ANTHONY POLCYN V TIMOTHY L TURNER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ANTHONY POLCYN, MARY POLCYN,
GEORGE HAUKE, JEAN HAUKE, RAY
WALLICK, EDWARD KASSUBA, M. FAY
KASSUBA, JEFFREY BURKS, ANITA PIATEK,
RONALD VOGT, and ELLEN VOGT,
UNPUBLISHED
November 26, 2002
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
V
No. 230960
Antrim Circuit Court
LC No. 00-007650-CH
TIMOTHY L. TURNER, and CATHY A.
TURNER,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
PATRICIA ANSPAUGH, IRIS BEEBEE,
WESLEY BEEBEE, CHESTER BUDZYNSKI,
PATRICIA BUDZYNSKI, JANICE EVANS,
LYNN EVANS, BRIAN GENDELMAN, CAROL
GENDELMAN, MARCIA HOLCOMB, VICTOR
HOLCOMB, ESTHER JOHNSON, HAROLD
JOHNSON, C. SCOTT KOON, MAPLE RIDGE
HARDWOODS, INC, AUDREY MOORE,
LESTER MOORE, SHIRLEY F. SMILEY,
deceased, and STEPHAN SMILEY,
Defendants.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Smolenski and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this action to quiet title, defendants Timothy and Cathy Turner appeal as of right from
an order granting summary disposition to plaintiffs.1 We affirm.
1
The remaining defendants, owners of other parcels east of Dingman School Road not included
(continued…)
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I. Facts and Proceedings
Plaintiffs are the owners of the nine lots in Echo Six Estates, a platted subdivision across
the road from Six Mile Lake in Echo Township. Echo Six Estates was originally platted by
William and Julia Yochum in 1972. In 1971, the Yochums purchased lakefront land on the
eastern shore of Six Mile Lake that was bordered by Dingman School Road. They also
purchased land on the east side of Dingman School Road. They divided a portion of that land
into nine lots to create Echo Six Estates. Each of the nine lots has frontage on Dingman School
Road, but no lake frontage. The Yochums provided for lake access in the plat, however. Echo
Six Estates, according to the language of the plat, includes the “9 lots numbered 1 [through] 9
inclusive, [and] one private park designated as Echo Six Park.” The park is bordered by
Dingman School Road on the east and Echo Six Lake on the west. According to the plat, “EchoSix Park is private and for the exclusive use of the lot owners in this plat. Echo Six Park extends
to the shore of Six Mile Lake with full riparian rights thereto.” At that time, the Yochums’ land
to the north and south of Echo Six Park was unplatted, and their land east of Echo Six Estates
was likewise unplatted.
In 1971, before Echo Six Estates was platted, the Yochums recorded a “declaration of
restrictive covenants” and a master drawing that applied to their entire parcel. The drawing
shows the lots that became Echo Six Estates, but also shows waterfront lots A through D, which
lie to the north and south of Echo Six Park, and lots to the east of Echo Six Estates labeled E
through N. Defendants purchased lot N in 1999. They were the first purchasers of any of lots E
through N who developed their property. When they purchased their lot, they were under the
impression that they, too, had a right to access Six Mile Lake through Echo Six Park.
Defendants based this impression, in part, on four affidavits that were recorded concerning the
property in 1976. Three of the affidavits were filed on the same day in September 1976: the
affidavits of C. Eugene Ostling, the surveyor of the Yochum parcel, and Richard Georgi and
William E. DeWitt, real estate brokers who sold lots in the Yochum parcel. Ostling stated in his
affidavit that “it was the intent of the developer to allow purchasers of both platted lots and
parcels access to Six Mile Lake over and across [Echo Six Park].” DeWitt and Georgi both
stated that they had the understanding and had told potential purchasers that all of the lots in the
Yochum parcel would have the right to use Echo Six Park. William and Julia Yochum filed an
affidavit approximately two weeks later that stated that they had always intended for all of the
lots and parcels within their original parcel to have the right to use Echo Six Park and that they
never intended to limit the use of the park to lots 1 through 9. In addition to these affidavits,
defendants reviewed the survey drawings and the declaration of restrictive covenants and
concluded that as owners of parcel N, they would have lake access through the park. During the
summer of 1999, defendants used the park several times without objection from plaintiffs.
However, when Timothy Turner inquired about docking a boat off of the park, he was told that
he would have to discuss the issue with the park administrator.
In February 2000, plaintiffs filed their complaint to quiet title, also alleging ownership of
the park through adverse possession, to keep defendants from using the park. Defendants
(…continued)
in Echo Six Estates, either entered into consent judgments or were defaulted. They are not
involved in this appeal.
