PEOPLE OF MI V TIMOTHY TERRY HAMILTON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 14, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 231965
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 00-172565-FH
TIMOTHY TERRY HAMILTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Kelly, P.J., and Murphy and Murray, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right following his jury trial conviction for assault with intent to
do great bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84. Defendant was sentenced as a third
habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to 12 ½ to 20 years’ imprisonment. We affirm defendant’s
conviction but vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing.
I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant was charged with assaulting his girlfriend in her apartment that she had shared
with defendant. The victim was brutally beaten on or about February 28, 2000, and she
sustained multiple trauma, including a closed head injury with multiple intracranial contusions
and a large subdural hematoma. The victim required brain surgery, and she initially was not
expected to live; however, after a lengthy hospital stay she recovered. The victim’s injuries have
left her unable to live independently. During the course of the victim’s medical treatment, the
treating doctor learned that the victim was an IV drug user and a heavy drinker. Defendant did
not challenge the claim that the victim was beaten and suffered serious injuries, but defendant
denied being the perpetrator.
At the first preliminary examination, the case was dismissed by the district court on the
basis that there was a lack of probable cause that defendant was the perpetrator. Shortly
thereafter, the prosecutor reinstated the charges against defendant. At the second preliminary
examination, defendant was bound over for trial after the prosecutor presented new evidence of
defendant’s guilt. The new evidence came in the form of testimony from defendant’s cellmate,
who testified that defendant admitted assaulting the victim. At the preliminary examination, the
cellmate admitted to drug use and to having an extensive criminal history.
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Defendant claimed he discovered the victim’s near lifeless body after letting himself into
her apartment with his keys. Defendant asserted to an officer that he used to live at the
apartment but had recently moved out because he was having frequent arguments with the
victim. Defendant stated that they remained friends after he moved out, and that he would often
stop at the apartment to give her cigarettes and pick up his mail. After defendant called 911, he
allowed a police officer into the apartment, which was in disarray and, according to the officer, it
appeared as though a fight had taken place. To enter the victim’s apartment, it was necessary to
go through two secured doors and one unsecured door. There were no signs of forced entry.
Paramedics found the victim on the bedroom floor with a dresser on her head, and she
was unconscious but breathing. The victim had bruises on her arms, legs, and face, and she was
dehydrated. Paramedics suspected that the injuries had been inflicted one or two days earlier.
Defendant claimed that he and the victim had not fought on the day of the crime, and defendant
was unaware of any individuals who would have reason to assault the victim.
The officer who responded to defendant’s 911 call testified that defendant did not have
any visible bruises or blood, nor did he appear to have been in a fight. According to the officer,
defendant was cooperative, and defendant explained that he had gone to the victim’s apartment
to give her cigarettes and pick up his mail when he discovered her body.
A neighbor in the apartment building testified that on the day the victim was found, or
possibly the day before, she heard the victim arguing with a male. The neighbor testified that the
male voice was one she had heard arguing with the victim in the past, but she could not say
definitively that the voice was defendant’s. The neighbor did not see defendant in the apartment
building on the day the victim was found or the day before. An acquaintance of the victim and
defendant testified that defendant had moved out of the building but continued to visit the victim,
and that he had never seen the victim with any other male besides defendant.
Defendant sought to present the testimony of a friend of the victim who was supposedly
prepared to testify that the victim had contacted her around the time of the crime, and the victim
stated that she felt threatened by a male that she had met in a bar located in the apartment
complex. The trial court ruled that defendant could present the evidence, but the prosecutor
could then pursue questioning of the victim regarding her fear of defendant around the time of
the assault. Defendant declined to pursue the questioning of the victim’s friend regarding the
matter according to defendant’s appellate brief. The victim’s friend was assisting the victim in
alcohol abuse rehabilitation, but according to the friend, the victim was still abusing alcohol at
the time of the offense. The friend did testify that the victim had once felt threatened by a
woman who told the victim that she would have her boyfriend beat her up because the victim had
touched her car. The friend also testified that the victim had shown her an unsigned letter
threatening the victim. The friend did acknowledge that she was aware of problems between
defendant and the victim.
