COLLETTE BRAINERD-SPRENKEL V BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF MICHIGAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
COLLETTE BRAINERD-SPRENKEL,
UNPUBLISHED
March 15, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF MICHIGAN,
No. 227055
Eaton County Circuit Court
LC No. 99-000152-NO
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Markey and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals by right the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of
defendant. We affirm.
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition in favor of
defendant and dismissing her claim brought pursuant to the Persons with Disabilities Civil
Rights Act (PWDCRA). We disagree. A trial court’s grant of summary disposition is reviewed
de novo on appeal. Paul v Lee, 455 Mich 204, 210; 568 NW2d 510 (1997).
With respect to employment, MCL 37.1202(1)(b) of the PWDCRA states that an
employer shall not:
(b) Discharge or otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to
compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of a
disability or genetic information that is unrelated to the individual’s ability to
perform the duties of a particular job or position.
Further, the PWDCRA defines “disability” as:
[a] determinable physical or mental characteristic of an individual, which may
result from disease, injury, congenital condition of birth, or functional disorder, if
the characteristic . . . substantially limits 1 or more of the major life activities of
that individual and is unrelated to the individual’s qualifications for
employment . . . . [MCL 37.1103(d)(i)(A).]
“To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the PWDCRA, a plaintiff must
demonstrate (1) that she is disabled as defined by the PWDCRA, (2) that the disability is
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unrelated to her ability to perform the duties of a particular job, and (3) that she was
discriminated against in one of the ways described in the statute.” Lown v JJ Eaton Place, 235
Mich App 721, 727; 598 NW2d 633 (1999).
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in finding that her disability was related to her
ability to perform the duties of her job. Plaintiff claims that she is excepted from the requirement
that the disability be unrelated to her ability to perform her duties because she was on an
approved medical leave that had not expired at the time she was terminated. In response to
plaintiff’s argument, the trial court stated:
Plaintiff claims that her approved medical leave constituted a protection of her
employment status. However, the [PWDCRA] no longer requires that an
employer allow a disabled employee a reasonable time to heal. Lamoria [v
Health Care & Retirement Corp, 233 Mich App 560, 562; 593 NW2d 699
(1999)]. It is undisputed that Plaintiff was an at-will (exempt) employee in a
supervisory capacity and therefore had no reasonable expectation of continued
employment when she went on leave status. Based upon the evidence submitted,
this Court finds that Plaintiff’s disability was related to her ability to perform her
duties as a supervisor, therefore her termination was not in violation of the
[PWDCRA].
We agree with the trial court. In a case involving a plaintiff employee being terminated
by the defendant employer while she was on a medical leave of absence, this Court held that the
PWDCRA “does not require that an employer allow a disabled employee a reasonable time to
heal.” Lamoria, supra at 562. This Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary disposition
in favor of the defendant company with regard to the plaintiff’s PWDCRA claim. Id. Thus,
defendant was not required to grant plaintiff a medical leave and a reasonable time to heal until
such time as she would be able to perform the requirements of her job. Id.
Further, although instant plaintiff apparently is arguing that her job was “protected” while
she was on leave and that she could not be terminated during this time, there is no dispute that
plaintiff was an “at will” employee who had no reasonable expectation of continued
employment. Franzel v Kerr Manufacturing Co, 234 Mich App 600, 606; 600 NW2d 66 (1999).
In Franzel, supra at 602, the defendant appealed a jury verdict that found it liable for breaching
the parties’ contract that formed the basis for the plaintiff’s return to work. In vacating the
judgment in favor of the plaintiff, this Court stated that “even if defendant breached its contract
with plaintiff regarding her return to work, nothing in the contract ensured her continued
employment because . . . she was an at-will employee . . . .” Id. at 603, 606. Similarly, instant
plaintiff was not guaranteed continued employment. Because of plaintiff’s at-will employment
status, defendant had the right to terminate plaintiff’s employment.
Further, plaintiff’s disability was related to her ability to perform her supervisory duties.
The disability status of an individual is determined as of the date of discharge. Ashworth v
Jefferson Screw Products, Inc, 176 Mich App 737, 744; 440 NW2d 101 (1989), quoting Wilson v
Acacia Park Cemetery Ass’n, 162 Mich App 638, 643-644; 413 NW2d 79 (1987). In this case,
plaintiff was discharged on June 11, 1998. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to
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plaintiff, Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999), the evidence
demonstrates that plaintiff could not perform the duties of her job that required her to be
physically present at work at least 7.75 hours per day so that she could, for example, supervise
and monitor her subordinates, prioritize and assign work to employees, select and train support
staff personnel, and interface with other company personnel to resolve issues and inquiries.
Plaintiff acknowledged in her deposition that in not working full-time on a daily basis, she was
unable to observe and monitor the work production of those employees that she supervised and
was unable to attend meetings with the employees. When plaintiff was discharged on June 11,
1998, she was not working at all and plaintiff’s physician previously had written a note in April
1998 stating that plaintiff was restricted to working four hours per day until at least June 18,
1998 at which time she would be reevaluated. Plaintiff’s absenteeism was ongoing and her
inability to work full-time related to the performance of her duties when she was terminated on
June 11, 1998. The trial court did not err in granting summary disposition to defendant on this
issue.
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her retaliation claim. We
disagree.
MCL 418.301(11) provides:
A person shall not discharge an employee or in any manner discriminate against
an employee because the employee filed a complaint or instituted or caused to be
instituted a proceeding under this act or because of the exercise by the employee
on behalf of himself or herself or others a right afforded by this act.
To establish a retaliatory discharge claim, the plaintiff must prove: (1) she was engaged
in a protected activity, (2) defendants knew of the protected activity, (3) defendants acted
adversely to plaintiff, and (4) the protected activity caused the adverse employment action.
DeFlaviis v Lord & Taylor, Inc, 223 Mich App 432, 436; 566 NW2d 661 (1997). The burden is
on the plaintiff to establish that there was a causal connection between the protected activity, i.e.,
the filing of her worker’s compensation claim, and the adverse employment action. Chiles v
Machine Shop, Inc, 238 Mich App 462, 470; 606 NW2d 398 (1999).
In addressing this issue, the trial court stated that it had reviewed all the evidence
submitted by plaintiff in support of the retaliation claim and that a “causal link” between
plaintiff’s filing for worker’s compensation benefits and her subsequent termination cannot be
found. Thus, the trial court concluded that the fourth element was not established. We agree.
In the present case, there is no evidence to support a causal connection. Plaintiff merely
has introduced evidence that she applied for worker’s compensation benefits and that she was
terminated several months later. There is no evidence that defendant terminated plaintiff because
she filed for benefits or that defendant had any ill-will against plaintiff regarding her claim for
benefits. See Roulston v Tendercare, Inc, 239 Mich App 270, 280; 608 NW2d 525 (2000) (this
Court concluded that sufficient evidence existed to support an inference of retaliation after the
defendant displayed visible anger toward the plaintiff and terminated her just hours after learning
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of the plaintiff’s protected activity). Further, although not addressed by the trial court, there is
no evidence, contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, that she was terminated because she had filed a
prior lawsuit against defendant. The trial court did not err in granting summary disposition in
favor of defendant on plaintiff’s retaliation claim.
We affirm.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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