PEOPLE OF MI V DENNIS JAMES MONEHEN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 6, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 229626
Muskegon Circuit Court
LC No. 99-043313-FH
DENNIS JAMES MONEHEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Sawyer and R. J. Danhof*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted of one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct,
MCL 750.520c. He was sentenced to 7-1/2 to 15 years’ imprisonment. He appeals as of
right. We affirm.
Defendant, a middle school math teacher for twenty-nine years, was charged with six
counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC) involving three female students. All
of the alleged conduct took place during school hours and in defendant’s classroom. The first
student, K.W., testified that she was in defendant’s sixth-hour math class during the 19981999 school year. On one occasion, she approached defendant’s desk to ask for assistance.
She stood next to defendant while he pointed to a poster on the wall. When defendant
pointed, he touched the side of the victim’s breast. She thought it was an accident and moved
backward. When defendant withdrew his hand, however, he more firmly touched both
breasts. The contact involved her nipples. Defendant was charged with one count of seconddegree criminal sexual conduct for his actions toward K.W.
The second student, R.D., testified that defendant was her math teacher in the 19931994 school year. Sometimes, defendant rubbed her shoulders. On occasion, he slipped his
hand onto her breast, in close proximity to the nipple. He then moved his hand around the
area. At other times, defendant knelt next to R.D.’s desk and rubbed the inside of her thigh,
up to the point where her legs met. Defendant was charged with one count of second-degree
criminal sexual conduct for his actions toward R.D.
The third student, J.T., testified that defendant was her seventh-grade math teacher
during the 1998-1999 school year. Defendant often rubbed her shoulders and back. In 1998,
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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shortly before the holidays, defendant slid his hand from J.T.’s shoulder onto her breast,
stopping just above the nipple. Defendant engaged in similar conduct on two other occasions
in a period of several weeks. Each time, he patted her breast after placing his hand on it. On
a fourth occasion, defendant’s hand moved all the way down the victim’s breast and cupped
it. Defendant was charged with four counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct for his
actions with respect to J.T.
Defendant’s theory of the case was that the victims fabricated false allegations against
him. Defendant denied the charges and questioned whether he would have engaged in the
alleged sexual contact in front of other students. The prosecutor’s theory of the case was that
defendant created an atmosphere wherein he often touched his students. He groomed or
conditioned them to think of him as a “touchy feely” or a hands-on teacher. He did this so
that he could take advantage of female students when opportunity presented itself and so that
he could always argue that his conduct was not sexual but was accidental or inadvertent.
During the investigation in this case, defendant denied any physical contact with his
students, stating that he had learned his lesson from a prior, formal reprimand and that he
went out of his way to keep his hands away from students. Defendant indicated that he totally
refrained from touching students.1 The jury heard testimony that, in the 1993-1994 school
year, defendant was formally reprimanded for inappropriate nonsexual contact, which
included rubbing the shoulders and touching the hair of a seventh-grade math student.
The prosecutor presented eleven female student witnesses who testified that they were
in defendant’s math classes during the 1998-1999 school year. Two of the witnesses testified
that they saw defendant touch J.T. on the shoulders on several occasions. Seven of the
witnesses testified that defendant touched their shoulders or the shoulders of other girls, that
he touched the hair of female students, either twirling it or blowing on it, and that he called
some girls by inappropriate names like “big Mama.” One witness testified that, on one
occasion while defendant was at her desk, he used his red pen to write little red dots on her
knuckles. The remaining student witness testified that defendant pulled a stray string or
thread off of her shirt and, in the process of doing so, touched her left breast. Defendant
subsequently held the string up to his mouth and blew it away. Before the testimony of the
witnesses, the trial court issued a cautionary instruction, informing the jury that the witnesses
were called to contradict defendant’s claim that he never touched students at all and that the
testimony could not be used to convict defendant because he was a bad person. The
information could be considered, however, with respect to whether defendant had a plan or
scheme.
The prosecutor also presented the testimony of four former students. The first,
Deanne Kiely, testified that in the mid-1970s she attended the middle school where defendant
taught math. Kiely had a social relationship with defendant. She was a cheerleader and he
was the boys’ basketball coach. Defendant drove Kiely home on occasion. Sometimes they
stopped in a church parking lot and talked. Kiely also visited defendant’s home. The last
1
At trial, the jury heard an audiotape of defendant’s interview with the police and prosecutor.
