PEOPLE OF MI V JESSIE J KYLES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 18, 2003
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 238180
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 01-003053
JESSIE J. KYLES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Neff, P.J. and Bandstra and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his bench trial convictions of assault with intent to rob
while armed, MCL 750.89, carjacking, MCL 750.529a, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. The trial court sentenced defendant to two concurrent
terms of seven to fifteen years’ imprisonment for the assault and carjacking convictions and two
consecutive years’ imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. We affirm. This case is
being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Defendant’s sole issue on appeal is that he was deprived of his right to the effective
assistance of counsel based on defense counsel’s failure to (1) object to and move to suppress the
victim’s in-court identification, (2) “thoroughly” cross-examine the victim, and (3) call two
witnesses. We disagree.
I. Standard of Review
This Court reviews de novo claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v Toma,
462 Mich 281, 310; 613 NW2d 694 (2000). Our review is limited to the existing record because
defendant failed to move for a new trial or a Ginther1 hearing on the basis of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Sabin (On Second Remand), 242 Mich App 656, 658-659; 620 NW2d 19
(2000). Pursuant to Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 687; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674
(1984) and People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 309-327; 521 NW2d 797 (1994), a defendant must
satisfy a two-pronged test to establish ineffective assistance of counsel:
1
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This
requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.
Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. [Strickland, supra at
687.]
Effective assistance is presumed, and the defendant bears a heavy burden of proving that his
counsel was ineffective. People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76; 601 NW2d 887 (1999).
II. In-Court Identification
Defendant first argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to move to
suppress the in-court identification. We disagree.2
An identification procedure can be so suggestive and conducive to irreparable
misidentification that it denies an accused due process of law. People v Anderson, 389 Mich
155, 168-169; 205 NW2d 461 (1973); People v Williams, 244 Mich App 533, 542; 624 NW2d
575 (2001). To establish that an identification procedure denied him due process, a defendant
must show that the pretrial identification procedure was so suggestive under the totality of the
circumstances that it led to a substantial likelihood of misidentification. Williams, supra at 542.
If the procedure was impermissibly suggestive, the identification evidence is inadmissible unless
an independent untainted basis for the in-court identification can be established. Id. at 542-543.
Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the identification procedure was impermissibly
suggestive. Defendant does not cite any facts suggesting that the police indicated to the victim
that they apprehended the right person or singled defendant out at the lineup. The first
identification occurred the day after the incident as a result of the police calling the victim’s wife
indicating that a lineup would be conducted because an arrest had been made. At the lineup, the
victim first chose another man and then identified defendant. The victim was able to provide a
reasonable explanation for the mistake:
Q.
Did you, when you saw that lineup, did you pick him right away, or was
there somebody else that you picked out?
2
In order to preserve a claim that an in-court identification was improper, a defendant must
either object at trial or request a Wade hearing. People v McCray, 245 Mich App 631, 638; 630
NW2d 633 (2001); United States v Wade, 388 US 218; 87 S Ct 1926; 18 L Ed 2d 1149 (1967);
People v Anderson, 389 Mich 155, 167-172; 205 NW2d 461 (1973). Because defendant failed to
object or request a Wade hearing, this issue, if raised, would be reviewed for plain error affecting
his substantial rights. McCray, supra at 638, citing People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764;
597 NW2d 130 (1999). However, defendant’s argument that the in-court identification was
improper is in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Therefore, defendant
must show that defense counsel erred and, but for the error, there is a reasonable probability that
the result would have been different. Pickens, supra at 302-303.
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A.
No. I had a couple of things that stuck out in my mind, specifically. I
remembered that he had a beard and a scar by his eye. And the very first guy that
I looked at had a beard and a scar by an eye. But as I – as I looked at him, I knew
– he had a full beard, the other guy did. And he – they had them sittin’ [sic]
down. And he looked like he was much shorter. So, then, as I moved down the
row, I recognized him by the scar. And he had a scrappy beard on. He didn’t
have his hat on, or his fatigue jacket, or anything, but –
Q.
