PEOPLE OF MI V LONNIE LONG
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 24, 2003
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 234786
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 00-011189
LONNIE LONG,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and Murray and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
I. Nature of the Case
Defendant appeals his jury trial convictions for assault with intent to commit murder,
MCL 750.83, assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84,
discharge of a weapon in or at a building, MCL 750.234b, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b.1 The trial court sentenced defendant to thirty to sixtytwo years for the assault with intent to murder conviction, one to four years for the assault with
intent to commit great bodily harm conviction, three to ten years for the weapon discharge
conviction, and two years for the felony-firearm conviction. We affirm.
Defendant’s sole claim on appeal is that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel
because of a combination of alleged errors defense counsel made during trial. We disagree.
Because defendant failed to timely move for a new trial or a Ginther2 hearing below, our review
is limited to errors that are apparent on the record. People v Rodriguez, 251 Mich App 10, 38;
650 NW2d 96 (2002). Relevant facts will be reviewed in connection with our analysis of the
legal questions raised.
II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
1
Defendant appeals as of right.
2
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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To establish a claim that a defendant was denied his constitutional right to the effective
assistance of counsel, he must show that his attorney’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness and that this was so prejudicial to defendant that he was denied a fair
trial. Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 687; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984); People
v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). To prove prejudice, a defendant must
affirmatively demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 302-303; 613 NW2d 694
(2000). Effective assistance of counsel is presumed and a defendant bears a heavy burden of
proving otherwise. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687; 521 NW2d 557 (1994).
Decisions regarding what evidence to present and whether to call or question witnesses
are presumed to be matters of trial strategy and, therefore, a court will not substitute its judgment
for that of counsel. People v Davis, 250 Mich App 357, 368; 649 NW2d 94 (2002). A
defendant must overcome a strong presumption that the assistance of his counsel was sound trial
strategy. Id. In addition, failure to call witnesses will only constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel if the failure deprives the defendant of a substantial defense. People v Daniel, 207 Mich
App 47, 58; 523 NW2d 830 (1994). A substantial defense is one that might have made a
difference in the outcome of the trial. Id.
B. Alibi Witness
Defendant claims that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to call codefendant
Robert Reed as a corroborating alibi witness for the defense. Defendant relies on People v
Johnson, 451 Mich 115; 545 NW2d 637 (1996), to support his claim; however, Johnson is
clearly distinguishable. In Johnson, defense counsel failed to call six witnesses who would have
provided exculpatory eyewitness testimony which clearly could have changed the outcome of the
trial. Id. at 122. Here, though the jury ultimately rejected defendant’s alibi defense, defendant
presented an alibi witness, Keith Baldwin, who testified that defendant was with him on the day
and time of the shooting. We conclude, therefore, that counsel’s failure to call another witness
did not deprive defendant of a substantial defense. Furthermore, the record does not support
defendant’s assertion that Reed would have testified that defendant was not at the scene of the
shooting.
Defendant attached an affidavit to his brief on appeal in which Reed declares that he was
willing and able to testify at defendant’s trial, but that he was not asked to appear. However,
Reed did not execute this affidavit until January 2002, almost nine months after defendant’s trial.
Accordingly, the affidavit is not part of the record and, therefore, will not be considered on
appeal. Rodriguez, supra, 251 Mich App 38. Thus, defendant has failed to show that a
reasonable probability exists that, if counsel had called Reed as a witness, the outcome of the
proceedings would have been different. Further, we hold that defendant has failed to overcome
the presumption that defense counsel’s decision not to call this witness was sound trial strategy.
C. Exculpatory Evidence and Arguments of Counsel
Defendant also argues that trial counsel failed to present other exculpatory evidence.
More specifically, defendant contends that counsel failed to further develop an officer’s
testimony regarding a physical description he obtained that was inconsistent with defendant’s
physical appearance. Though defendant does not specify the name of the officer, our review of
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the record reveals that defendant means to identify Officer Michael Yaw. However, defendant
bases his argument on erroneous comments defense counsel made during his closing argument
regarding defense witness, Rodney Robinson. Because the physical description did not refer to
defendant, any error is harmless.
Defendant also argues that defense counsel failed to give a meaningful opening
statement, failed to utilize misidentification as a trial strategy, and made statements during
closing argument that bolstered the prosecution’s case. Decisions regarding whether to present
an opening statement and evidence are presumed to be matters of trial strategy. People v Garza,
246 Mich App 251, 255; 631 NW2d 764 (2001). In support of his claim, defendant makes
generalized contentions regarding counsel’s opening statement and closing argument and fails to
specify which portions of those arguments were allegedly deficient. Moreover, nothing in the
record suggests that defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s opening statement or closing
argument. Further, contrary to defendant’s assertions, our review of defense counsel’s
arguments and cross-examination reveals that, throughout trial, defense counsel attempted to
convince the jury that this was a case of mistaken identity. We hold, therefore, that defendant
has failed to demonstrate that defense counsel’s statements and arguments were not sound trial
strategy.
D. Expert Witness
Finally, defendant says that defense counsel failed to offer any evidence to rebut the
testimony of the prosecution’s firearms expert witness. The record indicates that, at trial,
defense counsel objected to Officer Pauch testifying as an expert witness on the ground that
counsel had not received a copy of Pauch’s reports until three weeks prior to trial. Defense
counsel argued that three weeks was not enough time for him to perform an independent
investigation and offer counter expert testimony regarding the firearm. Over defense objection,
the trial court allowed Pauch to testify as an expert for the prosecution and ruled that three weeks
was sufficient time to retain an expert.
Furthermore, Pauch did not place defendant at the crime, but only testified that the shell
casings recovered from the crime scene were fired from the shotgun he examined in his
laboratory. The best testimony an expert could have provided defendant is that this was not the
shotgun used in the shooting. However, because defendant maintained throughout trial that he
was somewhere else at the time of the shooting and that this was a case of mistaken identity, the
potential testimony of an expert witness would not have led to a different outcome. Therefore,
defendant was not deprived of a substantial defense. Daniel, supra, 207 Mich App 58.
Accordingly, we conclude that defense counsel’s failure to call an expert witness to counter
Pauch’s firearms testimony did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
We hold that defendant has not demonstrated that defense counsel’s assistance was either
deficient or prejudicial and, therefore, defendant was not denied the effective assistance of
counsel.
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Affirmed.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
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