PEOPLE OF MI V WILLIAM STEWART
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 28, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 230899
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 99-012574
WILLIAM STEWART,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and O’Connell and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial,1 defendant was convicted of first-degree home invasion, MCL
750.110a(2), unarmed robbery, MCL 750.530, three counts of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct (CSC I), MCL 750.520b(1)(c) (sexual penetration occurring under circumstances
involving the commission of other felony), and two counts of second-degree criminal sexual
conduct (CSC II), MCL 750.520c(1)(c) (sexual contact occurring under circumstances involving
the commission of other felony). The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 7 to 20 years’
imprisonment for the first-degree home invasion conviction, to be served consecutively to
concurrent terms of 8 to 15 years’ imprisonment for the unarmed robbery conviction, 10 to 25
years’ imprisonment for each CSC I conviction and 5 to 15 years’ imprisonment for each CSC II
conviction. We affirm.
On appeal, defendant first argues that the trial court committed error warranting reversal
when it instructed the jurors that if they found the prosecutor had proven the elements of the
charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt, they must convict defendant. Specifically, during
its closing instruction, the trial court stated:
Every crime is made up of parts [called] elements. The prosecutor must
prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Neither defendant is
required to prove his innocence or do anything. If you find the prosecutor has not
proven every element beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find each
1
Defendant was tried during a joint jury trial with codefendant Antoine Smith. Smith’s appeal is
also before this panel in Docket No. 230898.
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defendant not guilty. If you find the prosecutor has proven each element beyond a
reasonable doubt, then you must find each defendant guilty. [Emphasis supplied.]
We review a trial court’s instructions to the jury as a whole to determine if they fairly
presented the issues to be tried and sufficiently protected the defendant’s rights. People v
McCrady, 244 Mich App 27, 30; 624 NW2d 761 (2000); People v Ullah, 216 Mich App 669,
677; 550 NW2d 568 (1996). Defendant failed to preserve this issue of instructional error for our
review by objecting in the lower court. Therefore, we review for plain error affecting
defendant’s substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
After a thorough review of the challenged instructions, we are satisfied that the trial court’s
instructions fairly presented the issues to be tried to the extent that plain error affecting
defendant's substantial rights did not occur. McCrady, supra at 30.
In a criminal jury trial, the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments combine to require that the
elements of the charged offense be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Bearss, 463
Mich 623, 629; 625 NW2d 10 (2001). Thus, it is error for the trial court to direct a verdict of
guilty in whole or in part no matter how overwhelming the evidence of guilt. People v Duncan,
462 Mich 47, 53; 610 NW2d 551 (2000); People v Goss (After Remand), 446 Mich 587, 596597, ns 12, 13; 521 NW2d 312 (1994); People v Reed, 393 Mich 342, 350-351; 224 NW2d 867
(1975).
In the present case, the trial court properly instructed the jury regarding the presumption
of innocence and the burden of proof. Further, the challenged portion of the trial court’s
instructions did not direct a guilty verdict in whole or in part or otherwise invade the factfinding
province of the jury. Rather, the trial court instructed the jurors that if they found that the
prosecutor had proven every element of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt, then a verdict of
guilty was appropriate. Notably, although defendant omits any mention of this in his brief on
appeal, a review of the instructions in context reveals that the court also instructed the jurors that
if the prosecutor did not meet its burden of proof with respect to every element of the charged
offenses, the defendants must be acquitted. On this record, there is absolutely no indication that
the trial court impermissibly “attempt[ed] to override or interfere with the jurors’ independent
judgment in a manner contrary to the interests of . . . [defendant].” United States v Martin Linen
Supply Co, 430 US 564, 573; 97 S Ct 1349; 51 L Ed 2d 642 (1977).
In People v Reichert, 433 Mich 359, 361; 445 NW2d 793 (1989), the trial court instructed
the jurors during jury selection in a similar fashion to the trial court in the instant case.
Specifically, in explaining the burden of proof to a particular juror the trial court stated:
[I]f after you have heard all the evidence in this case and I instruct you that
the burden of proof is on the Prosecutor to establish each and every element of the
crime -- let's assume for purposes of illustration that there are four elements of the
crime that the prosecutor has to prove to you beyond a reasonable doubt, and after
hearing all of the evidence, you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the
prosecutor has established each and every one of those four elements. Do you
understand that the verdict in that instance, if you were convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt, would be guilty? [Id. at 361 (emphasis in original).]
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On appeal, our Supreme Court found the trial court’s instructions during jury selection
proper and opined:
We are persuaded that the remarks challenged by the instant defendant did not
constitute error requiring reversal. The trial court was merely informing the jurors
of their obligation to apply the law in accordance with its instructions. The court
explained what the jurors “would” do if they were true to their oaths and
performed their legal duty. There has been no suggestion that the jury was not
otherwise properly instructed. [Id. at 363-364.]
Similarly, in United States v Pierre, 298 US App DC 5, 6-7 (1992), the trial court
instructed the jury in a similar manner as the trial court in the present appeal.
Ladies and gentlemen, every defendant in a criminal case is presumed to be
innocent. This presumption of innocence remains with the defendant throughout
the trial, unless and until he is proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The
burden is upon the government to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. This burden of proof never shifts throughout the trial. The law does not
require a defendant to prove his innocence, or to produce any evidence. If you
find that the government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt every element of
the offense with which the defendant is charged, and which I will define for you,
it is your duty to find him guilty. On the other hand, if you find the government
has failed to prove any element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, then
you must find him not guilty.
