PEOPLE OF MI V ANTHONY O WRIGHT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 28, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 226743
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 99-006103
ANTHONY O. WRIGHT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and Gage and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317,
assault with intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent
prison terms of thirty to fifty years for the murder conviction and twenty to forty years for the
assault conviction, and a consecutive two-year term for the felony-firearm conviction.
Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm defendant’s convictions, but remand to allow the court
to state its reasons for departing from the sentencing guidelines’ recommended minimum
sentence ranges.
This case involved a drug-related killing. A dispute regarding drugs or the rental of an
apartment had occurred between defendant and Hayes Smith. On the evening of the crimes,
defendant, who had armed himself with a shotgun in advance, went to the nearby apartment
Smith shared and knocked on the door. When the door was answered, defendant walked in and
went directly to a bedroom where Smith and others were packaging drugs. Defendant shot
Smith, then pointed the gun at a woman in the room. John Cheatham, who also was present
inside the room, shot defendant with a handgun. Defendant then shot and killed Cheatham.
I
Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to read into
evidence the prior testimony of witness Terrie Lynn Patterson because the prosecutor had not
used due diligence to secure her presence at trial. The court found that the witness was
unavailable and that due diligence had been shown, and therefore permitted the prosecutor to use
Patterson’s preliminary examination testimony pursuant to MRE 804(b)(1).
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Although the prosecutor had earlier sought and received a material witness detainer that
imposed a bond on Patterson to assure her availability for testimony, we do not believe that this
fact put the prosecutor on notice that he must take extraordinary measures such as arrest and
detention to assure her availability. Patterson appeared and testified at the preliminary
examination. While she failed to appear at one pretrial hearing, she had not yet been served a
subpoena. Patterson honored the trial subpoena and appeared at an evidentiary hearing on the
first scheduled day of trial, although she did not return for additional trial dates. When a witness
voluntarily excludes herself from testifying at trial, it appears questionable whether due diligence
need be shown before the witness may be deemed unavailable. See People v Adams, 233 Mich
App 652, 659 n 5; 592 NW2d 794 (1999) (questioning whether MRE 804(a)(5) and its due
diligence standard apply when the prosecution procured the witness’ attendance for trial but she
left before testifying). Even assuming that the due diligence standard applies to this situation,
under the instant circumstances we find no clear error in the trial court’s determination that the
prosecutor employed due diligence, and we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
admission of Patterson’s prior testimony. People v Briseno, 211 Mich App 11, 14; 535 NW2d
559 (1995).
II
The trial court also permitted the use of preliminary examination testimony supplied by
shooting victim Smith, who died before trial. Defendant challenges the trial court’s admission of
the prior testimony on the basis that the preliminary examination magistrate restricted his cross
examination of Smith. Defendant suggests that these restrictions deprived him of his state and
federal right of confrontation.1 See Pointer v Texas, 380 US 400; 85 S Ct 1065; 13 L Ed 2d 923
(1965).
During the preliminary examination, defense counsel was twice interrupted during cross
examination of Smith. The court interrupted once when counsel questioned Smith about a
collateral matter, specifically when Smith had moved into a particular apartment unit within the
building where the shooting took place. The court’s second interruption occurred when defense
counsel inquired whether Smith had used any illegal substances on the evening of the shooting.
The answer to counsel’s question whether Smith had used drugs shortly before the shooting
clearly would have tended to affect Smith’s credibility with respect to his ability to perceive
events accurately. However, defense counsel did successfully inquire of Smith whether he had
consumed alcohol before the shooting, to which Smith responded negatively. As the court
observed, Smith had explained that he arrived home from a dialysis treatment within a half hour
before the shooting occurred. Defense counsel also was permitted before Smith himself testified
to inquire of Patterson whether Smith had partied with her on the day of the shooting, whether
Smith “had anything to drink in terms of alcohol,” and whether Smith was “using crack cocaine
on that day as far as” Patterson knew. Patterson denied that Smith had partied with her, and that
1
The federal constitution provides in relevant part, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .” US Const, Am
VI. In nearly identical language, the Michigan Constitution provides, “In every criminal
prosecution, the accused shall have the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him .
. . .” Const 1963, art 1, § 20.
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Smith ever used alcohol or illicit drugs. Accordingly, we conclude that neither interruption by
the court detracted from defense counsel’s ability to cross examine regarding the circumstances
of the offense or issues of Smith’s credibility.