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time she visited, defendant told her that he liked “kissing little titties.” Kiely testified that
defendant physically touched her breasts and thighs.
Kari McCamant testified that when defendant was her seventh-grade math teacher in
the 1980s, he often put his arm around her shoulders and rubbed her back. Eventually, he
started to move his hand from her shoulders to her breast. He cupped her whole breast with
his hand. This behavior frequently took place during class.
Kimberly Shoemaker testified that when defendant was her math teacher in the early
1970s, he moved her desk to the front of the classroom, actually touching his desk. When
defendant was at his desk, he used his feet to touch her feet. Sometimes defendant pulled her
hair away from her face and shoulders. On one occasion defendant offered to give
Shoemaker a ride home from school. He first stopped at his own home and asked her inside
to see it. Once inside, he touched her shoulders and put his hand on her breast. She left and
walked home.
Wendy Rockwell, who was aged thirty-seven at trial, testified that defendant was her
lunchroom monitor at the middle school. Defendant often sought Rockwell out for
conversation. He stood uncomfortably close and stroked her long hair. When he did, he
touched her breasts. He also wrote hall passes to permit her to leave her English class and
visit him in the cafeteria study hall that he monitored. Rockwell sat behind defendant’s desk
in the study hall and he talked to her about her boyfriend. They talked in whispered
conversation and defendant’s lips occasionally touched Rockwell’s earlobes.
The prosecutor also called defendant’s former neighbor, Rick Homan, who testified
that on a couple of occasions in the late 1970s and early 1980s, defendant confided that he
touched the breasts of his students. Defendant boasted that his conduct was not obvious
because he touched the students while pretending to brush their hair back or pick a stray hair
or thread off of their chest. Defendant once told Homan that “their titties are so fine at that
age.”
Defendant called numerous witnesses to testify that while he often touched the
shoulders of students and other adults, he was never seen engaged in inappropriate behavior.
Defendant also disputed factual testimony given by the prosecution’s witnesses. The jury
reached a verdict with respect to only one count involving J.T. They deadlocked on the
remaining counts.
I
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of other bad acts
under MRE 404(b). We review this preserved evidentiary issue for an abuse of discretion.
People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 383; 582 NW2d 785 (1998).
MRE 404(b) provides:
(1) Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
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opportunity, intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident when the same is
material, whether such other crimes, wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous
with, or prior or subsequent to the conduct at issue in this case.
MRE 404(b) is a rule of inclusion. People v Pesquera, 244 Mich App 305, 317; 625 NW2d
407 (2001). Relevant, other-acts evidence does not violate MRE 404(b) unless offered solely
to show the criminal propensity of an individual to establish that he acted in conformity
therewith. People v Katt, 248 Mich App 282, 304; 639 NW2d 815 (2001), lv gtd in part on
other gds 466 Mich 889; 649 NW2d 72 (2002). In People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 55;
508 NW2d 114 (1993), amended 445 Mich 1205; 520 NW2d 338 (1994), the Court clarified
the test to be utilized to determine the admissibility of other bad acts evidence:
First, that the evidence be offered for a proper purpose under Rule
404(b); second, that it be relevant under Rule 402 as enforced through Rule
104(b); third, that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially
outweighed by unfair prejudice; fourth, that the trial court may, upon request,
provide a limiting instruction to the jury.
It is insufficient for the prosecution to merely recite one of the purposes articulated in MRE
404(b). Crawford, supra at 387. It must also demonstrate that the evidence is relevant. Id.
Relevance is a relationship between the evidence and a material fact at
issue that must be demonstrated by reasonable inferences that make a material
fact at issue more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence. [Id. (citation omitted).]
The offered evidence must truly “be probative of something other than the defendant’s
propensity to commit the crime.” Id. at 390. “If the prosecutor fails to weave a logical thread
linking the prior act to the ultimate inference, the evidence must be excluded.” Id. Where the
evidence is relevant, “admissibility depends on whether its probative value outweighs its
prejudicial effect, taking into account the efficacy of a limiting instruction.” Id. at 385.
