PEOPLE OF MI V GORDON SCOTT DITTMER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 24, 2003
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 231381
Gladwin Circuit Court
LC No. 99-006442-FC
GORDON SCOTT DITTMER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Griffin and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree premeditated murder, MCL
750.316(1)(a), conspiracy to commit first-degree premeditated murder, MCL 750.157a, firstdegree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2), felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. He was sentenced to
concurrent prison terms of life imprisonment without parole for the first-degree murder
conviction, life imprisonment for the conspiracy conviction, and six to fifteen years for the felon
in possession conviction. He also received a twenty-five to fifty year sentence for the firstdegree home invasion conviction, which was to be served consecutive to the murder and
conspiracy convictions. Finally, he received a two-year term for the felony-firearm conviction to
be served before his other sentences. Defendant appeals by right. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that he is entitled to a new trial based on the newly discovered
evidence that a prosecution witness, John Benjamin, committed perjury at defendant’s trial. We
disagree. We review the trial court’s ruling denying defendant’s motion for a new trial for an
abuse of discretion. People v Mechura, 205 Mich App 481, 483; 517 NW2d 797 (1994). In
order to obtain a new trial based on a discovery that perjured testimony was introduced at trial, a
defendant must show that the evidence (1) is newly discovered, (2) is not merely cumulative, and
(3) would probably have caused a different result, and was not discoverable and producible with
reasonable diligence at trial. Id. Assuming for purposes of our analysis that the testimony at
issue was actually perjured, we nevertheless conclude that it is not reasonably probable that
evidence of John Benjamin’s false testimony regarding this essentially collateral matter would
have caused a different result at trial. The alleged perjury pertained to details of John
Benjamin’s travels when he allegedly followed the victim before defendant’s involvement in the
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alleged murder plot.1 Because the testimony in question concerned a matter preceding
defendant’s alleged involvement in the murder plot, the only plausible benefit to defendant had
the jury learned that John Benjamin lied about this matter would be to undermine John
Benjamin’s general credibility. However, the jury already had much reason to question
Benjamin’s integrity – particularly his acknowledged involvement in a plot to murder the victim
in order to wrongfully receive life insurance benefits. Against this background, learning that
John Benjamin had lied about the details of his prior travels would have added extremely little to
the already apparent reasons to question his general credibility. Further, this was not a case that
hinged solely on the credibility of Benjamin’s testimony; there was substantial independent
evidence to corroborate Benjamin’s account of the events and defendant’s involvement in the
murder plot, including testimony from various witnesses who placed defendant in the company
of Benjamin in proximity to the time and location to the murder. Additionally, two witnesses
testified that defendant told them that he shot the victim. There was also evidence that after the
murder, defendant had compact discs belonging to Barbara Cross, which were normally kept in
the victim’s house. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying
defendant’s motion for a new trial on the basis of perjury by John Benjamin regarding a matter
preceding defendant’s alleged involvement.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by denying his request for a change of
venue. However, we conclude that this issue has not been properly preserved for our review.
The trial court denied without prejudice defendant’s pretrial motion for a change of venue.
Defendant, however, did not renew his motion and, thus, failed to act to prevent any perceived
prejudice from proceeding with the trial in Gladwin County. See People v Schmitz, 231 Mich
App 521, 527-528; 586 NW2d 766 (1998) (“The purpose of the appellate preservation of error
requirements is to induce litigants to do what they can in the trial court to prevent error and
eliminate its prejudice, or to create a record of the error and its prejudice.”). Accordingly, we
review this unpreserved matter for plain error that resulted in the conviction of an actually
innocent defendant or that seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
The general rule is that “if a potential juror, under oath, can lay aside preexisting
knowledge and opinions about the case, neither will be a ground for reversal of a denial of a
motion for a change of venue.” People v Jendrzejewski, 455 Mich 495, 517; 566 NW2d 530
(1997). In this case, no juror seated at the end of jury selection responded when the trial court
asked if the jurors knew of any reason they could not be fair and impartial. Accordingly, we
conclude that there was no plain error in proceeding with the trial in Gladwin County.
