SAFECO INSURANCE CO OF AMERICA V CARRIER CORP
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF
AMERICA,
UNPUBLISHED
February 21, 2003
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 235567
Grand Traverse Circuit Court
LC No. 99-019270-NZ
CARRIER CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Smolenski and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this products liability action, plaintiff appeals by right from the trial court’s decision
granting defendant’s motion for a directed verdict. We affirm.
A home that was under construction started on fire on December 4, 1997. Plaintiff
insured the house. Plaintiff, as a subrogee of the homeowners, sued defendant on two theories:
design defect and breach of implied warranty. Plaintiff’s theory was that the fire started in the
furnace that defendant designed.
Plaintiff argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that the opinion of
plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Anderson, with regard to a design defect, was not based on reliable,
scientific evidence. We disagree. “The decision to admit or exclude expert testimony is within
the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal absent a clear abuse of
discretion.” Berryman v K Mart Corp, 193 Mich App 88, 98; 483 NW2d 642 (1992).
In the case at hand, Dr. Anderson was received as an expert witness in electrical
engineering. However, the trial court took under advisement whether Dr. Anderson could offer
opinions with regard to the design defect. Dr. Anderson testified that the circuit board in the
furnace, which was designed by defendant, caused the fire. Dr. Anderson also testified that the
009 and 016 circuit boards, which were different boards from the one in the furnace, were
alternate designs.
At the close of plaintiff’s proofs, defendant moved for and was granted a directed verdict.
The trial court stated that it could not find one of the key elements established -- an alternate
design that was economically and technically feasible. The trial court further stated that Dr.
-1-
Anderson’s opinions regarding an alternate design and the defective condition of the furnace
were not supported by reliable, scientific evidence as required by Daubert v Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 509 US 579; 113 S Ct 2786; 125 L Ed 2d 469 (1993), and MRE 702. We
review a trial court’s grant or denial of a directed verdict de novo. Derbabian v S & C
Snowplowing, Inc, 249 Mich App 695, 701; 644 NW2d 779 (2002).
In Daubert, supra at 582, the question before the Court was what the standard is for
admitting expert scientific testimony in a federal trial. The Court found that the Frye1 test, i.e.,
the “general acceptance test,” was superseded by the adoption of the FRE 702. Id. at 587-588.
The Michigan Legislature enacted MCL 600.2955(1) “in an apparent effort to codify the
United States Supreme Court’s holding in Daubert, [supra.]” Greathouse v Rhodes, 242 Mich
App 221, 238; 618 NW2d 106 (2000), rev’d on other grounds 465 Mich 885 (2001). MCL
600.2955 states in part:
(1) In an action for the death of a person or for injury to a person or
property, a scientific opinion rendered by an otherwise qualified expert is not
admissible unless the court determines that the opinion is reliable and will assist
the trier of fact. In making that determination, the court shall examine the opinion
and the basis for the opinion, which basis includes the facts, technique,
methodology, and reasoning relied on by the expert, and shall consider all of the
following factors:
(a) Whether the opinion and its basis have been subjected to scientific
testing and replication.
(b) Whether the opinion and its basis have been subjected to peer review
publication.
(c) The existence and maintenance of generally accepted standards
governing the application and interpretation of a methodology or technique and
whether the opinion and its basis are consistent with those standards.
(d) The known or potential error rate of the opinion and its basis.
(e) The degree to which the opinion and its basis are generally accepted
within the relevant expert community. As used in this subdivision, “relevant
expert community” means individuals who are knowledgeable in the field of
study and are gainfully employed applying that knowledge on the free market.
(f) Whether the basis for the opinion is reliable and whether experts in that
field would rely on the same basis to reach the type of opinion being proffered.
(g) Whether the opinion or methodology is relied upon by experts outside
of the context of litigation.
1
Frye v United States, 54 App DC 46; 293 F 1013 (1923).
-2-
“The plain language of the statute establishes the Legislature’s intent to assign the trial court the
role of determining, pursuant to the Daubert criteria, whether proposed scientific opinion is
sufficiently reliable for jury consideration.” Greathouse, supra at 238 (emphasis in original).
The trial court listed a number of reasons why Dr. Anderson’s opinions with regard to a
design defect were not reliable, including that Dr. Anderson had not disassembled the 011 circuit
board (the same board that was in the furnace); that Dr. Anderson did not test an 011 board; and
that Dr. Anderson made no effort to recreate the failure of the 011 board. The trial court noted
that Dr. Anderson concluded that the 011 board did not have to be tested separately because
except for the board materials, it was for all other relevant purposes, identical to the 008 boards.
However, the trial court noted that Dr. Anderson could not state from what the board materials
were made, whether one board was stiffer than the other, or whether their thermal properties
differed.
The trial court also stated that Dr. Anderson testified that the 009 and the 016 boards
were alternative designs. But then the trial court noted that Dr. Anderson would not agree that
the 009 was a safe alternative design that he would “sign off on” and that Dr. Anderson could not
say that the 016 board was better than the 011 board with regard to any specific design changes.
“In evidentiary rulings, an abuse of discretion will be found ‘only if an unprejudiced
person, considering the facts on which the trial court acted, would say that there was no
justification or excuse for the ruling made.’” Berryman, supra at 98, quoting Gore v Rains &
Block, 189 Mich App 729, 737; 473 NW2d 813 (1991) (citation omitted). After reviewing Dr.
Anderson’s testimony, we conclude that his opinion testimony with regard to a design defect was
not supported by appropriate validation or indication of reliability, as required by Daubert, MRE
702, and MCL 600.2955(1). Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that
Dr. Anderson’s opinion testimony was not reliable.
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion for a directed
verdict. We disagree. In order to prove breach of an implied warranty, the plaintiff must show
that the product left the manufacturer in a defective condition and that the defect caused the
plaintiff’s injuries. Jodway v Kennametal, Inc, 207 Mich App 622, 629; 525 NW2d 883 (1994).
A product is defective if it is not “reasonably fit for its intended, anticipated or reasonably
foreseeable use.” Gregory v Cincinnati Inc, 450 Mich 1, 34; 538 NW2d 325 (1995) (citations
omitted).
As discussed above, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Dr.
Anderson’s opinion regarding the design defect was not reliable. Plaintiff presented no other
evidence to establish that the furnace was defective. Because the evidence was insufficient to
establish a prima facie case for breach of implied warranty, the trial court properly granted
defendant’s motion for a directed verdict. Reisman v Regents of Wayne State University, 188
Mich App 526, 538; 470 NW2d 678 (1991).
Plaintiff also brought a claim against defendant for design defect. “A plaintiff who
claims that a product was defectively designed has the burden of producing evidence of the
magnitude of the risk posed by the design, alternatives to the design, or other factors concerning
the unreasonableness of the risk of a particular design.” Lawrenchuk v Riverside Arena, Inc, 214
Mich App 431, 435; 542 NW2d 612 (1995) (citations omitted). Again, because the trial court
-3-
did not abuse its discretion in finding that Dr. Anderson’s opinion with regard to alternate
designs was not reliable, we find that the evidence presented was insufficient to establish a prima
facie case. Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting defendant’s motion for a directed
verdict with regard to plaintiff’s design defect claim.
We affirm.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.