PEOPLE OF MI V TODD RENE HARRIS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 13, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 234686
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 20001-007388-FC
TODD RENE HARRIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr., and Cooper, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317,
and unlawfully driving away an automobile, MCL 750.413, and was sentenced, as a third
habitual offender, to concurrent terms of sixty to ninety years’ imprisonment and four years and
nine months to ten years’ imprisonment, respectively. Defendant now appeals as of right. We
affirm.
On appeal, defendant first claims that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court
improperly submitted the charges of first-degree murder, MCL 750.316, and carjacking, MCL
750.529a(1), to the jury. Specifically, defendant argues that the trial court erred in submitting
the charge of first-degree murder and carjacking to the jury because the prosecution failed to
present sufficient evidence to establish each element of these charged offenses beyond a
reasonable doubt. People v Graves, 458 Mich 476, 487-488; 581 NW2d 229 (1998). Thus,
according to defendant, he was subject to a compromised jury verdict because the jury
considered these unwarranted charges.
Because defendant failed to object below, we review this issue for plain error affecting
substantial rights. In People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999), the Court
noted:
To avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, three requirements must be met: (1)
error must have occurred, (2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, and (3) the
plain error affected substantial rights . . . . . The third requirement generally
requires a showing of prejudice, i.e., that the error affected the outcome of the
lower court proceedings. “It is the defendant rather than the Government who
bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice.” Finally, once a
defendant satisfies these three requirements, an appellate court must exercise its
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discretion in deciding whether to reverse. Reversal is warranted only when the
plain, forfeited error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant
or when an error ‘“seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation
of judicial proceedings’ independent of the defendant’s innocence.” [460 Mich
763 (citation omitted)].
Here, defendant cannot establish, under the plain error rule, that he is entitled to a new trial.
“[W]hen determining whether sufficient evidence has been presented to sustain a
conviction, a court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and
determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the
crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d
748, amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992). To convict a defendant of first-degree murder, the
prosecution must show that the “defendant intentionally killed the victim and that the killing was
premeditated and deliberate. Premeditation and deliberation require sufficient time to allow the
defendant to take a second look.” People v Marsack, 231 Mich App 364, 370-371; 586 NW2d
234 (1998). Premeditation and deliberation need not be established by direct evidence. People v
Hoffmeister, 394 Mich 155, 158-159; 229 NW2d 305 (1975). “The requisite state of mind may
be inferred from defendant’s conduct judged in light of the circumstances. Such an inference,
however, must have adequate basis in record evidence.” Id. at 159. A reviewing court looks to
the “totality of the circumstances” to determine whether sufficient evidence of premeditation and
deliberation was presented. People v Tilley, 405 Mich 38, 44; 273 NW2d 471 (1979).
In this case, defendant stabbed the victim, Mr. Aaron Smith, to death after the latter
attempted to break up an argument between defendant and his wife outside a bar in Flint. At
trial, the prosecution introduced eyewitness testimony that after Smith intervened to stop
defendant’s quarrel with his wife, defendant stumbled back momentarily and then lunged at
Smith with a knife, stabbing him repeatedly in the back and chest before fleeing in Smith’s car.
The testimony established that after defendant swung at Smith, he then chased the victim. When
Smith, who was unarmed, fell near his car, defendant continued to stab him. Viewed in a light
most favorable to the prosecution, there was sufficient evidence introduced to allow a rational
trier of fact to infer premeditation and deliberation from all the facts and circumstances. Here,
sufficient time elapsed to allow defendant to take a “second look” before stabbing the victim to
death. People v Plummer, 229 Mich App 293, 299-301; 581 NW2d 753 (1998). Thus, we
conclude that defendant failed to show that the trial court committed clear error in submitting the
charge of first-degree murder to the jury.
However, even assuming that the trial court committed plain error in this regard,
defendant cannot establish that the presumed error was prejudicial by showing evidence of a jury
compromise with regard to his conviction for second-degree murder. Here, the trial court
specifically instructed the jury against compromising merely “for the sake of arriving at a
verdict.” Further, we note that defendant was acquitted of first-degree murder. Finally, as
discussed below, there was sufficient evidence to support his conviction for second-degree
murder. See People v Moorer, 246 Mich App 680, 682; 635 NW2d 47 (2001). Accordingly,
defendant cannot establish, under the plain error rule, that he is entitled to a new trial on the
ground that the trial court improperly submitted the charge of first-degree murder to the jury.
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In addition, defendant cannot show that the trial court committed plain error by
submitting the charge of carjacking to the jury. According to defendant, the trial court should
not have submitted the charge of carjacking to the jury because the prosecution failed to present
evidence that he used violence against the victim for the purpose of stealing his car. To convict a
defendant of carjacking, the prosecution must prove “(1) that the defendant took a motor vehicle
from another person, (2) that the defendant did so in the presence of that person, a passenger, or
any other person in lawful possession of the motor vehicle, and (3) that the defendant did so
either by force or violence, or by putting the other person in fear.” People v Davenport, 230
Mich App 577, 579; 583 NW2d 919 (1998). Here, defendant, after repeatedly stabbing the
victim, drove away in the victim’s car as he lay on the ground bleeding to death. Viewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the prosecution presented sufficient
evidence to establish each element of carjacking beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the trial court
did not err in submitting this charge to the jury.
