PEOPLE OF MI V AARON W ADAMS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 28, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 231244
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 99-011559
AARON W. ADAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Kelly, P.J., and Murphy and Murray, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted of felonious assault, MCL 750.82, possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b, and reckless use of a firearm, MCL
752.863a. He was sentenced as a second habitual offender, MCL 769.10, to concurrent prison
terms of twenty-one months to six years for the felonious assault conviction and ninety days to
three months for the reckless use of a firearm conviction, to be served consecutive to a two-year
term for the felony-firearm conviction. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
On October 17, 1999, Billie Sue London, the thirty-six-year-old victim, was driving in
her Ford Explorer. She was crying because she learned that her previous boyfriend had a new
girlfriend. At some point, she pulled off the highway and into the parking lot of a trucking
business. She sat in her car and continued to cry. Defendant, who worked at the trucking
company, noticed the victim’s Explorer in the parking lot and approached. He attempted to talk
to the victim for several minutes. Eventually, she conversed with him. Defendant appeared to
have good intentions, and he asked her if she would like to go somewhere to talk. With the
victim’s permission, defendant entered her vehicle. She allowed him to drive. They first
stopped at a liquor store and bought gin. They then went to the home of defendant’s uncle.
The victim testified that she met defendant’s uncle and sister at the house. They were
friendly to her. The victim and defendant stayed at the home for twenty to thirty minutes. The
victim testified that she did not cuddle up to defendant while there. She also testified that she did
not drink alcohol while there. She further claimed that she only consumed two alcoholic drinks
the entire evening. According to defendant’s uncle, defendant’s nephew and defendant’s cousin,
who were all present at the uncle’s home, the victim consumed alcohol in front of them and
cuddled with or rubbed defendant. Defendant’s relatives testified that defendant did not drink
any alcohol at his uncle’s house, although it appeared that he consumed alcohol before arriving.
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The victim testified that after she and defendant left his uncle’s house, they went to
defendant’s home, which was undergoing renovation. The victim noticed a rifle by the door
when she first entered the house. Defendant explained that he kept the rifle for protection. The
victim, while disturbed by the presence of the rifle, did not leave. She looked through the whole
house. She testified that it was obvious that the house was in the midst of renovation. At some
point, defendant called and ordered a pizza. When he left to pick it up, the victim went to the
upstairs bedroom, which was the only furnished room. She watched television.
When defendant returned with the pizza, they ate it in the bedroom and watched
television. The victim testified that ten or fifteen minutes after they started eating, defendant
exited the bedroom to go to the bathroom. When he returned, he slammed the door to the
bedroom and turned out the lights. He ripped his clothes off and shouted obscenities at her,
indicating that he was going to “f***” her. The victim testified that she was scared. When she
tried to stand up from the floor, he grabbed her sweat pants and pulled them, along with her
underwear, down to her knees. She fell to the floor, thinking defendant was going to rape her.
Defendant was standing in front of her. He was naked and he threatened her. She could not
leave the room because the door was closed. The victim testified that in order to calm defendant,
she agreed to “do it” with him but first, she asked to go to the bathroom. When she tried to crawl
around defendant, he grabbed at her sweatshirt and yanked at it. She pulled away, stood up, and
ran to the window. While the window opened, there was a storm window inserted and thus, she
could not scream out for help. She turned to face defendant and kept screaming. The victim
testified that defendant did nothing more. He started eating his pizza again. She tried to leave
the bedroom but the door was locked. Defendant opened it for her. At that point, she noticed
that the rifle was leaning against the door. Defendant subsequently walked the victim downstairs
and let her out of the front door. He carried the gun with him.
The victim ran to her Explorer and jumped into it. She backed out of defendant’s
driveway. She decided to park in front of the house across the street because she noticed that the
porch light was illuminated. After parking, she ran to the door of the neighbor’s house and
banged on it, screaming for help. The neighbor, David Isabelli, eventually answered the door
and let the victim inside his house. He called the police for her.
The victim testified that after Isabelli telephoned the police, she sat down on his couch.
While sitting there, she heard gunshots come from the direction of defendant’s house. She was
scared. She thought defendant may point the gun at her through Isabelli’s windows. Therefore,
instead of waiting for the police, she ran back outside to her car. At that point, she noticed that
the back window was shattered. There were bullet holes in the front windshield. Defendant was
outside and she screamed at him, asking why he did this to her. Defendant walked down his
driveway, carrying the rifle. The victim testified that she heard a click. Defendant pointed the
gun at her1 and said, “bitch, if you don’t get out of here, I’ll kill you.” She felt threatened. She
managed to get into her car and drive away. As she did, she heard more gunshots.
