PEOPLE OF MI V DAVID MICHAEL-OBRIEN NEALY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 19, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 228703
Eaton Circuit Court
LC No. 99-020357-FC
DAVID MICHAEL O’BRIEN NEALY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Owens, P.J., and Sawyer and Cooper, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of: first-degree home invasion, MCL
750.110a(2); taking and driving away another’s motor vehicle, MCL 750.413; two counts of
armed robbery, MCL 750.529; two counts of kidnapping, MCL 750.349; eight counts of firstdegree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b(1)(c) ; conspiracy to commit first-degree home
invasion, armed robbery, kidnapping, and first-degree criminal sexual assault, MCL 750.157a;
and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. He was
sentenced to concurrent prison sentences of: 150 to 240 months for the home invasion
conviction; 320 to 480 months each for the kidnapping and armed robbery convictions; 30 to 60
months for the conviction of taking and driving away another’s vehicle; 324 to 600 months for
each criminal sexual conduct conviction; 120 to 240 months for the conspiracy to commit firstdegree home invasion conviction; 210 to 480 months each for the conspiracy to commit armed
robbery and kidnapping convictions; and 260 to 480 months for the conspiracy to commit firstdegree criminal sexual conduct conviction. Defendant also received two years’ imprisonment
for the felony-firearm conviction, with 223 days of sentence credit, to be served before and
consecutive to his other sentences. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
This case arises from a crime spree that began in Mulliken and continued to Detroit,
during the early morning hours of November 14, 1999. The prosecutor presented evidence that
defendant and two others entered a home, threatened a young woman with guns, and repeatedly
raped her.1 The assailants also demanded money and other property from her father. The father
testified that during this ordeal he was bound and gagged with duct tape and left in his basement
1
There was no evidence presented at trial that defendant was one of the assailants who
physically raped or sexually assaulted the young woman.
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bedroom.2 Thereafter, one of the assailants forced the female victim to drive him to a bank and
withdraw money from an ATM machine. Upon returning to her home, the perpetrators, joined
by a fourth person, forced the female victim into a Ford Expedition and drove her to Detroit,
repeatedly raping her on the way. When the assailants reached Detroit they rented a motel room
and continued their campaign of sexual assault against the young woman. Later that morning,
she was dropped off at a restaurant in Novi.
I. Venue
Defendant argues that he was denied due process and an impartial jury when the trial
court denied his request for a change of venue. We disagree. The defense argued that they were
forced to collectively exhaust their peremptory challenges in order to obtain a jury that was
unaware or unbiased by the publicity and that a number of potential jurors were excused for
cause. In denying their motions, the trial court announced that it was “satisfied that those
fourteen people are fair and impartial jurors.” A trial court’s decision on a motion for change of
venue will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. People v Jendrzejewski, 455
Mich 495, 500; 566 NW2d 530 (1997).
Criminal defendants are generally tried in the county where the alleged crime occurred.
Id. at 499; MCL 600.8312. However, a trial court may order a change of venue when justice
demands. Jendrzejewski, supra at 499-500; MCL 762.7. Justice requires a change of venue
when the pretrial publicity is so ubiquitous and unrelenting that the entire community must be
presumed to have been prejudiced by it. Jendrzejewski, supra at 501. The Court in
Jendrzejewski, supra at 500-501, noted that:
Community prejudice amounting to actual bias has been found where there was
extensive highly inflammatory pretrial publicity that saturated the community to
such an extent that the entire jury pool was tainted, and, much more infrequently,
community bias has been implied from a high percentage of the venire who admit
to a disqualifying prejudice.
However, we note that a juror’s exposure to media reports about the defendant and the alleged
crime does not automatically establish that defendant was denied a fair trial. Id. at 502. Rather,
a reviewing court must look at the circumstances surrounding the trial to determine if it was fair.
Id. Due process only demands that jurors act with a “lack of partiality, not an empty mind.” Id.
at 519.
