PEOPLE OF MI V ISHMIAR G DAVISON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 28, 2003
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 237230
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 00-008093-01
ISHMIAR G. DAVISON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Saad, P.J., and Zahra and Schuette, J.J.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of four counts of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b (victim under thirteen years of age). He was sentenced to four
concurrent terms of five to ten years’ imprisonment. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant’s nine-year-old male cousin testified that defendant engaged in oral and anal
sex with him on several occasions. Defendant denied the allegations, and asserted that the
complainant learned about sex from exposure to explicit materials supplied by other family
members.
I. Effective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant argues generally that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel in five
ways: (1) counsel “failed to conduct effective pretrial discovery;” (2) counsel failed to “engage
in substantive client consultation;” (3) counsel failed to object to inadmissible evidence; (4)
counsel did not “present a substantial defense,” including engaging in “timid” cross-examination
of the complainant; and (5) counsel failed to call four witnesses who would have supported
defendant’s denial of the offenses.
The right to counsel is not violated unless counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness and the defendant was so prejudiced that he was deprived of a fair
trial. Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 688; 104 S Ct 2052, 2065; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984);
People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 314; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). Prejudice is present when the
court can conclude that there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would
have been different – that is, the jury would have had a reasonable doubt about guilt. Pickens,
supra at 312.
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A. General Allegations of Ineffective Assistance
Although defendant conducted an evidentiary hearing in connection with a motion for
new trial pursuant to People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973), he did not
question trial counsel at the Ginther hearing about the first four allegations of ineffective
assistance asserted on appeal. Accordingly, his argument on appeal necessarily relies on the
existing trial record. People v Juarez, 158 Mich App 66, 73; 404 NW2d 222 (1987).
Defendant merely presents generalized allegations of ineffectiveness without identifying
on the record the conduct that he claims was deficient, and he does not argue on appeal how his
attorney should have handled the matters differently. Therefore, defendant has not shown that
counsel was deficient in his handling of pretrial discovery. Further, he has not shown how much
counsel consulted with him before trial or how it harmed his defense, he has not identified the
evidence that counsel should have objected to or why counsel failed to object, and he has not
identified how or why counsel should have conducted a more forceful cross-examination of the
complaining witness.1 Thus, defendant has failed to show that counsel was ineffective with
regard to the first four allegations.
B. Failure to Call Witnesses
At the Ginther hearing, defendant examined trial counsel regarding only one of the
grounds asserted here, the failure to call witnesses. Defendant claims on appeal that four people
should have been called as witnesses, but there were no proofs about counsel’s failure to call two
of them (Anita Franklin and Lance Franklin).2 Accordingly, we must presume that counsel’s
failure to call those two witnesses was a matter of trial strategy, People v Avant, 235 Mich App
499, 508; 597 NW2d 864 (1999).
Turning to the sole allegation supported by proofs at the Ginther hearing, we find no
error in trial counsel’s decision to refrain from calling Sheree Johnson-Sledge and Karletha
Gilliam as witnesses. Neither woman testified at the Ginther hearing, but their proposed
testimony was summarized in affidavits prepared after defendant’s conviction. Defendant’s
mother testified that she gave defense trial counsel copies of written statements from the two
women months before trial and believed they would be called as witnesses.
In her affidavit, Sheree Johnson-Sledge, a family friend, stated that the complainant
seemed “troubled.” Upon further inquiry, she said that the complainant told her that defendant
had not touched him sexually but that his grandmother kept telling complainant that he had been
touched until the complainant relented and agreed with her. She also stated that the
1
We note in passing that the manner of cross-examining a child witness is a matter of trial
strategy, and it is not unusual to treat such witnesses gently to avoid giving the jury the
unfavorable impression that the defense is bullying a child.
2
Mr. and Mrs. Franklin did not testify at the Ginther hearing, and their proposed testimony was
not preserved in sworn affidavits. Instead, in correspondence, they asserted that defendant had
never molested their children (who were unconnected with the charges in this case).
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complainant’s mother continued to leave the complainant in defendant’s care while charges were
pending.
Maternal aunt Karletha Gilliam asserted that she received a phone call from her sister –
the complainant’s mother – in which the complainant’s mother said that the complainant had
accused defendant of forcing the complainant and Ms. Gilliam’s son to have sex at gunpoint.