The victim was able to testify, and she stated that her and defendant had been friends and
lovers for about four years. The victim further testified that defendant had lived with her and had
keys, and that three keys were needed to get through various doors before entry into the
apartment unit. The victim stated that after she awoke in the hospital, her first thought was
wondering why defendant assaulted her. However, she had no recollection of the assault and
how she was injured, but the victim did recall her last memory was defendant coming into the
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apartment. The victim testified that she had no other boyfriends and no enemies. The victim
denied meeting a man in the apartment bar and bringing him to her apartment. The victim
testified that she and defendant were still a couple at the time of the assault, and that defendant
would stop at her apartment on almost a daily basis, bringing her a newspaper and cigarettes.
She testified that the couple frequently argued about defendant’s work and his personal life. The
victim asserted that defendant was a terrible liar, and that she wondered whether he was seeing
another woman.
The victim also testified that she did not recall arguing with defendant on the day of the
assault. The victim, who admitted being a problem drinker earlier in her life, stated that she
never drank at the apartment bar, and she had no recollection of contacting her friend on the day
of the assault to talk about being afraid of anyone.
An employee at the bar testified that the victim came by often for coffee, but she did not
recall the victim being at the bar around the time of the offense. Another bar employee testified
that the victim would, at times, come to the bar to drink, and on occasion she was already drunk
when she arrived at the bar.
Defendant’s cellmate testified that defendant stated that he had beaten up his girlfriend
when he was high on drugs. A detective had approached the cellmate to inquire about any
statements made by defendant. The cellmate testified that he did not ask for anything, nor was
he promised anything, for his testimony. However, the cellmate admitted that he expected some
consideration, and that the detective who had approached him sent a letter to the cellmate’s
sentencing judge and also met with the judge and the cellmate’s attorney, and he was sentenced
to a one-year minimum as opposed to the two-year minimum as recommended by probation
officials.1 The cellmate testified that the detective stated that he would assist him after the
cellmate had already stated that defendant confessed to the crime.
The detective who approached the cellmate testified that he was the live-in manager of
the apartment complex where the crime occurred, and he knew both defendant and the victim.
The detective testified that after the district court initially dismissed the action, the prosecutor
suggested that he talk to defendant’s cellmates. The detective also testified that he interviewed
the victim at the hospital on March 13, 2000, and she shook her head indicating that defendant
had not assaulted her. The victim asserts no recollection of the interview. On March 29, 2000,
the victim physically indicated to the detective that defendant had assaulted her.
The jury convicted defendant, and he was sentenced to a minimum term that was three
years above the legislative guidelines.
1
The evidence is unclear regarding the detective’s recommendation and the cellmate’s actual
sentence because the detective testified that the cellmate subsequently sought a sentence that
would put him in prison because county jail time was “dead time.” The cellmate was in prison at
the time he testified at defendant’s trial.
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II. ANALYSIS
A
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in its ruling concerning the testimony of
the victim’s friend regarding an alleged phone call from the victim that she felt threatened by
another male whom she had met in the apartment bar. Defendant claims that the trial court erred
in ruling that the testimony could be introduced, but only if the prosecutor could then introduce
evidence that the victim was generally fearful of defendant around the time of the assault.
Defendant asserts that the trial court’s actions deprived him of his right to present evidence in his
defense.
This Court reviews decisions regarding the admission of evidence for an abuse of
discretion; however, where those decisions involve preliminary questions of law, e.g.,
application of a rule of evidence, review is de novo. People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 488; 596
NW2d 607 (1999). Despite the fact that the evidence is clearly relevant and admissible pursuant
to MRE 401-403, defendant’s argument lacks merit.
On cross-examination of the victim, defense counsel specifically asked if she recalled
calling her friend on the day in question to tell her that she was afraid of someone other than
defendant. The victim responded that she may have spoken with her friend on that day, but she
simply could not recall; however, the victim definitively stated that the only person she was
afraid of was defendant. Defendant therefore elicited the very testimony that supposedly
prevented him from pursuing the questioning of the victim’s friend; i.e., that she was fearful of
defendant. More importantly, the friend subsequently testified as part of defendant’s case as
follows on direct examination:
Q. The, the threat that occurred, was that individual, did [the victim] indicate to
you if that was somebody from the bar, that she was afraid of somebody from
the bar, if you recall?
