PEOPLE OF MI V CORNELL JEROME STRICKLEN JR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 14, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 228138
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 99-012515-FH
CORNELL JEROME STRICKLEN, JR. a/k/a
CARNELL JEROME STRICKLEN, JR. a/k/a
JEROME SMITH a/k/a CORNELL
STRICKLAND,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Hoekstra and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
After a trial by jury, defendant was convicted of felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b).1
Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for his conviction. Defendant appeals as of right.
We affirm.
The prosecution alleged that defendant forcefully entered the apartment of Lyndsey
Matthews and Theresa Tafoya, defendant’s girlfriend, along with his brother, Benjamin Ragan,
in the early morning hours of July 17, 1999. Matthews, the only occupant of the apartment at
that time, was stabbed to death with two different knives, a fork, and a screwdriver. Earlier that
day, defendant was involved in a physical altercation at that same apartment with Tafoya.
Defendant struck Tafoya in the face, knocking her to the ground. Marcus Markey and Edward
Harris defended Tafoya, fighting with defendant and chasing him away. As defendant left, he
vowed to return. Thereafter, Mackey and Harris left for Mackey’s apartment. Approximately
fifteen minutes after Mackey and Harris left, they returned. Peering into the building, they saw
defendant’s brother leaving the apartment and heard him speaking to someone. When they were
finally let into the building they went to Matthews’ apartment, where they found her dying. At
trial, defendant acknowledged that Ragan was possibly involved in the murder, but disputed that
he had assisted Ragan in any way.
1
We note that defendant was also convicted of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, and firstdegree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2)(b). However, these convictions were vacated.
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First, defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence presented to convict him of
felony murder because there was no evidence that the murder of Matthews occurred during the
perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony.2 We disagree.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecutor and determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the
essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Reid, 233
Mich App 457, 466; 592 NW2d 767 (1999). This review is de novo. See People v Kim, 245
Mich App 609, 615; 630 NW2d 627 (2001).
“The elements of felony murder are: (1) the killing of a human being; (2) with the
intent to kill, to do great bodily harm, or to create a very high risk of death or
great bodily harm with knowledge that death or great bodily harm was the
probably result [i.e., malice]; (3) while committing, attempting to commit, or
assisting in the commission of any of the felonies specifically enumerated in [the
statute, including armed robbery].” [People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 758-759;
597 NW2d 130 (1999) (quotation omitted).]
Furthermore, we have explained, “[T]o qualify as felony murder, the homicide must be
incident to the felony and associated with it as one of its hazards. It is not necessary that the
murder be contemporaneous with the felony. A lapse of time and distance are factors to be
considered, but are not determinative. Defendant must intend to commit the felony at the time
the killing occurs.” People v Thew, 201 Mich App 78, 86-87; 506 NW2d 547 (1993), quoting
People v Goddard, 135 Mich App 128, 136; 352 NW2d 367 (1984), rev’d on other grounds 492
Mich 505 (1988) (emphasis added). Indeed, “where the predicate crime underlying a charge of
felony murder is part of a continuous transaction or is otherwise immediately connected with the
killing, it is immaterial whether the underlying felony occurs before or after the killing.” People
v Hutner, 209 Mich App 280, 284; 530 NW2d 174 (1995). “The statute requires only that the
defendant intended to commit the underlying felony at the time the homicide occurred.” People
v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 643; 588 NW2d 480 (1998), citing People v Brannon, 194 Mich
App 121, 125; 486 NW2d 83 (1992). However, we have also explained that a defendant has
committed felony murder if the murder “is committed while a defendant is attempting to escape
from or prevent detection of the felony, and if it is immediately connected with the underlying
felony.” Goddard, supra at 135.
We find that a reasonable trier of fact could have concluded, based on the evidence
presented, that the death of Matthews occurred immediately after the home invasion and that
defendant’s actions were part of one continuous transaction. A neighbor testified that she heard
the door of the apartment being kicked in, heard the girl screaming, and then the screaming
stopped. Then, the neighbor heard two men discussing cleaning “up the mess” and eliminating
any fingerprints. Thus, the evidence permitted the reasonable inference that, immediately after
2
We have also considered defendant’s “amended and supplemental pleadings,” which he filed in
propria persona.
-2-
defendant and Ragan entered the apartment, a struggle ensued with Matthews, which resulted in
her death.
Furthermore, a rational trier of fact could have also concluded that defendant and Ragan
murdered Matthews in an effort to avoid detection. When defendant and Ragan forcefully
entered the apartment, they committed the crime of home invasion. Matthews was the only
individual in the apartment at that time, and defendant and Ragan could have decided to kill
Matthews to prevent her confirmation to police about what defendant and Ragan had done. In
any event, murder is certainly associated with home invasion as one of its hazards.
Consequently, defendant’s argument fails.
Second, defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence presented to convict him of
felony murder because the elements of the underlying felony, first-degree home invasion, were
not satisfied. Again, we disagree.
In this case, defendant’s felony murder conviction was premised on the underlying felony
of first-degree home invasion. MCL 750.110a(2)3 explains:
A person who breaks and enters a dwelling with intent to commit a felony or a
larceny in the dwelling or a person who enters a dwelling without permission with
intent to commit a felony or a larceny in the dwelling is guilty of home invasion
in the first degree if at any time while the person is entering, present in, or exiting
the dwelling either of the following circumstances exist:
(a) The person is armed with a dangerous weapon.
