ALLSTATE INSUR CO V NAIL MAROKI
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
UNPUBLISHED
September 24, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 230051
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 99-015865-CK
NAIL MAROKI and YASSER MARROGI,
Defendants-Appellants.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Griffin and Hoekstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, the trial court entered a declaratory judgment in favor of plaintiff.
Defendants appeal as of right from the judgment. We affirm.
Defendants, who are brothers, obtained an insurance policy from plaintiff, Allstate
Insurance Company, on defendant Yasser’s leased vehicle. Defendant Nail signed the
application and Yasser was not listed as a driver on the policy. Later, defendants were involved
in an automobile accident. As a result, the vehicle was a total loss and defendants sustained
injuries. Defendants filed a personal injury protection claim under the insurance policy for
medical expenses and for uninsured motorist benefits. After paying off the vehicle, plaintiff
received the title and discovered that Yasser, not Nail, was the lessee of the insured vehicle.
Plaintiff conducted an investigation and determined that defendants were not properly insured.
Plaintiff filed a complaint for declaratory relief, alleging fraud in the application of insurance and
material misrepresentations/fraud in pursuing the claim. The trial court conducted a jury trial
and the jury found, among other things, that Nail had no insurable interest in the vehicle, that
Nail intentionally made a material misrepresentation when he applied for the insurance, and that
defendants intentionally concealed or misrepresented material facts when making a claim under
the policy. Thereafter, the trial court declared the insurance policy and all claims for benefits
under the policy void and entered a judgment against defendants.
On appeal, defendants argue that the trial court improperly instructed the jury concerning
plaintiff’s burden of proof on the fraud claim, and that this error prejudiced defendants. The trial
court instructed the jury that plaintiff had to prove fraud by a preponderance of the evidence,
rather than by clear and convincing evidence. Because whether the trial court’s instruction on
the burden of proof was proper presents a question of law, our review is de novo. Hilgendorf v
St John Hosp & Medical Ctr Corp, 245 Mich App 670, 694-695; 630 NW2d 356 (2001).
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In Mina v General Star Indemnity Co, 218 Mich App 678; 555 NW2d 1 (1996), rev’d in
part on other grounds 455 Mich 866 (1997), this Court addressed the standard of proof issue. In
Mina, supra at 680, the insurer denied the insured’s claim for fire insurance coverage on the
basis of fraud, false swearing, and arson. Thereafter, the insured brought suit against the insurer
for payment under the policy and the insurer raised fraud, false swearing and arson as affirmative
defenses to preclude recovery. Id. The trial court, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in
Campbell v Great Lakes Ins Co, 228 Mich 636, 638; 200 NW 457 (1924), which also involved
an insurer alleging fraud and false swearing as an affirmative defense, instructed the jury that the
insurer must prove its fraud and false swearing defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
Mina, supra at 681. On appeal, the insured argued that the trial court erroneously instructed the
jury because the more recent Michigan case law held that the burden of proof in fraud cases was
by clear and convincing evidence. Id. After analyzing the apparent confusion in Michigan law
regarding the proper standard of proof, this Court upheld the jury instruction requiring that the
plaintiff prove by fraud by a preponderance of the evidence, concluding that it was not improper
for the trial court to rely on Campbell, supra. Mina, supra at 685. In so deciding, this Court
stated:
[U]nless and until the Supreme Court offers us additional guidance on this
issue, we cannot find that the trial court erred in relying on Campbell . . . . In
Campbell, the Supreme Court addressed the identical issue that is presented in the
present case. The Supreme Court has never overruled Campbell. Accordingly,
the trial court properly followed Campbell and instructed the jury that defendant
had to prove its defense of fraud and false swearing by a preponderance of the
evidence. [Id.]
See also Hawkeye Casualty Co v Holcomb, 302 Mich 591, 604; 5 NW2d 477 (1942) (“The
burden was upon plaintiff, who claimed fraud on the part of defendants in obtaining the issuance
of such policy, to prove such fraud by a preponderance of the evidence.”)
Defendants rely on Hi-Way Motor Co v Int’l Harvester Co, 398 Mich 330; 247 NW2d
813 (1976), and Foodland Distributors v Al-Naimi, 220 Mich App 453, 459; 559 NW2d 379
(1996), to support their argument that plaintiff must prove its claim by clear and convincing
evidence. As defendants point out, in Hi-Way, supra at 336, the Court stated that “fraud will not
be presumed but must be proven by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence.” Similarly, in
Foodland, supra, this Court stated that “[i]t is generally held that fraud must be proved by ‘clear
and convincing’ evidence, rather than by the preponderance of the evidence.” However, these
cases are distinguishable from Campbell and Mina. In both Campbell and Mina, the insurer
asserted the defense of fraud and false swearing to bar the insured from recovery under the
insurance policy, but Hi-Way Motor Co and Foodland were tort actions. The present case is a
declaratory action where plaintiff-insurer asserted fraud to preclude the insured from recovery
under the policy, and although this is an original action, rather than a defense, it remains more
similar to Campbell and Mina. In other words, although procedurally different, Campbell, Mina,
and the present case concern the preclusion of an insured’s recovery from an insurance policy on
the basis of fraud. The Mina Court explained:
Unfortunately, in the Hi-Way Motor opinion, the Supreme Court did not
overrule its previous cases holding that fraud had to be proved by a
preponderance of the evidence. In fact, the opinion made no mention of them.
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***
[W]e are unable to say with any degree of certainty exactly what standard
of proof courts should apply in fraud cases. The Supreme Court has alternately
required fraud to be established by a preponderance of the evidence and by clear
and convincing proof, with little consistency and no detailed analysis. While the
most recent Supreme Court pronouncements regarding the question have stated
that fraud must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, we think it unlikely
that the Supreme Court would overrule a significant body of case law without at
least mentioning that it was doing so. [Mina, supra at 684-685.]
Pursuant to MCR 7.215(I)(1), we are bound by Mina. Therefore, the trial court’s instruction was
not improper.
Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
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