PEOPLE OF MI V RONALD LEON ALLEN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 12, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 224966
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 99-074635-FC
RONALD LEON ALLEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Sawyer and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of first-degree murder, MCL
750.316, armed robbery, MCL 750.529, and felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b. We affirm.
On October 10, 1998, a Marathon service station was robbed and the service attendant
was shot in the head and killed. A surveillance camera videotaped the robbery and murder, using
a time-lapse recorder and VHS videotape. The police retrieved both the recorder and the
videotape and had the videotape transferred from its analogue format into a digital format. The
digital images were then viewed and still frames were selected, saved as an image file,
transferred to a zip diskette, and given to the police. A detective then took the zip diskette to a
printing service and had the selected images printed as photographs.
The police also contacted a videographer who copied the original surveillance videotape
onto a one-inch, broadcast standard, tape, which would permit a higher quality image while
maintaining the original analog format. The videographer also prepared two videotapes that
recorded ten-minute segments of fourteen particular frames, i.e., each image would be held still
for ten minutes, allowing time to examine each frame of interest. Ten-second segments of the
same fourteen frames were also recorded on another videotape. The videographer also digitized
specific frames or images from the videotape in the TIFF file format and transferred the data
over the Internet to an imaging expert for the purpose of image recovery, i.e., reduction or
removal of noise and blurring from the images.
Dr. Normal Sauer, a forensic anthropologist, reviewed the videotapes, photographs, and
other still frames that resulted from the surveillance videotape and compiled a list of
morphologic features of the perpetrator of the crime. He then compared, side-by-side, those
surveillance images and the morphologic features of the perpetrator with known photographs of
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defendant, as well as eight to ten other individuals, and could not conclude that defendant was
not the person on the surveillance videotape.
Dr. Sauer also utilized superimposition techniques to compare the images. In particular,
using a video mixer and two cameras situated on vertical rods, allowing photographs of different
sizes to be compared by moving the cameras up or down the rods, Dr. Sauer performed two
types of superimposition. First, he superimposed images from the surveillance tape over known
photographs of defendant and proceeded to perform systematic horizontal and vertical “wipes”
or erasures to determine whether particular morphologic features portrayed on the two
comparative images were consistent or aligned. Dr. Sauer was unable to conclude that defendant
was not the person on the surveillance tape. Second, he used a superimposition fading technique
that permitted the comparative images to be integrated, also allowing comparisons of locations
and proportions of morphologic features. Dr. Sauer testified that there were no significant
differences between the features of the perpetrator in the surveillance tape and defendant’s
features. In sum, after performing his various identification studies, Dr. Sauer testified that he
was unable to exclude defendant as a suspect and that it would be a “rare occurrence that two
people would have the same identical [constellation of comparable] features.” On crossexamination, however, Dr. Sauer testified that he was unable to conclude that the person on the
surveillance tape and defendant were the same person, i.e., make a positive identification.
On appeal, defendant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Dr.
Sauer’s testimony regarding his use of superimposition techniques to compare photographs
without conducting a Davis-Frye1 hearing to determine whether this methodology was reliable
and, hence, the evidence admissible. We disagree. A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude
expert testimony is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion. People v Haywood, 209 Mich
App 217, 224; 530 NW2d 497 (1995).
Expert testimony is admissible under MRE 702 if (1) the witness is qualified as an expert
in a pertinent field, (2) the testimony is relevant in that it “assist[s] the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,” and (3) the testimony is derived from “recognized
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge . . . .” MRE 702; People v Beckley, 434
Mich 691, 710-719; 456 NW2d 391 (1990). The issue in this case concerns the third
requirement—whether identification testimony based in part on superimposing photographs to
permit morphologic comparisons of facial features is reliable for purposes of MRE 702.
The Davis-Frye test is a means to determine whether proposed testimony regarding a
novel scientific principle, technique, or methodology is “recognized,” i.e., has gained general
acceptance, within the relevant scientific community and, thus, is admissible as reliable
evidence. Beckley, supra at 718. The burden of proving admissibility rests on the party offering
the evidence. People v Lee, 212 Mich App 228, 262; 537 NW2d 233 (1995). The purpose of the
Davis-Frye rule “is to prevent the jury from relying on unproved and ultimately unsound
scientific methods.” People v Marsh, 177 Mich App 161, 164; 441 NW2d 33 (1989), quoting
People v Gonzales, 415 Mich 615, 623; 329 NW2d 743 (1982). However, the Davis-Frye rule
1
People v Davis, 343 Mich 348; 72 NW2d 269 (1955); Frye v United States, 293 F 1013 (CA
DC, 1923).
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only applies to novel scientific techniques, methods, or principles; therefore, when a technique,
method, or principle has been established as generally accepted, even when it is used in a novel
application, the rule does not apply. Lee, supra at 282-283; Haywood, supra at 221; People v
Davis, 199 Mich App 502, 512-513; 503 NW2d 457 (1993).
