PEOPLE OF MI V TIMOTHY JAMES BAKER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 1, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V
No. 226569
Ottawa Circuit Court
LC No. 99-023359-FC
TIMOTHY JAMES BAKER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Griffin and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted defendant of first-degree murder, on a theory of premeditation and
deliberation, as well as a theory of felony-murder. MCL 750.316(1)(a),(b). The jury also
convicted defendant of armed robbery, carrying a concealed weapon, and felony-firearm. MCL
750.529; MCL 750.227; MCL 750.227b. The trial court sentenced defendant to life
imprisonment for first-degree murder and imposed concurrent sentences of 285 to 480 months’
imprisonment for armed robbery and thirty-six to sixty months’ imprisonment for carrying a
concealed weapon. Finally, the trial court sentenced defendant to the mandatory term of two
years’ imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. Defendant appeals as of right. We
affirm.
I. Motion to Suppress Evidence
Defendant first argues that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress
evidence regarding his second statement to police. Defendant does not challenge the
admissibility of his initial statement to police, made within hours of the offense. Before making
that first statement, defendant received his Miranda rights.1 Defendant then told investigating
detective Bulthuis that he had picked up a hitchhiker who committed the robbery-murder in
defendant’s presence, but without defendant’s prior knowledge or assistance.
After defendant made the above statement, Bulthuis learned that co-defendant Anthony
Krehn had implicated defendant as the shooter. Bulthuis questioned defendant a second time,
1
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
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confronting him with Krehn’s statement and with inconsistencies that had been discovered
regarding defendant’s first statement. Bulthuis did not repeat defendant’s Miranda rights
verbatim before taking defendant’s second statement. However, Bulthuis testified that he did
remind defendant that his Miranda rights were still available to him, and defendant indicated that
he still understood those rights and agreed to talk further with police. Defendant then admitted
that he and co-defendant Krehn had planned the robbery, and admitted that he had shot the victim
because he knew that the victim would be able to identify him.
Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress his second statement to Bulthuis, arguing
that the statement was taken in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Both Bulthuis
and defendant testified that they did not know, at the time of defendant’s statement, that
defendant’s family had retained an attorney to act on defendant’s behalf. Nevertheless, defendant
claims that he impliedly requested an attorney before making his second statement, and argues
that Bulthuis should have immediately ceased his questioning when defendant made that
request.2
At the suppression hearing, the trial court made a factual finding that defendant never
requested an attorney, either explicitly or impliedly. The trial court specifically found that
defendant’s testimony was not credible and the trial court accepted Bulthuis’ testimony that
defendant did not mention the issue of an attorney, either before or during defendant’s second
statement. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress, concluding that defendant’s
statements were voluntary and preceded by a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda
rights.
Although defendant argues that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached before he
made his second statement to Bulthuis, we need not decide that issue in order to resolve
defendant’s appeal. Regardless of when a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel
attaches, it is clear that a defendant is required to assert that right in order to enjoy its protection.
As our Supreme Court explained in People v Anderson (After Remand), 446 Mich 392, 402; 521
NW2d 538 (1994):
The [Sixth Amendment] right to counsel attaches and represents a critical stage
only at or after the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings against the accused
by way of a formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or
arraignment. However, the right is invoked only by requesting counsel, usually at
postcharge questioning or at arraignment. Therefore, after formal adversarial
proceedings have begun and the defendant asserts the right to counsel either at
questioning or arraignment, the police may not conduct further interrogations until
counsel has been made available to the accused, unless the accused initiates
further communications, exchanges, or conversations with the police. [Citations,
footnotes, and internal quotations omitted; emphasis added.]
2
At the suppression hearing, defendant testified that he had asked Bulthuis, “When do I get a
lawyer?” Defendant admitted that this was distinguishable from a present request to speak to an
attorney.
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In the present case, whether defendant invoked his right to an attorney was a disputed fact
that the trial court was required to determine at the suppression hearing. The credibility of
witnesses is a key factor in determining contested facts, and the trial court is in the best position
to assess the credibility of witnesses. People v Daoud, 462 Mich 621, 629; 614 NW2d 152
(2000). In fact, this Court “gives deference to the trial court’s superior ability to judge the
credibility of the witnesses, and will not reverse the trial court’s factual findings unless they are
clearly erroneous.” People v Bender, 208 Mich App 221, 227; 527 NW2d 66 (1994), aff’d 452
Mich 594 (1996). Here, the trial court expressly found that defendant did not invoke his right to
counsel. Based on our review of the record, we cannot say that the trial court’s factual finding
was clearly erroneous, because we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been made. People v Sexton (After Remand), 461 Mich 746, 752; 609 NW2d 822 (2000);
People v Manning, 243 Mich App 615, 620; 624 NW2d 746 (2000). Because defendant did not
invoke his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion
to suppress his second statement to police.
