PEOPLE OF MI V DESHAWN LAMAR GREEN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 17, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 234040
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 00-009107
DESHAWN LAMAR GREEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Kelly, P.J., and Jansen and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted, following a bench trial, of four counts of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b(1)(a). He was sentenced to nine to twenty years’ imprisonment
for each count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct to run concurrently. Defendant appeals as
of right. We affirm.
Defendant’s convictions arose from allegations of sexual abuse made by complainant,
who was a six-year-old boy. Defendant, who was aged seventeen at the time of trial was the son
of a friend of complainant’s mother. Complainant alleged that several incidents of sexual assault
occurred while complainant and his mother stayed at defendant’s mother’s home.
On appeal defendant argues his rights to confrontation, a fair trial, and to present a
defense were violated when the trial court denied his request to question the child victim
regarding prior sexual assaults by third parties for the purpose establishing his familiarity with
sexual matters or to refute medical evidence of penetration. We disagree. A party seeking
admission of excluded evidence must make an offer of proof to provide the trial court with an
adequate basis on which to make its ruling, and to provide this Court with the information
needed to evaluate the claim of error. MRE 103(a)(2); People v Grant, 445 Mich 535, 545; 520
NW2d 123 (1994). Here, though defendant requested to question complainant regarding prior
sexual assaults, he did not proffer this evidence to explain complainant’s familiarity with sexual
matters or to refute medical evidence of penetrations. Nor did defendant express his concern
over how complainant could have provided the sexual detail without having suffered defendant’s
conduct. We find that the trial court had no basis to rule on this issue, and it is not properly
preserved for our review. Id. at 545. In order to avoid forfeiture of this unpreserved
constitutional issue on appeal, defendant must show that (1) an error occurred, (2) the error was
plain, i.e., clear or obvious, and (3) the plain error affected substantial rights. People v Carines,
460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). Also, the decision to admit evidence under the rape-1-
shield statute is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Hackett, 421 Mich 338, 349; 365
NW2d 120 (1984).
In People v Morse, 231 Mich App 424, 436-437; 586 NW2d 555 (1998), this Court
identified safeguard procedures that must be followed when determining whether evidence of
prior sexual abuse involving the victim and another person is admissible. The defendant is
obligated to make an offer of proof and demonstrate relevance. Id. In this context, “the prior
sexual conduct must account for how the child could provide the testimony’s sexual detail
without having suffered defendant’s alleged conduct.” Id. at 434, citing People v Hill, 289 Ill
App 3d 859, 862-865, 683 NE2d 188, 225 Ill Dec 244 (1997).
Defendant attempted to question the victim regarding whether prior sexual incidents by
third parties occurred. The trial court here excluded the evidence, relying on the rape-shield
statute, MCL 750.520j. It appears from the record that the purpose of defendant’s attempt to
question complainant regarding these events was not purported to explain how the child could
have provided the sexual detail without having suffered defendant’s alleged conduct. We
conclude that the trial court properly determined that defendant failed to demonstrate the
relevance of the incidents as required by Morse, supra, 231 Mich App 436-437. Thus, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion and the issue is forfeited. Carines, supra, 460 Mich 763;
Hackett, supra, 421 Mich 349.
Even if defendant had established that questioning complainant about prior sexual
incidents with third parties was relevant to his “age inappropriate” sexual knowledge, the trial
court still properly held such questioning impermissible. Specifically, Morse requires the
defendant to establish that another person was convicted of criminal sexual conduct involving
the victim, and the facts underlying the previous conviction are significantly similar, to be
relevant to the proceedings. Morse, supra, 231 Mich App 437. Our review of the record reveals
that neither of these requirements were met in this case. There was no evidence that another
person was convicted of criminal sexual conduct involving the victim. The facts underlying the
previous alleged act were not shown to be remotely similar. There was no direct testimony
demonstrating that the alleged prior sexual incidents actually occurred or that the content of
those incidents were sufficiently similar to defendant’s conduct. Therefore, the trial court
properly denied defendant’s request to question the victim regarding prior sexual incidences with
third persons. Id.
Defendant next argues the denial of questioning was improper when the evidence was
offered to refute medical evidence of penetration. There was medical testimony that complainant
was scarred at the opening of the anus caused by penetration to the rectum by an object larger
than the opening of the rectum. The prosecution’s purpose for introducing such evidence was, in
part, to establish that penetration occurred. In support, defendant relies on People v Haley, 153
Mich App 400, 405-406; 395 NW2d 60 (1986), where this Court held the defendant should have
been allowed to introduce evidence of the victim’s previous sexual conduct with her father when
the prosecution introduced medical evidence to establish penetration of the victim. Here,
defendant did introduce evidence of complainant’s previous sexual conduct with others.