The Pierre court found that the trial court’s instruction did not inhibit the jury’s right to
acquit the defendant and therefore did not direct a guilty verdict. Id. at 7. Rather, the court held
that the instruction merely clarified the responsibility of the jury on making its factual
determination and accurately stated the duty of the jury. Id. Consequently, on the basis of the
foregoing, we are not persuaded that the trial court’s instruction to the jury amounted to plain
error.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court committed error when instructing the jury on
the law of aiding and abetting. According to defendant, the instruction would have permitted the
jury to find defendant criminally responsible for assisting himself, something not possible.
Moreover, defendant claims the trial court’s instruction on the requisite intent was incomplete
because it did require that to establish culpability as an aider and abettor the accused must
possess the same intent required for liability as a principal. Because defendant did not raise an
objection in the lower court our review is limited to plain error affecting defendant’s substantial
rights. Carines, supra at 763. After carefully reviewing the instructions as a whole we conclude
that defendant’s arguments are meritless, and are satisfied that the instructions properly presented
the issues tried and sufficiently protected defendant's rights. McCrady, supra at 30.
Defendant correctly notes that to be found guilty as an aider and abettor, someone must
have committed the crime as a principal. People v Wilson, 196 Mich App 604, 614; 493 NW2d
471 (1992). However, the law does not distinguish between a principal and an accomplice when
one is charged, tried, convicted and punished for a criminal offense, MCL 767.39; People v
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Coomer, 245 Mich App 206, 223; 627 NW2d 612 (2001), and the prosecutor may properly
proceed on alternative theories that a defendant is guilty either as a principal or as an aider and
abettor. See e.g., People v Gadomski, 232 Mich App 24, 30-31; 592 NW2d 75 (1998). To
establish criminal liability under an aiding and abetting theory there must be evidence of a guilty
principal. People v Vaughn, 186 Mich App 376, 381-382; 465 NW2d 365 (1990). Further, as
the prosecutor acknowledges in her brief on appeal, where the prosecutor presents sufficient
evidence of the defendant’s guilt under either a principal or aiding and abetting theory, the
defendant’s right to a unanimous verdict is not violated by the return of a general verdict of guilty
without the jury’s specification on which alternative theory it relied. People v Smielewski, 235
Mich App 196, 201-202; 596 NW2d 636 (1999).
When reviewed in their proper context, the trial court’s instructions made clear that
alternate theories were being advanced and that, to be guilty as an aider and abettor, the jury must
find (1) that defendant assisted someone else in committing the offense, and (2) that defendant
possessed the requisite intent or was aware that the principal possessed such intent. After
reviewing the instructions as whole, we are of the view that they properly stated the applicable
law with regard to accomplice liability. See Carines, supra at 757-758.
Next, defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial when the trial court permitted the
prosecutor to admit into evidence codefendant Antoine Smith’s statement to the police. In his
brief on appeal, defendant challenges the admission of the statement into evidence,
characterizing it as “rank hearsay.” However, our careful review of the trial transcript reflects
that when the parties were discussing the admission of this evidence, defendant’s trial attorney
told the trial court that once a challenged portion of the statement was excised, he did not object
to the redacted statement being admitted into evidence. Once the statement was redacted, the
trial court inquired of defendant’s attorney whether he had any objection to the admission of the
statement. In response, defendant’s attorney clearly articulated that he had “[n]o objection.”
Under the circumstances, because defendant’s attorney expressed his satisfaction with the
admission of the statement after the challenged portion was excised, we are of the opinion that
any error pertaining to the admission of this evidence has been waived. People v Carter, 462
Mich 206, 216; 612 NW2d 144 (2000).2
Next, defendant contends that remand for clarification of the sentences imposed by the
trial court is necessary. We disagree.
At sentencing, the trial court first imposed a sentence of 7 to 20 years’ imprisonment for
the first-degree home invasion conviction and noted on the record that the sentence “will be
served consecutive[ly] to the other sentences.” The trial court also imposed concurrent sentences
of 10 to 25 years’ imprisonment for each CSC I conviction, 5 to 15 years’ imprisonment for each
CSC II conviction, and 8 to 15 years’ imprisonment for the unarmed robbery conviction. In
2
Likewise, defendant has not met the heavy burden of proving that counsel’s action in not
objecting to the admission of this evidence was not the product of trial strategy. People v
Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76; 601 NW2d 887 (1999).
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response to defendant’s inquiries at the sentencing hearing, the trial court indicated that the
sentences for the CSC I, CSC II and unarmed robbery convictions were to run concurrently.
It is well-settled that a court speaks through its written orders and judgments. People v
Vincent, 455 Mich 110, 123; 565 NW2d 629 (1997); People v Turner, 181 Mich App 680, 683;
449 NW2d 680 (1989). In this case the judgment of sentence, consistent with the trial court’s
articulation on the record at the sentencing hearing, ordered that defendant’s sentence for firstdegree home invasion be served consecutively to the concurrent sentences for the CSC I, CSC II,
and unarmed robbery convictions.3 Therefore, defendant’s contention that remand is necessary
for clarification is without merit.
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
3
Defendant has not raised issues concerning possible double sentencing. Therefore, we do not
address this issue.
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