LARRY DARABAN V STATE OF MICHIGAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
LARRY DARABAN, Personal Representative of
the Estate of RICHARD ALAN DARABAN,
Deceased,
UNPUBLISHED
March 5, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellant,
V
STATE OF MICHIGAN, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION and MACKINAC BRIDGE
AUTHORITY,
No. 223659
Court of Claims
LC No. 97-016706-CM
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Bandstra, C.J., and Gage and Whitbeck, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the Court of Claims’ entry of a judgment of no cause of action
in this negligence suit for the wrongful death of plaintiff’s decedent, who died when his vehicle
drove off the Mackinac Bridge and into the Straits of Mackinac. The court found that the cause
of death was not defendants’ negligence, but rather the decedent’s intentional act of suicide. We
affirm.
Plaintiff first contends that the trial court erroneously admitted the “psychological
autopsy” testimony of expert witness Dr. Cheryl King to prove that the decedent’s death was a
suicide. Although we agree that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony without
addressing the mandatory standards set forth in MCL 600.2955, we conclude that the error does
not require reversal. MCR 2.163(A). Our review of the trial record reflects that ample properly
admitted and unrebutted evidence existed to support a finding of suicide, including the
following: eyewitness accounts of the bridge accident that suggested the decedent’s vehicle
traveled at a high rate of speed and deliberately swerved toward the outer railing of the bridge;
the state police accident reconstructionist’s observations that the decedent’s vehicle was
traveling at approximately 60 to 65 miles per hour when it swerved toward the bridge railing and
that no indication existed that the decedent had applied his brakes or attempted to steer away
from the outer bridge railing; the conclusion of the medical examiner’s report that characterized
the decedent’s death as a suicide; records documenting the decedent’s prior hospitalizations and
treatment for depression and substance abuse, including during the months immediately
preceding decedent’s death; testimony concerning the decedent’s knowledge that, within months
of his death, his former girlfriend and the mother of his child had moved in with another man
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that she was dating; and coworkers’ concerns that the decedent was suicidal just days before his
unexplained drive to the Mackinac Bridge and recollections that on his last day of work before
the accident, the decedent discussed with another coworker a previous accident during which a
vehicle left the bridge and the possibility that a vehicle traveling fast enough could breach the
bridge’s outer railing.
Plaintiff offered some evidence that the decedent died accidentally because of an alleged
bridge defect, but in light of the substantial evidence tending to prove that the decedent
committed suicide we cannot characterize as clearly erroneous the trial court’s finding that the
decedent caused his death by purposefully driving off the bridge. MCR 2.613(C) (noting that the
trial court’s factual findings “may not be set aside unless clearly erroneous” and that “regard
shall be given to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses
who appeared before it”). Because the trial court’s proper finding regarding causation prevented
plaintiff from establishing a necessary element of his negligence claims, we conclude that the
court appropriately entered a judgment of no cause of action in favor of defendants.1
Plaintiff also argues that the judge who conducted the trial should have disclosed that at
the time of the trial his wife worked for the state attorney general’s office, which entered an
appearance in the case. We find, however, that because neither the judge’s wife nor the attorney
general’s office represented a party to this case, the judge was not required to disclose the
relationship. See MCR 2.003(B); People v Dycus, 70 Mich App 734, 736; 246 NW2d 326
(1976); Ethics Opinion R-3 (July 21, 1989). The fact that an assistant counsel from the attorney
general’s office made a brief appearance solely with respect to a motion that affected one
nonparty state police officer, who had received a witness subpoena, does not create an
appearance of impropriety. Because we find no appearance of impropriety and plaintiff does not
allege that the judge acted impartially, we conclude that no error occurred when the judge failed
to disclose the relationship.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
1
In light of our conclusion that the trial court properly determined the element of causation, we
need not address plaintiff’s further arguments on appeal alleging errors by the trial court with
respect to its findings regarding the breach element of plaintiff’s cause of action. We further
note that we need not address plaintiff’s additional issue criticizing the manner in which the trial
court determined that the bridge median played no role in the decedent’s death because
defendants owed no duty with respect to the median of the bridge. McIntosh v Dep’t of
Transportation (On Remand), 244 Mich App 705, 709-710; 625 NW2d 123 (2001) (explaining
that the highway exception to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1402(1), does not extend to a
highway median area, which “is, obviously, outside the actual physical structure of the roadbed
surface designed for vehicular travel”).
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