Complainant’s mother testified that she suspected there was a prior sexual incident between
complainant and a friend. In fact, there was testimony that complainant admitted to something
of a sexual nature that happened with the friend. As such, the record indicates defendant was not
foreclosed from offering evidence regarding other possible sources of scarring and penetration.
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The trial court permitted such testimony, and, unlike Haley, the allegations of other occurrences
of sexual abuse were speculative in nature. Id. at 406. Since the trial court permitted testimony
to rebut medical testimony and to present other sources of penetration, defendant’s argument
fails to demonstrate prejudice. Carines, supra, 460 Mich 763.
Defendant’s final argument is that defense counsel’s failure to provide notice under the
rape-shield statute was ineffective assistance of counsel because evidence of the victim’s sexual
incidents with third persons could have provided evidence critical to the defense and may have
resulted in defendant’s acquittal. Generally, to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must show: (1) that counsel’s performance was below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms; (2) that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceedings would have been different; and (3) that
the resultant proceedings were fundamentally unfair or unreliable. People v Toma, 462 Mich
281, 302; 613 NW2d 694 (2000); People v Rodgers, 248 Mich App 702, 714; 645 NW2d 294
(2001). Since an evidentiary hearing or motion for new trial before the trial court did not
precede this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we will consider it only to the extent that
alleged errors are apparent from the record. People v Johnson, 144 Mich App 125, 129-130; 373
NW2d 263 (1985).
Our review of the record indicates that there is no reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s alleged error, the result of the proceedings would have been different. Defendant’s
argument assumes the trial court’s decision to preclude evidence related to the victim’s prior
sexual history would be upheld by this Court because of his non-compliance with the notice
provisions of the rape-shield statute. However, the trial court’s decision was supported on
grounds of irrelevance and the substantive portion of the rape-shield statute. Therefore, it is
unnecessary to address whether non-compliance with the rape-shield notice provisions would
have affected the result of the proceedings. Also, there was no objection to the failure to comply
with notice provisions of the rape-shield statute at trial. In fact, the prosecution offered to
stipulate to defense counsel’s proposed questioning regarding the victim’s prior sexual history,
but the trial court precluded the questioning, reasoning that the parties could not stipulate to a
violation of the law. There is little possibility that the result of the proceedings could have been
different where the issue of notice under the rape-shield provision was not objected to, or raised.
Administratively, we note that defendant was initially charged with four counts of firstdegree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b(1)(a). After the preliminary examination the
felony information was amended to include an additional count of second-degree criminal sexual
conduct, MCL 750.520c. Following a bench trial on the charges, the trial court found defendant
“guilty as charged, or guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the first[-]degree as charged in counts
one, two, and three, as well as count four, criminal sexual conduct in the second degree.” At the
sentencing hearing, the trial court stated “[a]fter a trial by this Court sitting without a jury, he
was adjudicated guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree in Count 1, and I believe
there was an adjudication of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree in all four counts.” The
trial court then sentenced defendant to nine to twenty years’ imprisonment “as to each named
count.” The judgment of sentence reflects nine to twenty years’ imprisonment for each of four
counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct to be served concurrently. It is clear from our
review of the lower court record that the trial court mistakenly did not sentence defendant on one
of the charges. However, it is unclear when reading the transcripts if the missing count is the
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fourth count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct or the fifth count of second-degree criminal
sexual conduct. In any event, since a court speaks through its written orders, not through its oral
statements, we must assume after reading the judgment of sentence that the trial court did not
sentence defendant on the fifth charge, second-degree criminal sexual conduct. People v Turner,
181 Mich App 680, 683; 449 NW2d 680 (1989). Neither defendant nor the prosecutor raise any
issues relating to the error. We note that the error does not merit any substantive relief to
defendant, however, we must remand this issue to the trial court for the ministerial task of
entering an order correcting the administrative error on the judgment of sentence. See generally
People v Herndon, 246 Mich App 371, 392-393, 423; 633 NW2d 376 (2001); People v Avant,
235 Mich App 499, 521; 597 NW2d 864 (1999).
We affirm defendant’s convictions, and remand for entry of an order correcting the
administrative errors associated with defendant’s judgment of sentence. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
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