1
At the preliminary examination, the victim testified that defendant shot the gun up in the air. In
her statement to the police, she indicated that she could not see if defendant was pointing the rifle
in her direction. She “felt” he was shooting at her.
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Isabelli testified that he reluctantly answered the door when he heard the victim
screaming for help. The victim was panic stricken and indicated that “he” tried to rape her.
Isabelli called the police and he also obtained the victim’s name, address and telephone number.
The victim sat on his couch and waited. While waiting, they heard two or three gunshots.
Isabelli testified that the victim was frightened and dove to the floor. After that, she decided not
to stay at Isabelli’s house. She left, indicating that she wanted to forget about “it.” Once outside,
the victim sat on the street curb. Isabelli testified that he did not see anyone outside and that he
yelled at the victim to go to the police. The victim walked to her vehicle. She subsequently
called to Isabelli to come and look at it because “he” had blown the windows out of it. Isabelli
did not go to look. He again told the victim to go to the police. Isabelli testified that the victim
was very upset. She went into the middle of the street and started screaming in the direction of
defendant’s house, asking why he did this to her. Isabelli watched a man exit defendant’s house.
The man said, “bitch, if you don’t shut up, I’m going to f***ing kill you.” There were two or
three more shots after that time. The shots came from the person who left defendant’s house.
The victim got into her vehicle and “hightailed” it out of the neighborhood.
The police eventually came to Isabelli’s house. While the police were talking to Isabelli,
defendant exited his house and walked to a taxicab that had pulled up in front. Isabelli pointed
defendant out to the officers. One of the officers testified that defendant was carrying a loaded,
.22 caliber rifle as he walked to the taxicab. He was carrying it at his side, trying to conceal it.
He was walking casually. Defendant was arrested. While he smelled of intoxicants, he spoke
clearly to the officers. He was cooperative and not hostile. He had a little bottle of whiskey in
his possession.
The victim did not go to the police that evening or the following day. She testified that
she did not do so because the crime was already reported and because she was too scared to do
anything more. On Sunday, October 19, 1999, the police contacted her. She thereafter made a
full statement to the police. The victim denied telling the police that she met defendant at a
party, was intoxicated, and asked defendant to drive her home. Investigator Brenda Stevenson
testified that when she first spoke to the victim on the telephone, the victim indicated that she
met defendant at a party, that she was very intoxicated, and that she asked defendant to drive her
home.
The jury acquitted defendant of a charge of assault with intent to commit criminal sexual
penetration, MCL 750.520g(1). They convicted defendant, however, of felonious assault,
reckless use of a firearm, and felony-firearm.
I
Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding similar acts
evidence that the victim previously made false charges against other men. The trial court ruled
that the evidence was inadmissible propensity evidence and that any probative value it may have
was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The admission of similar acts evidence pursuant to
MRE 404(b) is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Knapp, 244 Mich App 361, 378;
624 NW2d 227 (2001).
If an error is found, defendant has the burden of establishing that, more
probably than not, a miscarriage of justice occurred because of the error. No
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reversal is required for a preserved, nonconstitutional error "unless after an
examination of the entire cause, it shall affirmatively appear that it is more
probable than not that the error was outcome determinative." [Id., citing People v
Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495-496; 596 NW2d 607 (1999).]
MRE 404(b) is not limited to the admission of evidence of a criminal defendant’s other
wrongs or bad acts but, by its clear language, it encompasses the acts of any person, including
the victim. People v Rockwell, 188 Mich App 405, 409-410; 470 NW2d 673 (1991).
Pursuant to MRE 404(b), evidence of other crimes or wrongs "is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith." However, other acts evidence may be admissible "for
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, scheme,
plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident when the same is material." MRE 404(b). Other acts evidence must be
offered for a proper purpose under the rule, the evidence must be relevant, and its
probative value must not be substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.
[Knapp, supra at 378-379, citing People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 55; 508
NW2d 114 (1993), amended 445 Mich 1205 (1994).]
It is insufficient for the proponent of the evidence to merely recite one of the purposes
articulated in MRE 404(b). People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 387; 582 NW2d 785 (1998). The
proponent must also explain how the evidence relates to the recited purposes. Id.
Relevance is a relationship between the evidence and a material fact at
issue that must be demonstrated by reasonable inferences that make a material
fact at issue more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
. . . The logical relationship between the proffered evidence and the ultimate fact
sought to be proven must be closely scrutinized. [Id. at 387-388 (citation
omitted).]