II. Hearsay Evidence and the Confrontation Clause
Defendant next contends that the prosecutor violated defendant’s rights under the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment3 when he introduced at trial certain excerpts from
his co-defendant’s guilty plea to first-degree murder. For the co-defendant’s plea statement to be
admissible as substantive evidence against defendant at his trial, the statement must be
admissible under the Michigan Rules of Evidence, and admission of the statement cannot violate
defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause. People v Poole, 444 Mich 151, 157; 506
NW2d 505 (1993). We conclude that the trial court erroneously admitted the co-defendant’s plea
statement. Nevertheless, we conclude that this preserved, nonstructural constitutional error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 774; 597 NW2d 130
(1999); People v Smith, 243 Mich App 657, 690; 625 NW2d 46 (2000), remanded 465 Mich 928
(2001).
A. Hearsay Evidence
In the present case, the trial court admitted excerpts of the co-defendant’s guilty plea
under MRE 804(b)(3). When reviewing a trial court’s decision to admit a statement against
penal interest under that rule, this Court should consider the following four factors: (1) whether
the declarant was unavailable, (2) whether the statement was against the declarant’s penal
interest, (3) whether a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would have believed the
statement to be true, and (4) whether corroborating circumstances clearly indicated the
trustworthiness of the statement. People v Ortiz-Kehoe, 237 Mich App 508, 518; 603 NW2d 802
(1999).
First, it is clear that the co-defendant was unavailable to testify at defendant’s trial, having
communicated through his attorney that he would invoke the Fifth Amendment and refuse to
testify. Second, the statement was clearly against the co-defendant’s penal interest because it
3
US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20.
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subjected him to a penalty of life in prison without parole. Third, a reasonable person in the codefendant’s position would not have made such a statement, implicating himself in a plot to
commit first-degree murder, unless that portion of the statement were true. Nevertheless,
defendant argues that those parts of the codefendant’s guilty plea that inculpated him were not
against the co-defendant’s penal interest, that those statements could have been made by a
reasonable person in the co-defendant’s position regardless of their truth or falsity, and that the
statements lacked traditional indicia of trustworthiness. Therefore, defendant argues that the
portions of the co-defendant’s guilty plea that inculpated him should not have been admitted at
trial under MRE 804(b)(3). We agree.
In Poole, supra at 160, our Supreme Court considered whether portions of a codefendant’s statement that inculpated a defendant in a crime could be considered as properly
admissible, under MRE 804(b)(3), at the defendant’s trial. The Court concluded that such
statements could be deemed admissible, in their entirety, as long as certain conditions were met: 4
“[W]here, as here, the declarant’s inculpation of an accomplice is made in the
context of a narrative of events, at the declarant’s initiative without any prompting
or inquiry, that as a whole is clearly against the declarant’s penal interest and as
such is reliable, the whole statement—including portions that inculpate another—
is admissible as substantive evidence at trial pursuant to MRE 804(b)(3).” [Id.]
In Poole, the co-defendant’s statement was made to a relative without prompting,
encouragement or questioning regarding the details. Id. at 157-158. Further, the co-defendant’s
statement was a narrative account, given at his own initiative, in a non-custodial setting, without
examination by law enforcement officials. Id. at 154, 160. Under those facts, the Court found
the whole of the co-defendant’s statement admissible under MRE 804(b)(3). Id. at 161-162.
In the present case, we conclude that the co-defendant’s plea statement does not satisfy
the Poole test, and that the trial court erroneously admitted this testimony under MRE 804(b)(3).
First, we start with the presumption that defendant's statement is unreliable. People v Schutte,
240 Mich App 713, 717; 613 NW2d 370 (2000); People v Richardson, 204 Mich App 71, 75;
514 NW2d 503 (1994). Next, we must consider the fact that the co-defendant's statement was
made to authorities in a custodial setting. Although the co-defendant's guilty plea was voluntary,
the plea proceeding itself cannot be said to be at the co-defendant's initiative, or a
contemporaneous statement or statement to friends or relatives such that the co-defendant's
statement would be viewed as eminently trustworthy. Id .; United States v York, 933 F2d 1343,
1362-1363 (CA 7, 1991), rev'd on other grounds sub nom Wilson v Williams, 182 F3d 562 (CA
7, 1999). Further, the plea was not an open-ended narrative, but involved prompting and inquiry
by the prosecutor. Finally, the statement was made to law enforcement authorities and involved
some degree of blame-shifting that minimized the declarant’s role.
4
In Williamson v United States, 512 US 594; 114 S Ct 2431; 129 L Ed 2d 476 (1994), the United
States Supreme Court ruled that the comparable federal rule, FRE 804(b)(3), does not include
statements that inculpate another person, even if such statements are included in a broader selfinculpatory narrative. Nevertheless, we must follow Poole, rather than Williamson, on this point.
People v Beasley, 239 Mich App 548, 556; 609 NW2d 581 (2000).
