KENNETH DECKER V CITY OF WYANDOTTE
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
KENNETH DECKER, SHIRLEY DECKER,
DEAN EASTMAN, MARILYN EASTMAN,
WILLIAM LILIENTHAL, ROSE LILIENTHAL,
EDWARD ROTHERMAL, SOPHIA
ROTHERMAL, ROBERT SCHRADER,
GERALDYN SCHRADER, and DONNA
YOUNG,
UNPUBLISHED
December 20, 2002
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
and
CHARLES BROWN, TONI BROWN, and
MICKEL YOLAN,
Plaintiffs,
v
No. 236372
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 99-937487-CK
CITY OF WYANDOTTE,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Kelly, P.J. and Jansen and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this breach of contract case, plaintiffs appeal as of right from an order granting
summary disposition to defendant. We affirm.
I. Basic Facts and Procedural History
Plaintiffs are retired non-union employees of defendant and the retirees’ spouses. It is
undisputed that defendant agreed to provide health insurance benefits to plaintiffs during their
retirement. However, when plaintiffs reached age sixty-five, defendant required them to pay “a
portion of their hospitalization insurance.” Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that defendant’s
refusal to provide “fully paid hospitalization insurance” after age sixty-five constituted a breach
of contract.
-1-
At the outset, it is necessary to clarify plaintiffs’ claim. In plaintiffs’ brief on appeal and
briefs filed in the lower court, plaintiffs variously state that defendant promised: “health
insurance benefits after their retirement,” “the same health insurance benefits as those provided
to the patrolmen under their union contracts,” “fully paid hospitalization benefit[s]” and
“Medicare premiums.” Adding to the confusion, the trial court referred to “Plan B Medicare
premiums” and “Part B Medicaid benefits.” Additionally, defendant argues that plaintiffs claim
defendant agreed to “provide them with Medicare Part B benefits.” Based on plaintiffs’
complaint, we conclude that their claim was for fully paid hospitalization insurance after age
sixty-five.1
Defendant filed a motion for summary disposition arguing that there was no genuine
issue of fact regarding whether defendant agreed to provide fully paid hospitalization insurance
after age sixty-five. Defendant also argued that plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted with respect to claims based on a collective bargaining agreement and an
implied contract. The trial court granted defendant’s motion.
On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion for
summary disposition because there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether defendant expressly
or impliedly contracted to provide plaintiffs with fully paid hospitalization insurance after
retirement and beyond age sixty-five. Further, plaintiffs argue that even if the evidence does not
establish an express or implied contract, a unilateral contract was established by city counsel
resolution.
II. Standard of Review
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision regarding a motion for summary disposition de
novo to determine if the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Smith v
Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 454; 597 NW2d 28 (1999). Defendant brought a motion for
summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10). Summary disposition pursuant
to MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim by the pleadings alone; the motion may
not be supported with documentary evidence. Patterson v Kleiman, 447 Mich 429, 432; 526
NW2d 879 (1994). In reviewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), the court considers
affidavits, pleadings, admissions and documentary evidence filed in the action or submitted by
the parties in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Id. Summary
disposition may be granted if the affidavits and other documentary evidence show that there is no
genuine issue with respect to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Id. at 454-455.
III. Analysis
1
In their first amended complaint, plaintiffs alleged, “That the Defendant City agreed to provide
fully paid hospitalization insurance for Plaintiffs and their spouses during the entire period
of retirement . . . That the City presently provides fully paid hospitalization insurance only
until the retirees reach the age of 65, at which time the City informs the retirees that they must
now pay a portion of their hospitalization insurance, contrary to the contracts between the
Plaintiffs and the Defendant.”
-2-
Although plaintiffs frame the issue as whether there was an express or implied contract
for fully paid hospitalization insurance after age sixty-five, the issue is properly framed as one of
contract interpretation. Defendant has not denied that a contract for post-retirement benefits
exists,2 nor did the trial court find that such a contract does not exist.3 Thus, the question
presented is whether the contract permits the interpretation that defendant agreed to provide fully
paid hospital insurance after age sixty-five. We review de novo the proper construction and
interpretation of a contract. Perry v Sied, 461 Mich 680, 681, n 1; 611 NW2d 516 (2000). The
basic rule in contract interpretation is to ascertain the intention of the parties. D’Avanzo v Wise
& Marsac, PC, 223 Mich App 314, 319; 565 NW2d 915 (1997). In the context of a summary
disposition motion, the “trial court may determine the meaning of the contract only when the
terms are not ambiguous.” Id. A contract is ambiguous if the language is susceptible to two or
more reasonable interpretations. Id. If the contract is ambiguous, factual development is
required to determine the parties’ intent and summary disposition is inappropriate. Id.