She questioned the complainant, Ms. Gilliam stated, and the complainant repeated the allegation
that defendant forced him to have oral and anal sex at gunpoint. The complainant then said that
defendant did not perform the sex acts because Ms. Gilliam’s son told defendant to stop.
Ms. Gilliam questioned her own child, and she said he denied that defendant had sex with
him or that defendant put a gun to anyone’s head. Ms. Gilliam also alleged that her mother (the
complainant’s grandmother) said that she was going to have the complainant’s family sue
defendant’s family because the acts happened at their house. The grandmother also allegedly
stated that defendant had sex with three other named children. The parent of one child told Ms.
Gilliam that her child denied the accusation.
Trial counsel admitted receiving written witness statements, but he testified that they
differed from the affidavits prepared after trial and presented for the first time as exhibits to
defendant’s motion for new trial. Trial counsel testified that he did not call Ms. Gilliam as a
witness because he was concerned that her proposed testimony could create an impression that
defendant had committed a series of sexual assaults against relatives and the family had been
unable or unwilling to halt his behavior. He did not call Ms. Johnson-Sledge because he felt that
he had adequately dealt with the allegation that the complainant had been encouraged to lie by
his grandmother through cross-examination of the complainant.3 He also was concerned that it
would appear that defendant’s family was attempting, through friends, to persuade witnesses not
to testify.4 The trial judge found that the statements would have been damaging to defendant’s
case.
Counsel testified that he consulted defendant about his decision not to call the witnesses
and defendant agreed with the strategy. Defendant denied that he had been consulted.
Each witness had the potential to harm defendant’s case. Evidence of other allegations
that were “investigated” solely by family members could create the impression that defendant
engaged in a lengthy series of sexual assaults upon children. Even if retracted, the allegation that
defendant used a gun took the scenario to a more threatening level. Testimony that defendant
only stopped performing sex acts because a child told him to stop would be devastating. Any
implication that defendant’s friends or family were attempting to persuade witnesses to testify
could also be harmful to the defense. While defendant argues that his continued contact with the
children demonstrates that no one considered him a threat, we believe this evidence could also be
used to show that defendant violated the court’s bond order, which prohibited contact with the
3
Counsel cross-examined the complainant about what his grandmother had told him.
4
Trial counsel testified at the Ginther hearing that, during trial, the prosecutor complained to the
court that witnesses reported that defendant’s family was attempting to get them to refrain from
testifying.
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complainant. Defendant has failed to overcome the presumption that the failure to call the
witnesses was sound trial strategy. People v Davis, 250 Mich App 357, 368-369; 649 NW2d 94
(2002).
II. Pretrial Discovery Order
Defendant argues that the prosecutor violated MCL 767.40a when it failed to disclose
that defendant had made a brief statement to the arresting officer, which was reduced to writing
in the officer’s preliminary complaint report (“PCR”) and signed by defendant. MCL 767.40a
requires the prosecutor to disclose the names of res gestae witnesses. The arresting officer’s
name was disclosed on the prosecutor’s witness list dated April 4, 2001. We reject defendant’s
argument that MCL 767.40a required the prosecutor to supply the documents in question. The
statute deals only with the disclosure of witnesses’ names.
Defendant has not identified or quoted any court order compelling the production of
documents, and our review of the lower court file fails to disclose such an order. The prosecutor
stated at trial, however, that the document should have been turned over to defendant as “part of
the discovery counsel received.”
The trial court offered defendant an opportunity to conduct a Walker hearing5 to
challenge the statement; defendant declined the offer. The prosecutor offered to produce the
officer who took the statement so defense counsel could interview him. The court ruled that the
written statement would not be admitted into evidence because “PCR’s don’t get admitted.” The
court allowed the officer to testify about the statement defendant made6 though, and defendant
vigorously cross-examined the officer about the statement and its surrounding circumstances.
Even if we were to assume that there was a formal or informal discovery process in this
case, we would find no error. The trial court’s decision to allow evidence that should have been
produced during pretrial discovery is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Johnson, 206
Mich App 122, 126; 520 NW2d 672 (1994) (disclosure of exhibits on first day of trial); People v
Canter, 197 Mich App 550, 563; 496 NW2d 336 (1992) (late endorsement of witness). The
court here offered adequate procedures to prevent prejudice from any surprise evidence. Canter,
supra. The court did not abuse its discretion.
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Bill Schuette
5
People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331, 338; 132 NW2d 87 (1965).
6
Defendant denied making the statement and denied that his signature appeared twice on the
PCR.
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