; 646 NW2d 158 (2002). Upon reconsideration, we again
reverse defendant’s conviction, but now remand for a new trial.
Initially, we note that the Hardiman decision does not implicate our prior holding that the
August 25, 1999 conversation between Kent Johns, i.e., defendant’s alleged co-conspirator, and
the undercover police officer (UCPO) was inadmissible to the extent that it in any way
implicated defendant’s knowing involvement in an agreement to purchase cocaine from the
UCPO.2 However, Hardiman materially impacts our further conclusion that the remaining
evidence presented in the case was insufficient to sustain a conviction.
In Hardiman, our Supreme Court reiterated the familiar standard of review for challenges
to the sufficiency of the evidence:
Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the
question on appeal is whether a rational trier of fact could find the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Id. at 421.]
1
People v Daggett, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued July 19,
2002 (Docket No. 228915)
2
For purposes of clarification, in the event of a retrial, the UCPO’s testimony regarding his offer
to sell cocaine to Johns is admissible; it is the UCPO’s testimony regarding John’s response to
that offer that is inadmissible, including, most particularly, Johns’ indication that he would
involve defendant in the transaction.
-1-
However, in the context of the facts of that case, the Supreme Court clarified that test.
Specifically, the Court examined the rule established in People v Atley, 392 Mich 298; 220
NW2d 465 (1974), that it is impermissible to make an inference that is built upon another
inference to establish an element of an offense. The Hardiman Court concluded that
when reviewing sufficiency of the evidence claims, courts should view all the
evidence—whether direct or circumstantial—in a light most favorable to the
prosecution to determine whether the prosecution sustained its burden. It is for
the trier of fact, not the appellate court, to determine what inferences may be
fairly drawn from the evidence and to determine the weight to be accorded those
inferences. In compliance with MRE 401, we overrule “the inference upon an
inference” rule of Atley and its progeny. [Hardiman, supra at 428.]
In the present case, when the admissible evidence is considered in light of the holding in
Hardiman, we are persuaded that a rational trier of fact could find defendant guilty of conspiracy
to possess more than 650 grams of cocaine, as the prosecution alleged. From the tape of the
campfire conversation that defendant participated in along with the UCPO and Johns on
September 1, 1999, it may reasonably be inferred that defendant had prior knowledge that Johns
and the UCPO had discussed a reverse buy transaction involving cocaine in an amount exceeding
650 grams. Also, the tape reveals that defendant and Johns actively negotiated with the UCPO in
an attempt to finalize the details of a cocaine transaction. From these facts and circumstances, a
rational trier of fact could reasonably further infer that defendant discussed this opportunity with
Johns prior to the events of the evening of September 1 and entered into a conspiracy with Johns
to possess cocaine in an amount exceeding 650 grams. Consequently, sufficient untainted
evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could convict defendant of the charged offense.
Because we now conclude, in light of the Hardiman decision, that sufficient evidence
was introduced to support defendant’s conviction, we must address an issue that was unnecessary
for us to reach in our prior opinion. The question is whether the improper admission of hearsay
evidence at trial is harmless error. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that it is more
probable than not that this error was outcome determinative, MCL 769.26; MCR 2.613(A),
People v Carines, 460 Mich 750; 597 NW2d 130 (1999); People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495496; 596 NW2d 607 (1999), and therefore we reverse defendant’s conviction and remand for a
new trial.
In the present case, the prosecutor argued that defendant was guilty of a criminal
conspiracy because he agreed with Johns to attempt to buy the cocaine that the UCPO offered to
sell to Johns during their meeting on August 25. In support of that argument, the prosecutor
repeatedly referred to the August 25 meeting and, in particular, to the UCPO’s testimony that
Johns responded to his offer to sell cocaine by indicating that he would act as a middleman and
bring defendant into the deal. The prosecutor referred to this testimony as telling the jurors
“exactly how the agreement between [defendant] and Johns is going to be structured.” The rest
of the prosecutor’s argument maintained that the other evidence in the case confirmed that in fact
defendant and Johns formed a conspiracy on August 25. Because inadmissible evidence was the
centerpiece of the prosecution’s theory of the case, we find that its admission undermined the
reliability of the verdict. Lukity, supra at 495.
-2-
Reversed and remanded for a new trial. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
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