Here, on appeal, defendant challenges the admission of Dr. Sauer’s identification
testimony with regard to his use of superimposition techniques to compare the images of the
person in the surveillance tape with photographs of defendant.2 See MCR 7.212(C)(5).
However, this methodology was not novel; rather, it was essentially a photo-to-photo comparison
but instead of the photographs being aligned side-by-side, they were layered on top of each
other, through the use of a mixer, and then progressively “blended” to determine if there were
consistencies in morphologic features. Comparing photographic images is not a new scientific
technique. See, e.g., Marsh, supra at 167. Further, defendant’s own expert videographer
performed similar superimposition techniques and testified that the techniques were not new but
that he did not have the expertise to perform comparisons of the resulting images for
identification purposes. Dr. Sauer’s use of superimposition techniques as a method of comparing
photographic images to assist in his ability to reach conclusions was sound and offers a
trustworthy foundation for his conclusions. The superimposition techniques presented the
comparative evidence—the photographs—in a more perceptible and effective manner, without
altering, manipulating, or distorting the original images. In sum, Dr. Sauer’s testimony that
relied on this method of displaying and comparing photographic evidence was admissible
without first conducting a Davis-Frye hearing, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting this testimony.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting similar acts evidence
regarding his alleged involvement in another shooting because the prosecutor did not give proper
notice of such intent under MRE 404(b)(2) and because the testimony was inadmissible. We
disagree.
First, because defendant did not object to the lack of notice under MRE 404(b)(2), our
review is limited to whether the unpreserved error affected defendant’s substantial rights. People
v Grant, 445 Mich 535, 545, 551-552; 520 NW2d 123 (1994). In this case, defendant’s
substantial rights were not affected by the lack of notice because the contested testimony
regarding defendant’s alleged involvement in another shooting was presented at defendant’s
preliminary examination months before the trial and the witnesses were endorsed. Accordingly,
defendant had the opportunity to object to and defend against the other acts evidence consistent
with the purpose of the notice requirement. See People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 89, n 51;
508 NW2d 114 (1993), amended 445 Mich 1205 (1994); People v Hawkins, 245 Mich App 439,
454-455; 628 NW2d 105 (2001).
We also reject defendant’s claim that evidence prohibited under MRE 404(b) was
improperly admitted. Because defendant did not object to the admission of this evidence at trial,
2
Although defendant appears to take issue with Dr. Sauer’s allegedly “subjective”
characterizations of the comparative morphologic features and his use of a non-exclusion
hypothesis, defendant did not challenge Dr. Sauer’s expertise on appeal.
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the issue is forfeited unless plain error is established. See Grant, supra; People v Pesquera, 244
Mich App 305, 316; 625 NW2d 407 (2001).
Defendant argues that testimony regarding his alleged involvement in another shooting
was improperly admitted. In particular, Bobby Simpson, Jr. testified that defendant shot at him
six or seven times, striking him once in the arm, using a rusty .22-caliber Ruger handgun in
September 1998. Antoine Williams testified that he saw defendant shoot Simpson. Williams
further testified that, in early 1999, he found a .22-caliber Ruger pistol in a speaker box that he
had observed in defendant’s automobile in November or December of 1998, and he turned the
gun over to police. An expert in firearm and tool mark identification testified that the shell
casing recovered from the Marathon service station crime scene and the shell casings recovered
from the Simpson shooting were fired from the .22-caliber Ruger pistol that Williams gave to
police.
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible under MRE 404(b) if the
evidence is “(1) offered for a proper purpose and not to prove the defendant’s character or
propensity to commit the crime, (2) relevant to an issue or fact of consequence at trial, and (3)
sufficiently probative to outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice, MRE 403.” People v Ho, 231
Mich App 178, 185-186; 585 NW2d 357 (1998). Here, the contested evidence was not simply
offered to show defendant’s bad character. Contrary to defendant’s argument on appeal, the
testimony was not admitted by the prosecution for the purpose of supporting a modus operandi
theory of identification; rather, the testimony was admitted for the purpose of linking defendant
to the murder weapon. See People v Yacks, 49 Mich App 444, 451; 212 NW2d 249 (1973). The
disputed testimony, coupled with the firearm expert’s testimony, demonstrated that defendant
previously possessed and was observed with the murder weapon. Finally, evidence is not
inadmissible simply because the very nature of the evidence is prejudicial, and defendant has not
demonstrated that he was unfairly prejudiced by the testimony. See MRE 403. In sum,
defendant has failed to establish plain error warranting reversal. Further, because this testimony
was admissible, defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim on this ground is without
merit. See People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 425; 608 NW2d 502 (2000).
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
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