3
We are mindful of the fact that, in 1999, MCL 750.110a(2) was amended to read:
A person who breaks and enters a dwelling with intent to commit a felony,
larceny, or assault in the dwelling, a person who enters a dwelling without
permission with intent to commit a felony, larceny, or assault in the dwelling, or a
person who breaks and enters a dwelling or enters a dwelling without permission
and, at any time while he or she is entering, present in, or exiting the dwelling,
commits a felony, larceny, or assault is guilty of home invasion in the first degree
if at any time while the person is entering, present in, or exiting the dwelling
either of the following circumstances exists:
(a) The person is armed with a dangerous weapon.
(b) Another person is lawfully present in the dwelling. [Emphasis added.]
However, the amendments to MCL 750.110a(2) were not effective until October 1, 1999.
Therefore, because defendant’s crime occurred on July 17, 1999, the previously stated version of
MCL 750.110a(2) applies to the instant case.
-3-
(b) Another person is lawfully present in the dwelling. [Emphasis added.]
[See also generally People v Bigelow, 225 Mich App 806, 809; 571 NW2d 520
(1997), opinion reinstated 229 Mich App 218 (1998).]
Here, defendant argues that plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence for a rational trier
of fact to conclude that defendant had the intent to commit a felony or a larceny. In particular,
we must decide whether plaintiff presented sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to
conclude that defendant entered the apartment with the intent to commit the felony of assault
with intent to do great bodily harm. Plaintiff argues that sufficient evidence was presented that
defendant intended to assault Matthews. We disagree.4 There was no evidence presented that
Matthews was in any way involved in the earlier physical fight between Tafoya, Mackey, Harris,
and defendant. Further, the testimony indicates that the weapons used to murder Matthews, two
knives, a fork, and a screwdriver, were from inside the apartment. Therefore, a rational trier of
fact could not infer that defendant and Ragan entered the apartment with the weapons and,
therefore, had the intent to commit an assault with intent to do great bodily harm against
Matthews.
However, as plaintiff points out, it is not necessary for plaintiff to demonstrate that
defendant entered the apartment with the intent to commit an assault with intent to do great
bodily harm to Matthews. See generally Carines, supra at 758-759. Instead, plaintiff argues that
there was sufficient evidence that defendant entered the apartment with the intent to commit a
felony because defendant entered the apartment with the intent to commit an assault with intent
to do great bodily harm to Mackey and Harris. We agree. As a result, a rational trier of fact
could have concluded that defendant entered the apartment with the intent to commit an assault
with intent to do great bodily harm against Mackey and Harris. In particular, defendant’s
aggressive behavior towards Harris and Mackey before he left, defendant’s promise to return,
and the short amount of time that passed between the fight and the murder of Matthews all
support this conclusion. See generally id.; Bigelow, supra at 809.
Third, defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction
because there was no evidence presented linking defendant with this crime. We disagree.
While fighting with Mackey and Harris, defendant tried to get assistance from someone
in a nearby apartment. Defendant left the apartment building after this strategy proved
unsuccessful, but promised to return. When Mackey and Harris returned to the apartment,
Mackey observed Ragan on the balcony of Matthews’ and Tafoya’s apartment. Ragan was
speaking to another person and Mackey heard the other person reply, “I don’t care. Let the
mother f---ers in.” Although Mackey could not identify this person’s voice as defendant’s voice,
Betty Smith, a neighbor, testified that she heard two men talking on the balcony. Smith
recognized one of the voices as belonging to the man she had seen involved in the earlier fight.
4
While we agree with defendant that sufficient evidence was not presented that defendant
intended to assault Matthews, we find this argument to be unsuccessful, because sufficient
evidence was presented that defendant entered the apartment with the intent to commit an assault
with intent to do great bodily harm to Mackey and Harris.
-4-
Furthermore, blood retrieved from the exit door of Matthews’ and Tafoya’s apartment
matched defendant. Blood retrieved from the light switch and doorjamb in the bathroom of the
Green Road apartment, where defendant and Ragan resided, contained a mixture of defendant’s
DNA, Matthews’ DNA, and Ragan’s DNA. When arrested by police, defendant had lacerations
on his knuckles and gave police a false name. Finally, while in jail, defendant questioned an
inmate and former law student about the ability of the police to determine which knife was used
as a murder weapon. Thus, when considering the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff,
there was evidence presented linking defendant to the crime. See generally MCL 750.110a(2);
Carines, supra at 758-759.
Fourth, defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction
because the testimony of witnesses was contradictory and unreliable. Defendant’s argument
fails. We will not interfere with the role of the jury when reviewing an appeal based on the
sufficiency of evidence. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 514-515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992),
amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992).
[An appellate court] must remember that the jury is the sole judge of the facts. It
is the function of the jury alone to listen to testimony, weigh the evidence and
decide the questions of fact . . . . Juries, not appellate courts, see and hear
witnesses and are in a much better position to decide the weight and credibility to
be given to their testimony. [Id., quoting People v Palmer, 392 Mich 370, 375376; 220 NW2d 393 (1974).]
In this case the jurors were presented with conflicting testimony, which required them to
make a determination concerning the credibility of each witness and the weight to afford each
witness’ testimony. The jury must have found the testimony of the witnesses credible because it
found defendant guilty of felony murder. Therefore, we will not interfere with that
determination. Id.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
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