The prosecutor articulated proper purposes for the evidence under MRE 404(b),
including that the evidence demonstrated a common plan or scheme, intent and lack of
fabrication. The prosecutor also demonstrated that the similar-acts evidence was logically
relevant to demonstrate a common plan or scheme and to demonstrate intent. It was not
offered solely to show defendant’s propensity to commit crime.
The evidence of the charged conduct was sufficiently similar to the evidence of the
uncharged conduct to support an inference that they were manifestations of a common plan,
scheme or system. Katt, supra, citing People v Sabin (After Remand), 463 Mich 43, 63; 614
NW2d 888 (2000). See also Pesquera, supra at 319. The charged and uncharged acts
involved common features beyond mere commission of acts of impermissible sexual contact,
to wit: (1) all of the similar-acts witnesses were students at the school where defendant
taught; (2) all were female and were of similar age; defendant had an authoritative role over
all of them as a teacher and coach; (3) defendant touched all of them in nonsexual ways; and
(4) in some instances, defendant touched their breasts and thighs. There is “such a
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concurrence of common features” between the charged and uncharged acts that the charged
acts are “naturally to be explained as caused by a general plan of which they are individual
manifestations.” Katt, supra at 306. The prosecutor’s theory was that defendant engaged in a
common plan or scheme of grooming and manipulating his students to accept his touchings,
which in turn allowed him to engage in criminal touchings when the opportunities arose. In
other words, defendant ingratiated himself into his students’ confidence and conditioned them
to accept his nonsexual touchings in order to take advantage of them. The similar-acts
evidence supported this theory.
With respect to intent, the prosecutor was required to prove that defendant touched the
three victims for sexual gratification or arousal. MCL 750.520c(1); MCL 750.520a(k). The
similar-acts evidence supported that defendant acted for sexual gratification. People v Knapp,
244 Mich App 361, 380; 624 NW2d 227 (2001). He made statements to Kiley and Homan
that he liked the breasts of his students. Some of the similar-acts witnesses testified that
defendant touched their breasts after previously engaging in nonsexual contacts. This
evidence was not only logically relevant to prove that defendant acted for his own sexual
gratification in the instant case, it also negated that the victims misconstrued defendant’s
actions. In other words, there was no mistake with respect to the nature of the conduct. It
was purposeful. In addition, the evidence was also logically relevant to rebut the charge of
fabrication. Id.2
Defendant also argues that the evidence was unfairly voluminous and detailed, that
there was a risk of jury confusion, and that the evidence was, in some cases, extremely old.
He argues that the probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. MRE 403. We disagree. The similar-acts evidence was presented in a
straightforward manner with little extraneous information or detail. While the evidence was
voluminous, no authority supports that this fact, by itself, requires a finding of prejudice
sufficient to warrant preclusion under MRE 403. In addition, we reject defendant’s argument
that some of the similar-acts evidence was too old to be relevant. The argument is
unsupported by any authority and is abandoned. People v Piotrowski, 211 Mich App 527,
530; 536 NW2d 293 (1995). Moreover, it is disingenuous. The evidence, reaching as far
back as defendant’s early days at the same middle school, demonstrated a long term,
continuing plan or scheme. Finally, nothing in the record suggests that there was a risk of
confusion or a risk that the jury would be overwhelmed and unable to follow their
instructions. To the contrary, the prosecutor carefully delineated the charged conduct in both
opening statement and closing argument, and he clearly differentiated between the similaracts evidence and the charged conduct. He specifically informed the jury that the similar-acts
evidence could be used only to determine if defendant had a plan or scheme to groom his
students with nonsexual touches so that he could take advantage when opportunity presented
2
We note that the evidence was not admissible on the ground that it demonstrated defendant’s
motive to touch the students. An argument that a defendant is motivated out of sexual
attraction is “undistinguishable from the so-called ‘lustful disposition’ rule,” which has never
been adopted by our courts. Sabin, supra at 68; People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 579580; 629 NW2d 411 (2001). Use of the evidence for that purpose would have been
inadmissible.
