KEVYN CLARK V STATE OF MICHIGAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
KEVYN CLARK, a Minor, by his Next Friend and
Mother, LETONIA CLARK,
UNPUBLISHED
July 5, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 231769
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 99-901932-NO
STATE OF MICHIGAN, HARRY HICKS, and
NEIL WASSERMAN,
Defendants-Appellants.
and
TINA MCCRAY,
MCCRAY, a Minor,
as
Guardian
of
JUAN
Defendant.
KEVYN CLARK, a Minor, by his Next Friend
LETONIA CLARK,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
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No. 231854
Court of Claims
LC No. 99-017336-CM
Before: Zahra, P.J., and Cavanagh and White, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants appeal by leave granted the circuit court’s denial of their motion for summary
disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (C)(8), in these consolidated cases alleging
gross negligence by the government defendants and a public building defect claim.1 We reverse.
Letonia Clark, next friend and mother of Kevyn Clark, alleged that Kevyn was sexually
assaulted on February 16, 1998, when he was eight years old and a patient at an inpatient
juvenile psychiatric facility operated by the Michigan Department of Community Health, the
Hawthorn Center. Neil Wasserman is the director and CEO of the Hawthorn Center. Defendant
Harry Hicks is the child care worker on shift in Kevyn’s living area at the Hawthorn Center at
the time of the incident. Juan McCray, twelve years old at the time, is the alleged perpetrator.
Tina McCray is Juan’s mother.
Defendants State of Michigan, Wasserman and Hicks filed a motion for summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (8). After the circuit court denied the motion,
defendants filed an application for leave to interlocutorily appeal. This Court granted leave
limited to the issues raised in defendants’ application and consolidated the cases.
I
Defendants argue that the circuit court improperly denied their motion for summary
disposition of plaintiff’s gross negligence claim with regard to the state and Wasserman. We
agree.
We review de novo the circuit court’s determination to deny summary disposition.
Brennan v Edward D Jones & Co, 245 Mich App 156, 157; 626 NW2d 917 (2001). On a motion
under MCR 2.116(C)(7) all well pleaded allegations are accepted as true unless contradicted by
affidavits or other appropriate documentation submitted by the movant. Patterson v Kleiman,
447 Mich 429, 433-434, 434 n 6; 526 NW2d 879 (1994). A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7)
should not be granted unless no factual development can provide a basis for recovery; however,
if the pleadings show that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, or if there is no
genuine issue of material fact, summary disposition is proper. Bgg nan, supra at 157.
Section 7 of the governmental tort liability act, § MCL 691.1401 et seq., states that
except as otherwise provided in the act “all governmental agencies shall be immune from tort
liability in all cases wherein the governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a
governmental function.” MCL 691.1407(1). The act defines “governmental agency” as meaning
the state or a political subdivision. MCL 691.1401(d). The term “governmental function” is to
be broadly construed, and the statutory exceptions narrowly construed. Kerbersky v Northern
Michigan University, 458 Mich 525, 529; 582 NW2d 828 (1998). Officers and employees of
1
Plaintiff filed suit in circuit court and the court of claims. The parties stipulated to joinder of
the cases.
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governmental agencies are not subject to immunity if their conduct amounts to “gross negligence
that is the proximate cause of the injury or damage.” MCL 691.1407(2). The statute defines
“gross negligence” as “conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for
whether an injury results.” MCL 691.1407(2)(c).
The Hawthorn Center, an in-patient facility operated by the Michigan Department of
Community Health, is immune from tort liability when engaged in a governmental function. See
MCL 691.1407(1) and (4)(b). There is no dispute that the Hawthorn Center was engaged in a
governmental function.
As the director of the Hawthorn Center, Wasserman is immune from tort liability unless
his conduct was grossly negligent. Plaintiff submitted documentary evidence in response to
defendants’ motion for summary disposition that in February 1998, when Kevyn was assaulted,
Wasserman was the director and CEO of the Hawthorn Center, was in charge of administering
the Center’s programs, all staff reported to him through intermediate supervision, and he was
responsible for the Center’s day to day operations. Wasserman testified at deposition that the
Center was licensed to hold 118 patients, and that in 1999 approximately 325 staff were
employed (mostly nursing staff, which includes child care workers). Wasserman testified that
the Center’s patients are generally aged four to eighteen, are referred by community mental
health offices, evaluated by in-house staff, and are assigned to living units “by age and sex
roughly.” There are six living areas. Five of the living units have twenty people, and one has
eighteen people. Each unit has from one to four bedrooms.
