PEOPLE OF MI V MICHELLE BAZZETTA
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 3, 2003
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 237756
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 88-086394-FC
MICHELLE BAZZETTA,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and Gage and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was tried with her husband, Joseph Bazzetta, on a charge of open murder for
the August 1, 1983, strangulation of Joseph’s stepmother, Helen Bazzetta. Helen Bazzetta had
been missing for almost five years when her body was discovered in a wooded area in Oakland
County. The prosecution tried defendant on the theory that she aided and abetted Joseph in
murdering Helen. The defense was based on the theory that, although defendant helped Joseph
dispose of the body, she did not participate in Helen’s death. Following a jury trial, defendant
was convicted of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, and was sentenced to life imprisonment.
Defendant appealed as of right, claiming that her life sentence exceeded the sentencing
guidelines’ recommendation of eight to twenty-five years. This Court affirmed, finding that the
sentence was not disproportionate to the circumstances of the offense and the offender. Ten
years later, the parole board declined to grant defendant a public hearing. Defendant filed with
the trial court a motion for relief from judgment on the grounds that her sentence was invalid
because the trial court was operating under a misconception of the law when it sentenced her to
parolable life. The trial court granted defendant’s motion and ordered resentencing. The
prosecutor filed an interlocutory appeal, and this Court granted leave to appeal and stayed the
resentencing. We reverse the trial court’s order and reinstate defendant’s life sentence.
In this prosecutor’s appeal, this Court is asked to determine the validity of the parolable
life sentence that was imposed on defendant in November 1989, in light of the fact that the trial
court, twelve years later, stated that the sentence was invalid. The court concluded that it
operated under a misapprehension of the law in sentencing defendant because it did not know the
parole board would consider a parolable life sentence the equivalent of a sentence of life without
parole. We review this issue de novo because it essentially involves a question of law. See
People v Harris, 224 Mich App 597, 599; 569 NW2d 525 (1997).
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According to MCR 6.429(B)(4), if a defendant is no longer entitled to appeal by right or
by leave regarding the issue of correcting and appealing a sentence, the defendant may seek
relief pursuant to the procedure set forth in subchapter 6.500. To be entitled to relief from
judgment, it is necessary that a defendant demonstrate both good cause and actual prejudice as
set forth in MCR 6.508(D)(3)(a) and (b). People v Brown, 196 Mich App 153, 158; 492 NW2d
770 (1992). MCR 6.508(D) permits a convicted defendant the opportunity to challenge a
sentence even after an unsuccessful appeal of right. MCR 6.508(D) provides, in part:
The defendant has the burden of establishing entitlement to the relief requested.
The court may not grant relief to the defendant if the motion
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(3) alleges grounds for relief, other than jurisdictional defects, which could have
been raised on appeal from the conviction and sentence or in a prior motion under
this subchapter, unless the defendant demonstrates
(a) good cause for failure to raise such grounds on appeal or in the prior
motion, and
(b) actual prejudice from the alleged irregularities that support the claim
for relief. As used in this subrule, "actual prejudice" means that,
***
(iv) in the case of a challenge to the sentence, the sentence is
invalid.
Here, the prosecutor asserts that the elements of both good cause and actual prejudice
were not met. Our review of the record shows that the question of actual prejudice is dispositive
in this case.
Although the trial court unequivocally stated at the motion hearing that it was under a
misconception of law when it imposed the parolable life sentence, a review of the sentencing
transcript indicates otherwise. A resentencing cannot be validly ordered unless the initial
sentence is invalid. People v Robinson (After Second Remand), 227 Mich App 28, 37; 575
NW2d 784 (1997). As stated in People v Miles, 454 Mich 90, 96; 559 NW2d 299 (1997),
“Although the authority of the court over a defendant typically ends when a valid sentence is
pronounced, the court may correct an invalid sentence after sentencing.” “A sentence is invalid
when it is beyond statutory limits, when it is based upon constitutionally impermissible grounds,
improper assumptions of guilt, a misconception of law, or when it conforms to local sentencing
policy rather than individualized facts.” Id., citing People v Whalen, 412 Mich 166, 169-170;