Next, defendant argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to
object to the admission of testimony from Larry Tatro regarding things said to him by Cross as
inadmissible hearsay. We disagree. Contrary to the premise of defendant’s argument, the
testimony at issue was not inadmissible hearsay. Tatro’s testimony that Cross asked him to kill
1
This matter apparently came to light because the prosecutor forthrightly sent a letter to
appellate defense counsel advising him of inconsistent testimony by John Benjamin related to
this matter. Contrary to the indication in the prosecution’s brief on appeal, defendant does not
argue that the prosecutor knowingly used false testimony against him.
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the victim was not hearsay because it was not an assertion. It was a question or request, so it was
incapable of being true or false. See People v Jones (On Reh After Remand), 228 Mich App 191,
205; 579 NW2d 82 (1998), modified in part on other grounds 458 Mich 862 (1998) (a command
that “is incapable of being true or false” cannot be hearsay). The remainder of the testimony at
issue was admissible under the plain language of MRE 803(3), the state of mind exception to the
hearsay rule. Specifically, Tatro’s testimony that Cross told him that she wanted the victim
killed so she could receive insurance money was admissible as a statement of her then existing
intent and motive. Similarly, his testimony about her statements regarding how and when she
wanted to kill the victim were admissible as statements of her then existing plan. Thus, trial
counsel was not ineffective by not objecting to the testimony as inadmissible hearsay. Counsel is
not required to make futile objections. People v Milstead, 250 Mich App 391, 401; 648 NW2d
648 (2002).
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to elicit
testimony that prosecution witnesses John Benjamin and Billy Joe Benjamin promised to testify
truthfully as part of their plea agreements. We disagree. Contrary to defendant’s position, mere
reference to a plea agreement containing a promise of truthfulness is not in itself a ground for
reversal where, as in this case, it is not used by the prosecution to suggest that the government
has special knowledge that the witness was testifying truthfully. People v Bahoda, 448 Mich
261, 276; 531 NW2d 659 (1995).
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by precluding him from cross-examining John
Benjamin regarding a major misconduct determination issued against him by the Department of
Corrections for falsely reporting that another inmate threatened him. In particular, defendant
sought to admit this as evidence under MRE 404(b) that John Benjamin had a scheme or pattern
of lying to get out of difficult situations. We review a trial court’s ruling excluding evidence for
an abuse of discretion. People v McGuffey, 251 Mich App 155, 160-161; 649 NW2d 801 (2002).
For other acts evidence to be admissible as showing a plan, scheme, or system, “there must be
such a concurrence of common features that the uncharged and charged acts[2] are naturally
explained as individual manifestations of a general plan.” People v Hine, 467 Mich 242, 251;
650 NW2d 659 (2002). The circumstances of John Benjamin’s alleged lying in the prison
system were so different from the circumstances of his testimony against defendant in this case
that they could not reasonably be considered to be naturally explained as manifestations of a
general plan. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding this evidence.
Defendant’s additional claim that denying cross-examination of John Benjamin regarding the
prison misconduct violated his constitutional right to confrontation was not preserved by an
appropriate objection on this basis below. Regardless, there was no violation of defendant’s
confrontation rights because cross-examination may be denied regarding “collateral matters
bearing only on general credibility.” People v Canter, 197 Mich App 550, 564; 496 NW2d 336
(1992).
2
The use of the “charged” and “uncharged” terminology simply reflects that MRE 404(b) issues
seem to typically arise in the context of the prosecution seeking to offer other acts evidence
regarding a criminal defendant. However, nothing in the language of MRE 404(b) limits its
applicability to evidence regarding a criminal defendant.
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Finally, defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
testimony from a rebuttal witness regarding defendant’s silence. The witness effectively asked
defendant if he were involved in the charged murder but he did not answer. Defendant now
claims that asking this question was an impermissible comment on defendant’s silence. We
disagree. A defendant’s prearrest silence is admissible as impeachment evidence where it would
have been natural for a person to come forward with exculpatory information under the
circumstances. People v Hackett, 460 Mich 202, 213-214; 596 NW2d 107 (1999). Before the
rebuttal testimony at issue, defendant testified that he did not kill the victim. It would have been
natural for defendant to deny his involvement with the murder if he were actually innocent.
Thus, no proper basis for objection to the rebuttal testimony at issue as an improper use of
defendant’s silence would exist because it was permissible to impeach defendant’s testimony that
he did not kill the victim. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to futily object. Milstead,
supra.
We affirm.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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