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itself. Further, he indicated that the jury could consider the evidence when determining
whether the touches were accidental or were intentional and for a sexual purpose. The
prosecutor reminded the jury that defendant could not be convicted for the similar-acts
conduct and that he could not be convicted based on a finding that he was a bad person. The
prosecutor never improperly argued lustful disposition, i.e., that defendant was sexually
attracted to his female students and must therefore be guilty of the charged conduct. We note
that while the prosecutor recapped the MRE 404(b) evidence in detail in his closing argument,
a prosecutor is entitled to argue the evidence and all reasonable inferences from it. People v
Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 282; 531 NW2d 659 (1995). The prosecutor did not utilize the MRE
404(b) evidence for any improper purpose. Moreover, the jury received clear cautionary
instructions from the trial court during trial and during final instructions.3
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged
evidence under MRE 404(b).
II
Defendant next argues that testimony from eleven female students in his 1998-1999
math classes was improperly admitted under the proved-to-be false doctrine.4 The decision to
admit evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Herndon, 246 Mich App 371,
406; 633 NW2d 376 (2001). We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision,
which permitted the students to testify about defendant’s nonsexual touching of students. The
evidence was relevant and admissible apart from MRE 404(b).
On March 10, 1999, defendant voluntarily met with the police to discuss the
allegations of criminal sexual conduct. The tape of defendant’s interview was played before
the jury. During the interview, defendant indicated that he was “railroaded” with respect to
the reprimand he received for the 1993-1994 incident involving the nonsexual touching of a
student. Defendant further indicated that he learned his lesson from that incident and,
accordingly, was now “extremely careful of keeping” his hands to himself. He stated that he
definitely, totally refrained from touching his students. These statements were clearly
designed by defendant to exculpate him with respect to the allegations of improper sexual
touching.
In People v Dandron, 70 Mich App 439, 442-445; 245 NW2d 782 (1976), this Court
stated that exculpatory statements, which are made by a defendant to a law enforcement
officer, may be circumstantial evidence of guilt if they are shown to be false. Thus, the
prosecutor may offer evidence to demonstrate that an exculpatory statement was false. Id.
3
We reject defendant’s contention that the jury likely disregarded instructions on how to treat
the MRE 404(b) evidence. Nothing in the record supports or suggests that the jury failed to
follow the given instructions. And, jurors are presumed to follow their instructions. People v
Graves, 458 Mich 476, 486; 581 NW2d 229 (1998).
4
Several of the student witnesses were permitted to testify under MRE 404(b). Their
testimony was not admitted only because it disproved defendant’s exculpatory statements to
the police.
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“Defendant has no claim to be protected against the exposure of this falsehood where he
indulges in it for his own exculpation.” Id. at 443, quoting People v Arnold, 43 Mich 303; 5
NW 385 (1880); see also People v Wackerle, 156 Mich App 717, 720; 402 NW2d 81 (1986).
The testimony of the eleven students demonstrated the falsity of the exculpatory
statements that defendant made to the police during his interview. As such, it was relevant,
circumstantial evidence of defendant’s guilt. We also conclude that the number of students
allowed to testify was not unfairly prejudicial. The testimony in total was short and included
no extraneous facts.5 Moreover, in order to demonstrate that defendant’s statements to the
police were false, it was necessary to show that defendant’s touching of students was not
isolated but was an ongoing pattern of behavior. There was no abuse of discretion.
III
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in refusing to grant his motion to sever.
Defendant moved to sever the charges in order to have three separate trials, one for each
victim. A trial court’s decision on a motion to sever is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
People v Duranseau, 221 Mich App 204, 208; 561 NW2d 111 (1997).
MCR 6.210(B) provides:
On the defendant’s motion, the court must sever unrelated offenses for
separate trials. For purposes of this rule, two offenses are related if they are
based on
(1) the same conduct, or
(2) a series of connected acts or acts constituting part of a single
scheme or plan.