312 NW2d 638 (1981).
Here, the sentencing transcript of November 21, 1989, shows that the trial court relied on
the following in sentencing defendant: (1) the trial court found the crime that defendant
committed was heinous; (2) the trial court believed that defendant willingly participated in the
crime; (3) the trial court had questions regarding defendant’s rehabilitative potential; (4) the trial
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court intended defendant to remain in prison until that time when she could demonstrate to the
parole board that she was rehabilitated and posed no threat to society; (5) the trial court
recognized that the minimum sentence guidelines range of eight to twenty-five years might not
prove effective in rehabilitating defendant; (6) the trial court was aware of the fact that only
twelve of about 1,200 inmates serving a life sentence had been released on parole at the time;
and (7) the trial court concluded a parolable life sentence would serve the trial court’s intentions
better. Accordingly, the trial court imposed a parolable life sentence.
However, ten years later, after the parole board decided not to grant defendant a public
hearing, she claimed in her motion for relief from judgment that certain 1992 parole board policy
changes have rendered a parolable life sentence the equivalent of a sentence of life without
parole. Defendant argued that, as a result of the parole board policy changes, the bases upon
which the trial court had relied in imposing defendant’s 1989 sentence became a nullity.
At the October 24, 2001, hearing on defendant’s motion for relief from judgment, the
trial court stated:
. . . I believe that I can hold that I was operating under a misconception of
law. I was quite clear what my thoughts were at the particular time of sentence.
And what I feel [sic] that the defendant has shown good cause and actual
prejudice. So I am going to have to say, based on that, that the sentence was
basically invalid, based upon my understanding of the law and the facts at that
time, and would resentence in connection with this matter.
***
It is interesting to observe that, at the recent Michigan Judges’ Association
Annual Judicial Conference, mandated by the Constitution, that the Michigan
Department of Corrections and Office of Parole Board filed a great deal of
material and statistics in connection with this whole concept, and they are very
precise in saying that now, as to what we do and what our powers are, but they
have specific language contained in that particular document emphasizing that, to
them, life means life and that there is nothing to talk about. And that is not what I
understood at the time I sentenced originally in connection with it and it would be
unjust, as far as I’m concerned, to put the defendant in that position of jeopardy,
and, therefore, that’s the reasoning behind what I’m doing.
As the prosecutor aptly points out, the case law that existed at the time of defendant’s
sentencing demonstrates that the trial court was not under a misconception of law. Five years
prior to defendant’s sentencing, in People v Waterman, 137 Mich App 429, 438; 358 NW2d 602
(1984), this Court held that Proposal B, now MCL 791.233b, left intact the provisions of MCL
791.234 that provide that a defendant receiving a non-mandatory life sentence is eligible for
consideration for parole once he has served a minimum of ten calendar years of his sentence.
Here, the sentencing transcript shows that the trial court was cognizant of the fact that defendant
would be eligible for parole consideration because the trial court pointedly explained that it was
up to defendant to earn her parole release from the parole board.
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In her motion for relief from judgment, defendant supported her argument by providing
the trial court with transcripts of sentences and letters by other circuit court judges who, in the
1970s and 1980s, had imposed parolable life sentences on other defendants. However, in all
these cases, the courts had imposed parolable life sentences with the intent that the defendants be
released on parole after ten to fifteen years’ imprisonment. Apparently, in those cases, the circuit
courts imposed life sentences under the erroneous belief that a life sentence would make the
defendants eligible for parole “sooner than a long term of years,” as was the case in People v
Biggs, 202 Mich App 450, 456; 509 NW2d 803 (1993). This is not the case here. The trial court
was not under any false impression that defendant, who was convicted of second-degree murder,
would be released for parole in ten to fifteen years. As previously noted, the trial court was
cognizant of the fact that it could impose a minimum sentence within the guidelines range of
eight to twenty-five years, but the trial court expressly opted not to impose such a sentence.