So, when you saw Mr. Kyles, the day before, he had a hat on?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And he had somewhat different clothing?
A.
Yes.
The inconsistency, if any, in the victim’s identification of defendant at the lineup merely goes to
the weight of the testimony rather than its admissibility. People v Gray, 457 Mich 107, 124; 577
NW2d 92 (1998). These facts do not indicate that the identification procedure was
impermissibly suggestive.
Even if defendant had succeeded in demonstrating that the identification procedure was
impermissibly suggestive, there was an independent basis on which the victim could identify
defendant in court. Gray, supra at 115. Factors to be considered in this analysis include: (1) the
witness’ opportunity to observe the criminal during the crime; (2) the length of time between the
crime and the disputed identification; (3) the witness’ level of certainty at the prior identification;
(4) discrepancies between the pretrial identification description and the defendant’s appearance;
(5) any prior proper identification of the defendant or failure to identify the defendant; (6) any
prior identification of another as the culprit; and (7) any special features of the defendant. Id. at
115-116.
Here, the victim had ample opportunity to view the defendant during the course of the
robbery. The robbery occurred at approximately 5:00 p.m. in December at which time there was
probably little sunlight. However, the victim was at a payphone at a gas station which probably
provided some artificial light. At any rate, the victim did not testify that he had any trouble
viewing defendant’s face. Defendant approached the victim and asked for his wallet to which
the victim responded that he was on the phone and turned away. Defendant demanded the wallet
again and was close enough to the victim to take the phone from his hands and slam it down.
The victim stated that his wallet was in his truck. Defendant then instructed the victim to get the
wallet. As the victim opened the door of his truck, defendant stepped between him and the truck.
The victim pushed defendant into the truck whereupon defendant pulled out a sawed-off shotgun.
Based on this testimony, it does not appear that the victim was so panicked that he would not
recall the details of the incident. Furthermore, the victim was close enough to defendant and had
ample time to view him before the weapon was drawn. The victim immediately called the police
who arrived at the scene and took a report. The victim was able to identify defendant because of
a characteristic scar above the eye and a beard.
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Based on this record, a motion to suppress the identification would have been meritless.
Defense counsel is not ineffective for failing to advocate a meritless position. People v Snider,
239 Mich App 393, 424-425; 608 NW2d 502 (2000). Therefore, we find that defendant was not
denied the effective assistance of counsel on this basis.
III. Cross-Examination
Next, defendant argues that defense counsel failed to “thoroughly” cross-examine the
victim about his identification of defendant. This argument is without merit. Our review of the
record reveals that trial counsel cross-examined the victim on his prior statements as to
defendant’s description and the circumstances surrounding the lineup procedure. Furthermore,
trial counsel utilized this testimony in his closing argument that the identification was not
credible. Defendant was not deprived of the effective assistance of counsel on this basis.
IV. Failure to Call Defense Witnesses
Finally, defendant argues that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel
based on defense counsel’s failure to call two witnesses in his defense. We disagree. This Court
will not substitute its judgment for that of counsel regarding matters of trial strategy, nor will it
assess counsel’s competence with the benefit of hindsight. People v Rice (On Remand), 235
Mich App 429, 445; 597 NW2d 843 (1999). Decisions about what evidence to present and
whether to call or question witnesses are presumed to be matters of trial strategy. People v
Mitchell, 454 Mich 145, 163; 560 NW2d 600 (1997); Rockey, supra at 76.
Defense counsel was clearly aware of the two witnesses and their importance to the
defense. However, neither party was able to locate the witnesses. The trial court, aware of this
situation, provided additional time to locate the witnesses. The trial court also granted an
adjournment on the third day of trial for the same purpose. However, defense counsel declined
the adjournment conceding that the witnesses could not be found. Under oath, defendant agreed
with defense counsel’s decision to decline the adjournment and agreed to proceed with trial.
Therefore, defendant affirmatively waived the presence of the witnesses. We find no error.
Affirmed.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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