Wasserman testified that the admissions committee, of which he was not a member, made
the final determination regarding which patients are housed in what living area, and that he did
not participate in that process, or in the process of changing patients’ living situations.
Wasserman testified that he had no control over the placement of inpatients, did not review the
psychological assessments or intake of patients, and that the admissions committee, headed by a
clinical director, did so. He testified that he did not directly participate in the decisions regarding
patient placement in particular bedrooms within the living areas, and that treatment teams (the
ward psychiatrist, psychologist, social worker, and nursing staff) made those decisions.
Wasserman testified that he had no personal involvement in the individual placement of patients
at the Hawthorn Center, and that his responsibility for patient placement was one of
“periodically” being asked to give final approval to staff recommendations for general
assignments of patients to living areas. Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, Wasserman did not
testify that he was “aware of McCray’s criminal and violent propensities,” rather, he testified that
he had no idea about McCray’s assessment when he first came to Hawthorn Center, and had no
firsthand knowledge whatever regarding McCray.
Plaintiff submitted below an affidavit of an expert in behavior disorders opining that
Wasserman “knew or should have known before and during Juan McCray’s admission that he
was a juvenile who put himself and others at risk, including but not limited to sexual
aggression.” The affidavit further stated that “information drawn from Defendant McCray
during the admission process is replete with warnings about violence and sexual aggression,” and
that “Juan McCray’s behavior at the Hawthorn Center was consistently out of control; there was
a clear picture of a juvenile capable of predator behavior.” The affidavit stated that Wasserman,
as director of the Center, “should have heeded to these warnings,” and that his failure to act was
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“so reckless as to show a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results, gross
negligence.”
Contrary to plaintiff’s assertions, Wasserman testified that he did not participate in
patient placement decisions, but rather, that staff teams made those determinations. Given that
plaintiff presented no evidence that Wasserman participated in the decision to house Kevyn with
Juan, and other staff or staff teams were responsible for placing patients, we conclude that
plaintiff presented insufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact whether Wasserman’s
conduct was grossly negligent. Wasserman was thus immune.
As discussed above, the State is not directly liable because the Hawthorn Center was
engaged in a governmental function. The State can be vicariously liable for Wasserman’s
conduct only if Wasserman, during the course of his employment and within the scope of his
authority, committed a tort while engaged in an activity that is nongovernmental or proprietary,
or that falls within a statutory exception. Ross v Consumers Power (On Rehearing), 420 Mich
567, 625; 363 NW2d 641 (1984). Plaintiff does not contend that Wasserman was engaged in a
nongovernmental, or proprietary activity. The State and Wasserman should have been dismissed
under MCR 2.116(C)(7).
II
Relying on Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439; 613 NW2d 307 (2000), overruling Dedes
v Asch, 446 Mich 99, 107; 521 NW2d 488 (1994), defendants argue that the circuit court erred in
denying Harry Hicks’ motion for summary disposition with respect to plaintiff’s gross
negligence claim because Hicks’ alleged gross negligence was not the proximate cause of
plaintiff’s injuries. We agree.
Harry Hicks testified at deposition that he had been a child care worker at Hawthorn
Center for twenty-seven years. He testified that his general responsibilities were to direct care of
the children, including following the handling orders the doctors write, teaching them better
social skills and daily living behaviors, and role modeling. Hicks testified that he did not recall
any order being written up that Juan McCray was a high risk for sexual assault around February
1998. Hicks testified that the patients’ psychological assessments done at intake were kept in
patients’ records, but that he did not routinely or normally review them in their entirety, and he
could not remember any reason why he would necessarily do that. Hicks testified that he was
not aware that McCray was a high risk for sexual assault. He testified that in February 1998, the
ratio of child care workers to patients in his area was ten to two. Hicks testified that he was on
shift on February 16, 1998, from 3:00 pm to 11:00 p.m., and that the incident in question
occurred around 4:30 in the dorm room where Kevyn and Juan lived with two other persons.
