NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION V CLEVELAND CLIFFS IRON CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION and
UPPER PENINSULA ENVIRONMENTAL
COALITION,
UNPUBLISHED
June 11, 2002
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
No. 232706
Marquette Circuit Court
LC No. 00-037979-CE
V
CLEVELAND CLIFFS IRON CO, EMPIRE
IRON MINING PARTNERSHIP, MICHIGAN
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY, and RUSSEL J. HARDING,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and Hood and Sawyer, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right from an order dismissing their suit against defendants under
the Michigan Environmental Protection Act (MEPA), MCL 324.1701 et seq., for lack of
standing. The suit was filed in response to the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality’s
grant of a permit allowing defendants, Cleveland Cliffs Iron Company and Empire Iron Mining
Partnership (hereinafter defendants), to fill wetlands and streams on their property with mining
waste. We reverse.
The only issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in finding that plaintiffs lacked
standing to sue. Whether a party has standing to bring an action presents a question of law
reviewed de novo. Franklin Historic District Study Comm v Village of Franklin, 241 Mich App
184, 187; 614 NW2d 703 (2000).
Plaintiffs brought their claim under MEPA, which provides in relevant part:
The attorney general or any person may maintain an action in the circuit
court having jurisdiction where the alleged violation occurred or is likely to occur
for declaratory and equitable relief against any person for the protection of the air,
water, and other natural resources and the public trust in these resources from
pollution, impairment, or destruction. [324.1701(1) (emphasis added).]
-1-
Review of the plain language of the statute, In re MCI Telecommunications Complaint, 460 Mich
396, 411; 596 NW2d 164 (1999), reveals that plaintiffs have standing to pursue this action.
Furthermore, our Supreme Court held that a prior version1 of this statutory provision “provides
private individuals and other legal entities with standing to maintain actions in the circuit
courts.” Ray v Mason County Drain Comm’r, 393 Mich 294, 305; 224 NW2d 883 (1975). See
also Stevens v Creek, 121 Mich App 503, 507; 328 NW2d 672 (1982).2
In light of the plain language of the statute and its consistent construction conferring
standing to any person, we decline defendants’ invitation to read in an additional requirement of
compliance with non-statutory standing prerequisites.
Reversed.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ David H. Sawyer
1
The prior version of MEPA, MCL 691.1201 et seq., was repealed and now appears at MCL
324.1701 et seq.
2
We note that appellee, Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, agrees in its brief on
appeal that the trial court erred in its ruling and plaintiffs have standing to bring this suit.
Additionally, we note that defendants’ reliance on Lee v Macomb County Board of
Commissioners, 464 Mich 726, 740; 629 NW2d 900 (2001), is misplaced. There is no indication
that the Lee Court’s adoption of the test in Lugan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555, 559-560;
112 S Ct 2130; 119 L Ed 2d 351 (1991), to interpret the soldiers’ relief fund act, overruled Ray.
The soldiers relief act did not contain a provision expressly authorizing any person to maintain
an action for violations or omissions of the act.
-2-
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