PEOPLE OF MI V KEVIN L HARDWICK
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 24, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 229699
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 00-002744-01
KEVIN L. HARDWICK,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Talbot and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right his bench trial conviction of use of a motor vehicle without
authority, MCL 750.414. Defendant was sentenced to two years’ probation, 150 days in jail with
162 days of credit, and sixty days in jail to be served at the end of probation if defendant fails to
successfully complete probation. We affirm.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict on
the charge of receiving and concealing stolen property. We disagree. In reviewing a motion for
directed verdict, we review the record de novo and consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecutor to determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the
essential elements of the crime charged were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v
Mayhew, 236 Mich App 112, 124; 600 NW2d 370 (1999). “Circumstantial evidence and
reasonable inferences arising from that evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements
of a crime.” People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 757; 597 NW2d 130 (1999), quoting People v
Allen, 201 Mich App 98, 100; 505 NW2d 869 (1993).
MCL 750.535, the statute pertaining to the receiving and concealing offense, provides in
part:
A person shall not buy, receive, possess, conceal, or aid in the concealment of
stolen, embezzled, or converted money, goods, or property knowing the money,
goods, or property is stolen, embezzled, or converted. [MCL 750.535(1).]
The elements of receiving or concealing stolen property are (1) the property was stolen or
converted; (2) the value of the property; (3) the defendant bought, received, possessed, or
concealed the property knowing it was stolen or converted; and (4) the property was identified as
being previously stolen. MCL 750.535(1) and (3)(a); People v Quinn, 219 Mich App 571, 574;
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557 NW2d 151 (1996). Conversion is the unauthorized assumption and exercise of ownership
rights over goods or personal property belonging to another. Quinn, supra at 575, quoting
Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed), p 332.
We conclude that the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for directed verdict.
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecutor, the evidence and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom were sufficient to support the conclusion that defendant’s actions in
retaining control of the vehicle amounted to conversion.
Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. We
disagree. “[W]hen determining whether sufficient evidence has been presented to sustain a
conviction, a court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and
determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the
crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d
748 (1992), amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992).
The elements of the offense of use of a motor vehicle without authority are “(1) the motor
vehicle did not belong to the defendant, (2) having obtained lawful possession of the vehicle
from the owner, the defendant used it beyond the authority which was given to him, and (3) the
defendant must have intended to use the vehicle beyond the authority granted to him, knowing
that he did not have the authority to do so.” People v Hayward, 127 Mich App 50, 60-61; 338
NW2d 549 (1983); see, also, People v Crosby, 82 Mich App 1, 2-3; 266 NW2d 465 (1978).
We conclude that when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecutor, sufficient evidence was presented such that a reasonable factfinder could find that all
the necessary elements of the crime were established beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, the
evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom indicate that defendant was driving a vehicle
that did not belong to him, that he used his mother’s vehicle beyond the authority that was given
to him, and that defendant intended to use the vehicle beyond the authority granted to him.
Although defendant indicated to his mother that he was “coming right home” with the vehicle,
two days passed and the vehicle was returned only after defendant’s mother reported that the car
was stolen and the police arrested defendant while he was still in possession of the vehicle.
We affirm.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
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