PEOPLE OF MI V SCOTT GARRETT CANFIELD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 26, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 226953
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 99-169461-FC
SCOTT GARRETT CANFIELD,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr., and Cooper, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct,
MCL 750.520b(1)(f), and sentenced to ten to twenty years’ imprisonment. He appeals as of
right. We affirm.
Defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence of personal injury to support his
conviction for first-degree CSC under MCL 750.520b(1)(f). In reviewing this issue, this Court
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a
rational trier of fact could find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Johnson,
460 Mich 720, 722-723; 597 NW2d 73 (1999).
A person violates MCL 750.520b(1)(f) if he “causes personal injury to the victim and
force or coercion is used to accomplish sexual penetration.” People v Cowley, 174 Mich App 76,
80; 435 NW2d 458 (1989). Personal injury is defined as "bodily injury, disfigurement, mental
anguish, chronic pain, pregnancy, disease, or loss or impairment of a sexual or reproductive
organ." MCL 750.520a(j). Bodily injury, mental anguish, and the other conditions listed in the
statutory definition of personal injury “are merely different ways of defining the single element
of personal injury” and “should not be construed to represent alternative theories upon which
jury unanimity is required.” People v Asevedo, 217 Mich App 393, 397; 551 NW2d 478 (1996).
Thus, if sufficient evidence is presented establishing any one of the listed definitions, the
personal injury element has been proven. Id.
To satisfy the personal injury element of the statute, a physical injury need not be
permanent or substantial. People v Mackle, 241 Mich App 583, 596; 617 NW2d 339 (2000). In
People v Himmelein, 177 Mich App 365, 377-378; 442 NW2d 667 (1989), this Court stated:
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We decline defendant’s invitation to announce a new standard for evaluating the
severity of bodily injury that would be analogous to the standard of “extreme or
excruciating pain, distress, or suffering of the mind” set forth in [People v]
Petrella, [424 Mich 221, 257; 380 NW2d 11 (1985).] The Petrella holding
recognized and resolved the inherent ambiguity of mental anguish as an
aggravating factor elevating criminal sexual conduct from the third to the first
degree. . . . Bodily injury, viewed as an aggravating factor, does not share in this
inherent ambiguity. Given the absence of any statutory indication of a more
stringent standard than that previously applied by this Court, we find the present
standard for bodily injury to correctly reflect the legislative judgment that
evidence of even insubstantial physical injuries is sufficient to support a
conviction for criminal sexual conduct in the first degree. [177 Mich App 377378].
To prove “mental anguish” within the meaning of MCL 750.520a(j), “the prosecution is
required to produce evidence from which a rational trier of fact could conclude, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the victim experienced extreme or excruciating pain, distress, or suffering
of the mind.” Petrella, supra, 424 Mich 257, The following factors may be considered in
determining whether mental anguish has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) Testimony that the victim was upset, crying, sobbing, or hysterical
during or after the assault.
(2) The need by the victim for psychiatric or psychological care or
treatment.
(3) Some interference with the victim's ability to conduct a normal life,
such as absence from the workplace.
(4) Fear for the victim's life or safety, or that of those near to her.
(5) Feelings of anger and humiliation by the victim.
(6) Evidence that the victim was prescribed some sort of medication to
treat her anxiety, insomnia, or other symptoms.
(7) Evidence that the emotional or psychological effects of the assault
were long-lasting.
(8) A lingering fear, anxiety, or apprehension about being in vulnerable
situations in which the victim may be subject to another attack.
(9) The fact that the victim was the assailant's natural father. [Petrella,
supra at 270-71.]
In this case, the victim testified that defendant choked her, leaving abrasions on her right
shoulder, and medical testimony confirmed that the victim suffered abrasions on her shoulder
and at the entrance of her vagina. Viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, this
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evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that
the victim suffered a bodily injury under MCL 750.520a(j).
In addition, there was sufficient evidence that the victim suffered mental anguish.
Specifically, the victim testified that she was scared during the sexual assault, and was hysterical
and crying afterwards. The responding police officer also testified that the victim was very upset
and crying, and appeared to be very shaken. The emergency room physician who examined the
victim following the assault also described her as anxious and occasionally tearful. Furthermore,
the victim testified that, as a result of the sexual assault, she would cry at work, that she had a
hard time concentrating, her work productivity suffered, and she was required to take time off
from work due to the emotional effects of the assault. The victim also testified that, following
the assault, she felt scared and temporarily moved out of her apartment, had nightmares, had
trouble eating and sleeping, and found it difficult to trust men. The victim’s boyfriend also
testified that the victim’s behavior changed after the assault and that she was less loving and
more distrustful. Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational
trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim suffered mental anguish within
the meaning of MCL 750.520a(j). Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to support
defendant’s conviction of first-degree CSC.
