PEOPLE OF MI V CHARLES EARL MARTIN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 8, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 227943
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 99-169979-FH
CHARLES EARL MARTIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and Markey and K. F. Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon
(“CCW”), MCL 750.227, felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. He was sentenced as a second
habitual offender, MCL 769.10, to 1 to 7-1/2 years’ imprisonment for the CCW conviction with
credit for 156 days served. On the conviction for felon in possession of a firearm, the trial court
sentenced defendant as a second habitual offender to 1 to 7 ½ years’ imprisonment. He was
sentenced to a two-year term of imprisonment with credit for 156 days on his conviction for
felony-firearm. The judgment of sentence specifies that the two-year sentence imposed for
felony-firearm runs consecutive to the conviction for felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant
appeals of right. We affirm.
I. Basic Facts and Procedural History
On December 10, 1999, an officer responded to a domestic call. When he arrived, a
woman advised that she observed certain individuals firing a gun. Thereafter, the officer noted
five individuals walking in the vicinity. The officer ordered these five individuals to place their
hands atop the hood of his police cruiser. Four out of the five individuals complied. Defendant,
however, did not comply until the officer commanded him three times to do the same. The
officer then observed defendant take his hand out of his pocket, place his left hand on the hood
of the vehicle and place his right hand down between his legs. Observing this conduct, the
officer drew his weapon and proceeded to the other side of the police cruiser, whereupon he
observed a gun on the ground.
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The officer confiscated the weapon and placed defendant under arrest for carrying a
concealed weapon. The jury found defendant guilty on the three firearms offenses. Defendant
appeals as of right and we affirm.
II. Double Jeopardy
First, defendant argues that his conviction for both felony-firearm and felon in possession
of a firearm violate the constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy. We disagree.
A double jeopardy challenge presents a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.
People v Dillard, 246 Mich App 163; 631 NW2d 755 (2001). Indeed, both the United States and
Michigan Constitutions prohibit placing a defendant twice in jeopardy for a single offense. See
U S Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 15. The purpose underlying the constitutional prohibition
against double jeopardy is to ensure that a defendant does not endure any more punishment than
that intended by the Legislature. People v Mayfield, 221 Mich App 656, 661-662; 562 NW2d
272 (1997). To discern the Legislature’s intent, we are bound by the words expressed in the
applicable statute and may not otherwise speculate. Dillard, supra at 166.
After considering the language employed in the felony-firearm statute and the statute
governing felon in possession, the court in Dillard, supra, stated that, “[b]ecause defendant’s
felon in possession charge unquestionably does not constitute one of the explicitly enumerated
exceptions to the felony-firearm statute, we conclude that the Legislature clearly intended to
permit a defendant charged with felon in possession to be properly charged with an additional
felony-firearm count.” Id. 167-168. The court definitively concluded therefore, that the
protections against double jeopardy were not compromised. Id. at 169. Accordingly, in the case
at bar, we decline to find that defendant’s respective convictions twice placed him in jeopardy
for a single offense.
We similarly reject defendant’s argument that his dual convictions of both carrying a
concealed weapon and felon in possession of a firearm violate the double jeopardy provisions of
both the United States and Michigan Constitutions. Mayfield, supra at 661-662.
Considering the distinct nature of the concealed weapon statute and the felon in
possession statute relative to the interests that both seek to protect, “leaves no question that the
Legislature intended to permit multiple punishments when a single act violates both statutes.”
Id. at 662. Accordingly, a dual conviction for a single act violative of both the concealed
weapon statute and felon in possession statute does not violate the prohibition against double
jeopardy. Id. Consequently, in the case at bar, we uphold defendant’s convictions for these
offenses.
III. Consecutive Sentences
Defendant also argues that the trial court erroneously required his felony-firearm
sentence to be served consecutive to his sentences for carrying a concealed weapon and felon in
possession of a firearm. A review of the record belies defendant’s position. First, the judgment
of sentence indicates that the trial court only required the sentence for “Count II” to be served
consecutive to the felony-firearm sentence. Count II is the felon in possession of a firearm
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offense. Thus, contrary to defendant’s contention, the trial court did not order the felony-firearm
sentence to be served consecutive to the sentence for carrying a concealed weapon.
Furthermore, the trial court did not err in requiring the felony-firearm sentence to be
served consecutive to the sentence for felon in possession of a firearm. The felony-firearm
statute, MCL 750.227b(2), provides:
(2) A term of imprisonment prescribed by this section is in addition to the
sentence imposed for the conviction of the felony or the attempt to commit the
felony, and shall be served consecutively with and preceding any term of
imprisonment imposed for the conviction of the felony or attempt to commit the
felony.
Discussing this statute, our Supreme Court in People v Clark, 463 Mich 459, 463-464;
619 NW2d 538 (2000), stated:
Subsection 2 clearly states that the felony-firearm sentence “shall be
served consecutively with and preceding any term of imprisonment imposed for
the conviction of the felony or attempt to commit the felony.” It is evident that the
emphasized language refers back to the predicate offense discussed in subsection
1, i.e., the offense during which the defendant possessed a firearm. No language
in the statute permits consecutive sentencing with convictions other than the
predicate offense. (Emphasis in original.)
In the instant case, the crime of felon in possession comprised the “predicate offense” for
purposes of the felony-firearm charge. Thus, the trial court properly ordered defendant’s
sentences for felony-firearm and felon in possession of a firearm to be served consecutively.
IV. Jury Instructions
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the felony
firearm charge. Defendant did not object to the trial court’s jury instructions at trial. Therefore,
we review this unpreserved issue for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. People
v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). A review of the record reveals that the
trial court’s instructions on felony-firearm comport with CJI2d 11.34 and Clark, supra at 461
462. See also People v Lewis, 415 Mich 443, 454-455; 330 NW2d 16 (1982). Consequently,
defendant does not demonstrate the requisite plain instructional error requiring reversal.
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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