SANDRA LEE HART V WALTER J HART
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
SANDRA LEE HART,
UNPUBLISHED
March 5, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 228899
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 72-285613-DM
WALTER J. HART,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Murphy and Murray, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by delayed application for leave granted from an order denying his
motion to dissolve child support arrearages and for return of funds. We affirm. This appeal is
being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
The parties were divorced in 1972. Plaintiff was awarded custody of their two children
and defendant was ordered to pay child support until each child reached the age of majority or
graduated from high school, whichever was later. That event occurred in June 1987 for the older
child and June 1988 for the younger child. By then, defendant had accrued a child support
arrearage. Defendant apparently avoided making payments on this arrearage until 1996, when
plaintiff obtained an order of income withholding. Defendant did not object to the entry of that
order or move to have it set aside.
In 1999, defendant moved to dissolve the child support arrearage, asserting that the tenyear statute of limitation had run on the support obligation. The trial court denied the motion,
concluding that defendant’s failure initially to challenge the order of income withholding
constituted a waiver of the statute of limitation defense. On appeal, defendant contends that this
ruling was in error. In the absence of a factual dispute, the question whether a statute of
limitation defense exists is considered a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. See
Pitsch v ESE Michigan, Inc, 233 Mich App 578, 600; 593 NW2d 565 (1999).
The ten-year limitation period of MCL 600.5809(3) applies to an action to collect a child
support arrearage. Ewing v Bolden, 194 Mich App 95, 99; 486 NW2d 96 (1992). Thus, the
period of limitation in this case ran in June 1997 with regard to the older child and June 1998
with regard to the younger child. The trial court’s conclusion that defendant waived the
limitation defense was based on Alpena Friend of the Court ex rel Paul v Durecki, 195 Mich
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App 635; 491 NW2d 864 (1992). In that case, this Court concluded that partial payments made
on an arrearage after the expiration of the statutory period waived the statute of limitation
defense. The Durecki Court reasoned that a partial payment on a lapsed debt provides an
acknowledgment of the continuing vitality of the debt and revives the limitation period, allowing
enforcement of the obligation. Id. at 637-638.
To the extent the trial court concluded that defendant waived the statute of limitation
defense under Durecki by failing “initially” to object to the 1996 order of income withholding,
we conclude that the court erred. When the order of income withholding was entered in 1996,
the limitation period had not run. Durecki stands for the proposition that the ability to enforce an
obligation after the expiration of the limitation period may be revived by the obligor’s conduct
after the period has run. Acquiescing to the order of income withholding within the ten-year
period could not serve to revive a limitation period that had yet to expire.
Nevertheless, the trial court reached the right result. Defendant’s wage assignment
payments continued well beyond the running of the limitation periods in June 1997 and June
1998. In Yeiter v Knights of St Casimir Aid Society, 461 Mich 493, 497; 607 NW2d 68 (2000),
our Supreme Court held that “a partial payment restarts the running of the limitation period
unless it is accompanied by a declaration or circumstance that rebuts the implication that the
debtor by partial payment admits the full obligation.” (Footnote omitted). Elsewhere in Yeiter,
the Court characterized this formulation as a rebuttable presumption. Id. at 499-500. Here,
defendant has failed to rebut the presumption that his acquiescence to the continued assignment
of his wages for up to two years after the expiration of the limitation period amounted to an
implied new promise to pay. These voluntary payouts made subsequent to the expiration of the
statute of limitations also causes this case to fall within the holding of Alpena, supra.
Accordingly, we conclude that he waived the right to assert a statute of limitation defense to
avoid enforcement of his child support obligation.
Defendant contends that any wage assignments pursuant to the order of income
withholding cannot constitute a voluntary waiver of the statute of limitation defense because they
were not payments that he made of his own volition, but were instead made by operation of law.
In Durecki, supra at 638-639, this Court rejected the argument that the partial payments made in
that case were involuntary because they were made under duress to avoid being held in contempt
of court. If child support payments made out of fear of being held in contempt are considered
voluntary, it is reasonable to conclude that payments made to the friend of the court as a result of
acquiescence to a wage assignment are also voluntary. We therefore reject defendant’s
argument.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
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