Accordingly, the trial court was under no misapprehension of the law regarding the parole board
policies that existed at the time the trial court sentenced defendant.
The next question is whether the alleged parole board policy changes of 1992 frustrated
the expressed intent of the trial court, as stated on the record at the 1989 sentencing. Defendant
has not offered any proof to show that parole is unequivocally denied to all those sentenced to
parolable life for second-degree murder convictions. Instead, defendant showed that, during the
year following the 1992 parole board changes, thirteen inmates were released on parole.
Defendant also fails to show that the trial court was under any misapprehension about the fact
that, in 1989, very few felons sentenced to parolable life for second-degree murder convictions
were actually released on parole. On the contrary, the trial court had noted that only twelve of
about 1,200 lifers had been paroled as of 1988. The sentencing transcript shows the trial court
recognized the parole distinctions between an indeterminate sentence and a parolable life
sentence, that the trial court questioned defendant’s capability for rehabilitation, that the trial
court questioned whether defendant could “earn” parole, and that the trial court made a
conscious decision to disregard the minimum sentence guidelines recommendation of eight to
twenty-five years. As previously noted, had the trial court intended that defendant be released in
sixteen to twenty years, the trial court could have imposed a minimum sentence between eight
and twenty-five years. Instead, the trial court stated that such a sentence would not serve the
purposes of the punishment that defendant deserved.
Moreover, there is nothing to show that the parole board had ultimately decided not to
grant defendant parole, and thus her claim is not ripe for consideration. See, generally, People v
Conat, 238 Mich App 134, 145; 605 NW2d 49 (1999). Parole eligibility is governed by statute.
MCL 791.234; In re Parole of Johnson, 235 Mich App 21, 22; 596 NW2d 202 (1999). A
person serving a parolable life sentence is subject to the jurisdiction of the parole board after
serving ten years in the case of a prisoner sentenced for a crime committed before October 1,
1992. Johnson, supra at 23. This means that such a defendant will be eligible for review by the
parole board after serving ten years, not that she will be released. Id. All prisoners governed by
MCL 791.234(6)(a) “shall” be interviewed by a member of the parole board after serving ten
years and every five years thereafter without regard to the sentencing date. Id. at 24. Inmates
are interviewed, but not necessarily eligible, for parole consideration at that time because several
legal hurdles must still be overcome. Id. at 23-24. Here, defendant was only interviewed, the
first of several statutory hurdles before she becomes eligible for parole consideration.
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Accordingly, defendant’s claim does not reflect an actual, existing controversy, as opposed to a
potential one. Conat, supra at 145.
A review of the hearing motion transcript shows the trial court noted the rehabilitative
achievements that defendant has made during imprisonment. Defendant has commendably
pursued her higher education and obtained a Bachelor’s Degree, magna cum laude. She
successfully completed all recommended programs, and her conduct was exemplary. She
became an HIV/AIDS counselor and was considered a role model in prison. It appears that the
trial court was impressed, if not pleasantly surprised, by defendant’s progress, and it appears that
this affected the court’s decision regarding defendant’s motion for relief from judgment. In
effect, the trial court improperly assumed the role of the parole board and determined that
defendant had earned her parole. However, a trial court may not reevaluate its own discretionary
sentencing and invalidate its sentences by simply changing its mind. See People v Wybrecht,
222 Mich App 160, 168-169; 564 NW2d 903 (1997). Moreover, the decision whether to grant
parole is “discretionary with the parole board,” see MCL 791.234(9), and is a function of the
executive branch of government. Accordingly, the trial court erred when it allowed such
considerations to influence its decision. In light of the above, the sentence was valid. The trial
court improperly vacated defendant’s sentence and improperly ordered resentencing.
Because defendant failed to show actual prejudice under MCR 6.508(D)(3)(b)(iv), as
defendant’s sentence is valid, we find it unnecessary to address whether defendant successfully
showed good cause under MCR 6.508(D)(3)(a) for her failure to raise this issue in prior
proceedings.
The trial court’s order of October 31, 2001, is reversed, and defendant’s initial sentence is
reinstated. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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