EDWARD J TINKHAM V SAUHAIL HEKMAT SAEED
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
EDWARD J. TINKHAM,
UNPUBLISHED
March 15, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 227754
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 97-000684-NO
v
SAUHAIL HEKMAT SAEED and ADNAN
NAMOU,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
BASIM NAIMOU,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Neff, P.J., and Cavanagh and Saad, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this assault and battery case, defendants Sauhail Saeed and Adnan Namou
(“defendants”) appeal as of right from a judgment awarding plaintiff $28,027, inclusive of
interest, costs, and attorneys fees, which was entered following a jury verdict in plaintiff’s favor.
We affirm.
Plaintiff commenced this action and contended that he was assaulted by defendants while
he attempted to make a delivery at a strip mall. Defendants, who are part of a family that owns
the property and most of the stores in the strip mall, denied plaintiff’s contentions and claimed
instead that plaintiff was the aggressor and they simply acted in self-defense.
Exemplary Damages
Defendants claim that the court’s failure to instruct the jury specifically on the
requirements for exemplary damages requires reversal. We reject this argument.
The court instructed the jury regarding damages as follows:
-1-
Now if you decide that the Plaintiff is entitled to damages, it is your duty
to determine the amount of money which reasonable [sic], fairly and adequately
compensates him for each of the elements of damage which you decide has
resulted from the willful or intentional touching of the Plaintiff against Plaintiff’s
will by the Defendants, taking into account the nature and extent of the injuries.
You should include each of the following elements of damage which you decide
has been sustained by the Plaintiff to the present time, and that would be any
physical pain and suffering, swollen jaw, any medical anguish or emotional
distress, fright and shock, embarrassment, humiliation and mortification, outrage
at the indignity of being assaulted and battered, denial of social pleasures and
enjoyment, broken bridge work, chipped tooth, missed time from work and any
reasonable expenses of necessary medical care, treatment and services.
You should also include each of the following elements of damage which
you decide Plaintiff is reasonably certain to sustain in the future, and that again
would be any physical pain and suffering, swollen jaw, any mental anguish or
emotional distress, fright and shock, embarrassment, humiliation and
mortification, outrage at the indignity of being assaulted and battered, denial of
social pleasure and enjoyment, broken bridge work, chipped tooth, missed time
from work, any reasonable expenses of necessary medical care, treatment and
services.
Because the jury awarded a lump sum award, it is not clear what portion of the damages
awarded, if any, is attributable to exemplary damages. Importantly, defendants did not object to
the instructions as given, nor did the defendants request different instructions regarding damages.
Defendants’ failure to object to the trial court’s jury instructions, or to seek different instructions,
is fatal to their claim of instructional error. MCR 2.516(C) provides as follows:
A party may assign as error the giving of or failure to give an instruction
only if the party objects on the record before the jury retires to consider the
verdict. . . stating specifically the matter to which the party objects and the
grounds for the objection. (Emphasis added.)
We read this court rule to require a party in a civil case to either state the objection on the
record or to request a specific instruction or risk waiving the instructional issue on appeal.
Further, while there is language in some of our opinions suggesting that our Court will review
instructional error absent objection for “manifest injustice”1, we interpret our case law to require
us to use our appellate review in such a case sparingly. Hunt v Deming, 375 Mich 581; 134
NW2d 662 (1965). In Hunt v Deming, our Supreme Court made this astute observation
regarding the reasons parties must preserve, at trial, objections to jury instructions and the
consequences for failing to do so:
Plaintiffs point to language in prior cases, for example, Jorgensen v
Howland (1949), 325 Mich 440, in support of their claimed right to assert on
1
Jorgensen v Howland, 325 Mich 440; 38 NW2d 906 (1949).
-2-
appeal error in jury instruction notwithstanding their failure timely to object in the
trial court. It suffices to note that those cases were decided before the explicit
requirement of GCR 1963, 516.2 was promulgated.
This is not to say that this Court may not, in unusual circumstances, and to
prevent manifest injustice, take note of instructions which err with respect to basic
and controlling issues in a case even though objection thereto was not made
before the jury retired. See 2 Honigman and Hawkins, Michigan Court Rules
Annotated (2d ed 1963), p 567. It is to say, however, that the Court will exercise
its discretion in this fashion but sparingly. To do otherwise would be to
encourage counsel to maintain silence in the face of correctable erroneous
instructions, hoarding their objections for use in the event of an unfavorable jury
verdict. The course of expeditious justice is furthered by requiring that such
objections be made while time yet remains to set the record straight. [Hunt, supra
at 585 (emphasis added).]
We take, and defendants should have taken, our Supreme Court’s admonition in Hunt v
Deming seriously. We do not regard this case as presenting “unusual circumstances” which
would justify overturning a jury award. To do so here “would be to encourage counsel to
maintain silence in the face of correctable erroneous instructions.” Moreover, in light of the trial
court’s instructions regarding damages, we conclude that we need not reverse the trial court to
prevent “manifest injustice.”