Hicks testified that he was on a careful watch at the time, doing 15-minute checks on Juan
McCray, when he came upon the two boys in the dorm room, the door of which was open,
Kevyn was face down on the floor with his pants pulled down and buttocks exposed and Juan
was laying next to him on the floor. Hicks reported it to the nurse in charge of the living area
and may have reported it to the doctor on call. He separated the boys, took Kevyn to the nursing
office, and gave a statement to the police. Hicks testified that he was not sure why Juan had
been on careful watch.
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The affidavit of one of plaintiff’s experts, Dr. Lybarger, stated that Hicks “should have
known before and during McCray’s admission that he was a juvenile who put himself and others
at risk, including but not limited to sexual aggression,” and that Hicks’ “inappropriate
supervision was so reckless as to show a substantial lack of concern for whether injury results,
gross negligence.”
Assuming, arguendo, that Hicks’ conduct was grossly negligent, the Supreme Court in
Robinson, supra, held that the phrase “the proximate cause” in MCL 691.1407(2)(c) means that
the employee’s conduct amounting to gross negligence must have been “the one most immediate,
efficient, and direct cause of the injury or damage.” Robinson, supra at 459.
Plaintiff argues that Robinson does not apply because it is factually distinguishable and
involved motor vehicles, and that if Robinson does apply this Court should refuse to apply it and
follow the dissent in Robinson.2 Neither assertion has merit. The Robinson Court’s language
regarding the phrase “the proximate cause” in MCL 691.1407(2)(c), quoted supra, is not limited:
As to subsection (c), in Dedes, supra at 107, this Court effectively interpreted “the
proximate cause” in subsection (c) to mean “a proximate cause.” The Court
further explained that “the” proximate cause does not mean “sole” proximate
cause. Id. We overrule Dedes to the extent that it interpreted the phrase “the
proximate cause” in subdivision (c) to mean “a proximate cause.” The
Legislature’s use of the definite article “the” clearly evinces an intent to focus on
one cause. The phrase “the proximate cause” is best understood as meaning the
one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause preceding an injury.” [Robinson,
462 Mich at 458-459. Emphasis added.]
There is no indication, and plaintiff cites no authority in support of his argument, that the
Robinson Court’s holding regarding proximate cause applies only to cases involving police
chases and motor vehicles, as plaintiff argues. Further, this Court has no authority to opt to
apply the Robinson dissent.
On the record before us, the most immediate, efficient, and direct cause of plaintiff’s
injuries was Juan McCray’s alleged sexual assault on Kevyn. Thus, reversal is required under
Robinson, supra.
III
Defendants argue that the circuit court erred in denying their motion for summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) of plaintiff’s public building defect claim. We agree.
2
At argument, plaintiff asserted for the first time that Robinson should be applied prospectively
only. However, this argument is not preserved, and, even though a question of law, is not
properly before us. Plaintiff did not raise the prospective/retroactive issue in the circuit court,
and did not raise it in her brief on appeal. Nor did plaintiff file a supplemental brief.
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A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Maiden v
Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 119; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). All well pleaded factual allegations are
accepted as true, together with any inferences reasonably drawn therefrom. Id.
Statutory exceptions to governmental immunity are to be narrowly construed, including
the public building exception. Horace v Pontiac, 456 Mich 744, 749; 575 NW2d 762 (1998). In
order for the public building exception to governmental immunity to apply, the defect or
condition must be “of the building itself,” id. at 756, and the condition of the building must have
caused the injury. Reardon v Dep’t of Mental Health, 430 Mich 398, 410-411; 424 NW2d 248
(1988).
Plaintiff’s second-amended complaint alleged that the Hawthorn Center was a defective
building for “failure to have proper residencies for persons such as Defendant Juan McCray;”
“failure to have proper observation for dangerous behavior that would cause harm to others, such
as complained of;” and “failure to have any type of observation and/or monitoring devices for
the residence rooms.” Assuming that plaintiff pleaded a dangerous or defective condition in the
building itself, plaintiff did not plead or present evidence to show that such a condition caused
Kevyn’s injury. Reardon, supra. Plaintiff’s public building exception claim should have been
dismissed.
Reversed.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Helene N. White
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