Defendant argues that while the court’s interruptions of his questioning of Smith may not
themselves appear significant, they do not present the full picture. Defendant asserts that at the
preliminary examination the district court also restricted his cross examination of Patterson in a
manner that had a lingering effect on counsel’s manner of cross examining Smith. Defendant
suggests that his counsel had been rebuked so often during Patterson’s testimony that he did not
risk the wrath of the court by aggressively cross examining Smith.
We initially note that we do not find particularly persuasive defendant’s “chilling effect”
argument because we expect parties to build an adequate record from which to argue that their
constitutional rights have been violated. A defendant’s task on appeal becomes substantially
more difficult when he must rely on an indirect implication such as a “chilling effect” allegedly
carrying over from one witness’ testimony to another’s. We will nonetheless examine
defendant’s claim of a “chilling effect” in greater detail.
During counsel’s cross examination of Patterson, the district court prohibited counsel
from pursuing several lines of questioning. In response to objections by the prosecutor, the court
restricted counsel from inquiring whether the occupants of the shooting scene were legally
occupying the apartment or were “squatters;” whether Patterson had used cocaine two days
before the preliminary examination; and whether Patterson could characterize deceased victim
Cheatham’s condition due to drug or alcohol use on the evening of the shooting. In addition, the
court interrupted after defense counsel obtained Patterson’s concession that she had used cocaine
and alcohol on the day of the offense; after Patterson denied using other illegal substances, the
court precluded further questions about her use of illegal substances on the day of the killing.
The district court reminded counsel that it was conducting a probable cause hearing, and that
discovery was not a goal of the proceeding.
A preliminary examination is indeed a probable cause hearing, and appropriate limits can
be placed on examination or cross examination consistent with the purpose of the hearing. The
district court clearly was within its rights to restrict the testimony. However, the question here
becomes whether under the restrictions imposed the preliminary examination testimony is so
bare that it no longer serves as an adequate substitute for live testimony by a now unavailable
witness. While restrictions on cross examination at a preliminary examination may be proper,
they conceivably might also deprive the prosecutor of the ability to use the testimony in later
proceedings should any witness become unavailable.
We are mindful of both the district court’s legitimate need to focus on probable cause and
to avoid lengthy fishing expeditions, and the defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against
him even after they die or disappear. Under the circumstances of this case, we find no
constitutional violation. The district court’s admonition and restrictions on cross examination of
Patterson did not deny defendant his right to confront the witnesses against him. Three
restrictions during Patterson’s testimony arose from the prosecutor’s meritorious objections. If
asked at trial, those identical questions would have been excluded as irrelevant. The fourth
restriction came after defense counsel already had elicited from Patterson her use of cocaine and
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alcohol on the day of the offense, and her denial that she had used other illegal substances. Any
other questions on that specific point would have been repetitious.
Apart from these legitimate restrictions, defense counsel had ample opportunity to cross
examine Patterson about a variety of subjects.2 The record reflects that defense counsel’s cross
examinations of both Smith and Patterson occurred at length and involved many different
subjects. We cannot say that the restrictions on Patterson’s testimony chilled counsel’s cross
examination of Smith. Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not unduly limit pertinent
and fair cross examination.
III
Defendant next argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove the charged offense
of first-degree premeditated murder, and that the trial court erred in denying his motion for
directed verdict regarding this charge. Defendant explains that by allowing the first-degree
murder charge to go to the jury, the court opened the door to a compromise verdict for seconddegree murder.
To establish first-degree murder, the prosecutor must prove that the defendant
intentionally killed the victim and that the act was premeditated and deliberate. Premeditation
and deliberation may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the killing. People v
Wofford, 196 Mich App 275, 278; 492 NW2d 747 (1992). Defendant specifically challenges the
elements of premeditation and causation.
We agree with the prosecutor that premeditation may be inferred from the circumstances
of this case. Before confronting the victims, defendant armed himself with a shotgun. On
gaining entry into the apartment, he directly proceeded to the bedroom where he encountered
Smith—the man with whom he had a disagreement–-and two other persons. Apparently without
being threatened, defendant shot Smith, then pointed his weapon at a woman. Cheatham
2
This case appears similar in some respects to People v Martin #2, 21 Mich App 667; 176
NW2d 470 (1970). In Martin, the examining magistrate had requested counsel to bear in mind
that it was not conducting a trial and urged that only those questions essential to the issue of
probable cause be asked, although the court also stated that it would not preclude counsel from
asking more far reaching questions as part of “a full and complete cross-examination.” Id. at
670. Defense counsel asked two innocuous questions of one of the victims, and the defendant
later argued that his attorney had been forestalled from engaging in more vigorous cross
examination. Id. at 670-671. This Court disagreed, stating that the magistrate’s admonition did
not “taint” the proceedings, and that defense counsel apparently had other reasons for conducting
cursory cross examination. Id. at 676. This Court concluded that “[t]he remarks of the court
were no more than a concise statement of the law and a suggestion to expedite the proceedings.”
