IN RE MADDOX MINORS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of X.L.M., V.E.M., L.B.M., J.M.M.,
and T.T.M., Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
February 11, 2003
Petitioner-Appellee,
V
No. 237839
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 97-360976
TA-TANISHA D. FLEMING-MADDOX,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
WILLIE F. MADDOX,
Respondent.
In the Matter of T.D.M. and J.S.M., Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
V
No. 237920
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 96-340384
WILLIE F. MADDOX,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
TA-TANISHA D. FLEMING-MADDOX
Respondent.
-1-
In the Matter of X.L.M., V.E.M., L.B.M., J.M.M.,
and T.T.M., Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
V
No. 237921
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 97-360976
WILLIE F. MADDOX,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
TA-TANISHA D. FLEMING-MADDOX
Respondent.
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and Wilder and Schuette, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondents-appellants appeal as of right from the orders of the trial court terminating
their parental rights to their minor children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (g). We
affirm.
I. Facts and Proceedings
These cases first came to the attention of the Family Independence Agency (FIA) due to
allegations of neglect by both respondents and allegations of domestic violence by respondent
father toward respondent mother. Specifically, respondent mother fled to a domestic assault
shelter in October 1997 claiming that respondent father had beaten her. She brought with her
X.L.M., V.E.M., and L.B.M. (J.M.M. and T.T.M. were not yet born). While at the shelter,
employees noticed that respondent mother was not adequately caring for the children. The
children were dirty and had illnesses that respondent mother failed to have adequately treated.
Shelter employees stated that they rarely observed respondent mother feed her two younger
children and that the two younger children spent most of the day sitting in a stroller that was
stained with excrement. Further, V.E.M., who was nearly two years old at the time, had
significant developmental problems and was unable to speak, sit up or stand.
In October 1997, police cited respondent mother for larceny from a building (a
misdemeanor) for taking less than $15.00 in merchandise from a store. X.L.M., V.E.M., and
L.B.M. were with her at the time of the crime. When respondent mother left the domestic
-2-
violence shelter in November 1997 to rejoin respondent father, shelter workers alerted the
authorities about the alleged neglect and domestic violence.
A preliminary hearing was held November 7, 1997, where the trial court determined that
the children should be placed in foster care. The FIA petitioned for temporary custody and a trial
was held January 7, 1998, wherein the trial court found that the allegations of neglect and
domestic violence were substantiated by a preponderance of the evidence and assumed
jurisdiction of the children. In a hearing shortly thereafter, the trial court ordered that both
respondents attend parenting classes, domestic violence counseling and individual therapy.
Several review hearings were held during 1998 and the trial court continued to stress to
respondents the requirements for regaining custody of their children, specifically: drug testing;
drug evaluation and compliance with any recommendations; individual therapy; and verification
of having completed and benefited from parenting classes. During 1998 and 1999, X.L.M.,
V.E.M., and L.B.M. remained in foster care while respondents made some attempts to comply
with the court order. However, respondents were never in full compliance and the trial court was
particularly concerned about respondent father’s drug screens showing positive for low levels of
cocaine and marijuana and respondent mother’s failure to recognize that her relationship
involved domestic violence.
In addition, during 1998 and 1999, two older children, T.D.M. and J.S.M., children of
respondent father from a previous relationship, lived with respondents after their mother was
murdered. In January 2000, respondents had another child, J.M.M. FIA removed J.M.M.,
T.D.M., and J.S.M. from respondent’s care after caseworkers found their living conditions to be
unsuitable. Respondents did not have a lease; the city owned respondent’s house and it was
scheduled to be sold. Debris littered the backyard and porch and respondents were keeping a pit
bull on the front porch. Kerosene heated the home because there was no gas service to the house
due to an outstanding gas bill of $6,000 owed by respondent father. In January 2001,
respondents had another child, T.T.M. The trial court took jurisdiction of T.T.M. shortly after
her birth.
In July 2001 a permanent custody hearing was held. The court determined that despite
numerous efforts by the agency and emphasis by the trial court of the importance of domestic
violence counseling, respondents had failed to address this issue. With respect to income,
respondent mother was receiving $525 monthly in Social Security disability benefits. Her
disability is mental and she functions approximately at the level of an eleven-year-old; there are
no expectations that she will seek or find employment. Respondent father is unemployed and
has no income. He testified that he had not worked since November 2000 due to deteriorating
health of an unspecified nature. As of July 2001, respondents were still living without a lease in
the house owned by the city that the FIA had deemed unsuitable for seven children.
At the July 2001 permanent custody hearing, a caseworker testified that X.L.M. had been
exhibiting behavior problems. In addition, V.E.M. and J.M.M. are both developmentally delayed
and J.M.M. has a hearing problem. In addition, T.D.M. has had some problems relating to the
murder of her mother, but when she was in respondent father’s care after the murder, he kept her
out of school for two years and did not seek treatment.
-3-
Based on the permanent custody hearing, the trial court found clear and convincing
evidence to terminate respondents’ parental rights under both MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (g),
and further found that termination was not contrary to the best interests of all seven children.
The trial court subsequently entered orders to this effect.
II. Standards of Review
To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one of the statutory
grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been met by clear and convincing evidence.
In re McIntyre, 192 Mich App 47, 50; 480 NW2d 293 (1993). This Court reviews the trial
court’s findings of fact for clear error. MCR 5.974(I); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445
NW2d 161 (1989). A finding is clearly erroneous if, although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire record is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made. Id. Regard is given to the special ability of the trial court to judge the credibility of
the witnesses who appeared before it. Id.
Once the petitioner has established a statutory ground for termination by clear and
convincing evidence, the trial court is required to order termination of parental rights unless the
court finds from evidence on the whole record that termination is clearly not in the child’s best
interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 353; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). The trial
court’s decision regarding the child’s best interests is reviewed for clear error. Id.
III. Analysis
The trial court did not err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination were
established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 5.974(I); In re Miller, supra at 337. The
conditions that led to adjudication continued to exist at the time of termination. In the more than
three years that the case was before the trial court respondents-appellants failed to obtain
adequate housing and failed to complete domestic violence counseling as ordered by the trial
court. Respondents-appellants also failed to provide proper care for their children when in their
care and appeared to be no closer to being able to do so after three years of services.
In addition, the evidence did not show that termination of respondents-appellants’
parental rights was clearly not in the best interests of the children. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re
Trejo, supra. Respondents have no home and very little income. Respondent father claims
declining health and respondent mother is mentally disabled. They now have seven children
between them and several of them have special needs which respondents would be unable to
meet. The trial court therefore did not err in terminating respondents-appellants’ parental rights
to the children.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Bill Schuette
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