Next, defendant claims that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to
establish the elements of second-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. In particular,
defendant maintains that “the evidence . . . was legally insufficient evidence to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the killing did not occur under circumstances that reduced the crime to
manslaughter.” We disagree.
To be convicted of second-degree murder, the prosecution must prove “(1) a death, (2)
caused by an act of the defendant, (3) with malice, and (4) without justification or excuse.”
People v Goecke, 457 Mich 442, 464; 579 NW2d 868 (1998). For purposes of second-degree
murder, malice is defined as “the intent to kill, the intent to cause great bodily harm, or the intent
to do an act in wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of such
behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm.” Id. To support a conviction for voluntary
manslaughter, the prosecution must establish three elements: “First, the defendant must kill in
the heat of passion. Second, the passion must be caused by an adequate provocation. Finally,
there cannot be a lapse of time during which a reasonable person could control his passions.”
People v Pouncey, 437 Mich 382, 388; 471 NW2d 346 (1991).
In this case, the prosecution established the element of malice by presenting testimony
that defendant repeatedly stabbed the victim even after the victim attempted to run away.
Because the question of whether there was adequate provocation so as to reduce the crime from
murder to voluntary manslaughter was left to the trier of fact, the jury was free to reject this
claim and find defendant guilty of second-degree murder. People v Lange, 251 Mich App 247,
252; 650 NW2d 691 (2002).
Defendant also argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel on the basis
that his defense counsel failed to move for a directed verdict on the charges of first-degree
murder and carjacking. To show ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant has to establish
that counsel’s performance was deficient and that there was a reasonable probability that this
deficiency affected the outcome of the trial. People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 327; 521 NW2d
797 (1994). Specifically, a defendant must show a “reasonable probability [that defense
counsel’s error] would undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. . . .” Id. Because
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defendant did not move for a new trial or for a Ginther1 hearing on the issue of ineffective
assistance of counsel, our review is limited to mistakes apparent from the record. People v
Williams, 223 Mich App 409, 414; 566 NW2d 649 (1997). Because there was sufficient
evidence to establish the elements of both first-degree murder and carjacking, defense counsel’s
failure to move for a directed verdict on these charges did not amount to error. Accordingly,
defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel on this basis.
In a supplemental appellate brief, defendant, in propria persona, raises three additional
issues, none of which has any merit. First, defendant argues that his due process right to a fair
trial was violated when the trial court denied his pretrial request to have his appointed trial
counsel replaced by new counsel. In Michigan, an indigent defendant is not entitled to select or
change appointed counsel upon request. People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 441; 212 NW2d 922
(1973); People v Traylor, 245 Mich App 460, 462; 628 NW2d 120 (2001). To obtain the
replacement of appointed counsel, a defendant must demonstrate good cause and no
unreasonable disruption in the judicial process. Id. “Good cause” may exist when the
defendant's appointed counsel “is not adequate or diligent or . . . is disinterested.” Ginther, supra
at 442. “Good cause” may also be established by showing the existence of a legitimate
difference of opinion between a defendant and his appointed counsel regarding a fundamental
trial tactic. Traylor, supra at 462. In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying defendant's request to replace his appointed trial counsel on the basis that counsel failed
to challenge the bindover on the first-degree murder charge, to file any discovery motions or to
call a defense witness in behalf of defendant’s claim of self-defense. Here, the trial court noted
that defendant failed to provide “any reason” to support his dissatisfaction with appointed
counsel.
Defendant also claims in his supplemental brief that his counsel rendered ineffective
assistance for failing to raise these issues. Specifically, defendant argues that he was prejudiced
by trial counsel’s failure to call Anthony Raymond as a defense witness in support of his selfdefense theory. Even assuming arguendo that trial counsel erred by failing to call Mr. Raymond,
there is nothing in the record to indicate that counsel’s presumed error would have undermined
our confidence in the jury verdict.
Defendant also contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because
his trial counsel failed to file a pretrial motion in limine seeking to exclude alleged “bad acts”
evidence. However, even assuming for the sake of argument that trial counsel’s performance
was deficient in this regard, there was no reasonable probability that this presumed deficiency
affected the outcome of the trial. Pickens, supra, 446 Mich 327. Nor was counsel ineffective for
failing to object or request a cautionary instruction or a mistrial when the prosecutor questioned
defendant whether he was “upset that your wife and your step-daughter were with a black man.”
Here, defendant has failed to show that defense counsel committed error or that there was a
reasonable probability that the alleged error altered the outcome of the trial. Finally, there is no
merit to defendant’s assertion that he was denied a fair public trial or that trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel by not objecting or asking for a mistrial on the basis of the
denial of defendant’s right to a public trial.
1
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
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