RAY A GONZALES-EL V DEPT OF CORRECTIONS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RAY A. GONZALES-EL,
UNPUBLISHED
March 12, 2002
Petitioner-Appellant,
v
No. 227227
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 98-089523-AA
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
Respondent-Appellee.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Markey and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner appeals as of right from a trial court order denying his motion for summary
disposition and granting respondent’s request to dismiss his petition as a matter of law. We
affirm.
Following an administrative hearing determining that petitioner engaged in prohibited
conduct, respondent labeled petitioner a “homosexual predator” without holding a second
administrative hearing. Petitioner filed a petition for declaratory judgment alleging that
respondent’s failure to hold a second administrative hearing violated his federal and state due
process rights, and requesting the immediate removal of the “homosexual predator” label from
his file. Specifically, the petition alleged that respondent (i) failed to hold the requisite
administrative hearing pursuant to MCL 791.251(2); and (ii) failed to make a determination that
the “confidential informant” was both reliable and credible before labeling him a “homosexual
predator.” The trial court disagreed, concluding that petitioner was not entitled to relief as a
matter of law.
Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion for summary
disposition and dismissing his petition. We review de novo conclusions of law. Walters v
Snyder, 239 Mich App 453, 456; 608 NW2d 97 (2000).
Petitioner correctly notes that MCL 791.251(2)(c) requires an administrative hearing
before a prisoner can be labeled a “homosexual predator.” Gee v Department of Corrections,
235 Mich App 291, 298; 597 NW2d 223 (1999). However, the Gee panel recognized that, where
a prisoner has already received one administrative hearing to determine whether he or she
engaged in prohibited conduct, a second hearing to determine the propriety of the “homosexual
predator” label, resulting from a finding that the prisoner engaged in the prohibited conduct,
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would not necessarily be mandated by MCL 791.251(2)(c). Id. at 298-300. Here, petitioner does
not contend that he did not receive a proper administrative hearing where it was found that he
engaged in a “major misconduct.” Indeed, during the major misconduct hearing, petitioner was
able to present his contention that the purported victim was lying. The hearing examiner,
however, concluded that the victim was more persuasive and convincing, gave specific details,
and appeared sincere. While petitioner may disagree with the hearing examiner’s findings, this
is not tantamount to a deprivation of due process. Rather, petitioner received the hearing that he
was entitled to pursuant to MCL 791.251(2). Thus, as in Gee, respondent did not violate MCL
791.251(2) by labeling petitioner a “homosexual predator” without holding a second
administrative hearing. Id. Therefore, we do not believe that the trial court erred as a matter of
law by ruling that petitioner was not entitled to relief on this ground.
Petitioner also contends that respondent was required to make a determination that the
victim was “credible” and “reliable” before labeling petitioner a “homosexual predator.” We
disagree. Petitioner’s description of the victim as a “confidential informant” is misplaced. Both
petitioner and the hearing examiner were well aware of the victim’s identity. Moreover, the
concept of a “confidential informant” is relevant to a magistrate’s review of a request for a
search warrant, not to the general fact-finding process in a hearing, and petitioner has presented
no authority to the contrary. Indeed, the unique concerns presented in a search warrant context,
where the magistrate does not have an opportunity to personally assess the informant, are not
present in an administrative hearing because the hearing examiner may examine the complainant
and the accused. Further, the concepts of credibility and reliability are part of the general factfinding process undertaken by the hearing examiner, even if independent conclusions regarding
each variable are not expressly stated. Thus, we do not believe that petitioner was deprived of
due process by respondent’s failure to make an independent assessment of the victim’s
credibility or reliability during the administrative hearing. Consequently, we conclude that the
trial court did not err by ruling that petitioner was not entitled, as a matter of law, to the relief he
requested or by dismissing his case.
Affirmed.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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