KERRY MORGAN V AMERITECH CORP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
KERRY MORGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 7, 2003
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 233804
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 00-039940-CP
AMERITECH CORPORATION and
AMERITECH MICHIGAN,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and White and B. B. MacKenzie*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff Kerry Morgan commenced this putative class action against defendants
Ameritech Corporation, Inc., and Ameritech Michigan, alleging violation of the Michigan
Consumer Protection Act (MCPA), MCL 445.901 et seq., breach of contract, breach of fiduciary
duty, and misappropriation of confidential information. Plaintiff appeals by right from the trial
court’s order granting summary disposition to defendants under MCR 2.116(C)(8). We affirm.
In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendants used his unpublished telephone number
for improper purposes—namely, to attempt to sell plaintiff (and others similarly situated)
additional products and services. For the six years preceding the filing of his complaint, plaintiff
had paid a $4.95 monthly fee to defendants for non-published telephone service.
On appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in dismissing each of his four
counts under MCR 2.116(C)(8). We review de novo a lower court’s grant or denial of summary
disposition for failure to state a claim under MCR 2.116(C)(8). Trost v Buckstop Lure Co, 249
Mich App 580, 583-584; 644 NW2d 52 (2002). Such a motion tests the legal sufficiency of a
claim by the pleadings alone. Beaudrie v Henderson, 465 Mich 124, 129-130; 631 NW2d 1202
(2001). Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) is appropriate when a claim is so clearly
unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could possibly justify a judgment
in favor of the nonmoving party. Trost, supra at 584.
Plaintiff’s first count alleged violation of the MCPA, MCL 445.901 et seq. The MCPA
defines and enumerates “[u]nfair, unconscionable, and deceptive methods, acts, or practices” that
are unlawful in the conduct of trade or commerce. MCL 445.903. Plaintiff alleged that
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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defendants violated the MCPA by representing that the non-published telephone service had
benefits and standards that it did not have, representing that customer privacy would be
maintained, causing confusion regarding plaintiff’s rights, obligations, and remedies, and failing
to reveal that defendants may call the telephone number for commercial purposes. However,
beyond presenting evidence of his monthly telephone bill, which included a fee for “nonpublished service,” plaintiff’s allegations were conclusory and did not assert that defendants
made any specific representations with respect to the benefits, standards, legal rights, or material
facts of the non-published telephone number service. Accordingly, summary disposition was
properly granted to defendants on plaintiff’s MCPA claim pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8).
Plaintiff’s second count alleged breach of contract. It is generally undisputed that the
parties’ contract arose from plaintiff’s oral request for non-published telephone service and his
subsequent payment of the monthly fee for that service.1 Plaintiff alleged that this contract was
breached when defendants’ marketing department called his telephone number in an attempt to
sell him products or services. In granting summary disposition to defendants, the trial court
found the contract term, “non-published telephone service,” to be unambiguous and to mean that
defendants were prohibited from publishing or disseminating the number to the public. On
appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court was required to evaluate the definition of the term in
the light most favorable to plaintiff, who argued that the term should be reasonably construed to
include prohibition of publication of the number to defendants’ own marketing departments.
In construing contractual language, a court should strive to effectuate the intent of the
parties. Contract language is construed according to its ordinary and plain meaning; technical
and strained constructions are to be avoided. SSC Associates Limited Partnership v General
Retirement System of the City of Detroit, 210 Mich App 449, 452; 534 NW2d 160 (1995). A
trial court may grant summary disposition against a breach of contract claim as a matter of law
where the terms of the contract are plain and unambiguous, and subject to only one reasonable
interpretation.2 Conagra, Inc v Farmers State Bank, 237 Mich App 109, 132; 602 NW2d 390
(1999); BPS Clinical Laboratories v Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Mich (On Remand), 217
Mich App 687, 700; 552 NW2d 919 (1997).
Here, the trial court did not err in consulting a dictionary to determine the plain and
ordinary meaning of the subject term “non-published.” Twitchel v MIC General Ins Corp, 251
Mich App 476, 489; 650 NW2d 428 (2002). “Publish,” the opposite of “non-publish” is defined
as “[t]o distribute copies . . . to the public.” Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed). Accordingly,
1
Approved tariffs filed with the Michigan Public Service Commission generally “govern the
contractual relationship between a telephone company and its business and residential
customers.” Rinaldo’s Construction Corp v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 454 Mich 65, 67 n 1;
559 NW2d 647 (1997). However, there is no claim that a particular tariff applicable here defines
“non-published service.” We note that MBTC tariff No. 20R, which explains facility ownership
and maintenance, provides that customers have “no proprietary right in the [telephone] number.”
2
We reject plaintiff’s argument that he should have been permitted to conduct discovery to
determine the entire contract. Plaintiff sought to discover whether internal documents of
defendant provided a definition of “non-published service” that was consistent with plaintiff’s
interpretation of that term. However, defendant’s internal documents would not alter the plain
meaning of the term if the contents of the documents were never communicated to consumers.
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because plaintiff failed to allege that defendants published his telephone number to anyone other
than its own employees, we find that plaintiff’s breach of contract claim was properly dismissed
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8).
Plaintiff’s complaint also included counts for breach of fiduciary duty and
misappropriation of confidential information. However, plaintiff failed to address these counts
in his brief on appeal. A party may not merely announce a position and leave it to this Court to
discover and rationalize the basis for the claim. Morris v Allstate Ins. Co, 230 Mich App 361,
370; 584 NW2d 340 (1998). Accordingly, we decline to address these counts.
Lastly, plaintiff asserts that he must be given an opportunity to amend his complaint. We
disagree. Plaintiff failed to ask the circuit court for leave to amend. MCR 2.118(A)(4). Thus,
the issue is not properly before this Court on appeal. Lown v JJ Eaton Place, 235 Mich App 721,
725; 598 NW2d 633 (1999).
Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Barbara B. MacKenzie
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