A. I don’t recall.
Therefore, contrary to defendant’s argument, counsel did question the friend about the
victim being threatened by someone in the bar other than defendant. Accordingly, there was no
abuse of discretion.
B
Defendant next argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to question the cellmate
about his drug addiction history, which, had the inquiry been made, would have allowed for a
cautionary instruction regarding addict informers, CJI2d 5.7. Defendant argues that the
cellmate’s testimony was crucial to the prosecution; therefore, it was vital that counsel fully
impeach the credibility of the cellmate. Defendant cites a portion of the transcript of the
preliminary examination in which the cellmate admitted to heroin and cocaine use.
Allegations pertaining to ineffective assistance of counsel must first be heard by the trial
court to establish a record of the facts pertaining to such allegations. People v Ginther, 390 Mich
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436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). In cases such as this, where a Ginther hearing has not been
held, our review is limited to mistakes apparent on the record. People v Sabin (On Second
Remand), 242 Mich App 656, 659; 620 NW2d 19 (2000).
In People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298; 521 NW2d 797 (1994), our Supreme Court adopted a
two-pronged test for determining whether a defendant has been denied effective assistance of
counsel as set forth in Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674
(1984). In order to establish that defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel was violated
and that this violation is sufficient to justify reversal of an otherwise valid conviction, defendant
must show that: (1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,
and (2) the representation so prejudiced the defendant as to deprive him of a fair trial. Pickens,
supra at 302-303. To demonstrate prejudice, the defendant must show that, but for counsel’s
error, the result of the proceedings would have been different. People v Henry, 239 Mich App
140, 146; 607 NW2d 767 (1999).
Defendant’s argument lacks merit. We first note that defense counsel did in fact question
the cellmate at trial as to whether he used illegal drugs. However, the cellmate denied using
drugs, and defense counsel did not attempt to impeach the cellmate with his preliminary
examination testimony. Regardless, on cross-examination, the cellmate admitted that he sold
drugs, that he had juvenile convictions, that he went to prison for possession with intent to
deliver cocaine, that he had convictions for larceny, receiving and concealing stolen goods,
unlawful use of a credit card, retail fraud, and armed robbery, and that he received consideration
for his testimony.
In light of defense counsel’s aggressive cross-examination, which clearly showed that the
cellmate was of questionable character, we cannot say that counsel’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness by the failure to follow up on the negative responses
concerning drug use. Moreover, for the same reason, we cannot conclude that but for counsel’s
failure to reference the preliminary examination testimony, the result of the proceedings would
have been different.
As to the addict-informer instruction, even if the preliminary examination testimony
established that the cellmate was a drug addict in the past, defendant cites no evidence that the
cellmate was using drugs at the time of the jailhouse confession. In People v Griffin, 235 Mich
App 27, 40-41; 597 NW2d 176 (1999), this Court, rejecting a challenge to the trial court’s
refusal to give the addict-informer instruction, stated that “[a]lthough this evidence may raise
some suspicions concerning the informant’s drug habits over the recent past, it falls short of
clearly indicating that he was an addict at the time in question.” Emphasis added. Accordingly,
the instruction was not applicable here even had the preliminary examination evidence been
elicited. Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury as follows regarding their consideration of
witness testimony in general:
Does the witness have any bias, prejudice or personal interest in how this
case is decided. Have there been any promises, threats, suggestions or other
influences that affected how the witness testified.
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Based on the testimony actually elicited by defense counsel on cross-examination of the
cellmate, the above instruction clearly made the jury cognizant of the need to at least question
the credibility of the cellmate.
C
Defendant finally argues that the trial court erred in sentencing him outside the statutory
guidelines without substantial and compelling reasons to do so as required by MCL 769.34. The
statutory guidelines called for a minimum sentence of 38 to 114 months, and the trial court
sentenced defendant to a minimum term of 150 months. The court stated the following reasons
for its departure from the guidelines:
The Court is departing upward because of the seriousness of the offense[,
and] [b]ecause of the brutality with which this assault was accomplished.
This could have easily, was moments away from being a death and the victim
now lives in an adult living arrangement. She no longer has any independence
because of your assault of her.