In this case, defendant fails to identify any specific juror as having preconceived ideas
about defendant’s guilt. Further, defendant does not point to any prejudicial information that the
jurors may have received from pretrial publicity that potentially interfered with their duty to
decide the case according to the evidence presented at trial. Rather, defendant supports his
argument with a general statement that there was widespread pretrial publicity. Defendant
further cites the exhaustion of peremptory challenges by all three defense lawyers and the “large
2
The father was eventually able to escape from his restraints and call the police from a
neighbor’s home.
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number” of potential jurors excused for cause, as “strong evidence of how the pre-trial publicity
impacted on the community.”
However, defendant provides no evidence, other than the fact that a number of
prospective jurors were excused for bias, to support the assertion that the pretrial publicity was
“extensive, intensive, and inflammatory.” Nonetheless, it appears that the trial court was
sensitive to potential problems stemming from pretrial publicity. Indeed, the trial court followed
our Supreme Court’s recommendations and frequently resorted, with the participation of counsel,
to sequestered questioning of each prospective juror. See Jendrzejewski, supra at 509. While
the record reveals most prospective jurors were exposed to some pretrial publicity, all the jurors
who were eventually seated declared an ability to judge the case solely on the evidence presented
at trial.
To the extent defendant argues that the exhaustion of his peremptory challenges
evidences the likelihood of an impartial jury, we find his argument to be meritless. The
exhaustion of peremptory challenges merely preserves jury selection issues for appeal, People v
Taylor, 195 Mich App 57, 59-60; 489 NW2d 99 (1992). We further note that the record does not
indicate that any of the defense attorneys, including defendant’s, ever requested additional
challenges as permitted by MCR 6.412(E)(2).
Furthermore, defendant provides no numbers or citations to the record concerning
challenges for cause or how they may have reduced the jury pool. Defendant also fails to cite
any authority for his proposition that the extent of such challenges in this case is grounds for
reversal. We regard this failure of presentation as forfeiture of this argument. MCR
7.212(C)(7). We note that according to the record, less than half the prospective jurors excused
for cause were due to bias relating to pretrial publicity.
Based on the complete record, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion by
refusing to change venue to another county. Further, after a careful review of the jury selection
procedure in this case, Jendrzejewski, supra at 517, we are satisfied that the trial court succeeded
in seating an impartial jury.
II. Duress Instruction
Defendant further contends that the trial court erroneously refused a defense request for
an instruction on duress. We disagree. Jury instructions are reviewed in their entirety to
determine if error requiring reversal occurred. People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 124; 631
NW2d 67 (2001).
It is the function of the trial court to clearly present the case to the jury and instruct on the
applicable law. People v Katt, 248 Mich App 282, 310; 639 NW2d 815 (2001). Jury
instructions must include all the elements of the charged offenses and any material issues,
defenses, and theories that are supported by the evidence. People v Canales, 243 Mich App 571,
574; 624 NW2d 439 (2000). “The determination whether a jury instruction is applicable to the
facts of the case lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.” People v Ho, 231 Mich App
178, 189; 585 NW2d 357 (1998).
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The evidence in this case does not support defendant’s contention that he acted under
duress. Duress is a common-law affirmative defense that applies when the crime committed
avoided a greater evil. People v Lemons, 454 Mich 234, 245; 562 NW2d 447 (1997). To
warrant an instruction on duress, the defendant must present evidence that:
A) The threatening conduct was sufficient to create in the mind of a reasonable
person the fear of death or serious bodily harm; B) The conduct in fact caused
such fear of death or serious bodily harm in the mind of the defendant; C) The
fear or duress was operating upon the mind of the defendant at the time of the
alleged act; and D) The defendant committed the act to avoid the threatened harm.
[Id. at 246-247, quoting People v Luther, 394 Mich 619, 623; 232 NW2d 184
(1975).]
Absent sufficient evidence of each of these elements, the trial court is not required to instruct the
jury on duress. Id. at 248. We further note that a threat of future injury is insufficient to support
a defense of duress. People v Ramsdell, 230 Mich App 386, 401; 585 NW2d 1 (1998).
On appeal, defendant points exclusively to his police statements as evidence that he acted
under duress. However, defendant fails to identify any specific remarks or provide any citation
to the record to sustain his argument. Appellate review of this issue is thereby precluded. MCR
7.212(C)(7). We note, however, that a thorough review of defendant’s statements fails to
support the theory that he acted under duress.