There are three circumstances under which offenses are considered related for purposes of
determining whether severance is required: (1) where the “same conduct” is at issue; (2)
where a series of acts are connected together; or (3) where there is a series of acts constituting
parts of a single scheme or plan. People v Tobey, 401 Mich 141, 150-151; 257 NW2d 537
(1977). The only category that arguably fits the present case is the last category, “a series of
acts constituting parts of a single scheme or plan.” In People v McCune, 125 Mich App 100,
103; 336 NW2d 11 (1983), this Court quoted the commentary to the then-current ABA
Standard 13-1.2, relating to “common plan offenses”:
Common plan offenses are the most troublesome class of related
offenses. These offenses involve neither common conduct nor interrelated
proof. Instead, the relationship among offenses (which can be physically and
temporally remote) is dependent upon the existence of a plan that ties the
offenses together and demonstrates that the objective of each offense was to
5
The testimony of all eleven witnesses covered approximately sixty-eight pages of trial
transcript.
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contribute to the achievement of a goal not attainable by the commission of
any of the individual offenses. A typical example of common plan offenses is
a series of separate offenses that are committed pursuant to a conspiracy
among two or more defendants. Common plan offenses may also be
committed by a defendant acting alone who commits two or more offenses in
order to achieve a unified goal. [Emphasis added.]
In People v Miller, 165 Mich App 32, 44-45; 418 NW2d 668 (1987), this Court found
that two CSC offenses were related for purposes of joinder because they both occurred during
warm weather and both took place in the same building in locations of seclusion. “These
facts indicate a single plan or scheme on the part of defendant to sexually molest the victim
when the opportunity presented itself.” Id. at 45. In this case, we also find that the offenses
were related for purposes of joinder. The offenses all occurred while the victims were
students in defendant’s math classes and all of the conduct occurred in the same location,
defendant’s classroom. The facts support a single plan or scheme to engage in sexual contact
with female students when the opportunity presented itself. Any temporal gap in the charged
offenses is not sufficient to require a contrary holding. McCune, supra.
We also reject defendant’s contention that the trial court’s refusal to sever the charges
resulted in unfair prejudice to him. Defendant argues that some evidence introduced at the
joint trial would not have been equally admissible in each of the separate trials. He fails,
however, to explain or rationalize his position. “An appellant may not merely announce his
position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims.” People
v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 640-641; 588 NW2d 480 (1998). Defendant also argues that he
was prejudiced because J.T. was unavailable for the second trial and, had there been separate
trials, the prosecutor would have had a greater opportunity to locate J.T. This argument is
disingenuous. First, the decision with respect to defendant’s motion to sever was made before
the first trial in this case and thus, any prejudice resulting from J.T.’s failure to appear at the
second trial did not influence or affect the decision with respect to the motion to sever.
Second, defendant was not prejudiced by J.T.’s failure to appear at the second trial. Trial was
underway before it became apparent that J.T. would not appear. Defendant does not contest
the trial court’s rulings that J.T. was unavailable and that her prior testimony could be read
into the record.6
IV
Defendant next complains that the trial court erred when it refused to order an in
camera review of J.T.’s school and counseling records. A decision to order an in camera
review of records is discretionary and is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Fink,
456 Mich 449, 458; 574 NW2d 28 (1998); People v Laws, 218 Mich App 447, 455; 554
NW2d 586 (1996). “An abuse of discretion exists only if an unprejudiced person, considering
6
In a footnote, defendant “submits” that the due diligence issue is an independent issue that
warrants consideration and relief. This mere assertion in a footnote is not enough to properly
present this issue to this Court for review. People v Miller, 238 Mich App 168, 172; 604
NW2d 781 (1999).
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the facts on which the trial court acted, would say that there was no justification or excuse for
the ruling.” Id.
[I]n an appropriate case there should be available the option of an in
camera inspection by the trial judge of the privileged record on a showing that
the defendant has a good-faith belief, grounded on some demonstrable fact,
that there is a reasonable probability that the records are likely to contain
material information necessary to the defense. [People v Stanaway, 446 Mich
643, 677; 521 NW2d 557 (1994).]
The mere showing that a record exists does not warrant an in camera review.