Next, defendant argues that his due process rights were violated when, after being bound
over on a reduced charged of third-degree CSC, the case was dismissed without prejudice and
then later reinstated on the original charge of first-degree CSC. We disagree.
Following a preliminary examination, defendant was bound over for trial on a reduced
charge of third-degree CSC after the district court concluded that there was insufficient evidence
of personal injury to sustain the first-degree CSC charge. When defendant was arraigned in
circuit court, he moved to dismiss the charge after refusing to consent to the prosecutor’s request
for an adjournment to obtain DNA test results. The trial court granted defendant’s motion to
dismiss, without prejudice.
The prosecutor later issued another warrant, again charging defendant with first-degree
CSC. A second preliminary examination was conducted before the same district judge who
heard the first examination. The parties stipulated to the victim’s original preliminary
examination testimony. In addition, the prosecutor presented the testimony of the emergency
room physician who examined the victim after the assault, and the police officer who responded
to the complaint. Further, the victim gave additional testimony regarding the mental anguish she
suffered as a result of the assault. Based upon this new evidence, the district court concluded
that there was sufficient evidence of personal injury and, accordingly, bound defendant over for
trial on the charge of first-degree CSC.
After defendant was arraigned in circuit court, he moved to reinstate the prior charge of
third-degree CSC or quash the information. Defendant argued that, because the prosecutor did
not appeal the dismissal of the third-degree CSC charge from the original bindover, the
prosecutor could not seek a new warrant to reinstate the CSC-I charge and the district court did
not have jurisdiction to conduct a second preliminary examination on a new charge of firstdegree CSC. Rather, defendant claimed that the prosecutor’s only alternative was to reinstate the
original information charging him with third-degree CSC. The trial court denied defendant’s
motion.
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On appeal, defendant again argues that his due process rights were violated when a
second preliminary examination was conducted after his case was dismissed following his
bindover on the third-degree CSC charge. US Const, Am XIV; Const 1963, art 1, § 17.
This same issue was addressed in People v Robbins, 223 Mich App 355, 358-63; 566
NW2d 49 (1997), wherein this Court rejected the defendant’s argument that the prosecutor could
recharge the defendant only if there was newly discovered evidence to warrant the charge. In
Robbins, this Court interpreted MCR 6.110(f), which provides:
If, after considering the evidence, the court determines that probable cause
does not exist to believe either that an offense has been committed or that the
defendant committed it, the court must discharge the defendant without prejudice
to the prosecutor initiating a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. Except
as provided in MCR 8.111(C), the subsequent preliminary examination must be
held before the same judicial officer and the prosecutor must present additional
evidence to support the charge. [223 Mich App 359-360].
In Robbins, this Court determined that the plain meaning of the phrase “additional evidence” was
not synonymous with “newly discovered evidence.” Thus, the Court in Robbins held:
Therefore, in accordance with the plain meaning of the language of the
court rule, we find that the prosecution may reinstate the charges against a
defendant where it seeks to present “additional evidence” at the second
examination to the same magistrate who presided over the defendant’s
preliminary examination. The rule’s reference to “additional evidence,” rather
than to “newly discovered evidence,” must be regarded as an intentional choice
by the Supreme Court not to require that a subsequent examination be based on
newly discovered evidence. When the Supreme Court desires to require newly
discovered evidence, it does so by using that precise terminology. See, for
example, MCR 2.612(C)(1)(b).
The reference to "additional evidence" in MCR 6.110(F) redresses a
problem identified by this Court in People v Nevitt, 76 Mich App 402, 403-404,
256 NW2d 612 (1977), where after dismissal of the charges at the conclusion of
the first preliminary examination, the prosecutor recharged the defendant on the
same evidence, before a different magistrate, and succeeded in obtaining a
bindover following a second preliminary examination. Although this Court found
the prosecutor's tactics offensive and characterized the prosecutor's methods as
"judge shopping," it felt constrained to affirm the bindover, noting that "[i]f the
prosecutor is of the opinion that the examining magistrate erred in not binding the
defendant over for trial, the better approach is to appeal to the circuit court." Id.
We agree that when the same evidence is relied on at a subsequent
examination, appeal is the proper remedy. MCR 6.110(F) prevents "judge
shopping" by requiring that a subsequent examination be before the same
magistrate, if available, and that additional evidence be presented. In this case,
the prosecution's tactics were not offensive where it sought to introduce additional
evidence at a subsequent examination before the same magistrate.
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Moreover, we agree with the prosecution that the effect of the lower
court's ruling is to give double jeopardy protection where none exists. In People v
Miklovich, 375 Mich 536, 539; 134 NW2d 720 (1965), the Supreme Court stated:
The discharge by an examining magistrate upon examination of a person
accused of a crime is not a bar to his subsequent arrest, examination, and trial for
the same offense because he has not been placed in jeopardy. [Robbins, supra at
361-362.]