Defendant stated to police that he was with friends that night and made no indications
that he acted out of fear. At best, defendant’s statements suggest that he did not initially plan the
events of that night. However, both victims testified under oath that defendant was armed and
that none of the assailants threatened each other. The principal complainant also testified that
while she was being sexually assaulted during the drive to Detroit, defendant commented to one
of her rapists that “[he didn’t] hear her moaning.” There was further testimony that the victims’
money was split among all four assailants. Thus, neither the evidence produced during trial, nor
defendant’s statements to police, provided support for a jury instruction on duress.
III. Kidnapping
Defendant next maintains that the prosecutor failed to present sufficient evidence that he
kidnapped one of the victims. Specifically, defendant claims that the facts fail to support a
finding that the complainant’s father was secretly confined for purposes of the kidnapping
statute. We disagree. In reviewing sufficiency of the evidence claims, this Court views the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determines whether a rational trier of
fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
People v Johnson, 460 Mich 720, 723; 597 NW2d 73 (1999).
The trial court instructed the jury that in order to convict defendant of kidnapping, the
prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant, without legal authority,
forcibly confined or imprisoned the victim against his will, intentionally kept that location secret,
and acted wilfully and maliciously. See MCL 750.349. This is the secret confinement theory of
kidnapping. See People v Jaffray, 445 Mich 287, 305; 519 NW2d 108 (1994).
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The evidence produced at trial indicated that the victim in question was subdued with
duct tape around his face, arms, and legs. Trial testimony also established that a sock was placed
in the victim’s mouth, leaving him unable to speak and barely able to breath. The victim claimed
that the assailant wearing a red coat, whom his daughter identified as defendant, asked him
where he could find more money in the house and later put a gun to his head. The victim
testified that he was eventually able to work free of the duct tape and seek help from a neighbor.
Defendant insists that there was nothing secret about the victim’s confinement because
the victim was in his own bedroom. However, the secret confinement theory of kidnapping does
not necessarily fail when the victim is confined in his own home. “[A] victim can be a ‘prisoner
in his own castle’ for purposes of the kidnapping statute.” Id. at 312, n 37. Essentially, “secret
confinement,” as contemplated by MCL 750.349, exists when a victim is deprived of the
assistance by others due to the victim’s inability to communicate a need for help. Jaffray, supra
at 309.
Similar to Jaffray, supra, the evidence in this case clearly establishes that the victim was
secretly confined to his room and precluded from communicating his predicament to others. See
id. at 312-313. Indeed, a sock was put in his mouth and his arms and legs were bound with duct
tape. It appears that the victim was left in this manner to prevent him from calling for help.
While his daughter was aware of this confinement, she was being held captive by defendant and
his co-felons and could not communicate the victim’s plight to others. Because this evidence
suggests that defendant and his cohorts intentionally left the victim in a state of confinement,
unbeknownst to all but themselves and the victim’s daughter, the jury could reasonably conclude
that defendant secretly confined the victim for purposes of secret-confinement kidnapping.
IV. Sentencing
Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to several
minimum terms of imprisonment exceeding the range recommended by the legislative
sentencing guidelines.3 We disagree.
The sentencing guidelines require the trial court to impose a minimum sentence in
accordance with the calculated guidelines range. MCL 769.34(2). However, a trial court may
depart from the recommended sentencing range if it has a substantial and compelling reason.
MCL 769.34(3); People v Babcock, 244 Mich App 64, 72; 624 NW2d 479 (2000). To constitute
a substantial and compelling reason for departing from the guidelines, the reason must be
objective and verifiable, and must irresistibly hold the attention of the court. Babcock, supra at
75. A court may not base a departure on an offense or offender characteristic already considered
by the guidelines, unless it concludes that the guidelines provided inadequate or disproportionate
weight to that factor, given the facts of the case. MCL 769.34(3)(b).
The existence of a particular factor is a factual determination for the trial court and is
reviewed for clear error on appeal. Id. at 75-76. “[O]nce this Court determines as a matter of
3
Because the felonies in this case took place on November 14, 1999, the legislative sentencing
guidelines apply. MCL 769.34(1).