Defendant specifically argues that the trial court’s departure was error because the
reasons cited by the court were already considered in the scoring variables, without a finding that
those variables were not accorded adequate weight, and because the court’s nebulous
representation that the seriousness of the offense warranted an upward departure was neither
objective, nor verifiable. The prosecutor argues that the brutality of the assault and the severe
resultant injuries are objective and verifiable and constitute substantial and compelling reasons to
depart from the guidelines.
Under the legislative sentencing guidelines, which are applicable here, courts are
required, in most instances, to impose a minimum sentence within the appropriate sentence range
pursuant to MCL 769.34(2).2 People v Babcock, 244 Mich App 64, 72; 624 NW2d 479 (2000).
MCL 769.34(3) provides the following exception:
A court may depart from the appropriate sentence range established under
the sentencing guidelines . . . if the court has a substantial and compelling reason
for that departure and states on the record the reasons for departure. All of the
following apply to a departure:
2
MCL 769.34(2) provides, in part, as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection or for a departure from the
appropriate minimum sentence range provided for under subsection (3), the
minimum sentence imposed by a court of this state for a felony enumerated in part
2 of chapter XVII committed on or after January 1, 1999 shall be within the
appropriate sentence range under the version of those sentencing guidelines in
effect on the date the crime was committed.
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(a) The court shall not use an individual’s gender, race, ethnicity, alienage,
national origin, legal occupation, lack of employment, representation by
appointed legal counsel, representation by retained legal counsel, appearance in
propria persona, or religion to depart from the appropriate sentence range.
(b) The court shall not base a departure on an offense characteristic or
offender characteristic already taken into account in determining the appropriate
sentence range unless the court finds from the facts contained in the court record,
including the presentence investigation report, that the characteristic has been
given inadequate or disproportionate weight.
The Babcock panel noted that MCL 769.34(11)3 requires this Court to reverse and
remand where there are not substantial and compelling reasons for a departure from the
guidelines. Babcock, supra at 73-74. In defining what constituted “substantial and compelling
reasons,” this Court applied the language from People v Fields, 448 Mich 58; 528 NW2d 176
(1995), wherein our Supreme Court defined identical language found in the controlled
substances act. Babcock, supra at 74-75. The Babcock panel, relying on Fields, supra at 67-68,
stated that substantial and compelling reasons only exist in exceptional cases, and that the
reasons justifying departure should keenly or irresistibly grab the court’s attention and be
recognized as having considerable worth in determining the length of a sentence. Babcock,
supra at 75. The factors relied on by a trial court in determining whether there substantial and
compelling reasons for departure must be objective and verifiable. Id.
The existence of a particular factor is a factual determination for the sentencing court to
determine and is reviewed for clear error. Id. at 75-76. Whether a particular factor is objective
and verifiable is reviewed as a matter of law. Id. at 76. A trial court’s determination that the
objective and verifiable factors constitute substantial and compelling reasons to depart from the
guidelines is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id.
Here, we first note that the factors considered by the trial court, the brutality of the assault
and the severe injuries, are objective and verifiable, finding support in the record. We must next
consider whether the factors are already accounted for in the scoring variables. Offense variable
three (OV 3) provides for a score of twenty-five points, which the variable was scored at in the
present case, where a “[l]ife threatening or permanent incapacitating injury occurred to a victim.”
MCL 777.33(1)(c). Offense variable seven (OV 7) provides for a score of fifty points, which the
variable was scored at in the present case, where “[a] victim was treated with terrorism, sadism,
torture, or excessive brutality.” MCL 777.37(1)(a). Therefore, the severity of the injury and the
brutality of the assault are already accounted for in OV 3 and OV 7, respectively. The trial court
did not discuss whether OV 3 and OV 7 were given inadequate or disproportionate weight.
MCL 769.34(3)(b). Accordingly, we vacate defendant’s sentence and remand for resentencing,
at which time the trial court can sentence defendant within the guideline range or depart from the
3
MCL 769.34(11) provides that “[i]f, upon a review of the record, the court of appeals finds the
trial court did not have a substantial and compelling reason for departing from the appropriate
sentence range, the court shall remand the matter to the sentencing judge or another trial court
judge for resentencing under this chapter.
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range if proper substantial and compelling reasons are given as required by the language of MCL
769.34.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
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