PEOPLE OF MI V TERRANCE L EDWARDS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 11, 2003
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 235277
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 00-011794
TERRANCE L. EDWARDS,
Defendant-Appellee.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 236329
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 00-011794
TERRANCE L. EDWARDS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Cavanagh and Neff, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, both defendant and the prosecutor appeal as of right
following a bench trial that resulted in defendant’s convictions on two counts of armed robbery,
MCL 750.529, one count of carjacking, MCL 750.529a, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. Defendant was sentenced, as a fourth habitual
offender, to concurrent terms of eight to twenty years’ imprisonment on the robbery and
carjacking convictions, along with a consecutive two-year term of imprisonment on the felony
firearm conviction. The prosecutor appeals the sentence imposed on defendant, which reflected
a downward departure from the legislative sentencing guidelines. Defendant appeals the trial
court’s determination of guilt on the ground that the court’s factual findings were in error. We
affirm defendant’s convictions, but we vacate defendant’s sentence and remand for resentencing.
I. BASIC FACTS
This case arises out of a robbery at a gas station in Detroit at about three o’clock in the
morning on October 2, 2000. The male victim, who was at the gas station with his girlfriend and
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her three-year-old daughter, entered the station alone while his girlfriend and her daughter waited
in the girlfriend’s vehicle. The male victim walked around inside the gas station looking for
some food items when the perpetrator discreetly approached the victim in an aisle, pointed a
handgun at the victim’s midsection, and forced the victim to turn over money and all of his
personal property, including a cell phone, jewelry, and all of the victim’s clothing except his
socks. The perpetrator then exited the gas station, went over to the girlfriend’s vehicle,
threatened her with the gun, took her personal property, and stole the vehicle after first removing
the child from the car.
Police responded to the robbery scene, and the victims gave descriptions of the offender
and of the stolen vehicle. About thirty minutes after the crime, two police officers patrolling the
area in their squad car passed the stolen vehicle and turned to commence a pursuit. However, the
driver of the stolen vehicle jumped out of the moving car and fled on foot. The officers gave
chase but the perpetrator eluded capture. The officers described the person who fled the vehicle
as a black male with medium complexion, wearing dark clothing and a black jacket with a white
lining interior. Subsequently, another officer, who obtained word of the foot pursuit and the
suspect’s description, stopped defendant while he was walking in the street near the vicinity of
the pursuit. Defendant matched the general description provided by the officers involved in the
original pursuit; however, those officers could not positively identify defendant as the driver of
the stolen vehicle. No useable fingerprints were lifted from the stolen vehicle, and the stolen
personal property was not recovered.
Later, on the day of the crime, the male victim confidently picked defendant out of a line
up. Initially, the girlfriend could not identify the perpetrator in a line-up; however, as she was
leaving the police station, she changed her mind, returned to the officers involved in the line-up,
and indicated that defendant committed the crime.
Gas station surveillance tapes did not reveal the face of the offender, but the tapes
revealed that the offender had characteristics similar to defendant, and the tapes corroborated the
male victim’s version of the robbery.
II. TRIAL COURT’S FACTUAL FINDINGS
Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously found that defendant was identified by
police officers as the driver of the stolen car, where the officers’ actual testimony revealed no
such identification. Therefore, defendant concludes, the guilty verdict was defective and must be
reversed. We disagree.
In a bench trial, a trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. People v
Thenghkam, 240 Mich App 29, 45-46; 610 NW2d 571 (2000). A finding is clearly erroneous
where, after reviewing the entire record, this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been made. People v Parker, 230 Mich App 337, 339; 584 NW2d 336 (1998).
We note that defendant’s reference to the record is taken out of context, omits relevant
findings of fact by the trial court, and is inaccurate. The trial court took significant time in
detailing its factual findings regarding the circumstances of the crimes, and the majority of the
court’s findings related to the male victim’s identification of defendant as the offender. The trial
court went on to describe the efforts of police officers and their identification of the stolen
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vehicle after the crime. The court found that a person bailed out of the stolen vehicle upon
police pursuit, and it specifically acknowledged the officers’ testimony that they could not
positively identify defendant as being in the vehicle. The trial court further found, however, that
the officers who stopped the stolen vehicle provided a general description of the person who ran
from the vehicle, and another officer stopped defendant in the vicinity, while defendant was on
foot, based on the description. The court merely made the reasonable inference that defendant
had been driving the vehicle.