Id.
The examining magistrate in this case did not verbally invite counsel to engage in full
cross examination despite the admonition as did the magistrate in Martin, but the magistrate here
in fact permitted such cross examination to occur. Defense counsel did not limit himself to two
questions like counsel in Martin. Instead, cross examination occurred mainly uninterrupted, and
fills many transcript pages.
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grabbed a handgun and shot defendant, and defendant turned the shotgun on Cheatham and
killed him. Under these circumstances, we find that sufficient evidence of premeditation existed.
People v Anderson, 209 Mich App 527, 537-538; 531 NW2d 780 (1995).
Defendant further argues that causation was never shown because the medical examiner
did not identify a cause of death in his testimony. Defendant argues that the gunshot wound to
Cheatham’s thigh was not the cause of death, and suggests instead that death may have resulted
from the drugs in Cheatham’s system.
Although the medical examiner testified that the Cheatham had cocaine in his system, the
examiner could not determine when the cocaine had been ingested. The examiner described in
detail Cheatham’s entrance and exit wounds, which he characterized as showing “extensive
tissue destruction.” An eyewitness testified that after Cheatham was shot, he laid across a bed in
a puddle of blood, wheezing and fading in and out of consciousness. From this evidence, the
jury could reasonably infer that Cheatham’s death was caused by the gunshot wound, and not by
cocaine ingestion. Moreover, it is not always necessary for a medical examiner to identify a
cause of death. See People v Modelski, 164 Mich App 337; 416 NW2d 708 (1987) (upholding a
manslaughter conviction where no body was ever found).
IV
Defendant also asserts that insufficient evidence existed to sustain his conviction for
second-degree murder. The elements of second-degree murder are (1) a death, (2) caused by an
act of the defendant, (3) absent circumstances of justification, excuse or mitigation, (4) done with
an intent to kill, an intent to inflict great bodily harm, or an intent to create a very high risk of
death with the knowledge that the act probably would cause death or great bodily harm, i.e.,
malice. People v Bailey, 451 Mich 657; 549 NW2d 325, amended on other grounds 453 Mich
1204 (1996). Defendant specifically challenges the elements of malice and causation.
Because the proofs supported submission of the original first-degree murder charge to the
jury for reasons stated in part III of this opinion, we find that the proofs also supported
defendant’s conviction on the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder.
V
Defendant claims that several mistakes deprived him of the effective assistance of
counsel guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions.3 Defendant argues that counsel (1)
failed to adequately investigate and advance a theory of self defense, (2) failed to timely object
to a purported under representation of African-Americans on the jury, and (3) gave defendant
inadequate, coercive and misleading advice, which led him to waive his right to testify.
Defendant seeks a Ginther4 hearing where he can develop these arguments.
3
See US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20.
4
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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The right to counsel is not offended unless counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness and the defendant was so prejudiced that he was deprived of a fair
trial. People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 302-303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). Prejudice exists when
there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different
absent counsel’s errors. Pickens, supra at 312.
Defendant has not shown that his attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness. Furthermore, he also has not shown prejudice. Our review of the record
indicates that a different outcome would have been unlikely even if counsel had presented a self
defense theory. Defendant’s actions in initiating the fatal shootout make it unlikely that the jury
would have perceived him as a victim of Cheatham’s aggression.
Defendant’s claim regarding under representation of African-Americans on the jury has
no factual support whatsoever. Because defendant essentially provides only a bald suggestion
that African-Americans must have been systematically excluded from the jury array, we
conclude that his claim must fail. People v Flowers, 222 Mich App 732, 736-737; 565 NW2d 12
(1997). Accordingly, we cannot conclude that defense counsel unreasonably failed to object to
the alleged under representation of African-Americans.
For the reasons stated in part VI of this opinion, infra, we also reject defendant’s claim
that his counsel’s advice regarding his right to testify constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel.
VI
In addition to arguing that he received inadequate advice from counsel that resulted in a
waiver of his right to testify, defendant also contends that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing
regarding his waiver under Gonzalez v Elo, 972 F Supp 417 (ED Mich, 1997)5 so that he might
develop a record to substantiate that his waiver rested on inadequate advice. Defendant
specifically alleges that he did not know that he had an absolute right to testify or that the
ultimate choice whether to testify belonged to him.