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claimed that they had the right to use the park because the affidavits changed the rights granted
by the plat. They also claimed that the application of various equitable principles entitled them
to use the park. Plaintiffs moved for summary disposition based on MCR 2.116(C)(9) and (10)
prior to the close of discovery, which the trial court granted. Defendants now appeal the trial
court’s decision.
II. Standard of Review
The trial court granted summary disposition to plaintiffs based on MCR 2.116(C)(9) and
(10). This Court reviews decisions on motions for summary disposition de novo. Veenstra v
Washtenaw Country Club, 466 Mich 155, 159; 645 NW2d 643 (2002). A trial court may grant
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(9) to a plaintiff if the defendant fails to plead a valid
defense to a claim. Village of Dimondale v Grable, 240 Mich App 553, 564; 618 NW2d 23
(2000). The court must accept all well-pleaded allegations in a defendant’s pleadings as true. Id.
Only the pleadings may be considered when a trial court decides a motion under this rule. Id. at
565; MCR 2.116(G)(5). Summary disposition is proper under MCR 2.116(C)(9) only where the
defenses are “so clearly untenable as a matter of law that no factual development could possibly
deny plaintiff’s right to recovery.” Id. at 565, quoting Domako v Rowe, 184 Mich App 137, 142;
457 NW2d 107 (1990).
A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency
of the plaintiff’s claim. Veenstra at 163. The moving party has the initial burden of showing that
no genuine issues of material fact exist. Id. In order to avoid summary disposition, the opposing
party must not rely on mere allegations or denials, but must produce evidence demonstrating that
factual issues remain. Id. “A litigant’s mere pledge to establish an issue of fact at trial cannot
survive summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10).” Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109,
121; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). “Evidence offered in support of or in opposition to the motion can
be considered only to the extent that it is substantively admissible.” Veenstra, supra at 163. The
court must view all of the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at 164.
Summary disposition is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.
Generally, it is premature to grant summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) when
discovery on a disputed issue has not been completed. Colista v Thomas, 241 Mich App 529,
537; 616 NW2d 249 (2000). However, summary disposition before the close of discovery is
appropriate if there is no reasonable chance that further discovery will result in factual support
for the nonmoving party. Id. at 537-538.
III. Analysis
Before beginning our analysis of the issues raised on appeal, we find it necessary to
address a matter that neither party has raised.2 In their respective briefs, both parties have
characterized the plat language concerning Echo Six Park as a dedication. However, as this
Court recently held in Martin v Redmond, 248 Mich App 59; 638 NW2d 142 (2002), a
2
See Steward v Panek, 251 Mich App 546, 554; 652 NW2d 232 (2002).
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“dedication” under MCL 560.253 must be for public use. Id. at 65-69. Clearly, the plat does not
dedicate Echo Six Park to public use. Additionally, a valid dedication requires acceptance by a
public authority. Id. at 66. Here, no evidence of acceptance has been produced. Accordingly,
“dedication” is an improper term in this context. We do not need to analyze, however, whether
the language constitutes a gift or grant, both of which also convey fee simple under the statute,
because we conclude that defendants have not established a genuine issue of material fact
regarding their alleged right to use the park.
Defendants contend that MCL 565.451a allows recorded affidavits to modify the rights of
owners of parcels within a plat. We disagree. MCL 565.451a reads in relevant part as follows:
An affidavit stating facts relating to any of the following matters which
may affect the title to real property in this state made by any person having
knowledge of the facts or by any person competent to testify concerning such
facts in open court, may be recorded in the office of the register of deeds of the
county where the real property is situated:
***
(b) Knowledge of the happening of any condition or event which may
terminate an estate or interest in real property;
(c) Knowledge of surveyors duly registered under the laws of this state
with respect to the existence and location of monuments and physical boundaries,
such as fences, streams, roads and rights of way of real property;
***
(e) Knowledge of facts incident to possession or the actual, open,
notorious and adverse possession of real property. . . .
MCL 565.453 provides:
The affidavit, whether recorded before or after the passage of this act, may
be received in evidence in any civil cause, in any court of this state and by any
board or officer of the state in any suit or proceeding affecting the real estate and
shall be prima facie evidence of the facts and circumstances therein contained.
Defendants’ argument that based on these statutes, the right to use the park extended to
them when the four affidavits were recorded, is misplaced Initially, we note that none of the
recorded affidavits relates to the matters addressed in MCL 565.451a (a)-(f). The affidavits do
not concern an event that may terminate an interest in the property, MCL 565.451a(b), the
location of boundaries on the property, MCL 565.451a(c), or facts incident to possession or
claims of adverse possession, MCL 565.451a(e).