In this case, defendant wanted to admit evidence that the victim had previously accused
another man of breaking out her car window. Defendant indicated that the man was willing to
testify that the victim’s accusation was false and that he obtained a personal protection order
against the victim. In addition, defendant wanted to admit evidence that the victim previously
obtained a personal protection order against another man for threatening and harassing her.
Defendant argued a laundry list of reasons for admitting the evidence under MRE 404b,
specifically that the evidence was being offered to show “her overall scheme, plan, system and
motive, absence of mistake or accident.” Defendant argued that the victim was always
perceiving that men were trying to hurt and kill her and that she is therefore likely to mislead and
distort.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the similar acts evidence. First,
defendant merely recited a laundry list of reasons under MRE 404(b). He has not demonstrated,
either in the trial court or this Court, that the evidence had any logical relevance except with
respect to the prohibited argument that, because the victim had falsely accused in the past, she
must be doing so in this case, i.e., that the character of the victim was such that she made false
accusations against men before and that, acting in conformity with that trait, her accusations in
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this case must be false. This is improper propensity evidence under MRE 404(b). Not only did
defendant fail to articulate a proper purpose or demonstrate logical relevance, he fails to
acknowledge that there was a severe potential for unfair prejudice if the evidence was admitted.
The trial court properly recognized that the evidence sought by defendant was improper,
prejudicial propensity evidence. Its exclusion was not an abuse of discretion.
We further note that even if there was an abuse of discretion, reversal would not be
warranted. It cannot be said that any error with respect to the evidence was, more probably than
not, outcome determinative. Lukity, supra at 495-496. Defendant was acquitted of the charge of
assault with intent to commit criminal sexual penetration. He was convicted only of the assault
charges related to the gun. The victim’s testimony alone did not support the conviction on the
charges related to the use of the rifle. The victim’s testimony was corroborated by Isabelli, who
saw a man exit defendant’s house, heard the man threaten to kill the victim if she did not shut up,
and heard shots following the threat.
II
Defendant next argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue a defense of
voluntary intoxication. Our review of the ineffective assistance claim is limited to errors
apparent on the record because no Ginther2 hearing was held. People v Williams, 223 Mich App
409, 414; 566 NW2d 649 (1997). In order to prevail on a claim that counsel was ineffective, a
defendant must show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and that, but for defense counsel’s errors, there was a reasonable probability that
the result of the proceeding would have been different. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687688; 521 NW2d 577 (1994). The defendant must overcome the presumption that the challenged
action might be considered sound trial strategy. People v Tommolino, 187 Mich App 14, 17; 466
NW2d 315 (1991).
[A] diminished capacity defense, such as voluntary intoxication, is only
available where it is shown that a defendant's impairment rendered him unable to
formulate the specific intent to commit a crime. It is not available where
testimony establishes only that a defendant could not fully appreciate the
consequences of his actions. [People v Flaherty, 165 Mich App 113, 123-124;
418 NW2d 695 (1987) (citation omitted).]3
2
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
3
We note that our Supreme Court has recently rejected the “diminished capacity” defense in the
context of a defense based on mental impairment. People v Carpenter, 464 Mich 223, 241; 627
NW2d 276 (2001). The Carpenter Court stated:
The Legislature has enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme setting forth the
requirements for and the effects of asserting a defense based on either mental
illness or mental retardation. We conclude that, in so doing, the Legislature has
signified its intent not to allow evidence of a defendant’s lack of mental capacity
short of legal insanity to avoid or reduce criminal responsibility by negating
specific intent. Rather, the insanity defense as established by the Legislature is
(continued…)
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In this case, the victim testified that she did not know how much alcohol defendant
consumed. She speculated that he was acting crazy because of alcohol consumption but she did
not know. She also did not recall seeing him with a pint of whiskey at any time. Defendant’s
relatives testified that they did not see defendant drinking alcohol while at his uncle’s home. The
victim’s nephew specifically testified that defendant was not intoxicated. Further, defendant’s
uncle testified that, while it appeared that defendant had consumed a few drinks, he was not
drunk. There was no testimony that defendant drank alcohol at his uncle’s house or at any point
thereafter before the commission of the crime. When the police arrested defendant, after the
crime, he smelled of intoxicants, and he had a whiskey bottle with him. However, he spoke
clearly to the police and was cooperative. Under the circumstances, it is not apparent from the
record that defendant was so intoxicated that he could not form the requisite intent to commit the
felonious assault. Therefore, counsel’s decision not to pursue the defense was not objectively
unreasonable.