A. Express Contract
Plaintiffs first argue that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition of their
claim that defendant breached an express agreement to provide fully paid hospitalization
insurance after age sixty-five. We disagree. “An express contract is ‘an actual agreement of the
parties, the terms of which are openly uttered or declared at the time of making it, being stated in
distinct and explicit language, either orally or in writing.’” Benson v DMB, 168 Mich App 302,
307; 424 NW2d 40 (1988). Plaintiffs rely on several items in evidence to support their express
contract claim. We address each in turn.
1. Collective Bargaining Agreement
Plaintiffs alleged, “the specific hospitalization benefits for the Plaintiffs were determined
by the contract provision of the [FOP], Wyandotte Lodge No. 111.” However, it is undisputed
that plaintiffs were not union members at the time they retired. Because plaintiffs, as non-union
members, were not parties to this collective bargaining agreement, the trial court did not err in
ruling that plaintiffs failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted pursuant to this
agreement.
2. Personnel Handbook
Plaintiffs argue that the statements in the personnel handbook constituted an express
promise that defendant would provide fully paid hospitalization insurance after age sixty-five.
The portion of the personnel handbook upon which plaintiffs rely provides:
2
In its answer to plaintiffs’ complaint, defendant stated, “Defendant admits that the City
provides fully paid hospitalization insurance until the retirees or their spouses reach the age of
65, at which time the City informs them that they must pay a portion of their hospitalization
insurance.”
3
Plaintiffs’ confusion in this regard is evident in its brief which states, “the failure of the Trial
Court to find the existence of a health insurance contract between the retirees and the City is
contrary to the case law in the State of Michigan, and contrary to the facts established through
the discovery process.”
-3-
You may also continue your group health insurance benefits during retirement.
For this continuation of benefits, we will pay the entire cost of the premiums for
you and your spouse, or your dependents under the age of 19. This does not apply
to employees on a deferred retirement.
Complete details on the extent of coverage will be made available to you.
However, the evidence indicates that none of the plaintiffs saw or knew of this personnel
handbook until the time of litigation. Thus, there was no mutuality of agreement on its terms.
Eerdmans v Maki, 226 Mich App 360, 364; 573 NW2d 329 (1997). Additionally, the final
sentence indicates that details “will be made available.” Therefore, the trial court did not err in
finding that the handbook alone did not constitute an express promise that defendant would
provide fully paid hospitalization insurance after age sixty-five.
3. Retirement Letters from Defendant to Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs also argue that defendant sent a written notice to each of them, at the time of
retirement, that included an express promise to provide fully paid hospitalization benefits after
age sixty-five.
a. Plaintiffs Eastman, Decker, and Young
The retirement letters to plaintiffs Eastman, Decker and Young stated in relevant part,
“Hospitalization—the city will pay all premiums for retiree and spouse until death or employed
elsewhere where such coverage is offered.” We agree with the trial court that the phrase “where
such coverage is offered” amounted to “no promise at all.” The language is insufficiently
specific to create an express contract for fully paid hospitalization coverage after age sixty-five.
Although the letter states that defendant will pay all premiums until the retiree or spouse’s death,
it also contains the limiting language “where such coverage is offered.” Therefore, the trial court
did not err in finding that the letters to Eastman, Decker and Young did not contain an express
promise that defendant would provide fully paid hospitalization insurance after age sixty-five.
b. Plaintiffs Rothermal and Schrader
The letter to plaintiff Rothermal stated, “The City will continue to pay for you and your
spouse under the Retirees Group of the City of Wyandotte as described in the attached.” The
letter to plaintiff Schrader was substantially similar. The document attached to the letters read as
follows:
RETIREE HOSPITALIZATION COVERAGE:
At the employee’s option, the employee may select one of the following
coverages when applying for retirement benefits:
OPTION I
(1). The City will provide the following group health insurance for each retire
employee and will pay one hundred percent (100%) of the premiums for such
insurance provided that:
-4-
***
(2). Said coverage will be Blue Cross/Blue Shield MVF-1, Semi-Private
Coverage, with a Coordination of Benefits provision, First Aid Emergency Rider
(FAE) and Master Medical Option 1. . . . . This coverage will also be continued
as Blue Cross/Blue Shield Medicare Complementary coverage when the
retiree or spouse become eligible for Medicare, as long as retirement benefit
payments are being made. . . .
OPTION II
(1). The City will provide the following group health insurance for each retire
employee and will pay one hundred percent (100%) of the premiums for such
insurance provided that . . .