Moreover, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the Land Division Act, MCL
560.101 et seq, establishes the procedure for modifying a recorded plat and that the affidavits
have no effect on the plat as it was recorded. To change a plat, a complaint must “be filed in the
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circuit court by the owner of a lot in the subdivision, a person of record claiming under the
owner or the governing body of the municipality in which the subdivision covered by the plat is
located.” MCL 560.222. The complaint must include: “(a) [t]he part or parts, if any, sought to
be vacated and any other correction or revision of the plat sought by the plaintiff,” and “(b) [t]he
plaintiff’s reasons for seeking the vacation, correction, or revision.” MCL 560.223. “Upon trial
and hearing of the action, the court may order a recorded plat or any part of it to be vacated,
corrected, or revised . . . .” MCL 560.226.
Accordingly, whether the intent of those who filed affidavits was to grant the owners of
properties outside of Echo Six Estates the right to use Echo Six Park is irrelevant because the
proper method for changing the plat was not implemented. This being the case, defendants’
claims that further discovery would have aided their defense of plaintiffs’ suit is meritless.
We also conclude that defendants’ remaining arguments lack merit. Defendants claim
that the trial court erred by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issues of laches and
the statute of limitations. Neither of these issues requires an evidentiary hearing in every
instance, and an evidentiary hearing was not required here.3 The facts of this case show that in
1999, defendants purchased their property and began using the park to access the lake. In 2000,
plaintiffs filed suit to prevent them from doing so. This very brief passage of time does not
support a defense of laches, and defendants have not demonstrated that any material condition
changed that would make it inequitable to enforce plaintiffs’ claims against defendants. Kuhn v
Secretary of State, 228 Mich App 319, 334; 579 NW2d 101 (1998).
Defendants did not assert the expiration of the statute of limitations as an affirmative
defense, and the trial court denied their request to amend their answer to raise this argument as a
bar to plaintiffs’ claims. The trial court did not err by denying defendants’ request because the
amendment would have been futile. Weymers v Khera, 454 Mich 639, 658; 563 NW2d 647
(1997). Defendants claim that because the affidavits were recorded in 1976, plaintiffs had fifteen
years from 1976 to file suit. MCL 600.5801. However, plaintiffs’ claims did not accrue when
the affidavits were filed. On the contrary, their claims against defendants accrued when
defendants, the first owners any of lots E through N who developed their land, began using the
park in 1999.
We also find that defendants’ estoppel and acquiescence defenses did not prohibit
summary disposition. Three theories of acquiescence are recognized in Michigan: 1)
acquiescence for the statutory period; 2) acquiescence following a dispute and agreement; and 3)
acquiescence arising from intention to deed to a marked boundary. Walters v Snyder, 239 Mich
App 453, 457; 608 NW2d 97 (2000). Defendants have not shown that the facts support any of
these three theories, but instead attempt to establish a prescriptive easement under the first theory
3
Defendants claim that every time the statute of limitations is asserted as a defense, a full
evidentiary hearing is required. Their reliance on Moss v Pacquing, 183 Mich App 574, 455
NW2d 339 (1990), as support for this position is misplaced. Moss concerned the application of
the “discovery rule” to a plaintiff’s claim in a medical malpractice and products liability suit.
The broad statement used by the Court in that case should not be read out of the context of that
case to imply that in every instance, a statute of limitations question requires a full evidentiary
hearing. Id. at 579-582.
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through the assertion that “facts are likely to be developed after discovery” that prior owners of
lots E through N continuously used the park. As stated above, a promise to produce evidence at
trial is not sufficient to prevent summary disposition. Maiden, supra. Although discovery was
not complete in this case, discovery was available from March 2000 (when defendants were
served with the complaint) until October 2000 (when the trial court heard plaintiffs’ motion). In
response to plaintiffs’ motion, defendants did not produce evidence regarding the prior use of the
park that could even arguably support their claim that a prescriptive easement existed.
Finally, we find that defendants’ assertion of an implied easement is meritless. “To
establish an implied easement, three things must be shown: (1) that during the unity of title an
apparently permanent and obvious servitude was imposed on one part of an estate in favor of
another, (2) continuity, and (3) that the easement is reasonably necessary for the fair enjoyment
of the property it benefits.” Schmidt v Eger, 94 Mich App 728, 731; 289 NW2d 851 (1980). “A
claim of implied easement arises where two or more tracts of property are created from a single
tract, and the use of the servient estate for the benefit of the dominant estate is apparent,
continuous, and necessary.” Forge v Smith, 458 Mich 198, 211 n 38; 580 NW2d 876 (1998).
Here, defendants have failed to show continuity. They have presented no evidence that prior to
the division of the Yochums’ land, the servient estate, Echo Six Park, was used for the benefit of
defendants’ parcel. This case is therefore distinguishable from Koller v Jorgensen, 76 Mich App
623; 257 NW2d 192 (1977), where back lot property owners sought an implied easement
through a lake front access lot that had been previously owned by their homeowner’s association
and the purchaser of the access lot paid a reduced price because the access lot was being used by
the back lot owners. Id. at 625-627.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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