PEOPLE OF MI V JAMAL GARTH
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 19, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 229654
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 99-008842
JAMAL GARTH,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and White and Cooper, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his conviction, following a jury trial, of being a felon
in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f. The trial court sentenced defendant as a second
habitual offender, MCL 769.10, to a term of one to seven and a half years’ imprisonment. We
affirm.
Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his directed
verdict motion.1 We disagree. This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion for
directed verdict. People v Mayhew, 236 Mich App 112, 124; 600 NW2d 370 (1999).
When ruling on a motion for directed verdict, the trial court “must consider the evidence
presented by the prosecution up to the time the motion is made in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential
elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Vincent, 455 Mich
110, 121; 565 NW2d 629 (1997), quoting People v Hampton, 407 Mich 354, 368; 285 NW2d
284 (1979) (ellipses omitted). Questions concerning the credibility of the witnesses are to be left
to the trier of fact. People v Pena, 224 Mich App 650, 659; 569 NW2d 871 (1997), modified on
other grounds 457 Mich 885 (1998).
1
Defendant was originally charged as a second habitual offender with carrying a concealed
weapon, MCL 750.227, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f. Defendant
was ultimately acquitted of the CCW charge. Therefore, our review is limited to defendant’s
directed verdict motion with respect to the felon-in-possession charge because the CCW directed
verdict motion ruling is moot. See People v Rutherford, 208 Mich App 198, 204; 526 NW2d
620 (1994) (“Where a subsequent event renders it impossible for this Court to fashion a remedy,
an issue becomes moot”).
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“A person convicted of a specified felony may not possess, use, transport, sell, purchase,
carry, ship, receive or distribute a firearm in [Michigan] until . . . [t]he expiration of five years
after . . . (i) the person has paid all fines imposed for the [felony], (ii) the person has served all
terms of imprisonment imposed for the [felony, and] (iii) the person has successfully completed
all conditions of probation or parole imposed for the [felony].” MCL 750.224f(2)(a). The parties
conceded before trial that defendant was a convicted felon ineligible to possess or transport a
firearm.
After a review of the record, we are satisfied that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying defendant’s directed verdict motion because the prosecution presented
ample evidence for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly
possessed and transported a firearm. For example, defendant was operating the car when the
officers stopped him for a routine traffic stop. The car was owned by and registered to
defendant, and a consensual search of defendant’s car produced a firearm surreptitiously hidden
in the spare tire wheel well – under stereo equipment and a towel – in the trunk of defendant’s
car. Importantly, one of the police officers testified that defendant admitted to him that the
firearm was his and that he kept it in his car for protection. Viewing this evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, the jury could have concluded that defendant possessed or
transported the firearm in violation of MCL 750.224f.
Defendant next asserts that the trial court erred in denying his new trial motion. We
disagree. “This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion the trial court’s denial of a motion for a
new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence.” People v
McCray, 245 Mich App 631, 637; 630 NW2d 633 (2001), citing People v Stiller, 242 Mich App
38, 49; 617 NW2d 697 (2000).
A motion for new trial on the basis that the verdict is against the great weight of the
evidence may be granted only if the evidence preponderates so heavily against the verdict that it
would be a miscarriage of justice to allow the verdict to stand. People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625,
627; 576 NW2d 129 (1998); People v Gadomski, 232 Mich App 24, 28; 592 NW2d 75 (1998).
This Court may not resolve credibility issues on appeal, id., and “[n]ew trial motions based
solely on the weight of evidence regarding witness credibility are not favored.” Lemmon, supra
at 639. In the instant case the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant’s
new trial motion because the jury properly concluded that defendant knowingly possessed and
transported the firearm in his car. Specifically, one of the police officer witnesses testified that
defendant admitted that the firearm was his and that he kept it for his protection. The jury was
free to believe this witness’ testimony and reject defendant’s witness’ testimony that she placed
the firearm in the car without telling defendant.
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting improper
rebuttal evidence. We disagree. This Court reviews a trial court’s evidentiary decision for an
abuse of discretion. People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 488; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). “[A]n abuse of
discretion . . . exists when an unprejudiced person, considering the facts on which the trial court
acted, would say there was no justification or excuse for the ruling.” People v Ullah, 216 Mich
App 669, 673; 550 NW2d 568 (1996), citing People v Taylor, 195 Mich App 57, 60; 489 NW2d
99 (1992).
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Rebuttal testimony is admissible to “contradict, repel, explain, or disprove
evidence produced by the other party and tending directly to weaken or impeach
the same.” The question whether rebuttal is proper depends on what proofs the
defendant introduced and not on merely what the defendant testified about on
cross-examination. [People v Pesquera, 244 Mich App 305, 314; 625 NW2d 407
(2001), quoting People v Figgures, 451 Mich 390, 399; 547 NW2d 673 (1996).]
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted rebuttal evidence where it
was responsive to evidence offered by the defense and a theory defendant developed during trial.
Figgures, supra at 399.
Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
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