(2). Said coverage will be Blue Cross/Blue Shield MVF-1, Semi-Private
Coverage, with a Coordination of Benefits provision, First Aid Emergency Rider
(FAE) and Master Medical Option 5, and a $5.00 Co-Pay Drug Rider. . . . This
coverage will also be continued as Blue Cross/Blue Shield Medicare
Complementary coverage when the retiree or spouse become eligible for
Medicare, as long as retirement benefit payments are being made. . . .
(Emphasis added).
The foregoing language does not state that defendant agrees to fully pay hospitalization
insurance after age sixty-five.
Rather, it specifies that defendant will only provide
complementary coverage when the retiree or spouse becomes eligible for Medicare. Therefore,
the trial court did not err in finding that the letters to Rothermal and Schrader did not contain
defendant’s express promise to provide fully paid hospitalization insurance after age sixty-five.
Both in the lower court and on appeal, the parties refer to Sommer v City of Wyandotte,
unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued November 17, 1995 (Docket No.
152632).4 We note that res judicata5 is not applicable based on Sommer because plaintiffs, as
non-union members, were not parties to the Sommer class action. However, plaintiffs contend
the same contract language construed in Sommer must be construed in this case. “An
unpublished opinion is not precedentially binding under the rule of stare decisis.” MCR
7.215(C).
After reviewing the parties’ arguments and the Sommer opinion, we agree with the trial
court’s statement, “It is a gross understatement for the court to state that the arguments of the
respective parties concerning the persuasive effect of Sommers [sic] are not entirely clear (with
respect, neither is the opinion of the Court of Appeals itself).” Likewise, on appeal, plaintiffs fail
4
This Court’s judgment in Sommer was reversed in part by Sommer v City of Wyandotte,
unpublished order of the Supreme Court, entered March 25, 1997 (Docket No. 105647).
5
Ordinarily, res judicata bars a subsequent relitigation that is based on the same transaction or
events as earlier litigation. Pierson Sand & Gravel, Inc v Keeler Brass, 460 Mich 372, 380; 596
NW2d 153 (1999).
-5-
to adequately analyze and apply Sommer. A party may not “simply . . . announce a position or
assert an error and then leave it up to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his
claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments, and then search for authority either to
sustain or reject his opinion.” Wilson v Taylor, 457 Mich 232, 243; 577 NW2d 100 (1998).
Aside from the lack of precedential authority and plaintiffs’ failure to adequately discuss and
apply this factually complex case, we find the Sommer opinion of little assistance in this case
because the facts of the case and the exact language of the various contracts is not discussed with
enough detail for us to provide us with guidance.
c. Plaintiff Lilienthal
Plaintiff Lilienthal retired from defendant’s employ to become police chief in
Brownstown Township whereupon he enrolled in the township’s health insurance.
Subsequently, plaintiff Lilienthal requested that defendant re-enroll him in its coverage.
Defendant advised him that it would only provide complementary coverage. Based on this
evidence, the trial court did not err in finding defendant did not promise to provide plaintiff
Lilienthal with fully paid hospitalization insurance beyond age sixty-five.
4. Communiqué
Plaintiffs argue that on March 20, 1990, defendant “sent a communiqué to all department
heads” which provides evidence of a contract for fully paid hospitalization insurance beyond age
sixty-five. However, the memo contains the same language as the retirement letters to plaintiffs
Rothermal and Schrader which, as discussed above, does not constitute a promise that defendant
would provide fully paid hospitalization insurance to plaintiffs beyond age sixty-five.
For these reasons, we find that the trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs’ breach
of express contract claim pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10).
B. Unilateral Contract--City Council Resolution
Plaintiffs also argue that in bargaining sessions between union patrolmen and defendant,
defendant adopted the same benefits for non-union employees. Plaintiffs argue that this was
evidenced by a city council resolution. However, plaintiffs only produced evidence of a
proposed resolution stating:
“RESOLVED by the City Council that Council hereby approves the wage and
fringe adjustments . . . as recommended by the Director of Administrative
Services and Director of Financial Services.”
Plaintiffs argue that this “resolution” constituted a promise that defendant would pay benefits to
plaintiffs which plaintiffs would accept by working. We disagree.
To begin with, plaintiffs did not plead facts to support this claim, nor did they specifically
make a claim for breach of a unilateral contract in their complaint. Another flaw in plaintiffs’
argument is that there is no evidence of either the recommendations referred to in the resolution,
or the actual resolution itself. Plaintiffs admit that they have not provided the actual resolution
because defendant “claims that these resolutions [sic] are not available.” In fact, defendant
-6-
maintains, “no such resolution exists” and produced affidavits of the director of financial
services and the controller stating that no such resolution took place. Moreover, the “secondary
evidence” provided by plaintiff does not demonstrate a resolution that defendant would provide
fully paid hospitalization insurance to plaintiffs beyond age sixty-five.