In Robbins, this Court concluded that reinstatement of the charges against the defendant did not
violate due process “because the prosecution sought to present additional, noncumulative
evidence at the second examination to the same magistrate who presided over defendant's
preliminary examination.” Id. at 362. This Court added, however, that its “holding should not
be construed to encourage a prosecutor to subject a defendant to repeated preliminary
examinations[,]” and that “subjecting a defendant to repeated preliminary examinations violates
due process if the prosecutor attempts to harass the defendant or engage in ‘judge-shopping.’”
Id. at 363.
Although defendant urges this Court to reject the reasoning of Robbins, we reaffirm it as
controlling authority under MCR 7.215(I)(2) and (3).
Applying Robbins to this case, it is apparent that defendant’s due process rights were not
violated. First, there is no indication of “judge-shopping” because the second preliminary
examination was conducted before the same district court judge who conducted the first
examination. Moreover, at the second preliminary examination, the prosecutor presented new
and additional, noncumulative evidence that the victim suffered a “personal injury” as a result of
the sexual assault.
Furthermore, because jeopardy had not yet attached before the first case was dismissed,
reinstatement of the original first-degree CSC charge at the second preliminary examination did
not violate defendant’s double jeopardy protections. See Robbins, supra at 362. Additionally,
because it was not improper for the prosecutor to reinstate the original charge where defendant
was afforded a preliminary examination before the same district court judge and additional,
noncumulative evidence was presented supporting the higher charge, there is no merit to
defendant’s claim that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by seeking to reinstate the original
charge.
Finally, we reject defendant’s claim that his attorneys were ineffective in their handling
of this issue. Bell v Cone, 535 US ___; 122 S Ct 1843, 1850; 152 L Ed 2d 914 (2002);
Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984); People v Toma,
462 Mich 281, 302; 613 NW2d 694 (2000). Defendant’s first attorney was not ineffective for
failing to challenge the trial court’s decision to dismiss the case without prejudice, rather than
with prejudice, given that the trial court dismissed the case for procedural reasons. Any
objection would have been futile. Counsel is not required to advocate a meritless position.
People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 425; 608 NW2d 502 (2000). Similarly, because
defendant’s second attorney had no valid basis for opposing reinstatement of the original firstdegree CSC charge on double jeopardy grounds, Robbins, supra, he was not ineffective for
failing to do so.
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Defendant also argues that he was denied a fair trial because of misconduct by the
prosecutor during closing argument. Because defendant failed to preserve this issue by objecting
to the allegedly improper remarks below, we review the issue for plain error affecting
defendant’s substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130
(1999); People v Rodriguez, 251 Mich App 10, 32; 650 NW2d 76 (2002); People v Schutte, 240
Mich App 713, 720; 613 NW2d 370 (2000).
Defendant challenges the following remarks made during the prosecutor’s closing
argument:
In this case, the Defendant used sex for his own pleasure. He wanted it, he
wanted it from the victim. He needed somebody to dominate over, and that’s
exactly what he did. Rape is an ugly crime. It desecrates the soul, it violates the
body, it traumatizes an individual who is the victim, as in this case, of it. It’s a
crime of anger, it’s a crime of violence. This was uncalled for, unjust sexual
invasion of this young woman’s body.
Now, what separates making love, what separates voluntary sex from this
is the concept of mutuality, the willingness of two individuals in a setting to make
love, and when you add love, you add caring, that’s what separates us as
human[s] from animals. Animals, on the other hand, they assert their will over
the lesser victim, as was done in this case by the Defendant.
Defendant claims that it was improper and demeaning to equate him with an animal, because
“even those accused of felony offenses are to be treated as human beings.” The prosecutor’s
remarks were intended to convey that defendant’s sexual assault of the victim was
nonconsensual. Considered in context, we find no plain error.
We also disagree with defendant’s claim that the prosecutor’s comments during rebuttal
argument constituted an improper appeal to the jurors’ sense of rage or civic duty. People v
Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 282; 531 NW2d 659 (1995). Viewed in context, it is clear that the
prosecutor was responding to defense counsel’s plea that, at most, the jury should convict
defendant of only third-degree CSC on the basis that the evidence did not show that the victim
suffered a personal injury. The prosecutor, after recounting the evidence showing that the victim
had suffered both a bodily injury and mental anguish, was asking the jury to apply the law and
find that the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of first-degree CSC. Furthermore, the
prosecutor did not misstate the law by remarking that “a verdict of not guilty is saying . . . [the
victim] didn’t suffer mental anguish . . . didn’t suffer any injury.” Viewed in context, the
prosecutor was merely arguing that the evidence established defendant’s guilt of first-degree
CSC, as defined under the law.
Finally, because the prosecutor’s remarks were proper, defense counsel was not
ineffective for failing to object.
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Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
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