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law that the trial court’s stated factor for departure was objective and verifiable, our review is
limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that the factor constituted a
substantial and compelling reason to depart.” Id. at 78. Further, the extent of the departure from
the guidelines is reviewable pursuant to the principle of proportionality. People v Babcock (After
Remand), ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 235518, issued March 19, 2002), slip
op at 3-4.
In this case, several of the minimum sentences exceeded the range recommended by the
guidelines. Specifically, defendant received minimum sentences of 150 months for home
invasion, 320 months for each count of kidnapping and armed robbery, 324 months for each
count of criminal sexual conduct, and 260 months for conspiracy to commit criminal sexual
conduct. The guidelines recommended minimum sentences of 140, 285, 285, and 210 months,
respectively. At sentencing, the trial court explained its rationale for imposing these sentences:
[T]he victims in this case . . . have certainly endured as monstrous a crime
as you can imagine. Not only were they assaulted in their home, they were
deprived of what everybody should have and that’s security, security to be safe in
their homes, to be safe in their bodies. And that safety was violated continually
during that fateful night.
***
I think that also we have to understand that the community has also in a
way been assaulted because people who lived in the community and who have
known about this case certainly must not sleep as soundly, must have a sense of
their security also lost. . . .
. . . How you can repeatedly be involved in a brutal assault and rape
continually, again, I have no answer for that. . . .
***
[Defendant] presents, certainly, a difficult problem because one of the
things the Court has to consider is rehabilitation. And certainly the callousness in
which they treated the victims in this case argues against rehabilitation . . . .
I would agree with the Prosecutor that the sentencing guidelines do not
adequately meet the crimes that have been committed. There’s multiple crimes,
the callousness in which they treated the victims, the dehumanization of the
victims certainly require the Court to go outside of the guidelines.
But in sentencing, again, I have to consider the guidelines and any
deviation must be done with the understanding that the guidelines are there for a
purpose and the Court must adhere to that purpose.
***
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The Court has exceeded the sentencing guidelines for the reasons I’ve
previously stated, that the guidelines do not adequately take into account the
number of criminal offenses, nor does it take into account the severe callousness
in which the victims were treated.
In the departure evaluation, the trial court reiterated that “[t]he law does not take into account the
multiple criminal offenses and the callousness with which the defendant treated the victims.”
Defendant claims that there was no substantial and compelling reason for these
departures and that the guidelines already accounted for the circumstances of the instant crimes.
Initially, we note that defendant’s argument in this regard is very general. Moreover, defendant
fails to explain which factors were allegedly already considered by the sentencing guidelines.
“A party may not merely state a position and then leave it to this Court to discover and
rationalize the basis for the claim.” People v Mackle, 241 Mich App 583, 604, n 4; 617 NW2d
339 (2000).
We are satisfied that the trial court provided a detailed and rational explanation for its
upward departures. The guidelines for defendant’s crimes fail to account for the unusually high
number of crimes committed that night, combined with the humiliation, numerous atrocities, and
acts of criminal sexual conduct that the victim endured. The fact that a jury found defendant
guilty on nineteen separate counts in the matter, including eight counts of first-degree criminal
sexual assault, clearly establishes an objective and verifiable basis for concluding that the
multiplicity and callousness of defendant’s behavior constituted substantial and compelling
reasons for departing from the guidelines.
Defendant suggests that the guidelines failed to account for the fact the he was not the
principal actor but merely an aider and abettor. However, defendant’s argument neglects the
evidence presented that he held a gun to the father’s head while demanding money, that he
helped drive the vehicle while others were raping the daughter, that he cheered others on while
they raped her, and that he received a share of the money taken from the house. Furthermore,
defendant offers no authority to suggest that an aider and abettor should be judged more leniently
than a principal actor. Indeed, the public policy of this state is to treat all participants in a crime
as principals. MCL 767.39.
Based on this evidence, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s decision to exceed the
sentencing guidelines was so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidenced a
perversity of will. Babcock (On Remand), supra at 5. Nor do we find that the extent of the
upward departure constituted an abuse of discretion. Id.
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
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