PEOPLE OF MI V DEMARIO MITCHELL
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 26, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 232050
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-011832
DEMARIO MITCHELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr., and Griffin, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right from his bench trial convictions of felonious assault, MCL
750.82, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL
750.227b. Defendant was tried on two counts of armed robbery, MCL 750.529, and one count of
felony-firearm. Defendant was sentenced to six months to four years imprisonment for the
felonious assault conviction, and a consecutive two years’ imprisonment for the felony-firearm
conviction. We affirm. This appeal is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR
7.214(E).
In May 1998, complainants Latonya Cato and Christopher Williams were at home with
their approximately nine-month-old daughter when a man named Curtis, who was a friend of
Williams, came to their home. After Curtis was let into the house, he produced a handgun.
When Williams and Curtis began fighting over the gun, Cato took her child and ran upstairs and
called the police. After she got off the phone, Cato went back downstairs with her daughter. At
that point, defendant kicked down the front door and entered carrying an AK-47. Williams fled,
leaving Cato and her daughter alone in the house with Curtis and defendant. Defendant then
grabbed some jewelry and a pager sitting on a table, put the assault weapon to Cato’s head and
demanded money. When Cato told defendant she did not have any money, defendant and Curtis
fled, firing two or three shots outside the home. Several bullet holes in the home were identified
at trial by Cato and the police, one in the front hallway of the home, one in the front door, and
one in the outside molding of the front door. The police recovered a single spent shell casing on
the front porch of the home, which was identified as having come from one of two types of
assault weapons, one of which is an AK-47.
Count one of the amended felony information charged defendant with armed robbery of
Cato, and count two with armed robbery of Williams. Williams did not show for trial. At the
close of the prosecution’s case-in-chief, the court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss count
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two, and denied his motion for a directed verdict of not guilty. Following defendant’s proofs, the
trial court found that the prosecution had not proved that defendant took the jewelry and pager
with the specific intent to permanently deprive Cato of that property. Specifically, the court
found as follows:
Because of the testimony that was put on of a beef, of a problem between
the parties . . . .
. . . It is clear because there is consistency, there is marijuana dealing going on,
there is a problem between these people, the court cannot find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the property was taken, if it was, that it was taken with the
intent to permanently deprive, and that this, a felonious assault, was for the
purpose of armed robbery and not for some other dispute, in drug dealing.
The court found, however, that the elements of felonious assault and felony-firearm had been
established beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defendant filed a post-judgment motion for a new trial, arguing that there was
insufficient evidence to support the verdict.1 However, at the hearing on the motion, defense
counsel also argued “that felonious assault not having been previously filed or charged . . . ,
[defendant’s] . . . position is that is not an appropriate offense for him to have been convicted
of.” The court denied the motion, reasoning as follows:
The court found that the defendant did point the rifle at [Cato] . . . , and
feloniously assaulted her. And, of course, he was convicted of felony firearm;
because—given it was a firearm he used.
The court had a question with the original charge being robbery armed, as
to whether this felonious assault actually occurred in conjunction with an armed
robbery or whether it was a problem with the complainant and the defendant in a
disagreement over possible drug money, or some other circumstances other than
robbery armed, which caused this felonious assault and felony-firearm.
But the court had no doubt, given the testimony under oath at the trial, that
the defendant was guilty of felonious assault, and felony firearm.
On appeal, defendant argues that because he did not receive adequate notice of the need
to defend against a charge of felonious assault, the trial court abused its discretion in denying his
motion for a new trial.2 We disagree. Because felonious assault is a lesser included charge of
armed robbery, and because the amended felony information gave sufficient notice that
1
Defendant’s curt, one sentence brief in support of his motion for a new trial cited MCR
6.432(D) as supporting authority. We assume that this is a typographical error, and that
defendant actually meant to cite MCR 6.431(D).
2
Defendant has abandoned the claim that a new trial was warranted because the verdict was
based on insufficient evidence.
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defendant could face the lesser included charge, we see no abuse of discretion. People v Quinn,
136 Mich App 145, 147; 356 NW2d 10 (1984).
Defendant also argues that he was denied due process when the prosecution improperly
impeached a non-alibi witnesses by asking the witness why she had not gone to the police with
certain information testified to at trial. The witness, defendant’s sister, had testified during direct
examination that after the attack, Williams had told her in a three-way telephone conversation
that included Cato, that he would drop the matter if defendant paid off the debt he owed
Williams. On cross-examination, the following exchange took place:
Prosecutor: In October you learned of this conversation with you, Chris and
Peanut,[3] right?
Witness: Yes.
Prosecutor: And you went and told the police right away, right?
Witness: No.
Prosecutor: You didn’t?
Witness: I didn’t go tell the police.
Prosecutor: Did you tell the police that Chris made these statements about this
case against your brother?
Witness: No, I talked to the lawyer.
Prosecutor: Did you tell the police that Peanut made these statements about your
brother?
Witness: No.
Prosecutor: You never talked to anyone other than [defendant’s] . . . lawyer
about this, correct?
Witness: Right. And my family, that’s it.
Subsequent questioning established that the witness had told defendant’s lawyer about the
alleged phone conversation a couple of weeks prior to the bench trial.
Because defendant failed to object to this line of questioning, we review for plain error affecting
substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich. 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). “To avoid
forfeiture under the plain error rule, three requirements must be met: 1) error must have
occurred, 2) the error was plain . . . , 3) and the plain error affected substantial rights. . . . The
third requirement generally requires a showing of prejudice. . . .” Id. Further, if the three
3
Testimony established that “Peanut” is Cato’s nickname.
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elements of the plain error rule are established, “[r]eversal is warranted only when the plain,
forfeited error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or when an error
‘“seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings”
independent of the defendant's innocence.’” Id., quoting United States v Olano, 507 US 725,
736-737; 113 S Ct 1770; 123 L Ed 2d 508 (1993) (quoting United States v Atkinson, 297 US 157,
160; 56 S Ct 391; 80 L Ed 555 [1936]).
We find no error in the prosecutor’s questioning this witness about her failure to come
forward with this evidence earlier because the “information is of such a nature that the witness
would have a natural tendency to come forward with it prior to trial.” People v Emery, 150 Mich
App 657, 666; 389 NW2d 472 (1986). See also People v Perkins, 141 Mich App 186, 196; 366
NW2d 94 (1985). Both the close nature of the relationship between the witness and defendant,
and the tendency of this evidence to undermine the credibility of the complainants by implicating
them in a scheme to foster an improper prosecution, mitigate in favor of concluding that there
would be a natural tendency to go to the police with such information. Further, even if we did
not believe this evidence was of such a nature, defendant would not be entitled to reversal
because there is no evidence that the questioning was prejudicial. “Unlike a jury, a judge is
presumed to possess an understanding of the law, which allows him to understand the difference
between” permissible and impermissible questioning. People v Wofford, 196 Mich App 275,
282; 492 NW2d 747 (1992).
Affirmed.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
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