We initially note that the evidentiary hearing conducted in Gonzalez was the type of
hearing specifically endorsed by the habeas corpus statute, 28 USC § 2254(d). Gonzalez, supra
at 419-421. The habeas corpus statute applies specifically to federal courts, not state courts. 28
USC § 2254(a). Because the present action is not a federal habeas corpus action, defendant’s
reliance on Gonzalez is misplaced.
Furthermore, the record does not support defendant’s allegation that he was improperly
advised. After the prosecutor rested, the following was placed on the record:
5
In the federal district court opinion appearing at 972 F Supp 417, the court ordered an
evidentiary hearing into the petitioner’s allegation that he had been given improper advice
regarding his right to testify. After the hearing was conducted, the district court determined that
the petitioner had not been denied the effective assistance of counsel. That decision was upheld
in Gonzalez v Elo, 233 F3d 348 (CA 6, 2000).
-6-
Defense Counsel: The other issue I would like to address is I have had an
opportunity to discuss on numerous occasions with my client Mr. Wright, the
aspect of him testifying in his case. Mr. Wright understands two things, No. 1, he
has the right to testify if he so chooses. He also understands that the law does not
require him to testify. Mr. Wright has indicated to me that he does not wish to
testify in this matter. So I wanted to place that on the record. Mr. Wright, can
you hear me okay?
Defendant: Yes.
Defense Counsel: You understand that you have the right to testify on
your own behalf in this case, correct?
Defendant: Correct.
Defense Counsel: You also understand you do not have to testify and that
cannot be held against you, correct?
Defendant: Correct.
Defense Counsel: Is it your desire to testify or not testify on your own
behalf?
Defendant: Not to testify.
This colloquy demonstrates that defendant was informed that he had a right to testify, and that
his desire was specifically elicited. If defendant was advised against testifying, we can find no
fault in that trial strategy, a position endorsed by the Sixth Circuit when it ultimately found in the
Gonzalez case that the prisoner there had not been denied the effective assistance of counsel.
Gonzalez v Elo, 233 F3d 348, 356-357 (CA 6, 2000).
We additionally note that the Sixth Circuit in Gonzalez observed that a defendant who
disagrees with counsel’s advice must at least advise the trial court of his wish to testify or that a
disagreement with defense counsel has arisen concerning whether the defendant should testify.
Id. at 357. Defendant did not so alert the trial court, and we find nothing in the record that would
have alerted the trial court, or which raises alarm in this Court, to support further inquiry into the
circumstances that led defendant to waive his right to testify on his own behalf.
VII
Defendant next urges that even if none of the alleged errors standing alone entitles him to
a new trial, the cumulative effect of those errors warrants a new trial. Because we find no errors,
however, we also find no cumulative effect. People v Sawyer, 215 Mich App 183, 197; 545
NW2d 6 (1996).
VIII
Defendant lastly challenges the sentences for both his convictions. The trial court
sentenced defendant to thirty to fifty years’ imprisonment for the second-degree murder
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conviction, which sentence exceeded the guidelines’ recommended minimum range of fifteen to
twenty-five years, and to twenty to forty years’ imprisonment for assault with intent to murder
conviction, which exceeded the guidelines’ recommended minimum range of 135 to 225 months.
Defendant and the prosecutor both suggest on appeal that the trial court failed to
articulate sufficient substantial and compelling reasons for exceeding the guidelines’ ranges,
contrary to MCL 769.34(3). After reviewing the vague reasons for departure proffered by the
trial court, which appear to have been already taken into account within the calculation of the
guidelines’ ranges,6 MCL 769.34(3)(b), we agree that it is appropriate to remand this case for
further articulation of the court’s objective and verifiable reasons for departure from the
guidelines’ ranges. People v Babcock, 244 Mich App 64, 74-75; 624 NW2d 479 (2000).
We affirm defendant’s convictions and remand for further articulation of the trial court’s
reasons for exceeding the sentencing guidelines. We retain jurisdiction. People v Pena, 457
Mich 885; 586 NW2d 925 (1998).
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
6
The trial court explained its basis for departure as follows:
The sentence guidelines in your case are considerably very low, 15 to 25
years on the minimum on second degree murder, and considering your action and
considering the totality of the case, and how it had affected the family [of the
victim], and what you did, the court is going to exceed the guidelines by a small
amount, and sentence you to 30 to 50 on Count I, second degree murder.
The court is going to sentence you to 20 to 40 on Count 2, assault with
intent to commit murder; just two years over the guidelines. And those two
sentences are concurrent to each other.
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