In this case, the trial court determined, after a lengthy hearing, that defendant
produced nothing of substance to support his speculations that the school and counseling
records contained information material to his defense. Defendant produced an affidavit from
his own private investigator to support his request for the in camera review. The affidavit
contained second-hand information, which was not attributed to any identifiable person. The
information included that J.T. was from a troubled home; that she had a history of running
away from home; that she had a truancy problem; that she was extremely emotional, needy
and self-conscious; that she was an attention seeker; that she needed peer approval; that she
was a poor math student; that she knew how to manipulate people to get her way; and that she
was histrionic and outgoing. The affiant further indicated that he understood that J.T. was
treated or received counseling at two facilities as well as through the school system, and
further, that she may have a chemical imbalance that “supposedly caused her to have
difficulty” telling right from wrong. Defendant argued, based on the affidavit, that J.T.’s
school and counseling records may assist him in proving any or all of his four defense
theories: that J.T. felt left out of the biggest event in the school and sought to become the
center of attention by making accusations and obtaining approval and sympathy from her
peers; that J.T. was angry and upset that she was a poor math student; that J.T. had a troubled
home life and that men she encountered after running away influenced her emotional state of
mind; or that J.T. had a chemical imbalance, which affected her ability to distinguish between
truth and falsity.
Defendant offered no evidence to support the alleged information in the affidavit, with
one exception. Steven Cousins, the principal of the middle school at issue, testified that he
had heard from others that J.T. ran away from home on two occasions. Cousins did not
confirm any of the other information from the affidavit. There was simply no basis to verify
the information. More importantly, there was no basis to conclude that the records might
contain material evidence necessary for the defense. Defendant was on a fishing expedition to
find any information that could possibly assist him in presenting his case. Therefore, we
agree with the trial court that defendant failed to articulate a good faith basis for believing that
information of the type sought may actually be in the records. A defendant’s generalized
assertion that the records might contain evidence useful for impeachment on crossexamination is insufficient to support the request for an in camera review. Stanaway, supra at
681. “This need might exist in every case involving an accusation of criminal sexual
conduct.” Id. Because defendant failed to meet his burden of demonstrating the need for an
in camera review, the trial court’s denial of the motion for an in camera review was justified.
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V
Defendant also argues that the cumulative effect of the trial errors resulted in a denial
of his right to a fair trial. We find that there were no errors of consequence, which
cumulatively denied defendant a fair trial. People v Cooper, 236 Mich App 643, 659-660;
601 NW2d 409 (1999); People v Miller (After Remand), 211 Mich App 30, 43-44; 535 NW2d
518 (1995).
VI
Finally, defendant argues that he is entitled to resentencing because the trial court
erred in computing the sentencing guidelines and improperly departed from the guidelines
recommended range.
Defendant contends that four offense variables were incorrectly scored. Defendant
objected to the scoring of all four offense variables at sentencing. Thus, the issues are subject
to review on appeal in this Court. MCL 769.34(10). A scoring decision will not be reversed
if evidence exists to support the score. People v Hornsby, 251 Mich App 462, 468; 650
NW2d 700 (2002).
Offense variable 4 involves psychological injury to the victim. MCL 777.34. A score
of ten points is to be assessed where there is “serious psychological injury requiring
professional treatment” or where serious psychological injury may require professional
treatment even if treatment has not been sought. MCL 777.34. In this case, the trial court
heard testimony from the investigator who conducted the presentence investigation. The
investigator testified that he spoke with J.T.’s mother and that, after the incident, the victim
was hospitalized at Pine Rest psychiatric hospital and received counseling. J.T. became
suicidal. Based on the testimony presented, the trial court assessed ten points for offense
variable 4. Because evidence existed to support the score, we uphold the scoring decision.
Hornsby, supra.
Offense variable 10 relates to the exploitation of a vulnerable victim and is scored at
fifteen points when predatory conduct is involved. MCL 777.40. “Predatory conduct” means
“preoffense conduct directed at a victim for the primary purpose of victimization.” MCL
777.40(3)(a). In assessing fifteen points, the trial court referred to J.T.’s testimony where she
described defendant’s conduct against her. The trial court found that defendant’s conduct
toward J.T., which resulted in conviction, was part of a greater plan that fit within the
definition of predatory conduct. Based on the record, we affirm this scoring decision.
Hornsby, supra.
Offense variable 13 relates to a continuing pattern of criminal behavior. The variable
is scored at twenty-five points if the “offense was part of a pattern of felonious criminal
activity involving 3 or more crimes against a person.” MCL 777.43. It does not matter
whether the other crimes resulted in conviction and, all other crimes within a five-year period
are considered. MCL 777.43(2)(a). In this case, defendant was charged with four counts of
second-degree criminal sexual conduct against the victim and two counts of second-degree
criminal sexual conduct against two other victims. While there was only one conviction,
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there was evidence of three or more crimes against a person within the previous five-year
period. Thus, the offense variable was properly scored at twenty-five points. Hornsby, supra.