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The prosecutor argues that the co-defendant’s statement was reliable because it was made
under oath and subjected the co-defendant to a penalty of life imprisonment. Nevertheless, once
the co-defendant decided to acknowledge his guilt and became aware that he faced no further
penalty, there was little incentive for him to speak truthfully. Furthermore, the co-defendant
retained an incentive to minimize his own role and maximize defendant’s role for purposes of
placing himself in a better light. The co-defendant did so in the present case, claiming that
defendant was the shooter and that defendant shot the victim several more times than the codefendant had planned. Given all of the above facts, we conclude that the portions of the codefendant’s statement that inculpated defendant were not properly admissible under MRE
804(b)(3).
B. Confrontation Clause
Even if the co-defendant’s statement were properly admissible under the above hearsay
exception to the rules of evidence, we would conclude that its admission would nonetheless
violate the Confrontation Clause.
In Poole, supra, our Supreme Court held that a co-defendant’s statement inculpating the
defendant does not violate the Confrontation Clause so long as the co-defendant was
“unavailable as a witness and his statement bears adequate indicia of reliability. . . .” Id. at 162163, citing Ohio v Roberts, 448 US 56, 66; 100 S Ct 2531; 65 L Ed 2d 597 (1980).5
In evaluating whether a statement against penal interest that inculpates a
person in addition to the declarant bears sufficient indicia of reliability to allow it
to be admitted as substantive evidence against the other person, courts must
evaluate the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement as well as its
content.
The presence of the following factors would favor admission of such a
statement:
whether the statement was (1) voluntarily given, (2) made
contemporaneously with the events referenced, (3) made to family, friends,
colleagues, or confederates—that is, to someone to whom the declarant would
likely speak the truth, and (4) uttered spontaneously at the initiation of the
declarant and without prompting or inquiry by the listener.
On the other hand, the presence of the following factors would favor a
finding of inadmissibility: whether the statement (1) was made to law
enforcement officers or at the prompting or inquiry of the listener, (2) minimizes
the role or responsibility of the declarant or shifts blame to the accomplice, (3)
5
As set forth above, the co-defendant was unavailable as a witness at defendant’s trial, given his
invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights. Defendant does not contest the co-defendant’s
unavailability.
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was made to avenge the declarant or to curry favor, and (4) whether the declarant
had a motive to lie or distort the truth. [Poole, supra at 165.]
Our evaluation of the above factors leads us to the inescapable conclusion that admission
of the co-defendant’s plea statement at defendant’s trial violated defendant’s rights under the
Confrontation Clause.
C. Harmless Error
Although the trial court erroneously admitted excerpts of the co-defendant’s statement,
we must still determine whether that error requires reversal of defendant’s convictions.
Admission of hearsay testimony in violation of the Confrontation Clause, where preserved, is not
structural error that defies harmless error analysis. Lilly v Virginia, 527 US 116; 119 S Ct 1887;
144 L Ed 2d 117 (1999); Smith, supra at 690. A preserved constitutional error is harmless if it is
clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent
the error. People v Mass, 464 Mich 615, 640 n 29; 628 NW2d 540 (2001).
In the case at bar, it is clear that a rational jury would have found defendant guilty without
admission of the co-defendant’s guilty plea. At all times, defendant acknowledged that he was
present at the time of the robbery-murder, and acknowledged that he fled the scene. The victim’s
brother observed a large person, matching defendant’s description, fleeing the scene with what
appeared to be the bag in which the store kept change. Defendant fled the scene, “ditched” his
mother’s car, telephoned for a ride, and then hid in the back seat of a car when picked up—all
indicating a consciousness of guilt. Defendant admitted that he lied to his mother, other
relatives, and the police about who he was with during the robbery-murder. The police found
substantial physical evidence connected to the crime near the “ditched” car, including the murder
weapon. Defendant was captured on videotape at a store the day before the robbery-murder, with
the co-defendant, purchasing ammunition matching that used in the murder weapon. Defendant,
who was wearing a “Big Dog” brand shirt, and who was known to the victim and his brother as
“Big Dog,” also had a motive to commit the murder, because the victim could identify defendant
to the police. Given all of the above evidence, we conclude that the trial court’s error in
admitting excerpts of the co-defendant’s guilty plea was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
III. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Finally, defendant’s argument that the prosecutor impermissibly shifted the burden of
proof in his closing argument has been forfeited by defendant’s failure to make a specific
contemporaneous objection or request a curative instruction. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643,
687; 521 NW2d 557 (1994); People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 638; 588 NW2d 480 (1998).
Moreover, we conclude that the prosecutor’s arguments were properly based on the evidence or
reasonable inferences from the evidence and were responding to defense arguments that
defendant’s first statement to police was true while his second statement to the police and a later
statement to a jail inmate were suspect. People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 282; 531 NW2d 659
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(1995); People v Duncan, 402 Mich 1, 16; 260 NW2d 58 (1977). Therefore, we find no
miscarriage of justice.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
I concur in the result and join in all portions of the opinion except II, IIA and IIB.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
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