Plaintiffs also argue that defendant’s agents testified to their belief that the benefits for
union and non-union employees were the same. However, these “beliefs” do not constitute a
contractual agreement. Even if they do provide circumstantial evidence that a contract existed,
the other evidence cited by plaintiffs does not constitute a contractual agreement that defendant
would provide that defendant would provide plaintiffs with fully paid hospitalization insurance
beyond age sixty-five. Therefore, we find that the trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs’
breach of unilateral contract claim.
C. Implied Contract
Plaintiffs finally argue that there was an implied agreement for fully paid hospitalization
insurance after age sixty-five. We disagree.
Courts will recognize an implied contract “where parties assume obligations by their
conduct.” Williams v Litton Systems, Inc, 433 Mich 755, 758; 449 NW2d 669 (1989). “A
contract implied in law is an obligation imposed by law to do justice even though it is clear that
no promise was ever made or intended. A contract may be implied in law where there is a
receipt of a benefit by a defendant from a plaintiff and retention of the benefit is inequitable,
absent reasonable compensation.” In re McKim Estate, 238 Mich App 453, 457; 606 NW2d 30
(1999), quoting In re Lewis Estate, 168 Mich App 70, 74-75; 423 NW2d 600 (1988). A contract
implied in fact arises “‘when services are performed by one who at the time expects
compensation from another who expects at the time to pay therefore.’ The issue is a question of
fact to be resolved through the consideration of all the circumstances . . . .” Id. at 458.
To begin with, plaintiffs’ complaint does not contain a claim for breach of implied
contract. In fact, the complaint states, “contrary to the express, clear, and mandatory language of
the contract, the Defendant City has failed to comply with the terms of the contracts.” Neither
the original complaint nor the amended complaint contain any facts supporting a claim for
breach of implied contract. Because plaintiffs never pleaded a claim for breach of implied
contract, we find the trial court did not err in granting summary disposition of this claim.6
“[T]his Court will not reverse where the trial court reached the right result for the wrong reason.”
Lane v Kinder Care Learning Centers, Inc, 231 Mich App 689, 697; 588 NW2d 715 (1998).
6
Furthermore, “An implied contract cannot be enforced where the parties have made an express
contract covering the same subject matter.” Scholz v Montgomery Ward & Co, Inc, 437 Mich
83, 93; 468 NW2d 845 (1991). As discussed above, defendant did not deny that it contracted to
provide plaintiffs with health care benefits after retirement. The dispute arose when defendant
notified plaintiffs that these benefits would not continue past age sixty-five. The fact that the
parties had an express contract for health insurance benefits, precludes a finding that the parties
had an implied contract regarding the extent of those benefits.
-7-
Nevertheless, we find that the trial court did not err in ruling that the “past conduct of the
parties is . . . insufficient to create an implied contract.” Elements required to establish an
implied contract include: (1) parties being competent to contract, (2) proper subject matter, (3)
consideration, (4) mutuality of agreement, and (5) mutuality of obligation. Mallory v Detroit,
181 Mich App 121, 127; 449 NW2d 115 (1989). An implied contract must satisfy the elements
of mutual assent and consideration. Pawlak v Redox Corp, 182 Mich App 758, 765; 453 NW2d
304 (1990), quoting Lowery v Dep’t of Corrections, 146 Mich App 342, 359; 380 NW2d 99
(1985).
Mutual assent means that there has been a “meeting of the minds.” Kamalnath v Mercy
Hospital, 194 Mich App 543, 548-549; 487 NW2d 499 (1992). A meeting of the minds must
occur on all the material facts. Id. at 548, quoting Stanton v Dachille, 186 Mich App 247, 256;
463 NW2d 479 (1990), citing Heritage Broadcasting Co v Wilson Communications, Inc, 170
Mich App 812, 818; 428 NW2d 784 (1988). To determine whether mutual assent has occurred,
an objective test is used to examine “the express words of the parties and their visible acts,” and
the question should be asked whether a reasonable person could have interpreted the conduct or
words in the alleged manner. Id.
Here, plaintiffs have failed to present enough evidence to satisfy the element of mutual
assent. Plaintiffs cite only to plaintiffs’ beliefs, defendant’s agents’ beliefs and “the practice of
the City in providing Plaintiffs-Appellants with the same retirement benefits as the union police
officers.” However, plaintiffs provide no evidence of this practice. Therefore, a reasonable
person could not have interpreted the parties’ conduct and words to mean that an implied
contract existed whereby defendant would provide plaintiffs with fully paid hospitalization
insurance beyond age sixty-five.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
-8-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.