Defendants also contend that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to voir
dire the jury on a list of questions that they provided. Because defendants do not cite any
authority in support of this issue, we deem this issue abandoned. Neal v Oakwood Hospital
Corp, 226 Mich App 701, 722; 575 NW2d 68 (1997). In any event, the record discloses that
defendants expressed satisfaction with the jury as chosen, thereby waiving this issue. People v
Johnson, 245 Mich App 243, 254, n 3; 631 NW2d 1 (2001); People v Acosta, 16 Mich App 249,
250; 167 NW2d 897 (1969). Like the instructional issue, this issue is waived because defendants
simply failed to raise the matter before the trial judge who could have addressed the matter,
thereby obviating the necessity of this appeal.2
2
Defendants also assert that the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on the law of selfdefense and defense of others, in accordance with CJI2d. 7.22. Because defendants did not
request specific instruction at trial, and made no request for this instruction, defendant waived
this instructional issue for appeal. MCR 2.516(C).
Moreover, were we to review this issue on appeal, we note that jury instructions are to be
reviewed in their entirety to determine whether they adequately informed the jury regarding the
applicable law. Rickwalt v Richfield Lakes Corp, 246 Mich App 450, 459; 633 NW2d 418
(2001). Here, the court instructed the jury that “a person has a right to use reasonable force as
may be or reasonably appears to be at the time necessary to protect others from bodily harm in
repelling the assault.” We conclude that this instruction sufficiently informed the jury that
defendants were justified in using force if they had an honest and reasonable belief that force was
needed to protect Bassam, though it later turned out that they were wrong. This instruction
makes clear that the perspective must be from the person’s point of view at the time the person
(continued…)
-3-
Defendants further maintain that the trial court erred in permitting plaintiff to introduce
evidence of defendant Saeed’s guilty plea. The record shows that plaintiff’s questions were
directed at eliciting testimony regarding Saeed’s prior in-court admission that he assaulted
plaintiff. Party admissions are admissible under MRE 801(d)(1)(A) and MRE 801(d)(2)(A).
Plaintiff’s questions were not directed at eliciting testimony concerning the fact of a conviction.
Saeed’s unresponsive, volunteered answers to plaintiff’s proper questions did not amount to error
by the court or plaintiff’s attorney. People v Griffin, 235 Mich App 27, 36; 597 NW2d 176
(1999).
Additionally, defendants say that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on future
pain and suffering because the evidence did not support such an instruction. We disagree.
Plaintiff’s wife testified that, although the alleged assault occurred 4-1/2 years earlier, plaintiff
remained unable to bite down with his front teeth, and that any hard food, such as apples and the
like, must be cut into small pieces so that he can place them in his mouth and chew them with his
back teeth. We find this to be sufficient evidence to support the court’s instruction on future
damages. Murdock v Higgins, 208 Mich App 210, 219; 527 NW2d 1 (1994).
Further, defendants allege that the trial court abused its discretion when the court denied
defendants’ motion for a new trial. Bean v Directions Unlimited, Inc, 462 Mich 24, 34-35; 609
NW2d 567 (2000). The record shows that the motion for a new trial was heard by Judge George
Montgomery, who was not the presiding judge at trial. Although defendants contend on appeal
that Judge Montgomery abused his discretion in denying the motion because he was not familiar
with the facts and did not have a transcript of the trial, it is apparent from the record that
defendants were aware when they filed their motion that Judge Montgomery would be deciding
the motion and that a transcript had not yet been filed. Defendants never objected to Judge
Montgomery hearing the motion, nor did they request that a transcript be prepared and reviewed
before the motion was decided. Issues not raised in and decided by the trial court are not
preserved for appeal. Spencer v Citizens Insurance Co, 239 Mich App 291, 310; 608 NW2d 113
(2000). Further, “[a] party is not allowed to assign as error on appeal something which his or her
own counsel deemed proper at trial since to do so would permit the party to harbor error as an
appellate parachute.” Hilgendorf v St John Hosp, 245 Mich App 670, 683; 630 NW2d 356
(2001). Because defendants were aware that that Judge Montgomery would be deciding the
motion and neither objected nor requested that he delay his decision until after a transcript was
prepared, we find it disingenuous for defendants to now complain that Judge Montgomery
abused his discretion in deciding the motion. Hilgendorf, supra. This issue does not warrant
appellate relief. Again, defendants’ failure to do their job at trial – their failure to raise
objections before the trial judge – is fatal to their appeal.
Defendants also claim that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence. We
disagree. The weight to be accorded a witness’ testimony is a matter for the jury to determine.
Forton v Laszar, 239 Mich App 711, 717; 609 NW2d 850 (2000); Detroit v Larned Associates,
199 Mich App 36, 42; 501 NW2d 189 (1993). The jury is also free to credit or discredit any
testimony. Kelly v Builders Square, Inc, 465 Mich 29, 39; 632 NW2d 912 (2001); Stallworth v
Hazel, 167 Mich App 345, 351; 421 NW2d 685 (1988). Here, conflicting versions of the events
(…continued)
uses the force.
-4-
were presented to the jury; it was for the jury and not for us to weigh the evidence and determine
the credibility of the witnesses. The jury’s verdict is not against the great weight of the evidence
and our courts are very disinclined to overturn a jury verdict. Ellsworth v Hotel Corp, 236 Mich
App 185, 194; 600 NW2d 129 (1999).
Affirmed.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Henry William Saad
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.