IN RE DELBRIDGE MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of AUSTIN DELBRIDGE and
DANTE DELBRIDGE, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
March 12, 2002
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 232162
Allegan Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 99-024473-NA
WILLIAM DELBRIDGE, III,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
ROSE FITZGERALD,
Respondent.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Markey and Owens, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Respondent-appellant appeals as of right from the trial court's order terminating his
parental rights to the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g) and (j). We affirm.
Respondent-appellant argues that he has been denied his constitutional right to equal
protection because the trial court did not have the benefit of any expert opinion testimony relative
to the termination of his parental rights, whereas such testimony is required in a proceeding
involving a parent of an Indian child. See MCR 5.980(D). This Court has already considered
this argument and rejected it. In re Miller, 182 Mich App 70, 74-76; 451 NW2d 576 (1990).
Thus, respondent-appellant has failed to show that his constitutional rights to equal protection
and due process were violated for this reason.
Respondent also contends that he was not given a “fair opportunity to meet the demands
of the Family Independence Agency.” The gravamen of this argument, however, is that the trial
court clearly erred by finding that the aforementioned statutory grounds for termination were
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established. The “clearly erroneous” standard is used when reviewing a trial court’s findings on
appeal from an order terminating parental rights. MCR 5.974(I).
Here, respondent-appellant was given a fair opportunity to comply with his parent-agency
agreement. He was provided with necessary services and sufficient time to complete the
treatment plan, but was unable or unwilling to do so. The conditions that led to the removal of
the children continued to exist at the time respondent-appellant's parental rights were terminated.
Accordingly, we do not believe that the trial court clearly erred by terminating his parental rights
pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(c)(i), (g) and (j).1
Finally, respondent-appellant contends that the proceedings were tainted by racism and
gender discrimination. However, respondent-appellant fails to cite any authority in support of his
position. “It is well established that ‘[a] party may not merely announce a position and leave it to
this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for the claim.’” Eldred v Ziny, 246 Mich App
142, 150; 631 NW2d 748 (2001), quoting In re Webb H Coe Marital & Residuary Trusts, 233
Mich App 525, 537; 593 NW2d 190 (1999). Regardless, contrary to respondent-appellant’s
arguments, the evidence does not indicate that visits with the children’s mother were suspended
because of the race of her friends. Furthermore, respondent-appellant was provided with
sufficient services and an equal opportunity to obtain custody of the children. Nothing in the
record establishes that respondent-appellant was discriminated against because of his gender in
the services he was offered.
Affirmed.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Donald S. Owens
1
Further, the evidence did not show that termination of respondent-appellant’s parental rights
was clearly not in the children’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich
341, 352-354; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).
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