PEOPLE OF MI V DERICK THOMPSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 10, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 233317
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 99-011055
DERICK THOMPSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr., and Cooper, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of kidnapping, MCL 750.349,
carjacking, MCL 750.529a, armed robbery, MCL 750.529, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. Defendant was sentenced to a term of twenty to forty
years’ imprisonment as a fourth habitual offender for the kidnapping conviction, twenty to forty
years’ imprisonment for the carjacking conviction, twenty to forty years’ imprisonment for the
armed robbery conviction, and two years’ imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. We
reverse and remand for a new trial.
Defendant first claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial
because he was denied a fair and impartial jury when a juror, for the first time, revealed during
deliberations that she had been raped as a teenager. We review the trial court’s grant or denial of
a motion for a new trial on the basis of juror misconduct for a clear abuse of discretion. People v
Johnson, 245 Mich App 243, 250; 631 NW2d 1 (2001).
During deliberations, the trial judge received a note from the jury which stated, “We have
a juror who admits being raped as a teenager. Does this affect her being a juror?” The juror
failed to reveal this fact during voir dire even though the trial judge asked every juror if they had
been, or knew anyone who had been, a victim of a violent crime. The trial court did not remove
the juror, nor did the trial judge question the juror regarding her possible bias. After, instructing
the jury that they committed to be fair and impartial the trial judge ordered them to resume
deliberations. After the jury reached guilty verdicts on all counts, defendant moved for a new
trial on the basis that he was deprived of his opportunity to dismiss the juror for cause or
peremptorily and the juror potentially tainted the other jurors during the deliberations. At the
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hearing on the motion for the new trial, defense counsel stated that if he had known about the
prior rape, he would not have left the juror on the panel.
The United States and Michigan Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant a fair trial
by an impartial jury. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art I, § 20; Duncan v Louisiana, 391 US
145, 149; 88 S Ct 1444; 20 L Ed 2d 491 (1968); People v Tyburski, 445 Mich 606, 618; 518
NW2d 441 (1994); People v Daoust, 228 Mich App 1, 7; 577 NW2d 179 (1998). The purpose of
voir dire is to “elicit enough information for development of a rational basis for excluding those
who are not impartial from the jury.” Tyburski, supra at 618.
“It is important for trial courts to safeguard a defendant’s right to a fair trial before an
impartial jury.” People v Johnson, 103 Mich App 825, 829; 303 NW2d 908 (1981). As such,
“[i]t is imperative, in securing the rights of the parties to an impartial jury, for the court to allow
the elicitation of sufficient information so that the court can make an independent determination
of the juror’s ability to be impartial.” Tyburski, supra at 606. A trial court’s failure to
adequately question jurors regarding potential bias so that for cause and/or peremptory challenges
can be intelligently exercised constitutes an abuse of discretion. Id. at 619.1
In this case, the possible bias of the juror was apparent by the note provided to the court
indicating that she had previously been a victim of a rape. The note gave the court a reason to
suspect juror misconduct because the juror failed to disclose this fact even though the trial judge
asked every juror if he or she had been a victim of a violent crime. Additionally, defense counsel
moved for a mistrial on the basis of the juror’s possible bias. The trial court must safeguard a
defendant’s right to an impartial jury by eliciting enough information so that it can independently
determine the juror’s ability to be impartial. Id. at 606; Johnson, supra at 829. The trial court,
aware of the possible bias of the juror, did not further question the juror to ascertain how and to
what extent her prior rape may have affected her ability to act impartially. Therefore, in light of
the trial court’s duty to safeguard a defendant’s right to a impartial jury, we find that the trial
court, independently, should have questioned the potentially biased juror to ascertain if she could
be impartial. Not only did the court fail to inquire into the incident to determine whether the
juror could act impartially, the court did not obtain a reassurance from the juror that she could act
impartially. Accordingly, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the
juror should not be excused without conducting further examination of the potentially biased
juror to determine whether she could deliberate impartially. Johnson, supra at 256 n 5.
While the people confess error on this issue, they claim that a simple remand to determine
the prejudice of such juror, if any, and whether the jury’s verdict was tainted because of such
disclosure, could remedy any error below. We disagree and hold that such a remand would be
fruitless and an exercise in futility since well over two years has elapsed since the date of
defendant’s conviction. Jurors could well be deceased or there whereabouts unknown.
1
The same standard is applied to challenges made after the jury is impaneled. Rice v Winkelman
Bros Apparel, Inc, 13 Mich App 281, 287; 164 NW2d 417 (1968).
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Resolution of the foregoing issue being dispositive, discussion of defendant’s remaining
issues on appeal is rendered unnecessary.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
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