Counsel chose to argue for acquittal on the felonious assault charge by discrediting the
victim’s testimony that defendant pointed the gun at her. Counsel was successful in eliciting that
plaintiff gave contradictory testimony on this point at trial, at the preliminary examination and in
her statement to police. In her closing argument, defense counsel argued that the evidence did
not support that defendant pointed the gun at the victim and that, while he may have committed
the misdemeanor of reckless discharge of a firearm, he did not commit felonious assault. The
fact that the strategy chosen by defense counsel did not work does not constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel. People v Williams, 240 Mich App 316, 332; 614 NW2d 647 (2000).
Defendant cannot demonstrate that but for counsel’s failure to pursue the defense of voluntary
intoxication he would have been acquitted. Stanaway, supra at 687-688.
III
Defendant next asserts several allegations of prosecutorial misconduct. He argues that
the prosecutor denigrated and badgered the defense witnesses by asking them why they did not
tell their stories to the police before trial and by arguing that their testimony was fabricated.
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor improperly denigrated his witnesses’ knowledge of the
specific allegations and improperly asked one witness to comment on defendant’s truthfulness.
This Court reviews claims of prosecutorial misconduct case by case,
examining the remarks in context, to determine whether the defendant received a
fair and impartial trial. Concerning preserved issues of prosecutorial misconduct,
this Court evaluates the challenged conduct in context to determine if the
defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial. Where a defendant fails to object
to an alleged prosecutorial impropriety, the issue is reviewed for plain error.
(…continued)
the sole standard for determining criminal responsibility as it relates to mental
illness or retardation. [Id.]
The holding does not effect our decision today because here the defense is based on
intoxication, and regardless, we reject defendant’s argument on other grounds.
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Thus, to avoid forfeiture of the issue, defendant must demonstrate plain error that
affected his substantial rights, i.e., that affected the outcome of the proceedings.
[People v Kris Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 110; 631 NW2d 67 (2001) (citations
omitted).]
At trial, the prosecutor asked each of defendant’s three testifying relatives whether they
were aware of what occurred after the victim and defendant left the home of defendant’s uncle.
None of them knew what occurred because they were not present at or around defendant’s house
at the time of the crimes. Defense counsel did not object to this line of questioning. The
prosecutor also asked each of defendant’s three testifying relatives about the fact that they never
told their version of the events to the police before trial. Defendant objected to this line of
questioning. During closing argument, the prosecutor argued:
Or the family, Mr. Adams’ family, comes in here, no one knows squat
what goes on after they leave that house, they’re all drinking at the house, but
they’ve got this monumental evidence but they don’t tell the police. Why would
you tell the police? You don’t want to do that. You want to save it for the day of
trial and spring it on everybody because it didn’t happen.
***
Because it didn’t happen, they can’t testify. Matter of fact, they’re ready
to give their opinion right off the bat of what happened. Based on what?
During the course of this argument, defense counsel objected, indicating that the evidence
was not sprung on anyone and that the prosecution had access to the witnesses. The objection
was overruled. The prosecutor subsequently argued that defendant’s relatives fabricated their
testimony to protect defendant.
It was not improper for the prosecutor to question defendant’s relatives about why they
failed to come forward and tell the police their version of what occurred at the home of
defendant’s uncle. The witnesses’ testimony was designed to enhance defendant’s argument that
the victim was not credible, particularly with respect to her allegations of assault with intent to
commit criminal sexual conduct. The witnesses also tried to bolster defendant’s claim that the
victim wanted something from him, and that she fabricated the allegations when she did not get
what she wanted. Toward this goal, defendant’s relatives testified that the victim was touching,
rubbing, and “necking with” defendant before they left his uncle’s house. It is settled that the
credibility of an alibi witness may be tested by questioning about why he failed to come forward
before trial with evidence that would assist the defendant. People v Phillips, 217 Mich App 489,
494-496; 552 NW2d 487 (1996). In Phillips, id. at 494, this Court agreed that information about
why a witness failed to come forward is helpful to assist the trier of fact in determining whether
the testimony is an accurate reflection of truth or whether it is a recent fabrication. Further, in
People v Smith, 149 Mich App 189, 192-193; 385 NW2d 654 (1986), this Court held that a
prosecutor may properly argue that a “witnesses' delay in reporting [] exculpatory information to
the police on behalf of defendant meant that the witnesses had an opportunity to coordinate their
stories.” While not alibi witnesses, the witnesses in this case knew that defendant, their relative,
had been charged with serious crimes, including assault with intent to commit criminal sexual
penetration. They saw defendant and the victim shortly before the alleged crimes occurred and
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they observed the victim’s demeanor. Yet, they never came forward to give the helpful
information to the police or prosecutor. We conclude that defendant was not denied a fair trial
because of the prosecutor’s questions, which assisted the jury in determining whether the
testimony was credible. Further, the prosecutor’s closing argument that the witnesses fabricated
their version of events was proper comment on the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be
drawn from it. In People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 282; 531 NW2d 659 (1995), the Court stated:
“[P]rosecutors are accorded great latitude regarding their arguments and
conduct.” They are “free to argue the evidence and all reasonable inferences from
the evidence as it relates to [their] theory of the case.” [Citations omitted;
alteration in original.]