Even if the trial court erroneously found that the police officer specifically identified
defendant as the driver of the vehicle, any error would be harmless. MCL 769.26; People v
Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). Once again, the trial court, in support of its
guilty verdict, relied principally on the male victim’s identification of defendant and his
testimony about the circumstances of the crime, and the court found the victim’s testimony to be
very credible and convincing. Moreover, the female victim identified defendant as the
perpetrator, defendant fit the physical descriptions provided by the victims, defendant was found
in the vicinity wandering the street in the middle of the night, and video surveillance at the store,
although unclear and inconclusive, indicated that the robber had the same characteristics and
build as defendant.
There was no error requiring reversal because the unchallenged findings made by the trial
court supported a conviction on all counts, and because the court’s discussion of the facts
surrounding the police pursuit and the arrest clearly did not form the basis of the court’s
identification of defendant as the offender. We affirm the trial court’s guilty verdict.
III. SENTENCING
The crimes for which defendant was convicted occurred on October 2, 2000; therefore,
the legislative sentencing guidelines are applicable. MCL 769.34(2). The sentencing guidelines,
as provided for by statute, established a minimum sentence range of between 10½ to 35 years’
imprisonment. However, the trial court departed downward from the guidelines and imposed a
sentence of 8 to 20 years’ imprisonment. The prosecutor argues that the trial court’s departure
from the guidelines was improper because the court failed to provide a reason for the departure.
We agree.
MCL 769.34(2)(a) provides that “[i]f a statute mandates a minimum sentence for an
individual sentenced to the jurisdiction of the department of corrections, the court shall impose
sentence in accordance with that statute.” The trial court may depart from the appropriate
sentence range “if the court has a substantial and compelling reason for that departure and states
on the record the reasons for departure.” MCL 769.34(3)(emphasis added). Substantial and
compelling reasons justifying departure should keenly or irresistibly grab the court’s attention
and be recognized as having considerable worth in determining the length of a sentence. People
v Babcock, 244 Mich App 64, 75; 624 NW2d 479 (2000). The factors relied on by the court in
determining whether substantial and compelling reasons exist for departing from the guidelines
must be objective and verifiable. Id. This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s
determination that substantial and compelling reasons to depart are present in a particular case.
Id. at 76.
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Our review of the sentencing transcript reveals no explanation for the trial court’s
downward departure from the guidelines. The court simply did not provide any reason for the
departure, let alone a substantial and compelling reason based on objective and verifiable factors.
In his appellate brief, defendant as much as admits the trial court’s failure to state reasons on the
record for the departure. Instead, defendant argues that he and defense counsel presented
numerous reasons during allocution supporting departure, e.g., a good employment record prior
to drug involvement, a high school diploma, a year and a half of schooling in data processing,
involvement in church activities, and strong family support. Defendant concludes that the trial
court, having heard the arguments for a downward departure, “received and apparently adopted
those unrebutted objective factors . . . .” However, MCL 769.34(3) does not allow for a
departure where the court “apparently adopted” a defendant’s arguments; the court must
expressly state the reasons for the departure on the record. Without the required expression by
the trial court on the record of the reasons for a departure, the prosecutor is left without the
ability to properly challenge the decision, and this Court cannot render a substantive opinion
with regard to whether the departure constituted an abuse of discretion.
The trial court, prior to rendering the sentencing decision, spoke in general terms about
defendant’s drug problems and the unfortunate impact that drugs have in causing criminal
behavior; however, the court also noted that defendant had opportunities in the past to address
his drug abuse and had failed. There is no indication in the record whatsoever that defendant’s
drug dependency formed the basis for the court’s downward departure.
We remand for resentencing at which time the trial court shall articulate the reasons for
departure in accordance with the requirements of MCL 769.34 should the court in fact decide to
once again depart from the guidelines.
Affirmed in part, and vacated in part, and remanded for resentencing. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Janet T. Neff
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