Finally, offense variable nine, MCL 777.39, was scored at zero points.
defendant’s argument that it was improperly scored at ten points has no merit.
Thus,
Defendant also argues that he is entitled to resentencing because the trial court
departed from the sentencing guidelines range of nineteen to thirty-eight months’
imprisonment. Defendant argues that there were no substantial and compelling reasons to
depart and that the trial court relied on inaccurate information. MCL 769.34(3) provides:
A court may depart from the appropriate sentence range established
under the sentencing guidelines . . . if the court has a substantial and
compelling reason for that departure and states on the record the reasons for
the departure. All of the following apply to a departure:
(a) The court shall not use an individual’s gender, race, ethnicity,
alienage, national origin, legal occupation, lack of employment, representation
by appointed legal counsel, representation by retained legal counsel,
appearance in propria persona, or religion to depart from the appropriate
sentence range.
(b) The court shall not base a departure on an offense characteristic or
offender characteristic already taken into account in determining the
appropriate sentence range unless the court finds from the facts contained in
the court record, including the presentence investigation report, that the
characteristic has been given inadequate or disproportionate weight.
A departure must be based on objective and verifiable factors. People v Babcock (Babcock I),
244 Mich App 64, 75; 624 NW2d 479 (2000). Whether a factor is objective and verifiable is
reviewed as a matter of law, but the determination that there are substantial and compelling
reasons for departure is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 75-76. Reasons justifying
departure from the guidelines should irresistibly grab the court’s attention and be recognized
as having considerable worth in deciding the length of the sentence. Id. at 75. Further, the
principal of proportionality may be considered in evaluating the extent of a departure. People
v Babcock (Babcock II), 250 Mich App 463, 468-469; 648 NW2d 221 (2002), lv gtd ___
Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (order issued 9/18/02), citing People v Hegwood, 465 Mich 432,
437 n 10; 636 NW2d 127 (2001).
In this case, the trial court sentenced defendant to 7-1/2 to 15 years’ imprisonment. It
issued a written departure evaluation, articulating its determination that the guidelines did not
adequately take into consideration defendant’s twenty-nine-year pattern of abuse of middle
school students. Significantly, while offense variable 13 accounts for a pattern of criminal
behavior, it considers crimes only within a five-year period. MCL 777.43(2)(a). The
sentencing court reviewed the testimony and found that defendant’s improper sexual contact
with his female students began approximately the same time that defendant began teaching
and continued until he was charged. It is undisputed that defendant was employed as a math
teacher in the same middle school from 1970 until 1999. The evidence at trial support’s the
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trial court’s determination that the incidents of improper touching began in the early 1970s.7
While evidence of improper conduct was not produced for every year of defendant’s teaching
career, there was testimony about improper conduct occurring in each of the three decades
that defendant taught in the middle school. The trial court’s finding that defendant engaged in
improper conduct over the course of his twenty-nine years of teaching was objective and
verifiable on the record. Moreover, it was objective and verifiable that defendant’s pattern of
criminal behavior involved more “abhorrent” facts, which were not presented to the jury but
were known to the trial court. For example, the prosecutor sought to introduce evidence that
defendant French kissed one student (Kiely) numerous times and digitally penetrated her
vagina on one occasion The prosecutor also unsuccessfully sought to introduce evidence that
defendant rubbed the front of his body against the back and bottom of one of his students.
Clearly, the trial court identified objective and verifiable factors. In addition, we find no
abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination that the factors constituted substantial and
compelling reasons for departure. The factors were not adequately accounted for by the
guidelines. And, finally, we conclude that the extent of the departure was proportional.
Defendant is not entitled to resentencing.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Robert J. Danhof
7
Witness Kimberly Shoemaker testified about defendant’s conduct in the “early 1970s” when
defendant was her ninth-grade math teacher at the middle school. Other documents in the
lower court record reveal that Shoemaker was defendant’s student in the 1971-1972 school
year.
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