A prosecutor is not required to state inferences or conclusions in the blandest terms
possible. People v Launsburry, 217 Mich App 358, 361; 551 NW2d 460 (1996). He is allowed
to argue from the facts that a witness is not worthy of belief. Id.
We similarly find no misconduct in the prosecutor’s questioning of defendant’s relatives
about whether they had first-hand knowledge of the details of the alleged crimes or first-hand
knowledge of anything that occurred after the victim and defendant left the home of defendant’s
uncle. Defendant called his relatives as witnesses to try and demonstrate that the victim was not
truthful. Questioning the witnesses about what they actually knew about the events that led to
the charges was therefore appropriate. We further find that the record does not support that the
prosecutor unfairly badgered the witnesses. The questions about specific details were based on
the testimony already given by the victim. The jury had thus already heard the detailed
information and the prosecutor simply confirmed that the witnesses had no knowledge about it.
Defendant cannot demonstrate the existence of a plain error and, even if we accepted that the
questioning was improper, defendant cannot demonstrate that questioning the witnesses about
what they did not know affected the outcome of his trial. Thus, reversal is not required.
We also find no merit to defendant’s complaint that the prosecutor denigrated his female
cousin by asking her if she had a hard time hearing his question. Defense counsel objected when
the prosecutor asked the question, indicating that the witness had already answered it. Thus, the
issue is preserved. Nevertheless, we find that defendant was not denied a fair trial by the
question. The prosecutor asked the witness whether she had spoken to defendant. The witness
answered, “no.” The prosecutor followed up by asking if she had ever talked to him since his
arrest. The witness did not answer “yes” or “no” but rather, she began to explain. The
prosecutor interrupted and asked the question again. The witness indicated that she could not
answer. The prosecutor asked the question again, “[h]ave you talked to Aaron Adams since he
was arrested back on October of 1999?” Only then did the witness answer that she talked to
defendant after he got out of jail. The prosecutor next asked whether the witness and defendant
talked about the case. The witness gave a nonresponsive answer. The prosecutor needed to ask
the question a second time before the witness answered. The prosecutor followed up the answer
by asking if the witness told defendant that she recalled seeing the victim cuddling him at their
uncle’s home. After the witness gave a nonresponsive answer, the prosecutor asked the question
again and asked the witness if she had a hard time hearing the question. Given the witness’
argumentative and nonresponsive manner in answering the prosecutor’s questions, the question
at issue was appropriate. Defendant was not deprived of a fair or impartial trial because of the
isolated question.
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Defendant finally complains that the prosecutor improperly questioned his former
employer, asking the employer to comment on defendant’s truthfulness. The prosecutor asked
the witness whether he discussed the case with defendant and whether defendant gave
information about the case. The witness indicated that he and defendant had discussed the case.
The prosecutor subsequently inquired whether the witness knew if the information imparted by
defendant was true or was a lie; whether it was fact or fiction. The witness indicated that he had
no way of knowing what really occurred. The prosecutor did not ask the witness to comment on
defendant’s credibility. Rather, he attempted to determine if the witness had any first hand
knowledge of the events leading to the charges, and whether he could confirm the truth of
defendant’s statements. This was not improper. Even if we were to construe the question as
improperly soliciting comment on defendant’s credibility, we would find no error requiring
reversal based on this unpreserved issue.4 Defendant cannot and has not demonstrated that any
error with respect to the questioning affected the outcome of his trial. Indeed the witness did not
indicate that defendant was untruthful. He indicated that he did not know.
In sum, we have reviewed both the preserved and unpreserved allegations of
prosecutorial misconduct and found that defendant was not deprived of a fair trial.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
4
Although defense counsel objected to the line of questioning on the ground that it was outside
of the scope of her direct examination, she did not object on the ground now asserted on appeal.
An objection on one ground is insufficient to preserve an appellate attack on another ground.
People v Maleski, 220 Mich App 518, 523; 560 NW2d 71 (1996).
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